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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 May 2025
This paper examines the legal implications for Okinawan migrants of Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty (hereafter SFPT), signed between Japan and most of the Allied Powers in 1951. Particularly, it analyses the case of post-war Okinawan migrants in Bolivia, showing how the legal conditions in the Ryukyu Islands were extended to the Andean country. The Japanese defeat in the Asia-Pacific War (August 1945) was followed by the occupation of the country by the United States. The peace treaty, signed six years later, originated during the early years of the Cold War and was fraught with geopolitical implications. The SFPT allowed the U.S. military to retain control of Okinawa prefecture without formally severing it from Japan. In other words, the treaty-makers allocated de jure sovereignty over Okinawa to Japan while the U.S. enjoyed de facto sovereignty. This distinction gave rise to a legal conundrum concerning the future of the islands and the legal situation of the Okinawan people onshore and abroad. Building on Japanese and English primary sources I examine the reaction of American and Japanese jurists to Article 3 and the approach of both governments toward offshore Okinawan migrants.
1 I will use the terms Okinawa, Ryukyu Islands (or Ryukyus), and Nansei Shoto interchangeably. The Nansei Islands are the entire island chain to which the Ryukyus belong. In the San Francisco peace treaty the term Nansei Shoto (plus its bearings) was used. Okinawa is the name of the largest island of the Ryukyu group, and “Okinawa” is often used to designate all of the islands and the Japanese prefecture as well.
2 Ordinance 93, 1953: “Control of Entry and Exit of individuals into and from the Ryukyu Islands” in United States Civil Administration 1950 - 1972, Laws and Regulations During the U.S. Administration of Okinawa: 1945-1972, ed. Gekkan Okinawa Sha, vol. Book 2 (n/d). Section VII.
3 Endoh Toake, Exporting Japan: Politics of Emigration toward Latin America (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2009), p.164.
4 On the bilateral problem see Robert D. Eldridge, The Return of the Amami Islands: The Reversion Movement and U.S. - Japan Relations (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004), Robert D. Eldridge, “The Revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and Okinawa,” in Japanese Diplomacy in the 1950s: From Isolation to Integration, ed. Iokibe Makoto, et al. (London: Routledge, 2008). Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S. - Japanese Relations (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University, 2000).
5 Ōta Mas ahide, Okinawa No Tennō: Kōtōbenmukan (the Okinawan Emperor: The High Commissioner) (Tokyo: Asahi bunnkō, 1996), Yoshida Kensei, Democracy Betrayed: Okinawa under U.S. Occupation, ed. Edward H. Kaplan, vol. 23, Studies on East Asia (Bellingham: Western Washington University, 2001). Arasaki Moriteru, Okinawa Gendaishi (Contemporary History of Okinawa) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 2005). Tanji Miyume, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa (London: Routledge, 2006). Gavan McCormack and Satoko Oka Norimatsu, Resistant Islands:Okinawa Confronts Japan and the United States (Lanham: Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, 2012).
6 For instance the work of Watanabe Akio, The Okinawa Problem, a Chapter in Japan - U.S. Relations (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1970).
7 For example Ōta Masahide, Kenshō : Showa No Okinawa (Inspection: Okinawa During the Showa Period) (Naha: Naha shuppansha, 1990), Taira Koji, “Troubled National Identity: The Ryukyuans/Okinawans,” in Japan's Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity, ed. Michael Weiner (London: Routledge, 1997). Oguma Eiji, ‘Nihonjin’ No Kyōkai - Okinawa, Ainu, Taiwan, Chōsen, Shokuminchi Shihai Kara Fukki Undō Made (the Boundaries of the ‘Japanese’: Okinawa, Ainu, Taiwan and Korea. From Colonial Domination to the Return Movement) (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 1998).
8 There have been a few approaches to the topic from Kozy Amemiya and Taku Suzuki. See Kozy Amemiya, “The Bolivian Connection: U.S. Bases and Okinawa Emigration,” in JPRI Working Paper (JPRI: Japan Policy Research Institute at the USF Center for the Pacific Rim, 1996). Suzuki Taku, “Becoming ‘Japanese’ in Bolivia: Okinawa-Bolivia Trans(National) Formation in Colonia Okinawa,” Identities 13, no. 3 (2006).
