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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 May 2025
Growth in nuclear power generation in East Asia will increase significantly in the next few decades, as will regional stockpiles of spent nuclear fuel. The need for regional cooperation in dealing with the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle is becoming critical as the key players in the region—China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan— face the growing challenge of managing their spent nuclear fuel.
1 The authors would like to recognize the contribution of Park Seong-won, and the research assistance of Phillip Schell.
2 See text of the “Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” available here, which entered into force February 19, 1992. In this agreement, North and South Korea agreed “not to test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons; to use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes; and not to possess facilities for nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment.” With two nuclear tests and a declared nuclear weapons program that includes reprocessing facilities, North Korea has clearly violated the Joint Declaration; yet, to date, South Korea has been reluctant to renounce the agreement altogether, hoping that North Korea can be lured back into the Six-Party Talks aimed at eliminating North Korea's nuclear weapons program.
3 See related discussions in Shinichi Ogawa and Michael Schiffer, “Japan's Plutonium Reprocessing Dilemma,” Arms Control Today, October 2005, and Gavan McCormack, “Japan as a Nuclear State,” Japan Focus, August 1, 2007.
4 A “closed nuclear fuel cycle” refers to the process in which natural uranium is refined, converted, enriched, and then reconverted and fabricated before being utilized as fuel in the reactor; once it is irradiated, the spent fuel is reprocessed and the residual uranium and newly produced plutonium are recovered and re-used as fuel, normally in specialized advanced power reactors.
5 Data from “World Nuclear Generation and Capacity (2009),” Nuclear Energy Institute website.
6 “Nuclear Power Plants Information,” IAEA's Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) here.
7 This section draws on Miles A. Pomper, “U.S. International Nuclear Energy Policy: Change and Continuity,” Nuclear Energy Futures Paper No. 10, Centre for International Governance Innovation, January 2010.
8 The full text of this report is available from the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) website. For background and analysis on the matter see Lawrence Scheinman, “Equal Opportunity: Historical Challenges and Future Prospects of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” Arms Control Today, May 2007; and for a more extensive analysis see Lawrence Scheinman, “The Nuclear Fuel Cycle: A Challenge for Nonproliferation,” Disarmament Diplomacy, March/April 2004.
9 Sharon Squassoni, “The U.S. Nuclear Industry: Current Status and Prospects under the Obama Administration,” Nuclear Energy Futures Paper No. 7, Centre for International Governance Innovation, November 2009.
10 Cole J. Harvey, “The U.S.-India Reprocessing Agreement and Its Implications” Issue Brief, Nuclear Threat Initiative, May 5, 2010, available here.
11 “Statements of the Director General to the Forty-Seventh Regular Session of the IAEA General Conference,” IAEA website, September 15, 2003.
12 “Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle”; Expert Group Report, INFCIRC 640, IAEA website, February 2005.
13 “Expert Group Releases Findings on Multilateral Nuclear Approaches,” IAEA website, February 22, 2005.
14 Charles McCombie and Thomas Isaacs, “The Key Role of the Back-End in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” Dædalus, Winter 2010.
15 Efforts over the years have included: a proposed storage facility on Palmyra Island, an uninhabited U.S. possession, with a view to managing nuclear waste from Japan, South Korea and Taiwan; consideration of an offer from the Marshall Islands to provide space for spent nuclear fuel; and a proposal by the Australian firm Pangea Resources for identifying a suitable location for a spent fuel repository with Australia and South America being seen as potential locations.
16 Proliferation resistance is a measure of the degree of impediments to deliberate misuse of civil nuclear energy technology and materials to produce nuclear weapons. It must be noted that proliferation resistance does not imply proliferation proof. Rather, the term proliferation resistance must be seen as a method for comparing how difficult it would be for states and non-state actors to acquire or divert fissile materials and technology by using a particular fuel cycle technology.
17 These three initiatives have seen involvement of China, Japan and South Korea. Taiwan, due to its ambiguous political status, has not been able to participate in these multilateral endeavors.
18 For more on GNEP see this link. Although initiated by Washington, GNEP is a multilateral program. GNEP promotes cradle-to-grave nuclear fuel services in which the suppliers would agree to “take-back” the spent fuel for the final disposition of the spent fuel.
