¹ Dana Priest and William Arkin, Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American Security State (New York: Little Brown, 2011), 52.

² E.g. Marc Ambinder and D.G. Grady, Deep State: Inside the Government Secrecy Industry (New York: Wiley, 2013); John Tirman, “The Quiet Coup: No, Not Egypt. Here,” HuffingtonPost, July 9, 2013, here.

³ Erich Lichtblau, “In Secret, Court Vastly Broadens Powers of N.S.A.,” New York Times, July 6, 2013.

⁴ In addition there are unproven allegations that the United States granted a green card to Ayman al Zawahiri, identified in the 9/11 Commission Report (p. 57) as “the most important Egyptian in bin Laden's circle,” and since 2011 the leader of al-Qaeda (Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed, The War On Truth: 9/11, Disinformation And The Anatomy Of Terrorism [Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2005], 46). It is not contested that “Foreign trial transcripts and U.S. court records confirmed that Zawahiri had previously flown to America, once in the early 1990s, and again in 1994…. Ali Mohamed, bin-Laden's American-trained military adviser, served as Zawahiri's host during the 1994 American fundraising campaign” (Jayna Davis, The third terrorist: the Middle East connection to the Oklahoma City bombing [Nashville, TN: WND Books, 2004], 31819).

⁵ Richard Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror (New York: Free Press, 2004), 30.

⁶ It is relevant that in 2011 the U.S. provided assistance to the armed overthrow of Gaddafi in Libya, by a violent resistance force in which the MB were prominent. See Peter Dale Scott, “The Libyan War, American Power and the Decline of the Petrodollar System”,” Asian- Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, April 27, 2011, here.

⁷ E.g. Mark Mazzetti, “Spy Agencies Say Iraq War Worsens Terrorism Threat,” New York Times, September 23, 2006, here.

⁸ A recent FBI circular instructs enforcement officials that people should be “considered suspicious” of possible involvement in “terrorist activity” if they hold the “attitude” described as “Conspiracy theories about Westerners” (Ralph Lopez, “FBI calls half of populace with 9/11 doubts potential terrorists,” Crime, September 19, 2013, here; citing FBI circular, “Potential Indicators of Terrorist Activities Related to Sleepers”].

⁹ Jean-Charles Brisard and Guillaume Dasquié, Ben Laden: la vérité interdite (Paris: Denoël, 2001), 14.

¹⁰ Robert Baer, See No Evil: the true story of a ground so¡dier in the CIA's war on terrorism (New York: Crown Publishers, 2002), 243-44; discussion in Peter Dale Scott, Drugs, oil, and war: the United States in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Indochina (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). 28-31; The Road to 9/11: Wealth, Empire, and the Future of America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 170-72.

¹¹ Cf. my enlargement of the concept of an American deep state beyond parallel government in Peter Dale Scott, American War Machine (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), 20-23; Peter Dale Scott, “The ‘Deep State’ behind U.S. democracy,” VoltaireNet, April 6, 2011, here; etc.

¹² All of America's military engagements since 1950 have involved defense of the petrodollar system. See Peter Dale Scott, “The Libyan War, American Power and the Decline of the Petrodollar System,” Asian-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, April 27, 2011, here.

¹³ Peter Lance, Triple Cross: How bin Laden's Master Spy Penetrated the CIA, the Green Berets, and the FBI – and Why Patrick Fitzgerald Failed to Stop Him (New York: Regan/ HarperCollins, 2006), 120-25. Cf. Toronto Globe and Mail, November 22, 2001; Tim Weiner, Enemies: a history of the FBI (New York: Random House, 2012), 397.

¹⁴ Ali H. Soufan, The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against al-Qaeda (New York: Norton, 2011), 75-77.

