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Options for Denuclearising the Korean Peninsula
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2025
Abstract
A critically important part of assembling the Korean peninsula-wide denuclearization jigsaw puzzle is the institutional and legal form of North Korean commitments on the one hand, and the nuclear negative security assurances by the NPT-Nuclear Weapons States (NWSs), especially the United States, on the other. Given the risk of mutual annihilation between the two Koreas as well as to third parties such as the United States, Japan, and China, finding a way to square this circle is urgent.
The Nautilus Institute has published a special report 'A Korean nuclear weapons-free zone treaty and nuclear extended deterrence: options for denuclearising the Korean Peninsula, A Korean Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone Treaty and Nuclear Extended Deterence: Options for Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula
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- Copyright © The Authors 2018
References
Notes
1 NWFZ treaties predate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Article VII of which states: “Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.” In principle, any nuclear-armed state can provide nuclear negative security assurances to NPT-non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) who are party to a UN NWFZ treaty, and have ratified the NNPT and are fully compliant with their NPT obligations. In practice, in Northeast Asia, only NPT-NWSs would make such commitments to NNWSs such as the ROK, Japan should it join, and the DPRK should it comply. See UN Office of Disarmament Affairs, Nuclear Weapons Free Zones.
2 Morton Halperin, Peter Hayes, Leon Sigal, “A KOREAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS-FREE ZONE TREATY AND NUCLEAR EXTENDED DETERRENCE: OPTIONS FOR DENUCLEARIZING THE KOREAN PENINSULA”, NAPSNet Special Reports, April 12, 2018.