19 For further discussion on GIF see this link.
20 More details on INPRO can be found here.
21 Ellen Tauscher, “Addressing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Internationalizing Enrichment Services and Solving the Problem of Spent Fuel Storage,” Remarks Delivered at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, January 19, 2010, available here.
22 The order of this section is based on the ranking in world-wide power generation—from highest ranked downwards—as represented in Figure 1 of this report.
23 Sharon Squassoni, “Nuclear Renaissance: Is It coming? Should It?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report, October 2008.
24 “Processing of Used Nuclear Fuel,” World Nuclear Association website, updated March 2010.
25 Sodium coolant reactors are not the only proposed reactor design; other liquid metal reactors are also proposed. The liquid metals have a high thermal conductivity and will not slow down neutrons as is done in LWR's which is desired for fast spectrum reactors.
26 IAEA's Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) here.
27 Ibid.
28 Leonard Spector, “Letter to the Editor: The Coming Glut of Japanese Spent Fuel,” Arms Control Today, April 2010.
29 Tatsujiro Suzuki, “Japan's Plutonium Breeder Reactor and its Fuel Cycle,” in Fast Breeder Reactor Programs: History and Status, a research report of the International Panel on Fissile Materials, February 2010.
30 The PUREX technique dissolves spent fuel in nitric acid and then separates the uranium and plutonium using liquid-liquid extraction. Liquidliquid extraction exploits the difference in solubility of plutonium in the two phases in order to separate them. The plutonium can then be recycled for use in reactors.
31 Tadahiro Katsuta and Tatsujiro Suzuki, “Japan's Spent Fuel and Plutonium Management Challenges,” a research report of the International Panel on Fissile Materials, September 2006.
32 Mark Hibbs, “Japan's Fuel Cycle Work to Go Unchallenged,” Nuclear Fuels, September 7, 2009.
33 Spector, April 2010.
34 Discussions between authors and Japanese delegation, March 2010, in Washington, DC.
35 “Nuclear Power in Japan,” World Nuclear Association website, updated May 2010.
36 “Ship with Reprocessed Nuclear Waste Arrives in Japan from UK,” Kyodo News Service via BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 9 March 2010, in Lexis Nexis.
37 “Nuclear Power in Japan,” World Nuclear Association website.
38 Katsuta and Suzuki, September 2006; and Japan Atomic Energy Commission, “Interim Report Concerning the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Policy,” November 12, 2004, available here.
39 Ibid.
40 “Nuclear Power in Japan,” WNA website; and Katsuta and Suzuki, September 2006.
41 Ogawa and Schiffer, October 2005.
42 Tatsujiro Suzuki, “The Fast Reactor and Its Fuel Cycle Developments in Japan: Can Japan Unlock its Development Path?” Science & Global Security, January 2009.
43 Ibid.
44 “Problematic ‘Pluthermal’ Era,” Japan Times, November 11, 2009, in Lexis-Nexis.
45 For more information see Park Seong-won, Miles A. Pomper, and Lawrence Scheinman, “The Domestic and International Politics of Spent Nuclear Fuel in South Korea: Are We Approaching Meltdown?” Academic Paper Series, Korea Economic Institute, Vol. 5, No. 3, March 2010.
46 Based on the standard calculation for the quantity of spent nuclear fuel, capacity factor and efficiency.
47 Seong Won Park, “Why South Korea Needs Pyroprocessing,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 26, 2009.
48 For details see Park, Pomper, and Scheinman, pp. 3-4.
49 The final package from the government included: providing a one-time $300 million contribution along with additional contributions of $600 per waste drum accepted (with a total potential contribution of nearly $500 million if the site reaches full capacity); relocating KHNP headquarters to the community; locating a proton accelerator and related R&R facilities in the area; and additional long-term federal support to the area.
50 “Operation and Maintenance of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation Casks/Containers”, IAEA-TECDOC-1532, 2010, IAEA website, p 85.
51 Minor incidents occurred in 1994 and in 1996 preparing for the transportation (see ibid, p. 87). To the best of our knowledge, no incidents happened while in transport.
52 For further discussion of South Korea's plans for nuclear exports see David Adam Stott, “South Korea's Global Nuclear Ambitions,” Japan Focus, March 22, 2010.