¹⁵ Lance, Triple Cross, 373. Cf. J.M. Berger, “Paving the Road to 9/11,” Intelwire, here: “Ali Mohamed was the utility player who created al Qaeda's terrorist infrastructure in the United States – a series of connections, ideas, techniques and specific tools used by the [9/11] plot's hijackers and masterminds…. Mohamed described teaching al Qaeda terrorists how to smuggle box cutters onto airplanes.”

¹⁶ Lance, Triple Cross, 123-24.

¹⁷ Soufan, The Black Banners, 561. The testimony of former FBI agents like Ali Soufan that Mohamed was not incarcerated has been challenged in a curious book by Special Forces veteran Pete Blaber, The Mission, The Men, and Me: Lessons from a Former Delta Force Commander (New York: Berkley Trade, 2010). Blaber claims to have interviewed Mohamed in a prison cell, after reading Mohamed's perceptive document on how to track down Osama bin Laden. Blaber argues strenuously that Mohamed was not a double agent, but fails to deal with any of the countervailing evidence (such as the RCMP release).

¹⁸ “D.E.A. Deployed Mumbai Plotter Despite Warning,” New York Times, November 8, 2009; cf. Scott, American War Machine, 246-47. Cf. The Globe and Mail (Canada), May 26, 2011: “FBI thought Mumbai massacre plotter worked for them, court told.” Another much simpler domestic example of this puzzle is Richard Aoki, the FBI informant who in the 1960s supplied the Black Panthers in Oakland with arms (Seth Rosenfeld, Subversives: The FBI's War on Student Radicals, and Reagan's Rise to Power [New York: Macmillan, 2012], 418-24, etc.).

¹⁹ Peter Dale Scott, The Road to 9/11: Wealth, Empire, and the Future of America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 151-60. For a summary, see Peter Dale Scott, “Bosnia, Kosovo, and Now Libya: The Human Costs of Washington's On-Going Collusion with Terrorists,” Asian-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, July 29, 2011, here.

²⁰ Steven Emerson, American jihad: the terrorists living among us (New York: Free Press, 2002), 57-58; Peter L. Bergen, Holy war, Inc.: inside the secret world of Osama bin Laden (New York: Free Press, 2001), 135; Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al- Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Knopf, 2006), 181-82. Wright gives a detailed summary of John Zent's ensuing interview with Mohamed in May 1993, but says not a word about Zent's intervention with the RCMP. To my knowledge the only privileged book to do so is Tim Weiner, Enemies: a history of the FBI (New York: Random House, 2012), 397: “He explained that he was working for the FBI and he offered the telephone number of his Bureau contact in San Francisco. The Canadians released Mohamed after the agent vouched for him.” Weiner's relative candor came in 2012, long after this FBI scandal had already been publicized by Lance and other authors, including myself.

²¹ Cf. Washington Post, June 1, 2012: “Soufan's case was unusual because he never worked for the CIA. The PRB's [Publications Review Board's] authority [i.e. legal authority] is grounded in the secrecy agreements signed by agency employees that require them to submit any material prepared for public disclosure ‘either during my employment … or at anytime thereafter.’“ In other words, the CIA's PRB had no legal right to censor Soufan's book, but did so anyway - an example of the blurring of past bureaucratic distinctions in today's shadow state.

²² Michael Scheuer, Osama bin Laden (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 218n.

²³ “Ali Mohamed Case,” Defense Human Resources Activity (DHRA), Department of Defense, here; citing the Toronto Globe and Mail.

²⁴ Benjamin Weiner and James Risen, “The Masking of a Militant: A special report; A Soldier's Shadowy Trail In U.S. and in the Mideast,” New York Times, December 1, 1998. This embarrassing exercise in damage control cannot be found on Lexis Nexis.

²⁵ Peter Waldman, Gerald F. Seib, Jerry Markon, Christopher Cooper, “Sergeant Served U.S. Army and bin Laden, Showing Failings in FBI's Terror Policing,” Wall Street Journal, November 26, 2001.