9 For a discussion on “corporal inscription” in the Ryūkyū islands see Suzuki Taku, Embodying Belonging: Racializing Okinawa Diaspora in Bolivia and Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2010). pp.8-9.
10 The literature on this case has focused, mostly from an ethnographic perspective, on the local dynamics in the colonies in Bolivia and their relationship with the local Bolivian community.
11 The JILD is the journal of the Japanese Society of International Law (est. 1897), based in the Faculty of Law of the University of Tokyo. It has been published since 1902.
12 Ōta Masahide, “Re-Examining the History of the Battle of Okinawa,” in Okinawa: Cold War Island, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Cardiff: Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999). pp.13-14. Most textbooks date the Battle of Okinawa between April 1st and June 23rd of 1945.
13 For testimonies of the battle of Okinawa see Yahara Hiromichi, The Battle for Okinawa, trans. Roger Pineau and Masatoshi Uehara (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1995). p.105. and George Feifer, Tennozan: The Battle of Okinawa and the Atomic Bomb (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1992). p.446. Also see chapter 2 of McCormack and Norimatsu, Resistant Islands:Okinawa Confronts Japan and the United States. The Itoman Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum vividly illustrates the terrifying situation experienced before, during and after the battle.
14 The main study on the first seven years of U.S. administration in Okinawa from a military perspective is Arnold G. Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands. 1945 -1950, 2005 ed. (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 1988). p.4. For an Okinawan perspective, see the first chapter of Arasaki, Okinawa Gendaishi (Contemporary History of Okinawa). pp.1-30. On the genealogy of the bilateral problem see Robert D Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem : Okinawa in Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations, 1945-1952 (New York: Garland Pub, 2001). It should be noted that in December 1953, the Amami islands to the north reverted to Japan.
15 Although in the Cairo meeting Roosevelt intended to transfer the islands to China, Department of State personnel were not aware of his intention. So when the Division of Political Studies, under Dr. Isaiah Bowman, interpreted the Cairo Declaration, it concluded that the Ryukyus “did not appear to be of the type which fell within the meaning of the phrase in question (…)” quoted in Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem : Okinawa in Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations, 1945-1952 p.57.
16 For the Cairo Communiqué see here; for the Potsdam declaration here. All sites visited on April 7, 2010. The Yalta Agreement, the other main wartime agreement, did not address the future of Japan's territory. For a complete study on the wartime agreements and the position of China towards Okinawa see Hara Kimie, Cold War Frontiers in the Asia- Pacific:Divided Territories in the San Francisco System (London: Routledge, 2007), pp.158-65.
17 As early as 1942 discussion was held on the status of Okinawa. In 1943 the State Department recommended that the islands be returned to Japan following U.S. victory. See Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem : Okinawa in Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations, 1945-1952 p.53.
18 Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands. 1945 -1950. p. 55. For a cultural approach to the U.S. position in Okinawa see Pedro Iacobelli, “Orientalism, Mass Culture and the Us Administration in Okinawa,” ANU Japanese Studies On-Line 1, no. 4 (2011).
19 Okinawa had a different administrative structure than mainland Japan. The Ryukyu Islands were under the jurisdiction of the General Headquarters of the Far East Command GHQ/FECOM from 1947. For a complete analysis of the chain of command in occupied Japan and Okinawa see Takemae Eiji, Inside G.H.Q.:The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy, trans. Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann (New York: Continuum, 2002). pp.121-123.
20 Gavan McCormack, Client State: Japan in the American Embrace (London: Verso, 2007). p.122. For an analysis of the “separation” of Okinawa from Japan and its contemporary consequences see particularly chapters six and seven.
21 Okinawa Policy within the State Department, illustrated by the 1943 Masland Paper, 1944 Borton Paper, 1945/1946 Emerson paper, and 1946/1948 Feary Paper, all envisaged return of the Ryukyus to Japan. By 1949 that option was unthinkable. Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem : Okinawa in Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations, 1945-1952 p.54.
