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Has Komeito Abandoned its Principles? Public Perception of the Party's Role in Japan's Security Legislation Debate

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Summary

This article discusses key political issues surrounding Japan's Legislation for Peace and Security that came into effect on 29 March 2016. The past two years have seen heated public debate and political protests with opposition parties uniting in their opposition to the legislation in their attempt to challenge the LDP-Komeito ruling coalition in the July 10 Upper House election. This challenge continues. In this article, I discuss opposition claims that the security legislation is ‘war legislation’ that poses a threat to Japan's pacifist Constitution. I also discuss the central role played by Komeito in the passage of this legislation and examine the often antagonistic relationship between the LDP and its junior coalition partner, which is often ignored in the simplified narratives of the choice between ‘war and peace’ played out in the public sphere. This article, therefore, addresses not only the legislation but also public perceptions and misperceptions of the issues involved and the underlying political process.

Despite the push for more fundamental change and the heated rhetoric that followed the July 2014 Abe Cabinet Decision on the security legislation and its enactment in September 2015, this article argues that it was a centrist pragmatic development in Japanese politics rather than a radical change, due in large part to the moderating influence of Komeito.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2016

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References

Notes

1 This article draws on my long-term first-hand research amongst supporters of Komeito (primarily Soka Gakkai members) and recent interviews with key Komeito politicians involved in the negotiations. Additional interviews were conducted with former defence ministers from the main opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), current government policy advisors directly involved with the legislation and foreign policy experts who advised during the DPJ administration. I also include the voices of a number of political activists and academics who have been particularly vocal in their opposition to the legislation. The DPJ was renamed Democratic Party (DP) after its merger with the Renovation Party in March 2016 so there is reference to the party at times as DPJ or as DP.

2 Walter Lippmann (1927/1993), The Phantom Public. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

3 Dewey, John (1927/2003) ‘The Public and Its Problems’, reprinted in The Civil Society Reader p. 139, edited by Virginia A. Hodgkinson and Michael W. Foley. Hanover and London: University Press of New England.

4 See here.

5 See Anne Mette Fisker-Nielsen (2016) ‘Peace Through Friendship? The Soka Gakkai 1968 Youth Peace Movement between Japan and China’, New Religious Movements in Asian History. Australia: Brill (2016).

6 Ogawa did not use the term ‘war legislation’ in his campaign pamphlets, but made reference to the ‘unconstitutionality’ of the legislation.

7 See here.

8 For a summary of the security legislation, see here.

9 English version here.

10 Named after Yoshida Shigeru, who was prime minister during 1946-7 and 1948-54, the doctrine prioritised economic growth while relying on the military protection of the US.

11 For the October 2015 change in the JCP position on the issue of the US-Japan Security Treaty and the use of the SDF see here.

12 Author's interview with Miyamoto Tōru 11 April 2016. See also here.

13 ‘Security bills and Komeito’ Komei Shimbun, 16 May 2015.

14 Interview with author 18 April 2016.

15 At the Daiwa Foundation in London (22 Oct 2015) Alessio Patalano, a policy expert at King's College London, made the same argument. See his Japanese Military Power after the Security Legislation (2015). Brunswick: Bloomsbury Publishing.

16 This missile defence system alone would make it extremely difficult for Japan not to be called upon to protect American assets in Japan, such as military bases. See Sheila Smith.

17 For example, see Peter Lee 'China Not Leaving the “South China Sea” in The Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, Vol 14, Issue 6, March 2016.

18 For example, see Masakazu Yamazaki (1992) The Intellectual Community of the Showa Era in Showa: The Japan of Hirohito edited by Carol Gluck and Stephen R. Graubard, W. W. Norton & Company

19 Nathaniel Smith (2013) ‘Facing the Nation’ in Sound Space and Sociality in Modern Japan. Edited by Joseph D. Hankins and Carolyn S. Stevens. Routledge 2013: 41.

20 Ibid. 40.

21 See Oguma Eiji ‘Japan's 1968: A Collective Reaction to Rapid Economic Growth in an Age of Turmoil’, in The Asia Pacific Journal, Vol. 13, Issue 11, March 23, 2015.

22 Tens of thousands, including students from SEALDs, attended a demonstration on 5 June calling for a change of government.

23 The extent of the role of the SDF and the maritime police formed part of the debate on the security legislation.

23 NHK (Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai) Kenshō anpo hōan: ima nani o toubeki ka [Investigation of the security legislation: What should be debated?]