²⁶ Daniel Coleman, Affidavit, Sealed Complaint, United States of America v Ali Abdelseoud Mohamed, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, September 1998 (obtained by INTELWIRE.com), p.7, here. In fact Mohamed had been an FBI informant since at least 1992 (see below).

²⁷ I had no choice but to remove certain relevant material from The Road to 9/11. As British and American lawyers pointed out to me, my sources had already retracted their statements before me.

²⁸ Lance, Triple Cross, 12 5. Cf. Steven Emerson, “Osama bin Laden's Special Operations Man,” Journal of Counterterrorism and Security International, September 1, 1998, here: “In a seemingly bizarre twist, while in California, Mohammed volunteered to provide information to the FBI on a smuggling operations involving Mexicans and other aliens not connected to terrorist groups. Within time, officials say, the relationship allowed Mohammed to divert the FBI's attention away from looking at his real role in terrorism into examining the information he gave them about other smuggling.” But it could not have diverted the FBI's attention for very long. By May 1993, five months later, Mohamed had described to Zent in some detail his activities with Obama and al-Qaeda (Wright, Looming Tower, 181-82; J. M. Berger, ed., Ali Mohamed: An Intelwire Sourcebook (Intelwire Press, 2006), 31-32).

²⁹ Lance, Triple Cross, 95. Cf. Tim Weiner, Enemies, 397.

³⁰ Lance, Triple Cross, 99. Similarly Tim Weiner writes that the FBI agents handling Mohamed “did not comprehend him” (Weiner, Enemies: a history of the FBI, 397).

³¹ “Ali Mohamed Case,” Defense Human Resources Activity (DHRA), Department of Defense, here, emphasis added.

³² Miller, Stone, Mitchell, The Cell, 90-91.

³³ U.S. vs. Omar Abdel Rahman et al., September 11, 1995; quoted in Berger, Ali Mohamed, 210; cf. Lance, Triple Cross, 48.

³⁴ “Sergeant Served U.S. Army and bin Laden,” Wall Street Journal, November 26, 2001: “At the time, the FBI wrote them off as harmless zealots, fired up to help the mujahedeen fighting the Soviet puppet government in Afghanistan.”

³⁵ Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 134. The al-Kifah Center (al-Kifah means “the struggle”] was “known informally as ‘the jihad office.’… There was no problem finding volunteers, who might stay in Afghanistan up to three months at a time. The volunteers joined the forces of the Hezb-I-Islami (Party of Islam), led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar” (Stephen Franklin, “Slain Muslim Had Link To Radical Cleric,” Chicago Tribune, July 11, 1993, here.)

³⁶ Mitchell D. Silber, The Al Qaeda Factor: Plots Against the West (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 169-70.

³⁷ Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 130-31.

³⁸ Lawrence Wright, Looming Tower, 180; citing Boston Globe, February 3, 1995; cf. Robert Friedman, “The CIA's Jihad,” New Yorker, March 17, 1995; Paul L. Williams, Al Qaeda: brotherhood of terror ([Parsippany, NJ?]: Alpha, 2002), 117.

³⁹ Lance Williams and Erik McCormick, “Al Qaeda terrorist worked with FBI,” San Francisco Chronicle, November 4, 2001.

⁴⁰ “Ali Mohamed Case,” Pentagon, here.

⁴¹ Robert Friedman, “The CIA and the Sheik,” Village Voice, March 30, 1993; Evan Kohlmann, Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe (New York: Berg, 2004), 26.

⁴² John Miller, Michael Stone, Chris Mitchell, The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot, and Why the FBI and CIA Failed to Stop It (New York: Hyperion, 44. Cf. J.M. Berger, Jihad Joe: Americans who go to war in the name of Islam, (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2011), 44: “The stash included military training manuals and documents given to Nosair by Sergeant Ali Mohamed, the jihadist mole at Fort Bragg.”

⁴³ Newsday, November 8, 1990.

⁴⁴ New York Times, November 8, 1990.

