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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 May 2025
On December 6, 2013, Japan's Diet (national assembly) passed a controversial Designated Secrets Protection bill, having rushed it through both chambers in barely a month. Both the Liberal Democratic Party [LDP]-led administration that proposed the bill and the LDP-dominated Diet brazenly disregarded many voices of opposition, expressed in the public comments collected by the government (77% against and 13% for the bill), public opinion polls showing twice as many respondents opposing the bill as those in favor, daily demonstrations in front of the Diet building, and statements by an array of professional organizations: lawyers, journalists, academics, writers, film directors and actors, religious leaders as well as human rights and civil rights advocates. The law, promulgated December 13, 2013 and slated to take effect in a year's time, gives the government potentially unchecked power to designate government information as special secrets, some for an indefinite time, and to punish leakers much more harshly than now. Critics of the law fear that it will further restrict citizens’ already limited access to government information and intimidate public officials, journalists, and citizens, thereby severely eroding the people's constitutionally guaranteed right to know. Despite the grave and far-reaching implications of the legislation that could seriously jeopardize democracy in Japan, the Abe Shinzo administration rammed the bill through the Diet in less than a month: the administration introduced the bill on November 7, and the Diet spent only 67-68 hours to deliberate it, a strikingly brief time compared with more than 210 hours each that the Diet had spent deliberating the 2005 Postal Service Privatization Act and the 2012 legislation relating to the comprehensive reform of social security and tax systems, commonly known as the tax hike legislation.
1 Translator's note: This passage refers to the U.S.-Japan General Security of Military Information Agreement [GSOMIA] signed in 2007. Article 6, clause (b) of the agreement reads: “The recipient Party, in accordance with its national laws and regulations, shall take appropriate measures to provide to the CMI [“Classified Military Information”] a degree of protection substantially equivalent to that afforded by the releasing Party.” Diplomatic Cable “AGREEMENT REACHED ON GSOMIA TEXT”. U.S. prosecutions for disclosing state secrets are based on the Espionage Act of 1917, which provides for up to 10 years of imprisonment for a violation–hence the maximum penalty of 10 years for public officials convicted of Japan's proposed secrecy law. For a discussion of the U.S. experience and a critical examination of Japan's proposed law, see Lawrence Repeta, “A New State Secrecy Law for Japan?,”The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 11, Issue 42, No. 1, October 13, 2013.
2 Translator's note: Also called the “Okinawa reversion secret pact case” or the “Nishiyama case,” this case involved a leak of secret diplomatic cables exchanged between the U.S. and Japan negotiating the return of Okinawa, then under U.S. military rule, to Japan. In June 1971, the two governments signed an agreement for Okinawa reversion, which took place on May 15, 1972. In 1971, Nishiyama Takichi, then a reporter for the Mainichi Shimbun, obtained classified diplomatic documents that showed the existence of a secret pact in which Japan agreed to give the U.S. $4 million to restore farmland that had been requisitioned for bases. In 1972 Nishiyama and the MOFA clerk who gave him the documents were arrested for violating the National Civil Service Act. Prosecution, and the media covering the case, focused on how Nishiyama got his scoop, especially his personal relationship with his source. The trial and its media coverage turned the case into a sex scandal and never probed the state secret that Nishiyama had uncovered. In 1974, the Tokyo district court acquitted him, while giving the MOFA official a suspended six-month sentence. Prosecution appealed Nishiyama's case, and two years later Nishiyama was convicted and given a suspended four-month sentence. In 1978, the Supreme Court dismissed Nishiyama's appeal. In 1994 the United States declassified the secret documents, some of which came to be known in Japan in 2000 and 2002. In 2006 a former high- ranking MOFA official who had been involved in the negotiation of the deal openly admitted its existence. Still, to this day the Japanese government has steadfastly denied the existence of the secret deal and refused to acknowledge the existence of the secret documents. For further information, see Kyodo News, “Secret Details of Sordid Okinawan Reversion Deal Revealed,” published in The Asia-Pacific Journal, May 17, 2007. Even when the Nishiyama case is brought up in relation to the secrecy law today, the focus is on the reporter's news-gathering method and not on the state secret he exposed.
3 Translator's note: The law contains a provision stipulating that employees of contractors will also be subject to aptitude assessments. At a committee hearing in the Upper House on November 28, 2013, Mori Masako, the minister in charge of the bill, stated that not only national government officials but local government officials and contractors would also be subject to aptitude screenings.
4 Translator's note: In the law, screened personnel's criminal records, drug abuse, mental illnesses, drinking habits, financial records are listed. Also included in the evaluation is personal information (name, date of birth, address, and [past] nationality) of the screened person's family (spouse, children, parents, siblings, as well as the spouse's parents and children) and even non-family members who reside in the same dwelling as the screened person.
5 Translator's note: In October 2010, 114 electronic files containing detailed personal information of nearly 1,000 Muslims were leaked through file-sharing software. The information was collected by the Public Security Bureau of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police, which had been established during the Koizumi administration after 9.11. For the Muslim community's reactions to the leak, see David McNeill, “Muslims in shock over police ‘terror’ leak,” Japan Times, November 9, 2010.
6 Translator's note: Although the official was convicted in the district court, he was acquitted in the high court and the Supreme Court.
7 Translator's note: As predicted by Mr. Sakaguchi, the government inserted into the bill a clause that “freedom of the press or reporting that contributes to guaranteeing the people's right to know shall be given sufficient considerations” (Article 22 of the revised bill that passed the Lower House on November 26, 2013; my translation). The full text of the revised bill is available here.
8 The official name is the Act concerning the Measures for Protection of the People in Armed Attack Situations, etc., enacted and enforced in 2004 (link). The law specifies “the responsibilities of the national and local governments, cooperation of the people, measures for evacuated residents, measures for relief of evacuated residents etc., measures related to response to armed attack disaster, and other necessary measures.” This translation is extracted from Law Concerning Measures to Protect People in the Event of … - ICRC.
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