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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 May 2025
Declassified US Embassy Seoul cables related to nuclear proliferation during the Park Chung Hee era show that, far from making South Korea more secure, Park's toying with the nuclear option made him an unpredictable and even dangerous client who needed restraint in the eyes of US policymakers.
1 S.G. Hong, “The Search for Deterrence: Park's Nuclear Option,” in B.K. Kim and E. Vogel, ed, The Park Chung Hee Era, The Transformation of South Korea, Harvard University Press, 2011, pp. 483-510.
2 S.G. Hong, “The Search for Deterrence: Park's Nuclear Option,” in B.K. Kim and E. Vogel, ed, The Park Chung Hee Era, The Transformation of South Korea, Harvard University Press, 2011, pp. 483-510.
3 National Foreign Assessment Center, South Korea: Nuclear Developments and Strategic Decisionmaking US Central Intelligence Agency, June 1978, declassified for release, October 2005, p. I, link.
4 Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, “Preventing Proliferation Chain Reactions” Policy Workshop, August 15, 2007, link.
5 Hong outlines these reprocessing related activities in detail; op cit, pp. 488-491.
6 Hong, op cit, pp. 484-485.
7 Nixon canvassed a wide range of possible military options after this attack, including dropping scores of nuclear weapons onto North Korean airfields, factories, and cities, but ultimately chose to rely instead of political and diplomatic pressure. See R. Wampler, “How Do You Solve A Problem Like Korea? New Archive Document Collection Sheds Light on Nixon's Frustrating Search for Military Options,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 322, June 23, 2010, link.
8 Jungryom Kim, Hanguk Gyongje Jungchaek 30 nyonsa: Kim Jungryom Hoigorok (30 Years History of Economic Policy in South Korea: : A Kim Jungryom Memoir), Joongang Ilbosa, Seoul, 1990, pp.314-370; Chung-in Moon, “South Korea: Between Security and Vulnerability,” in James P. Katz (ed.), The Implications of Third World Defense Industrialization: The Sowing Serpent's Teeth, Lexington Press, 1986.
9 National Foreign Assessment Center, South Korea: Nuclear Developments, op cit, p. i.
10 National Foreign Assessment Center, South Korea: Nuclear Developments, op cit, p. 2.
11 Ibid, p. 2.
12 Ibid, p. 2.
13 Ibid, p. 2.
14 This speculative theory is premised on prior CIA contact between Park's assassin, then head of the Korean CIA Kim Jae-kyu. Of course, his post entailed constant contact with the CIA and is consistent with any explanation of why Kim assassinated Park. See J.H. Lee, Hangukui Haekjugwon (ROK's Nuclear Sovereignty), Guelmadang, Seoul, 2009, pp.202-205. The orthodox explanation for the assassination refers to rivalry between Kim and Park's Chief Bodyguard Cha Ji-chul, compounded by possible factors such as an impulsive murder from rage against Park's arbitrary power, a desire to end the dictatorship, and a failed coup..
15 Indeed, such thinking was widespread in Washington. For example, the Interdepartmental Group for East Asia and the Pacific chaired by Richard Sneider noted unsentimentally in April 1973, that “United States participation in the Korean War and subsequent support for the Republic of Korea have created a special United States-Republic of Korea relationship, but our basic interests in the Korean peninsula are strategic: we do not want the peninsula to become the cause of conflict among the United States, Japan, the Soviet Union, or the People's Republic of China; and we do not want the peninsula controlled by a government hostile to the United States and Japan.” In “Summary and Options From a Study Prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for East Asia and the Pacific, Washington,” circa April 3, 1973, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976, Document 235, link.
16 In “Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, February 24, 1973, 10:10 a.m.,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976, Document 232, link.