⁴⁵ New York Times, December 16, 1990. Compare the Pentagon's terrorist account of the training given by Mohamed (“surveillance, weapons and explosives”] with the more benign version in the long article about Mohamed in the New York Times: “Mr. Mohamed met the local Muslims at an apartment in Jersey City, and taught them survival techniques, map reading and how to recognize tanks and other Soviet weapons, according to testimony by one of his students at Mr. Nosair's 1995 Federal trial” (Weiner and Risen, “The Masking of a Militant: A special report,” New York Times, December 01, 1998).

⁴⁶ TV journalist John Miller, a former New York deputy police commissioner who would later become the FBI's Assistant Director for Public Affairs, reported in The Cell (44) that the disputed evidence from Nosair's home was withheld from NYPD officer Edward Morris, who prepared the NYPD case against Nosair: “On the third day after the shooting, while Norris was out to lunch, the FBI removed Nosair's 16 boxes of files from Norris's squad room. Unfortunately the evidence was about to enter a black hole. The FBI now says it turned the files the evidence was about to enter a black hole. The FBI now says it turned the files over to the Manhattan District Attorney's Office, after it was decided, following a series of meetings and phone calls, that the local prosecutor and the NYPD would have exclusive jurisdiction over the murder case. The Manhattan DA's office won't comment on what was done with the files before Nosair's trial, though Norris was never informed they were available. But this much is certain: The bulk of the material remained untranslated and unread for nearly three years.” [This last sentence is hard to reconcile with the detailed description given at the time by Borelli.]

⁴⁷ Friedman, “The CIA's Jihad.”

⁴⁸ Lance, Triple Cross, 58-62.

⁴⁹ For the list, see Lance, Triple Cross, 574-75.

⁵⁰ Steve Coll, Ghost wars: the secret history of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 251.

⁵¹ Quoted in Peter Lance, Triple Cross, 383.

⁵² Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, 255; “Since 1989 the FBI had been running paid informants inside circles of Islamic radicals in New York and New Jersey. In 1990, the FBI carted away forty- seven boxes of documents and training manuals from the home of El Sayyid Nosair.” Cf. Lance, Triple Cross, 73-75, etc.

⁵³ Robert Friedman, “The CIA's Jihad,” New Yorker, March 17, 1995.

⁵⁴ Robert Dreyfuss, Devil's Game: how the United States helped unleash fundamentalist Islam (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003), 73-79, 98-108, 120-25. Cf. Robert Baer (a former CIA officer), Sleeping with the Devil (New York: Crown, 2003), 99: “The White House looked on the Brothers as a silent ally, a secret weapon against (what else?) communism. This covert action started in the 1950s with the Dulles brothers… when they approved Saudi Arabia's funding of Egypt's Brothers against Nasser;” Scott, Road to 9/11, 44.

⁵⁵ Dreyfuss, Devil's Game, 274-75; quoting John Cooley, Unholy Wars (London: Pluto Press, 1999), 31-32: “By the end of 1980, U.S. military trainers were sent to Egypt to impart the skills of the U.S. Special Forces to those Egyptians who would, in turn, pass on the training to the Egyptian volunteers flying to the aid of the mujahideen in Afghanistan.”

⁵⁶ Joseph J. Trento, Prelude to terror: the rogue CIA and the legacy of America's private intelligence network (New York: Carrol and Graf, 2005), 150, 247.

⁵⁷ “Ali Mohamed Case,” here.

⁵⁸ Cf. Emerson, “Osama bin Laden's Special Operations Man:” “He had been in the United States earlier that decade, having graduated as a captain from a Special Forces Officers School at Fort Bragg in 1981 in a program for visiting military officials from foreign countries.”

⁵⁹ Lance, Triple Cross, 194 (oath).

⁶⁰ Scott, Road to 9/11, 161-62; citing Guardian (London), January 7, 1993; Kohlmann, Al- Qaida's Jihad in Europe, 16.