24 See here.

25 SEALDs disbanded in August 2016.

26 See for instance SEALD's recent and much celebrated statement.

27 See for example here.

28 Interview with author 18 April 2016.

29 Interview with author 21 July 2016.

30 Interview with author 19 April 2016.

31 Interview with author 21 July 2016.

32 See also here.

33 Jimbo likewise finds the stance of the current DP leadership difficult to grasp. When I asked his opinion of the joint campaign by the five opposition parties to win the Upper House election based on their opposition to the security legislation, he replied, 'I would say unbelievable. Especially the DP. They were the ruling party for three and a half years; I have many friends there and I personally supported their security policy inside the government. I was foreign advisor to Foreign Minister Maehara and actually wrote his speeches. But what I found, to my great disappointment, when it comes to political debate with regards to the security legislation, those people who worked with me during the administrative processes completely changed their view. They tried to attack the legislation and its due processes. So I was very disappointed with them. But probably the most important motivation that created such a stance against the LDP is their conceptualisation of illegality in terms of the Constitution. They thought that this agenda would capture people's attention and turn them against the legislation. And that is what has actually happened. If you look at the public polls, they show that the majority of people are against the legislation.' Interview with author 15 April 2016.

34 See here.

35 See assessment by political commentator Satō Masaru.

36 Cabinet Decision 1 July 2014.

37 See here.

38 Ibid.

40 A more detailed discussion of the various legal arguments forms part of my forthcoming book.

41 See here.

42 Interview with author 15 April 2016

43 A partial English translation is available.

44 For the Japanese original, see here.

45 Lawrence Repeta, ‘Japan's Democracy at Risk – The LDP's Ten Most dangerous Proposals for Constitutional Change’, The Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 14 July, 2013, Vol. 11, Issue 28, No. 3.

46 Ehrhardt, George et al. (eds.) (2014) Komeito: Politics and Religion, USA: Japan Research Monograph 18, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of Berkeley.

47 See Akimoto Daisuke pp. 159-162, ‘Exercising the right to collective self-defence: an analysis of Japan's Peace and Security Legislation’, ZJAPANR/JJapan. L Nr./No 41 (2016). This provides details of the 116 hours or debate in the House of Representatives and 100 hours debate in the Upper House on the Security Legislation.

48 Author's interview with Toyama 20 April 2016.

49 For the full legislative statement in English, see here.

50 Author's interview with Toyama 20 April 2016.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.

55 Author's interview with Toyama 30 June 2015.

56 Author's interview with Toyama 20 April 2016.

57 Translated by author. Mainichi Shimbun 25 February 2016, interview by Mainichi special advisor Takakazu Matsuda.

58 Author's interview with Toyama 20 April 2016.

59 Ibid.

60 Author's interview with Morimoto 19 April 2016.

61 Translated by author.

62 Takashi Mikuriya 10 November 2015.

63 Ibid. translated by author.

64 Author's interview with Toyama 20 April 2016.

65 Ibid.

66 See also Akimoto 2016 on the overlap between individual self-defence (ISD) and CSD.

67 Author's interview with Toyama 20 April 2016.

68 For example, see ‘Minesweeping in Mideast “OK under changes”‘, Japan Times, 14 July 2014.

69 See minutes from the 20th meeting of the Special Committee of the House of Councillors on the Legislation for Peace and Security of Japan and the International Community, the 189th Diet Session, 14 September 2015.

70 Author's interview with Toyama 20 April 2016.

71 Interview with author September 2015.

72 Adding content to the existing Constitution rather than all-out constitutional revision.

73 Interview with author June 2015.

74 For an in-depth discussion of some of these issues, see Levi McLaughlin ‘Komeito's Soka Gakkai Protesters and Supporters: Religious Motivations for Political Activism in Contemporary Japan’, The Asia-Pacific Journal 12 October 2015, Vol. 13, Issue 40, No. 1.

75 ‘LDP Vice President Negative about Revising Constitution's Article 9‘, Jiji Press English News Service, 26 July 2016.

76 See here; see also here and here.

77 Translated by the author. Asahi Shimbun online 9 July 9 2016.

78 Author's interview with Ueda Isamu, chairman of Komeito's International Affairs Committee June 2015.

79 Comments made at a press meeting 5 July 2016.