22 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, vol. VII, The Far East and Australasia (in two parts) Part 2. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976). pp.730-736. Also see Hara Kimie description in Hara, Cold War Frontiers in the Asia- Pacific:Divided Territories in the San Francisco System. Chapter seven.
23 Initially the U.S. Department of Defense and Department of State aimed to retain “facilities” and develop the U.S. position in Okinawa. See Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949. p.655. In 1950, this came to mean control of the whole territory. Dean Acheson, “Crisis in Asia -an Examination of the U.S. Policy,” The Department of State Bulletin XXII, no. 551 (1950). pp.111-118
24 Quoted in Yoshida, Democracy Betrayed: Okinawa under U.S. Occupation. p.45.
25 Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem : Okinawa in Postwar U.S.- Japan Relations, 1945-1952 pp.301-314.
26 For the official Japanese position on Okinawa, see Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, vol. VI, Asia and the Pacific (in two parts) Part 1. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977). pp. 811; 833; 960-961;1163. For comment on the so- called ‘Tenno message” see Ōta Kenshō: Showa No Okinawa (Inspection: Okinawa During the Showa Period). pp. 314-329. Matsuoka Hiroshi, Hirose Yoshikazu, and Takenaka Yorohiko, Reisenshi: Sono Kigen, Tenkai, Shūen to Nihon (the Cold War History) (Tokyo: Dobunkan, 2003). pp. 84-85.
27 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. pp.1057-1062. The U.S. position in Okinawa was repeatedly criticized by the Soviet bloc following the peace treaty meeting in San Francisco. See Nippon Times, “Excerpts from Gromyko Speech,” Sept. 7 1951.
28 Edwin O Reischauer, one of the most influential academics in Japanese affairs, and later U.S. ambassador to Japan, supported limiting the U.S. trusteeship on Okinawa as much as possible and returning the rest of the territory to Japan. W.W. Butterworth, Director of the Office of Far Easter Affairs, William Sebald and Douglas L. Oliver were cautious about extending the occupation. And J.F. Dulles and John Allison supported the trusteeship option. See respectively: Edwin O. Reischauer, The United States and Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950). pp.237-239; Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949. p.815; and Yoshida, Democracy Betrayed: Okinawa under U.S. Occupation. p.45.
29 Under the Mandates System, the Permanent Mandate Commission of the League of Nations was responsible for supervising the mandates territories but in the practice it did not have real power. See George Thullen, Problems of the Trusteeship System : A Study of Political Behavior in the United Nations (Geneve: Librairie Droz, 1964). p.12. ibid. p.11. The Trusteeship system has been inactive since 1994.
30 In the history of the Trusteeship System the only case of making an ex enemy territory a trust territory was when Somalia was trusted to Italy, its former colonial master. There are no cases in which states voluntarily placed a territory under the system. Chairmian Edwards Toussaint, The Trusteeship System of the United Nations (London: Stevens & Sons, 1956). p.40.
31 Ibid. pp.39-42.
32 Leland M. Goodrich and Edvard Hambro, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1946), pp.359-60.
33 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. p.933.
34 Ibid. p.933. For another document stating Dulles’ position see ibid. p.841.
35 “Treaty of Peace with Japan” in UCLA East Asia Studies Documents at here accessed April 7, 2010.
36 Ibid.
37 The Peace treaty was signed by forty eight nations, including Bolivia. The USSR opposed the “illegality” of transferring the Ryukyus to U.S. custody. Similarly the Gov. of India rejected Article 3 and thus did not attend the SFP Conference. Nippon Times, “Excerpts from Gromyko Speech.” For the Indian position see Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. pp. 1062; 1269-70; 1288-1291.
38 The term was Dulles’ creation. Mikio Higa, Politics and Parties in Postwar Okinawa (Vancouver University of British Columbia, 1963). pp. 10-12. Rosa Caroli suggests that the Ryukyu Islands became a “Land without status”. Rosa Caroli, Il Mito Dell’Omogeneita Giapponese : Storia Di Okinawa (Rome: Franco Angelini, 1999). pp.191-203.