⁶¹ Ferrukh Mir, Half Truth (iUniverse.com, 2011), 163-64: “In 1992, Ali Mohamed, a double agent and ex-US Special Forces officer with close ties to Al-Kifah, led a group of US militants who were all ex-US soldiers to train and fight in Bosnia. Abu Obadiah Yahiya, an exUS Marine and security chief at the Brooklyn branch, lead [sic] a second group of US militants to fight in Bosnia.” Cf. Mark Huband, Trading Secrets: spies and intelligence in an age of terror (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2013), 112; “Mohamed - using the nom-de-guerre Abu ‘Abdallah - travelled to Bosnia as part of a team which trained and armed Muslim fighters there until June 1993, when he travelled on to Khartoum and was asked by bin Laden to set up the al-Qaeda cell in Nairobi, Kenya.”

⁶² Kohlmann, Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe, 39-41; citing Steve Coll and Steve LeVine, “Global Network Provides Money, Haven,” Washington Post, August 3, 1993. Bin Laden also gave money to the Third World Relief Agency to buy weapons for Bosnian fighters (Anonymous [Michael Scheuer], Through our enemies’ eyes: Osama bin Laden, radical Islam, and the future of America [Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2006], 151).

⁶³ Scott, Road to 9/11, 149-50; Kohlmann, Al- Qaida's Jihad in Europe, 45, 73-75.

⁶⁴ Scott, Road to 9/11, 149; Kohlmann, Al- Qaida's Jihad in Europe, 73. I have been unable to identify this Prince Faisal securely. He is perhaps Prince Faisal bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, who frequently visited the United States in connection with his horse-breeding interests in Kentucky. In 2003 Gerald Posner claimed that Faisal's older brother and business partner Ahmed bin Salman had had ties to al-Qaeda and advance knowledge of 9/11 (Gerald Posner, Why America slept: the failure to prevent 9/11 [New York: Random House,), 202. Cf. Anthony Summers and Robbyn Day, The Eleventh Day: The Full Story of 9/11 and Bin Laden (New York: Ballantine Books, 2011), 405-07, 419, 563-64.

⁶⁵ Friedman, “The CIA's Jihad.” About this time, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in 2013 the leader of al- Qaeda, came without difficulty to America to raise funds in Silicon Valley, where he was hosted by Ali Mohamed (Lawrence Wright, New Yorker. “Zawahiri decided to look for money in the world center of venture capitalism-Silicon Valley. He had been to America once before, in 1989, when he paid a recruiting visit to the mujahideen's Services Bureau branch office in Brooklyn. According to the F.B.I., he returned in the spring of 1993, this time to Santa Clara, California, where he was greeted by Ali Mohamed, the double agent.”)

⁶⁶ Bruce O. Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 43: “Osama also worked with ISI in the creation of a key Kashmiri jihadist group in the late 1980s, the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba.” Cf. Yossef Bodansky, Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America (Rocklin, CA: Forum, 2001), 320.

⁶⁷ Michael Scheuer, “Central Asia in Al-Qaeda's Vision of the Anti-American Jihad, 1979-2006,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly (2006), 3.

⁶⁸ The Black Vault

⁶⁹ Ahmed Rashid, “They're Only Sleeping: Why militant Islamicists in Central Asia aren't going to go away,” New Yorker, January 14, 2002, here; cf. Ahmed Rashid, Jihad (New Haven: Yale UP, 2002), 165; Svante Cornell, “Narcotics, Radicalism and Security in Central Asia: The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,” Uppsala University, December 2004, 19: “Bolot Januzakov, Head of the Kyrgyz Security Council, asserted in 2000 that the IMU controlled the majority, perhaps up to 70%, of the heroin entering Kyrgyzstan.”

⁷⁰ Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror: How Heroin Is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda (New York: Macmillan, 2009), 69, 87, 89, 132-33.

⁷¹ Peters, Seeds of Terror, 132-33.

