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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 May 2025
Japanese prosecutors find themselves in the dock for abuses of power involving a number of high profile cases that have drawn considerable media attention in recent years. More than ever, the Japanese public is aware of the extent of prosecutors' power and how this jeopardizes justice. Until recently, prosecutors' post-WWII public reputation was relatively positive, and they were widely viewed as paragons of trust and propriety who had largely overcome the negative images stemming from their wartime role as tools of state oppression against critics and dissidents. This does not mean that Japan's procuracy has lacked critics both at home and abroad, but only recently has the positive public image come under sustained fire. The media is drawing unprecedented public attention to the ways and means of prosecutors and detailing their resort to unscrupulous methods in order to maintain their chilling 99% conviction rate.
1 These points are made by Daniel Foote, “Policymaking by the Japanese Judiciary in the Criminal Justice Field”, Paper presented at the General Symposium: Who is the Leading Actor in Criminal Justice? Judges, Prosecutors or Participating Citizens. 2010.
2 David Johnson, The Japanese Way of Justice (Oxford, 2002),
3 Matthew Wilson, “Japan's New Criminal Jury Trial System: In Need of More Transparency, More Access, and More Time”, Fordham International Law Journal, 33: 487 (2010), p. 7. Retrieved from LexisNexis Feb. 28, 2011.
4 Ibid., 6.
5 Ibid., p. 16.
6 This 23 day detention breaks down as follows: within twenty-four hours of detention prosecutors must ask a judge to approve up to ten days of additional detention beyond the initial seventy-two hours that any suspect may be detained at the police or prosecutor's discretion, and this detention may be extended for an additional ten days.
7 Ingram Weber, “The New Japanese Jury System: Empowering the Public, Preserving Continental Justice,” East Asia Law Review (125) 2009. p. 6. Retrieved from LexisNexis 2/28/11.
8 Arne Soldwedell, “Testing Japan's Convictions: The Lay Judge System and the Rights of Criminal Defendants,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 41, 1417, (November, 2008), p. 4. Retrieved from LexisNexis 2/28/11.
9 Foote, op.cit., 24.
10 Weber, op.cit., p.8. The lay judge system that includes citizen judges and professional judges was introduced in Japan in 2009, chiefly as a way for the judiciary to regain public trust and respond to social changes in Japan. It is important to bear in mind that lay judges participate only in the first, lower-court trials involving crimes for which the penalty upon conviction is death, life imprisonment or imprisonment for a fixed term, or crimes in which the perpetrators' deliberate acts cause someone's death, including murder, acts of arson and dangerous driving. For a discussion of goals and consequences of the lay judge system see, Zachary Corey and Valerie Hans, “Japan's New Lay Judge System: Deliberative Democracy in Action.” Asian-Pacific Law and Policy, 12:72, (2010) 1-21.
11 Wilson, op.cit., p. 10.
12 ibid., p. 10.
13 Foote, op.cit., p.16.
14 Johnson, op.cit., p 7.
15 Weber, op.cit., p. 6.
16 Judges also face pressure to convict. Weber, op.cit., p 6.
17 Ibid., p. 7.
18 “Prosecutor offices flawed: experts,” Japan Times, Oct. 2, 2010. Link.
19 Johnson, op.cit., chp 1, pp. 21-49.
20 ibid., p. 48.
21 According to media reports, the use of wiretapping has expanded considerably since then. In 2010, 47 people were arrested based on evidence gathered from eavesdropping and the number of warrants issued by courts, 34, was the highest since the law came into effect. Cases in 2010 included drug smuggling, a gangland murder and gun possession. Under the law, wiretapping is limited to illegal guns, gun possession, human smuggling and gang-related murder, not typical white collar crimes.
22 ibid., 49.
23 See Jeff Kingston, Japan's Quiet Transformation (Routlege, 2004), pp. 56-65.
24 Quotes regarding the Hakamada case are drawn from here and here.
25 Ezoe Hiromasa, Where is the Justice? Media Attacks, Prosecutorial Abuse, and My 13 Years in Japanese Court. Kodansha International: Tokyo, 2010.
26 For discussion of why corruption cases are difficult to prosecute with reference to the Recruit case see, David T. Johnson Why the Wicked Sleep: The Prosecution of Political Corruption in Postwar Japan, JPRI Working Paper No. 34: June 1997.
27 This and subsequent Ezoe quotes draw on author interview with Ezoe August 27,2010.
28 Sakagami Ryo, Bungei Shunju, October 2010, pp. 346-61.
29 Takai Yasayuki, Horie's lawyer and a former prosecutor, argued that Horie was framed and that the evidence was weak. According to him traditional customs and expectations often defy true justice. Japan Times, Sept., 8, 2006.
30 Takafumi Horie, Tetei Kosen (Total Resistance) Shueisha, 2009.
31 Online Gendai Business (8/19/2010) Tahara Soichiro's interview of Horie. Tahara, a prominent journalist, wrote a book on Ezoe's Recruit scandal (Seigino Wana, Justice Trap: Shogakukan, 2007), in which he argues Ezoe was unjustly prosecuted.
32 David Johnson, “US is No Role Model for Prosecutor Reform”, Japan Times, 10/20/10.
33 Japan Times 10/2/2010. Link.
34 Editorial, Japan Times, 1/3/2011, p.12.
35 “Official acquitted over postal scandal calls for greater investigation transparency” Mainichi Daily News, January 28, 2011. Link.
36 Editorial, Asahi Shimbun, 12/25/2010.
37 “Prosecutors' move toward interrogation transparency a small first step”, link.
38 In general, six lay judges adjudicate cases and determine sentences working with three professional judges. For details on the lay judge system see David Johnson, “Early Returns from Japan's New Criminal Trials,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol 36-3-09. September 7, 2009.
39 See Weber, op.cit., 12-16; Foote, op.cit., p. 35.
40 Foote, p. 36.
41 On transparency see Kingston, op. cit., 42-69 and 85-94. On due process see, Noriho Urabe, “Rule of Law and Due Process: A Comparative View of the United States and Japan”, Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 53, no. 1 (Winter 1990), 61-72.
42 Wilson, op.cit., 2.
43 ibid., 2.
44 On confession rate see Weber, op.cit., p.7.
45 Ibid. p.6.
46 ibid., 11.
47 ibid., 25.
48 Setsuo Miyazawa, The Politics of Increasing Punitiveness and the Rising Populism in Japanese Criminal Justice Policy“, Punishment and Society, vol. 10, (1) 2008, 47-77.
49 ibid., p.20. See pp.18-23 for a lengthy discussion of the various merits of full electronic recording of interrogations and the positive experience of other countries.
50 Ibid., pp. 67-68.
51 Ibid., p. 70.
52 ibid., p.70.
53 David Johnson, Justice System Reform: Where are the Police and Why Does it Matter?, p.4. Visited March 1, 2011.
54 ibid., p.8.
55 ibid., p.8.
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