53 Mycle Schneider et al., The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2009, August 2009.
54 Reactor numbers taken from the IAEA's Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) here. However, another source notes that the actual number was likely less than 16. See Schneider et al., The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2009.
55 “Nuclear Power Goal Revised to 86 GW,” China Daily, July 2, 2009.
56 Zheng Hualing and Ye Guo'an, “The Status and Prospect of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Back–End in China,” paper presented at the Atalante 2000 Conference on Scientific Research on the Back-End of the Fuel Cycle for the 21st Century, October 2000.
57 According to one Chinese nuclear energy expert, China's nuclear industry does not “have a very good plan for dealing with spent fuel,” noting further that “the nuclear interest group wants to push this technology, but they don't understand the risks for the future. They want to make money. But we scientists, we want to take a very comprehensive approach, including safety, environment, dealing with waste and other factors, and not rush into anything.” See Howard W. French, “China Promotes Another Boom: Nuclear Power,” New York Times, January 15, 2005.
58 “China's Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” World Nuclear Association website, updated March 2010.
59 Qiang Wang, “China Needing a Cautious Approach to Nuclear Power Strategy,” Energy Policy, Vol. 37 (2009).
60 See Mark Hibbs, “Chinese Experts Continue Work Exploring Possible Repository Sites,” Nuclear Fuel, August 1, 2005; Zheng and Ye, October 2000; and “China's Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” World Nuclear Association website.
61 Qiang, 2009.
62 Mark Hibbs, “CNNC Favors Remote Site for Future Reprocessing Plant,” Nuclear Fuel, April 7, 2008.
63 Mark Hibbs, “China Plan Envisions Commercial Reprocessing in 2025,” Nuclear Fuels, May 18, 2009.
64 “China: AREVA and CGNPC sign the biggest contract ever in the history of nuclear power and enter into a long-term commitment. AREVA and CNNC strengthen their links,” AREVA Press Release, November 26, 2007.
65 Ann MacLachlan, “AREVA, China Seal Long-term Mining, Fuel Cycle Pact,” Nuclear Fuel, December 3, 2007.
66 Ann MacLachlan, “EDF, AREVA Finalize Joint Ventures with Chinese Nuclear Companies,” Nucleonics Week, December 24, 2009.
67 Tyler Hamilton, “A Chance for Nuclear Industry to Clean Up its Act,” Toronto Star, January 14, 2008.
68 Ibid.
69 “China's Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” World Nuclear Association website; see also “Expert Panel Recommends CANDU as Best Choice for China's Alternative Nuclear Fuel Program,” News Release, AECL website, December 18, 2009.
70 “Chinese CANDU Reactor Trials Uranium Reuse,” World Nuclear News, March 24, 2010.
71 Xu Mi, “Fast Reactor Technology R&R Activities in China,” Nuclear Engineering and Technology, June 2007.
72 “China Experimental Fast Reactor to Connect to Grid in 2010,” People's Daily, December 12, 2008.
73 Hui Zhang, “On China's Commercial Reprocessing Policy,” paper presented at the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management 50th Annual Meeting, Tucson, Arizona, July 12-16, 2009.
74 “Chinese Fast Reactor Nears Commissioning,” World Nuclear News, April 7, 2009; and Xu Mi, June 2007.
75 “Taiwan New Power Plant Starts Trial Operation,” China Post, January 19, 2010, in Lexis Nexis.
76 Kalyan Kemburi, “A Taiwanese Nuclear Revival,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2009.
77 “Spent Fuel and Plutonium in East Asia,” Nuclear Control Institute website.
78 Mark Hibbs, “Long-Term Spent Fuel Dilemma at Issue in Taiwan-U.S. Renegotiation,” Nuclear Fuels, June 1, 2009.
79 David Albright and Corey Gay, “Taiwan: Nuclear Nightmare Averted,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Jan/Feb 1998. According to this article, the reactor transferred to Taiwan was “the same Canadian model that India used to produce plutonium for its first nuclear explosion in 1974. Canada also supplied Taiwan with U.S.-origin heavy water and 25 metric tons of natural uranium fuel rods.”
80 “Lan-yu Storage Site Status,” Taiwan's Atomic Energy Council website, updated February 2010.