⁷² 9/11 Commission, “Monograph on Terrorist Financing: Staff Report to the Commission,” 7. Cf. 9/11 Commission Report, 171: “Al Qaeda has been alleged to have used a variety of illegitimate means, particularly drug trafficking and conflict diamonds, to finance itself…. While the drug trade was a source of income for the Taliban, it did not serve the same purpose for al Qaeda.” The footnote to this sentence (p. 499) adds: “No evidence indicates any such involvement in drug trafficking, and none of the detained al Qaeda operatives has indicated that this was a method of fund-raising.”

⁷³ “ Evidence Presented to the British Parliament, 4th October 2001,” Los Angeles Times, October 4, 2001. Cf. New York Times, October 4, 2001. For further documentation, see Peter Dale Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War, 32, 36.

⁷⁴ New York Times, 7/20/93. Cf. J. R. de Szigethy, “Crime Scene – World Trade Center,” AmericanMafia.com, September 2004: “The murders [from the 1993 WTC bombing] were the result of a plot by members of an organized crime syndicate involved in drug trafficking.”

⁷⁵ Jayna Davis, The Third Terrorist: The Middle East Connection to the Oklahoma City Bombing (Nashville: WND Books/Thomas Nelson, 2004), 303.

⁷⁶ Boston Herald, 10/17/01; cf. 9/11 Report, 175.

⁷⁷ Cf. Scott, American War Machine.

⁷⁸ Steven Emerson, American jihad: the terrorists living among us (New York: Free Press, 2002), 28.

⁷⁹ Yossef Bodansky, Terror! The Inside Story of the Terrorist Conspiracy in America (New York: S.P.I. Books, 1994), 166. Similarly Gerald Posner notes “rumors that [Mustafa] Shalabi [the head of the al-Kifah Center until he was murdered in February 1991] … might be involved in counterfeiting” (Posner, Why America slept, 8).

⁸⁰ Berger, Jihad Joe, 37; citing USA v. Rahman, S5 93 Cr. 181, court transcript, April 3, 1995.

⁸¹ Scheuer, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes, 151.

⁸² Emerson, American jihad, 28.

⁸³ Bin Laden's and al-Qaeda's proximity to Khattab is both asserted and disputed at high levels. See Robert W. Schaefer, The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus: from gazavat to jihad (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2011), 165-66.

⁸⁴ Thomas Hegghammer. Jihad in Saudi Arabia: violence and pan-Islamism since 1979 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 56.

⁸⁵ Soufan, Black Banners, 62. Jeremy Scahill also writes of Special Operations veterans in Blackwater with previous “experience in Chechnya” (Jeremy Scahill, Dirty Wars: The World Is a Battlefield [New York: Nation Books, 2013], 408.).

⁸⁶ Berger, Ali Mohamed, 18 (discussed below).

⁸⁷ Yaroslav Trofimov, The Siege of Mecca: The 1979 Uprising at Islam's Holiest Shrine (New York: Anchor, 2008).

⁸⁸ Peter Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan: messianic terrorism, tribal conflicts, and the failures of great powers (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011], 179-82, 195-99.

⁸⁹ Coll, Ghost wars, 155. For Azzam's and OBL's Muslim Brotherhood memberships, see Steve Coll, The Bin Ladens: an Arabian family in the American century (New York: Penguin Press, 2008], 148, 253.

⁹⁰ Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale UP, 2001], 131. Cf. Steven A. Yetiv, The Petroleum Triangle: Oil, Globalization, and Terror (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011], 65.

⁹¹ Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan, 198.

⁹² Scott, Road to 9/11, 171; citing Rajeev Sharma, Pak Proxy War (New Delhi: Kaveri Books, 2002], 145-46.

⁹³ Cf. John J. Loftus, “What Congress Does Not Know about Enron and 9/11,” May 2003, here: “The … block order, in force since the 1980's, was against any investigation that would embarrass the Saudi Royal family. Originally, it was designed to conceal Saudi support for Muslim extremists fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan and Chechnya, but it went too far. Oliver North noted in his autobiography, that every time he tried to do something about terrorism links in the Middle East, he was told to stop because it might embarrass the Saudis. This block remains in place.”

