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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2025
The long-running, multi-party dispute over control of islets in the South China Sea (SCS) is worsening both in rhetoric and provocative activity. Meeting in late May at the Shangri-La Dialogue on regional security, US and Chinese defense officials sparred over responsibility for the increased tension, though they stopped short of issuing threats. In fact, all sides to the dispute say they want to avoid violence, prefer a diplomatic resolution, and support freedom of navigation. Both the US and China insist that the dispute notwithstanding, their relationship overall is positive and enduring. But China, citing its indisputable sovereignty over the SCS, is backing its claim in ways that alarm the US and several Asian governments: construction of an air strip on the Spratly Islands, a land reclamation project that has artificially expanded its claimed territory, and most recently emplacement of two mobile artillery vehicles.
1 State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, China's Military Strategy (Beijing, May 26, 2015). The relevant portion of the report states: “On the issues concerning China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, some of its offshore neighbors take provocative actions and reinforce their military presence on China's reefs and islands that they have illegally occupied. Some external countries are also busy meddling in South China Sea affairs; a tiny few maintain constant close-in air and sea surveillance and reconnaissance against China. It is thus a long-standing task for China to safeguard its maritime rights and interests.” Thus, “the PLA Navy (PLAN) will gradually shift its focus from ‘offshore waters defense’ to the combination of ‘offshore waters defense’ with ‘open seas protection,‘ and build a combined, multi-functional and efficient marine combat force structure. The PLAN will enhance its capabilities for strategic deterrence and counterattack, maritime maneuvers, joint operations at sea, comprehensive defense and comprehensive support. … The traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests.”
2 Carl Thayer disputes the notion that China is merely engaging in land reclamation. He argues that China is “building forward staging bases” for oil and gas and fishing purposes, as prelude to military uses of the islands. See Thayer, “No, China is Not Reclaiming Land in the South China Sea,” The Diplomat, June 7, 2015.
3 The Philippines took its claim before an arbitral tribunal under the UNCLOS in January 2013, challenging the validity of China's so-called nine-dash line as the basis for its territorial claim. China rejected an invitation to submit evidence, whereas the Philippines filed evidence in March 2014. Manila is now responding to the five-judge panel's questions and a ruling is pending. Gregory B. Poling, “The Philippines vs. China in the South China Sea: A Legal Showdown,” The National Interest.
4 See Bonnie Glaser, “A Step Forward in US-China Military Ties,” November 11, 2014.
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