39 Marjorie M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, vol. 1 (Department of State Publication 7403, 1963).,p.270.
40 Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem : Okinawa in Postwar U.S.- Japan Relations, 1945-1952 p.359.
41 “The United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald) to the Department of State” in Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, vol. 14,(in two parts) Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985). p.1092.
42 Cobb v. United States, 191 F.2d 604, N° 12746, (9th Cir, 1951) in here accessed April 10, 2010.
43 Ibid.
44 The case's description can be found in Whiteman, Digest of International Law. pp 268 - 271.
45 Ibid. p.269.
46 The Ryukyu kingdom was a tributary state to China and since the seventeenth century to the Satsuma daimyo. See George H. Kerr, Okinawa, the History of an Island People, 1969 ed. (Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1958).
47 Akiho Ichirō, “(Okinawa Kizoku Ni Kansuru Ichishōsatsu),” The Journal of International Law and Diplomacy (Kokusaihō gaikō zasshi) LIV, no. no. 1-3 (1955). p.57.
48 Hanabusa N., “Transitions About the Reversion of Okinawa (Okinawa Kizoku No Enkaku),” The Journal of International Law and Diplomacy (kokusaihō gaikō zasshi) LIV, no. no. 1-3 (1955). p.38.
49 Ueda T., “Okinawa Question in the Eyes of American Scholars (Amerika Gakusha No Mita Okinawa Mondai),” The Journal of International Law and Diplomacy (Kokusaihō gaikō zasshi) LIV, no. no. 1-3 (1955).
50 Ibid. pp.40-46.
51 Ibid. p.46. Hyman Kublin, “The Attitude of China During the Liu-Ch’iu Controversy, 1871-1881,” Pacific Historical Review Vol. 18, no. No. 2 (1949).
52 Kublin, “The Attitude of China During the Liu- Ch’iu Controversy, 1871-1881.” p.116.
53 Irie Keishirou, “Legal Status of Okinawa (Okinawa Shotō No Hōtekichii),” The Journal of International Law and Diplomacy (Kokusaihō Gaikō zasshi) LIV, no. 1-3 (1955). p.64.
54 Ashida Hitoshi, former Prime Minister and leader of the Democratic Party questioned Yoshida on the contents of the treaty. The focus was the practical benefits of having “residual sovereignty” of the territory.
55 Irie, “Legal Status of Okinawa (Okinawa Shotō No Hōtekichii).” p.74.
56 Ibid. p.77.
57 Ibid. pp.78-80.
58 Shinjo T., “Okinawa No Kokusaihōjyō No Chii (Status of Okinawa in International Law),” The Journal of International Law and Diplomacy (Kokusaihō gaikō zasshi) LIV, no. 1-3 (1955). p.107.
59 Kuwada Saburo, “Status of Okinawans under the Japanese Nationality Law,” The Japanese Annual of International Law, no. 3 (1959). p.88.
60 Following the documents on the San Francisco Peace Treaty published in the FRUS collection.
61 Source: JICA, Okinawaken to kaigai ijuu (Tokyo: Jica 1982) pp, 98 - 99. Cited in Endoh, Exporting Japan: Politics of Emigration toward Latin America. p.164.
61 The declaration of Human Rights was ratified in 1948. Japan joined the United Nations in 1956.
62 The directives for USCAR were established in a memorandum approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in October 4, 1950. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, vol. VI, East Asia and the Pacific (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976). pp.1313-1319. For the GRI see Art. II, C.A. Proclamation No. 13, 29 February 1952; in United States Civil Administration:1950 - 1972, Laws and Regulations During the U.S. Administration of Okinawa: 1945-1972, ed. Gekkan Okinawa sha, vol. Book 1 (n/d). p.112.
63 The U.S. supported the emigration program as a policy to reduce the levels of social tension in an overpopulated area. See Kozy Amemiya, “The Bolivian Conection: U.S. Bases and Okinawa Emigration,” in Okinawa: Cold War Island, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Cardiff: Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999).
64 “FOA Report on Emigration Possibilities in Bolivia”, 3 September 1954, U.S. National Archives, RG. 319, SA 270 R18 Ex60 Box 30.
