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Japan Crushes Resistance to Restart Nuclear Power Plants

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Thierry Ribault
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Summary

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This article reviews the Abe administration's moves to crush opposition to nuclear power and restart the first nuclear reactors since the closure of all 54 nuclear power plants following the triple meltdown of March 11, 2011. The author punctures official claims of an economic crisis resulting from post-3.11 import of fossil fuels, the basis for the Abe restart program. Likewise, claims that preserving a share of the energy mix to nuclear power is essential and inescapable in order to avert or alleviate climate crisis. Finally, the author considers the implications of government policies for the possible creation of a Japanese nuclear weapons arsenal.

Type
Research Article
Information
Asia-Pacific Journal , Volume 13 , Issue 38 , September 2015 , e5
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BYCreative Common License - NCCreative Common License - ND
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivatives licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is unaltered and is properly cited. The written permission of Cambridge University Press must be obtained for commercial re-use or in order to create a derivative work.
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2015

References

Notes

1 Mainichi, September 11 2015 (http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20150911p2g00m0dm004000c.html)

2 While, unofficially, the radiation exposure limit has been raised for the population, contaminated zones under 20 mSv a year having been progressively reopened to the public since April 2011, the last being the town of Nahara in Fukushima Prefecture where 7,400 residents have been “allowed” to return home permanently in early August (Asahi, June 17 2015 (http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201506170090)), Japanese nuclear plant workers will officially also “be allowed to be exposed” to more than twice the current level of radiation in emergency situations, according to the Nuclear Regulation Authority's Radiation Council. The radiation council announced in a report released July 30, that their radiation exposure limit will be raised from the current 100 mSv to 250 mSv in emergencies (Mainichi, June 17 2015 (http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20150630p2a00m0na018000c.html)).

As for risk communication, it is defined by UNSCEAR experts as the «interactive exchange of information and opinions concerning risks» (p.15). More precisely: “Risk communication isa key component of the risk analysis process, and is linked closely to risk assessment and risk management. Proactive risk communication, coupled with public involvement in the remedial process, is critical to the success of any remedial activity. Addressing public health concerns is a major communication challenge. The building blocks of an effective risk communication strategy are trust, transparency, ethics, technical accuracy, values, credibility and expression of caring.

Different types of messages may be more – or less – suitable for different audiences (e.g. the general public, policy-makers, decision-makers, the mass media). Fears and perceptions need to be addressed – even if they are not commensurate with the actual risks. It is of utmost importance to prevent reactions that themselves carry risk (such as selfadministration of potassium iodide), to allay unnecessary fears (such as avoidance of breastfeeding because of health fears), and to promote healthy coping mechanisms (such as social solidarity)” (Health risk assessment from the nuclear accident after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami based on a preliminary dose estimation, World Health Organization 2013, p.87.) In practical terms, risk communication policy in the Fukushima context consists in educating people to the nuclear culture and to encourage everyone to get used to a contaminated environment through educational workshops on radioactivity and cancer at schools, the dissemination of handbooks teaching how to manage life in a contaminated environment, and TV commercial campaigns on the virtues of fresh products from the contaminated areas.

As for the health effects of the Fukushima disaster, while experts from the UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) have been emphasizing since March 2011 that in Fukushima as in Chernobyl, the social and psychological impacts on health would be greater than the direct effects of radiation, they have also been asserting that “Radiation exposure following the nuclear accident at Fukushima-Daiichi did not cause any immediate health effects”and that “It is unlikely to be able to attribute any health effects in the future among the general public and the vast majority of workers” as was concluded during the 60th session (http://www.unep.org/NewsCentre/default.aspx?DocumentID=2716&ArticleID=9518#sthash.exGWznT4.dpuf) of the Vienna-based UNSCEAR, on May 2013. A more recent report from IAEA reaffirmed the same stance, asserting that, “Because the reported thyroid doses attributable to the accident were generally low, an increase in childhood thyroid cancer attributable to the accident is unlikely” (…) “However, uncertainties remain concerning the thyroid equivalent doses incurred by children immediately after the accident”. According to the report, those uncertainties are largely due to a lack of reliable personal radiation monitoring data immediately after the disaster started, when radioactive iodine and other radioactive materials were spewed into the environment (Japan Times September 1st 2015 (http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/01/national/science-healt…cers-unlikely-riseextent-radiation-exposureunclear/#.VfauSigQDKE)).

Echoing such prophecy and uncertainty based science, the Fukushima Medical University Health Survey identified 98 residents 18 years old and younger diagnosed with thyroid cancer and 14 others diagnosed with possible thyroid cancer, but asserts that no causality relation with the Fukushima accident can be established (Mainichi, September 1st 2015 (http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20150901p2a00m0na002000c.html)). A child in Fukushima Prefecture has been diagnosed with thyroid cancer in the latest health survey, which began in April 2014, and seven others are also suspected of having thyroid cancer but have not received a definitive diagnosis. They all tested negative in the first survey. “Despite the new results, I don't think we need to change our previous view” that they were not affected by radiation, said Hokuto Hoshi, who heads the panel (Japan Times, February 13 2015 (http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/02/13/national/fukushima-child-tests-positive-forthyroid-cancer-in-secondsurvey/#.VfbPyigQDKE)).

3 Source: Energy White Paper 2013, Outline June 2013, Agency for Natural Resources and Energy.

4 Le Monde, April 22, 2015 (https://apjjf.org/about: blank).

5 Ministry of Finance, July 2015. (http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/shinbun/trade-st_e/2015/2015075e.pdf)

6 Les cahiers de Global Chance, n°36 novembre2014 (http://www.global-chance.org/IMG/pdf/gc36p47-65.pdf).

7 Asahi, April 28, 2015 (http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201504280045).

8 Asahi, July 10, 2015 (http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201507100068).

9 Asahi, April 29, 2015 (http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201504290056).

10 The first proposed strategy report by the Institute for Sustainable Energy Policies (ISEP) after 3.11 for Japan's mid to long term reorganization of domestic energy was titled “unplanned electricity stoppage to strategically shift energy”. It was released in March 2011. The strategy involves a shift towards a diversified energy policy to stablize energy supply, work towards energy self-sufficiency, and curb global warming. The report sets a goal of reaching 30% renewable power generation by 2020 and 100% by 2050 (http://www.isep.or.jp/en).

11 Mainichi, February 21, 2015 (http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20150221p2a00m0na018000c.html).

12 Mainichi, August 10, 2015 (http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20150810p2g00m0dm066000c.html).

13 Mainichi, August 5, 2015 (http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20150805p2g00m0dm085000c.html).

14 Reporterre, October 2, 2012 (http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20150903p2a00m0na003000c.html).

15 Mainichi, May 25, 2015 (http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20150525p2a00m0na016000c.html).

16 Mainichi, September 3, 2015 (http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20150903p2a00m0na003000c.html).

17 Mainichi, May 25, 2015 (http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20150525p2a00m0na016000c.html).

18 Mainichi, August 10, 2015 (http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20150810p2a00m0na005000c.html).

19 Mainichi, August 11, 2015 (http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20150806p2a00m0na021000c.html).

20 Mainichi, August 11, 2015 (http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20150806p2a00m0na021000c.html).

21 Günther Anders, La violence: oui ou non. Une discussion nécessaire, Éditions Fario, Paris, 2014, p.30.