81 Mark Hibbs, “Taiwan Rejected Chinese Offer of Fresh Fuel for Waste Disposal,” Nuclear Fuel, April 20, 1998.
82 Mark Hibbs, “Taiwan to Wait on U.S.-Russian Deal Before Taking Spent Fuel Initiative,” Nuclear Fuel, 9 July 2001.
83 Mark Hibbs, “Taiwan Looks to GNEP for Answers to Threatening Spent Fuel Dilemma,” Nuclear Fuel, 7 May 2007.
84 Mark Hibbs, “Long-term Spent Fuel Dilemma at Issue in Taiwan-U.S. Renegotiation,” 1 June 2009.
85 “Dry Storage Management in Taiwan,” Taiwan's Fuel Cycle and Materials Administration website, March 15, 2010.
86 Hibbs, June 1, 2009.
87 Ibid.
88 Hibbs, May 7, 2007.
89 Mark Hibbs, “Taiwan Investigating Feasibility of French Reprocessing Option,” Nuclear Fuel, February 25, 2008.
90 “International Nuclear Energy Resurgence: A Conversation With Dale Klein”, Council of Foreign Relations, February 13 2009. It should be noted the that NRC licenses casks in 20 years interval.
91 Frank Von Hippel, “Spent Fuel Management in South Korea: The Illogic of Pyroprocessing,” Annual Conference of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, Baltimore, July 11-15, 2010.
92 Under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, “recognized” NWS are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.
93 Miles Pomper, “The Russian Nuclear Industry: Status and Prospects,” Nuclear Energy Futures Paper #3, Centre for International Governance Innovation, January 2009.
94 Russia has “take back” deals for fuel from Russian-made reactors or related to Russian-origin fuel with the Czech Republic and Bulgaria. “Чешское ОЯТ на ПО Маяк” (Czech SNF is at Mayak), Ozersk Daily, December 11, 2007; “Стоимость вывоза ОЯТ с АЭС Козлодуй в Россию возрастёт” (The cost of transporting spent nuclear fuel from Kozloduy NPP to Russia will rise), Atomic Energy.ru, February 15, 2010; and “Норвегия выбирает между Маяком и Францией для переработки партии ОЯТ” (Norway chooses between Mayak and France for reprocessing SNF), Atomic Energy.ru, February 25, 2010.
95 The U.S.-Russian nuclear cooperation agreement was recently resubmitted to Congress by the Obama administration. See “Obama Resubmits U.S.-Russia Nuclear Energy Pact to Congress,” AFP, May 10, 2010.
96 This commission is meant “to provide recommendations for developing a safe, long-term solution to managing the Nation's used nuclear fuel and nuclear waste.” See “Secretary Chu Announces Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future,” U.S. Department of Energy website, January 29, 2010.
97 Harvey, May 5, 2010.
98 Aaron Stein, “U.S.-UAE Nuclear Cooperation,” Issue Brief, Nuclear Threat Initiative website, August 13, 2009.
99 The cost of the PUREX reprocessing cycle is estimated to be about $2400/kg HM according to a Japanese study which should be compared to the once-through process estimated to cost $555/kg HM. See Japan Atomic Energy Commission, “Interim Report Concerning the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Policy,” November 12, 2004, available here, and U.S. Congressional Budget Office, “Costs of Reprocessing Versus Directly Disposing of Spent Nuclear Fuel,” Statement of Peter R. Orzag before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, November 14, 2007.
100 Arjun Makhijani, “The Mythology and Messy Reality of Nuclear Reprocessing,” IEER Report, April 8 2010. The total volume of waste estimated to be placed into a geological repository, rather than decreasing, would increase by a factor of six when the thermal recycle option using an advanced aqueous process compared to the once-through option.
101 “Safe Uranium Enrichment Under International Supervision,” Germany's Federal Foreign Office website.
102 See Anya Loukianova, “The International Uranium Enrichment Center at Angarsk: A Step Towards Assured Fuel Supply?” Issue Brief, Nuclear Threat Initiative website, October 2007 (Updated November 2008).
103 Dietrich Becker “The German Proposal for a Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project,” Seventh ROK-UN Joint Conference on Disarmament and Nonproliferation, November 24-26, 2008, Jeju, Republic of Korea.
104 Thomas D. Cochran and Christopher E. Paine, “Proliferation Resistant Uranium Enrichment”, Discussion Draft (November 25, 2009); slides of presentation available here.
105 Ibid.
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