65 In the preamble of the 1961 agreement between the Bolivian Government and the United States concerning the immigration of Ryukyuans, it is made clear that because the U.S. exercises “all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants”, it can act as responsible authority for the migrants in Bolivia. See “Agreement Between the Government of Bolivia and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Immigration of the Ryukyuans” Draft 8/23/61. The United States Administration Materials - The Ryukyu Islands: S 312 UN 19 (20), at the Sengo Shiryō shitsu, Ryukyu University.
66 The FAO was part of the U.S. aid plan for friendly countries. In 1953 the role of FAO was to assist the colonization plan by giving guidance. See “Memorandum for the Record” 10 Nov. 1953. At the U.S. National Archives, RG. 319, SA 270 R18 Ex60 Box 30. Still in late 1954 FOA's role in the migration program was not all clear. Oscar Powell, Director of the FOA office in Bolivia, was at loss about his duties toward the migrants, so he requested an Airgram defining in general terms what they were expected to do. See “Letter to Marry W. Yee (Director W.C. Division FOA)” December 22, 1954. U.S. National Archives, RG. 319, SA 270 R18 Ex60 Box 30.
67 Since there was no Japanese office in the Ryukyu Islands that could emit passports, they had to apply for one of the Ryukyu-proof of citizenship.
68 For a complete description of the Visa application procedures see Tamashiro Migorō, “Okinawa Kaigai Ishū Kankei Kiroku (Records Related to Okinawan Overseas Migration),” Ijūkenkyu, no. 16 (1979).
69 Turkey agreed to assign the island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England in the Berlin treaty (1878). England could control Cyprus though titular sovereignty would remain in Turkey. See Thomas Ehrlich, “Cyprus, the “Warlike Isle”: Origins and Elements of the Current Crisis,” Stanford Law Review 18, no. 6 (1966). pp.1024-1025.
70 Irie, “Legal Status of Okinawa (Okinawa Shotō No Hōtekichii).” p.86.
71 Ibid. p.86.
72 Ibid. p.88.
73 Quoted in Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem : Okinawa in Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations, 1945-1952 it should be noted that Yoshida's “always” could not mean anything earlier than 1609.
74 In conversation with Ota Masahide, I learned about the case of Japanese and Okinawan fishermen who were shipwrecked on the Indonesia coast in the 1950s. The Japanese consular office in Indonesia promptly took care of the Japanese fishermen whereas the Okinawans were left without assistance.
75 The term Hogo, together with “protection”, can be translated also as “conservation”, “guardianship” or “patronage”.
76 Kaigai Ijū, 20 July 1954, p.6.
77 “Summary of meeting held between Mr. Ishida and LO” 10 May 1954. In The United States Administration Materials - The Ryukyu Islands: S 312 UN 11 (19), at the Sengo Shiryō shitsua, Ryukyu University.
78 In Japan International Cooperation Agency's Record Office (JICA), Kaigai Ijū, edited by Nihon kaigai kyōkai rengōkai, 20 July 1954, p.6.
79 The U.S government, through USCAR, invested US$160,000 for the first Bolivian group. The U.S. Congress appropriated over US$800,000 to support migration. See Kaigai Ijū, 20 June 1954, p.39. However, the latter sum was not used in fiscal year 1955. Also the counterpart funds (from the Bolivian government), used to build housing, provide food supply for the first year and for road construction, was derived from the nine million dollars in aid received from the U.S. government. Therefore, most of the money came from U.S. appropriations. See “Memorandum for the Record” 10 Nov. 1953. U.S. National Archives, RG. 319, SA 270 R18 Ex60 Box 30.
80 The U.S. Technical Assistance Program was called “Point Four”. Harry Truman's inaugural address in 1949 proclaimed the Point Four Program, with the objective of “making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas”. See Ravi Kanbur, “The Economics of International Aid,” in Working Paper Department of Applied Economics and Mangement (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2003).
81 Gushiken arrived in Bolivia a year after the diseased was controlled. He quotes his brother, a member of the first group, to explain the tragedy. Kotei Gushiken, Okinawa Ijyūchi : Boribia No Daichi Totomoni (Okinawa's Migration Land : Together in Bolivia's Ground) (Naha: Okinawa Taimusu, 1998). p.52.