17 National Foreign Assessment Center, South Korea: Nuclear Developments, op cit, p. 3.
18 Ibid, p. 3.
19 Hong notes that the ROK also had F-4D/E fighter bombers that could deliver a 1,800 kg weapon. Hong, op cit, p. 493.
20 National Foreign Assessment Center, South Korea: Nuclear Developments, op cit, p. 6.
21 Ibid, p. 6
22 Ibid, p. 7.
23 Ibid, p. 7.
24 Ibid, p. 4.
25 Byung-jin Park, “Story on South Korea's Weapons Development- The Case of Baekgom Guided Missile, a Signal Of Military Self-Reliance,” SegyeIlbo, October 5, 2010, link.
26 S.G. Hong, “The Search for Deterrence,” op cit, p. 494-495.
27 National Foreign Assessment Center, South Korea: Nuclear Developments, op cit, p. 4. Hong provides a detailed account of the missile and propellant research and acquisition activities that entailed subterfuge and multiple purchasing strategies to evade US surveillance and controls; op cit, pp. 494-495.
28 National Foreign Assessment Center, South Korea: Nuclear Developments, op cit, p. 9.
29 Ibid, p, 9. Carboxyl terminated polybutadiene-type propellant or CTPB is a form of synthetic rubber. It is used as abinder for composite solid propellants in missiles suited to a wide range of storage and service temperatures. “Cross linking agents and other chemical additives are reacted during mixing and curing (heating after casting) to gain desirable physical and ballistic properties in the propellant grain.” G. Sutton, Rocket Propulsion Elements, An Introduction to the Engineering of Rockets, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1986, p. 297.
30 S.G. Hong, “The Search for Deterrence,” op cit, p. 495.
31 National Foreign Assessment Center, South Korea: Nuclear Developments, op cit, p.9.
32 Ibid, p. 9.
33 Ibid, p. 9.
34 Ibid, p. 6.
35 Ibid, pp. 5-6.
36 Ibid, and see J.H. Lee, ROK's Nuclear Sovereignty, op cit, pp. 187-193.
37 National Foreign Assessment Center, South Korea: Nuclear Developments, op cit, p. 6.
38 Ibid, p. 7.
39 Ibid, p. 7.
40 Ibid, p. 8.
41 In “Memorandum of Conversation, Seoul, August 27, 1975,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976, Document 272, link. The relatively greater vulnerability of South Korea to Soviet and Chinese nuclear attack, and the relative disutility of potential South Korean nuclear weapons in a variety of war scenarios relative to the use of conventional forces, was also analyzed in depth in another US military unclassified research report published five months before the CIA report. See B. Jack et al, The South Korean Case: A Nuclear Weapons Program Embedded in an Environment of Great Power Concerns, volume II, Regional Rivalries and Nuclear Responses, Panheuristics Final Report to US Defense Nuclear Agency, DNA 001-77-C-0052, February 28, 1978, pp. II-85 to II-95, link.
42 See United Nations Command, United States Forces Korea, Eighth United States Army, Chronology, 1 January-30 June 1975, p. 23, link. The “Forward Defense Concept and Oplan Revision” first appeared in 1975 in USFK's command annual history. See 1975 Annual Historical Report, Headquarters, UNC/USFK/EUSA, Command Historian, p. ii, link. According to Thomas Barnes, a US National Security official at the time, “The concept of winning the war in ‘nine days’…has serious implications. They include no planning for evacuation to the south, almost immediate U.S. air intervention, and possible use of tactical nuclear weapons.” In “Memorandum From Thomas J. Barnes of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft),” Washington, September 29, 1975, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976, Document 273, link.
43 See the account of this event in P. Hayes, Pacific Powderkeg, American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea, Lexington Press, 1991, pp. 60-62, link.
44 In “Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, Washington, August 19, 1976, 8:12-9:15 a.m.” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976, Document 285, link.
45 In “Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, Washington, August 25, 1976, 10:30 a.m.” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976, Document 286, link.
46 Section 6, “Study Prepared by the Office of International Security Affairs in the Department of Defense, Washington,” circa January 16, 1976, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976, Document 274, link.
