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In Deep Denial on North Korea and Prospects for US-North Korea Negotiation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 May 2025

Leon V. Siga
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“History is bunk,” Henry Ford once proclaimed. His statement is often cited as evidence for Americans’ lack of interest in the past. But some versions of history are bunk. Two memoirs by National Security Council officials, Victor Cha in the Bush administration and Jeffrey Bader in the Obama administration, reflect Washington's deep denial of its own recent past with North Korea. Deep denial still misinforms - and shackles - U.S. policy.

Type
Research Article
Information
Asia-Pacific Journal , Volume 10 , Issue 34 , August 2012 , e1
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BYCreative Common License - NCCreative Common License - ND
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivatives licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is unaltered and is properly cited. The written permission of Cambridge University Press must be obtained for commercial re-use or in order to create a derivative work.
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2012

References

Notes

1 Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and China's Rise: An Insider's Account of America's Asia Strategy (Washington: Brookings, 2012), p. 7.

2 Bader, p. 92.

3 Victor Cha, The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future ((New York: HarperCollins, 2012), pp. 3, 17.

4 Bader, p. 7. (Emphasis added.)

5 Bader, pp. 29-30.

6 Bader, p. 13.

7 Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington (New York: Crown, 2011), p. 648.

8 Bader, p. 12.

9 Agreed Framework, Section II.

10 Bader, p. 27.

11 Cha, p. 256.

12 Doug Struck, “North Korean Program Not Negotiable, U.S. Told N. Korea,” Washington Post, October 20, 2002, p. A-18. (Emphasis added.)

13 Rice, p. 161. (Emphasis in original.)

14 Rice, p. 162.

15 Cha, p. 278.

16 Cha, p. 257.

17 Rice, p. 159.

18 Rice, p. 163.

19 Rice, p. 348.

20 Rice, p. 525.

21 Rice, p. 521.

22 Cha, p. 264.

23 Cha, p. 10.

24 Bader, pp. 30-32.

25 Bader, p. 31.

26 Bader, pp. 90-91.

27 Cha, p. 242.

28 2007 Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity.

29 Cha, p. 290.

30 Bader, p. 13.

31 Cha, p. 403.

32 Lim Dong-won, Peacemaker: Twenty Years of Inter-Korean Relations and the North Korean Nuclear Issue, (Stanford: Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center/Brookings, 2012).

33 Cha, p. 161.

34 Cha, p. 394.

35 Cha, p. 408.

36 Cha, p. 414.

37 Cha, p. 413.

38 Cha, p. 454.

39 KCNA, “Declaration of G8 Summit Pulling up DPRK over Satellite Launch Refuted,” May 22, 2012.

40 Bader, p. vii.