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Rice and Circus in East Timor

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 May 2025

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With the regional and global spike in food prices it is naturally imperative that East Timor corner crucial sources of food, joining a queue of food deficit countries from the Philippines to Singapore. But how and why has East Timor – a land of subsistence agriculturalists and one of the world's poorest nations- been turned into a net food importer? And what is the future of East Timor's agriculture? The answers are complex but we are reminded of the “Timor problem” described Dutch geographer F.J. Ormeling in the mid-1950s in a book of the same name, a reference to Timor's delicate environmental niche including highly invariant rainfall, that always threatens to breach self-sufficiency. Apparently the food security “problem” was not understood by the World Bank which, from 1999 to 2002, prioritized irrigated rice development over and above East Timor's traditional basket of staples of which corn was dominant. Indonesian rule after the 1975 invasion did extend wet-field rice, but they also left the rice paddies abandoned in 1999. With the crisis apparent, FAO in East Timor has only belatedly acknowledged the need to address non-rice agriculture. The “problem” today, as addressed by Douglas Kammen, is that East Timor faces down the curse of other states drawing upon hydrocarbon rents for quick fixes, namely that it is cheaper to import just about everything – food included – and that agriculture – the life and blood of the country for millennium - is left to the market or to wither. But as Kammen also stresses, problems of overcoming cronyism and corruption at the interface of state and market are central to East Timor's future. This is the third in a continuing series on the world food crisis. See Walden Bello, How to manufacture a global food crisis: The destruction of agriculture in developing countries; C. Peter Timmer, Japan and a Solution to the World Rice Crisis Japan Focus

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Research Article
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This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivatives licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is unaltered and is properly cited. The written permission of Cambridge University Press must be obtained for commercial re-use or in order to create a derivative work.
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Copyright © The Authors 2008

References

Notes

[1] Douglas Kammen is Assistant Professor in the Southeast Asian Studies Programme at the National University of Singapore. He would like to thank the many individuals (most of whom requested anonymity) who shared their time and provided information used in this article.

[2] “Fos 3280 Toneladas Ba Funsionario To'o TL,” Suara Timor Lorosae, 19 January 2008.

[3] He carries three passports – one from Timor-Leste, one from Australia, and a third from China (Macau?). In February 2007 Mr. dos Santos told the author that he is a “Fretilin stand-by.”

[4] An email dated 6 December 2007 that circulated widely reported that Germano da Silva, Kathleen Gonçalves, and Antonio Seisal were each granted contracts for 2,500,000 tons. This grossly inflated figure is presumably the result of the mistranslation of the Portuguese word “mil” meaning thousand. See “Politika Fahe Foos iha Governo AMP – Korrupsaun!!!,” sent by Tatoli, 6 December 2007.

[5] See “Decreto n.o 3/II sobre o Orçamento Geral do Estado da República Democrática de Timor-Leste para 2008,” promulgated 29 December 2007, p. 28.

[6] The following discussion draws on the account provided by Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão, “Press Conference: Food Security – The Facts,” dated 9 July 2008.

[7] Information kindly provided by an AMP member of parliament, 27 July 2008.

[8] “Press Conference: Food Security – The Facts,” p. 3.

[9] República Democrática de Timor-Leste, Serviços de Aprovisionamento, Ordem do Compra/Purchase Order number 81586.

[10] “Press Conference: Food Security – The Facts,” p. 3. $510 per ton was the price of the contract between the government and Três Amigos, not the price from the supplier, as Gusmão claims. The attachments cited were not in fact provided with the press release.

[11] República Democrática de Timor-Leste, Ministério do Finanças, Servicão de Aprovisionamento, “Amendment to Contract RDTL – 81586, ‘The supply and warehousing of white rice’,” number 080508, dated 7 May 2008.

[12] Frans Holiwono of BTK is said to have paid Gil Alves' travel expenses.

[13] República Democrática de Timor-Leste, Ministério do Finanças, “Amendment to Contract RDTL – 81586, ‘The supply and warehousing of white rice’,” number 080508, dated 7 May 2008.

[14] See “Vietnam Extends Rice Export Ban Through June,” Reuters, 3 April 2008.

[15] “Presu Fos Sae: Governu Pronto Halo Prevensaun.” Timor Post, 16 April 2008. This article, based on an interview with the head of the food security department within the Ministry of Tourism, Commerce and Industry, suggests that in mid-April the ministry still expected fulfillment of the total order for 8,000 tons.

[16] See “Pemerintah Sediakan 4.000 Ton Beras,” Suara Timor Lorosae, 14 May 2008.

[17] “UNMIT Press Conference – 14 May 2008 – Near Verbatim Transcript,” dated 14 May 2008. Many of the “facts” presented in an accompanying WFP/FAO/UNMIT “Fact Sheet” (distributed by , dated 14 may 2008) are incorrect. A source who requested anonymity was certain that the first shipment of 2,700 tons of rice had arrived in April or early May.