47 National Foreign Assessment Center, South Korea: Nuclear Developments, op cit, p.11.
48 Ibid, p. 11.
49 Ibid, p. 12.
50 Ibid, p. 12.
51 Ibid, p. 12.
52 National Foreign Assessment Center, South Korea: The Agency for Defense Development, Central Intelligence Agency, May 12, 1978, p. 2; link.
53 National Foreign Assessment Center, South Korea: Nuclear Developments, op cit, p. 13.
54 Ibid, p. 13.
55 “Secure Telephone Conversation with Secretary Harold Brown on Wednesday, January 26, 1977,” p. 1, marked Carter Library, Declassified E.O. 12958, Sec.3.S PER 1/8/98 NSS Hr RE NV-96-156, Jimmy Carter Library, Donated Historical Materials-Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Subject Files, “Carter, Jimmy - Sensitive: [1/77 - 9/78]”, Box 21. Copy kindly provided by Sung Gul Hong (link). The authors authenticated this document directly with Carter Library on September 16, 2011 and determined that the author was Zbigniew Brzezinski. We are grateful for the prompt assistance provided by Ms. Sara Saunders, Supervisory Archivist at the Jimmy Carter Library and Museum.
56 Z. Brzezinski, Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC 13, National Security Council, January 29, 1977, link.
57 National Foreign Assessment Center, East Asia Review, Central Intelligence Agency, RP EAR 78-003, September 5, 1978, p. 5, link.
58 Ibid, p. 7.
59 Regional and Political Analysis Memo, The Implications of Withdrawing Nuclear Weapons From Korea, Central Intelligence Agency, RPM 77-10210 M, August 11, 1977, p. 2, link.
60 Ibid, p. 3.
61 National Foreign Assessment Center, South Korea: Nuclear Developments, op cit, p. 8.
62 Ibid, p.8. There is some confusion about the name of the specific facilities involved in the program in the extant literature. Like S.G. Hong, “The Search for Deterrence,” op cit, pp. 495, Byung-jin Park states that in September 1974, ADD set up the guided precision missile research team under the disguised title of the “Daejon Machinery Depot.” According to Park, it was renamed as “Anhung Meteorological Observation Center” in January 1975. This is possible and may be a precursor to the organization described in the CIA report on ADD activities at Taejon as of June 1978. However, the CIA report did not refer to the Taejon Machinery Depot in September 1974, nor a name change thereof in January 1975, but does refer to an ADD missile range at Anhung [sic, correct transliteration is Anheung] as of June 1978, which may be the same facility and location—or not. See Byung-jin Park, “Story on South Korea's Weapons Development–The Case of Baekgom Guided Missile, a Signal Of Military Self-Reliance,” SegyeIlbo, October 5, 2010.
63 National Foreign Assessment Center, South Korea: Nuclear Developments, op cit, p.9.
64 National Foreign Assessment Center, South Korea: Nuclear Developments, op cit, pp. 16-17.
65 Ibid, p. 16.
66 Ibid, p. 15.
67 Ibid, p. 16.
68 Ibid, p. 15.
69 Ibid, p. 17.
70 Ibid, p. 17.
71 Ibid, p. 17.
72 Ibid, p. 18.
73 Ibid, p. 18.
74 A. Beilenson, letter to Cyrus Vance, August 20, 1979, released under US Freedom of Information Act request to Nautilus Institute, May 21, 1982, link.
75 See Chung-in Moon, “No Time for Nukes,” The Korea Joongang Daily, May 10, 2011, link.
76 See P. Hayes and S. Bruce, “Unprecedented Nuclear Strikes of the Invincible Army: A Realistic Assessment of North Korea's Operational Nuclear Capability,” NAPSNet Special Report, September 22, 2011, link.
77 The original name was restored as Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute in 1989; see this link.
78 The Panheuristics report cited above makes exactly this point although they hoped that the Chinese and Russians would constrain the DPRK from proliferating. B. Jack et al, The South Korean Case, op cit, p. II-42.
79 J. On-Fat Wong, Security Requirements In Northeast Asia, dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1982, pp. 79-80.
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