82 “Letter from Shuzo Nishihira (Chairman Urgent Countermeasure) to Higa (6 January 1955)”. In U.S. National Archives, Registration Number 319, Stack Area 270 Room 18, ex.60 box 30.
83 Higa Shugei, Chief Executive, wrote to J. Tigner requesting immediate dispatch of government officials. He also called for an official investigation and necessary action. Similarly, Inamine wrote to U.S. Senator W. Judd. Letters and related documents in Okinawan Prefectural Archive (hereafter OPA), Cod. R 0053789B.
84 Many of Inamine's letters were directed to Representative Walter Judd, who had advocated and sponsored migration to Bolivia. See Walter Judd papers, Box 145, folder 2, The Hoover Institution Archives (HIA), California.
85 JICA, Kaigai Ijū, 20 March 1955, p.8. American specialists were interested in the disease itself and ran a series of experiments. The treatment was mainly to immunize the population against yellow fever with the first injection of diphtheria-tetanus-whooping cough vaccine administered to all children. See “Letter to Harry W. Yoe (FOA) by O.Powell”, February 1, 1955, U.S. National Archives R.G. 319 S.A. 270, R.18 Ex.60 Box 30.
86 Initially it was thought to be Malaria but the test failed to confirm it. JICA, Kaigai Ijū, 20 March 1955, p.8. According to Kozy Amemiya, it could have being an outburst of Hanta virus. Amemiya, “The Bolivian Connection: U.S. Bases and Okinawa Emigration.”
87 “Remittance as medical expenses for the patients among emigrants”, OPA, Cod. R 00053789 B
88 “Current Status of Ryukyuan Colonization in Bolivia” 10 February 1955. U.S. National Archives R.G. 319 S.A. 270, R.18 Ex.60 Box 30.
89 “GRI Mission to Bolivia” 23 March 1955. U.S. National Archives R.G. 319 S.A. 270, R.18 Ex.60 Box 30.
90 This doesn’t mean that the Japanese newspaper did not cover the event, but in their report there is no direct mention to any form of official aid.
91 “Report of the group condition”, OPA Cod. R00053789B. The official exchange rate was one dollar for 100 bolivianos, but the free rate was one dollar for 1200 bolivianos.
92 Ryukyuans were Japanese nationals even though Okinawa was under U.S. military control.
93 This situation changed in the 1960s when the U.S. modified its position towards Okinawan emigrants and allowed the Japanese agencies to gain control over all Okinawan and Japanese colonies.
94 Acts quoted in “Excerpts of Provisions of Japanese Laws” OPA Cod. 0000011835.
95 “Status of Ryukyuan Emigrants in Bolivia” OPA, Cod. 0000011835, p.2. Italics mine.
96 Nihon Kaigai Kyokai Renairais, “Boribia no seikatsuto roudou”, 1956, p.84.
97 “Status of Ryukyuan Emigrants in Bolivia” OPA, Cod. 0000011835, p.2.
98 MOFA, 16 Kai, J’0079, folder 2. Lt. Col. Crescenzo I. Guida from the Executive Office replied to the request to change the U.S.-issued Ryukyuan travel document for Japanese passports.
99 “Status of Ryukyuan Emigrants in Bolivia” OPA, Cod. 0000011835, p.3.
100 “Letter to Byron E. Blankinship, office of HICOM” 21 April 1961. in The United States Administration Materials - The Ryukyu Islands: S 312 UN 19 (7), in the Sengo Shiryō shitsu (Postwar Archives Room), Ryukyu University.
101 This situation affected the socioeconomic conditions of the community in the 1950s and early 1960s. Years later the mainland Japanese community of San Juan in Bolivia remembered this situation. JICA, Shinsaku Nanbo, in Nihonjin Borivia Ijyūshi (History of the Japanese Migration in Bolivia) (Tokyo: Nihonjin Borivia Ijyūshi Hensai iinkai, 1970). p.147.
102 See note 95.
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