⁹⁴ Scott, Road to 9/11, 172; citing Greg Palast and David Pallister, “Intelligence: FBI Claims Bin Laden Inquiry Was Frustrated,” Guardian, November 7, 2001, here.

⁹⁵ Coleman affidavit, 2; in Berger, Ali Mohamed, 26.

⁹⁶ Coll, The Bin Ladens, 399-401.

⁹⁷ For a summary of some of the conflicting accounts, see Summers and Day, The Eleventh Day, 215-16.

⁹⁸ Coll, Ghost Wars, 231, emphasis added. In 2001 Peter Bergen had claimed that bin Laden “used his family connections with King Fahd to convince the [Saudi] government that he needed to leave the country to sort out some business matters in Pakistan. Arriving there in April 1991, he then sent a letter to his family telling them that he would not be able to return home. After some months in Afghanistan he arrived in Sudan” (Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 8182].

⁹⁹ 9/1 1 Commission Report, 57. In the December 2004 paperback edition of Ghost Wars (231-32], Coll adjusted his account to reconcile with the 9/11 Report. He replaced his sentence, “The escort put bin Laden on a plane out of Saudi Arabia,” with two new ones: “Two associates of bin Laden later offered a different version while under interrogation. They said a dissident member of the royal family helped him leave the country by arranging for bin Laden to attend an Islamic conference in Pakistan during the spring of 1991.” The “Islamic conference” is almost certainly a reference to the negotiations in Peshawar, which produced the Saudi-backed Peshawar Accord (finalized in April 1992] to end the Afghan Civil War. Bin Laden did play a part in these negotiations. Like Sheikh Rahman before him, he tried, vainly, to negotiate a truce between the warring mujahideen leaders, Massoud and Hekmatyar (Wright, Looming Tower, 161; Roy Gutman. How We Missed the Story: Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban and the Hijacking of Afghanistan [Washington DC., Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace, 2008], 34].

¹⁰⁰ Steve Coll also suggests that the “interior ministry” (headed by the Prince] supplied bin Laden with “a one-time exit visa to travel to Pakistan to liquidate investments there” (Coll, The Bin Ladens, 381]. Both motives may have been present in bin Laden's mind, but his capacity to serve as a mediator may have been more influential in persuading the Saudis to arrange for his departure.

¹⁰¹ Wright, Looming Tower, 161. For Naif (or Nayef) as anti-American, see Coll, Ghost Wars, 399; Coll, The Bin Ladens, 437, 626n.

¹⁰² Tomsen, Wars of Afghanistan, 485: “Al- Qaeda, Muslim Brotherhood extremists, and Prince Turki's General Intelligence Directorate supported the ISI's extremist-centered Afghan strategy.”

¹⁰³ Against this odd claim cf. e.g. Wright, Looming Tower, 154: “The minister of the interior, Prince Naif, … summoned bin Laden to his office.. Bin Laden had reported to Naif…many times during the Afghan jihad.” As noted above, Ahmed Rashid claims that bin Laden and Prince Turki became “firm friends and allies” in the same cause (Taliban, 131).

¹⁰⁴ “A Biography of Osama bin Laden,” Frontline, PBS, here.

¹⁰⁵ Anonymous [Michael Scheuer], Through our enemies’ eyes, 131.

¹⁰⁶ Coll, Ghost Wars, 207.

¹⁰⁷ Barnett R. Rubin, Afghanistan in the PostCold war Era (New York: Oxford UP, 2013), 86.

¹⁰⁸ Coll, Ghost Wars, 215-16.

¹⁰⁹ Coll, The Bin Ladens, 403-05: (“Osama now became a target; it is not entirely clear why”).

¹¹⁰ Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan, 337.

¹¹¹ Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan, 406-07.

¹¹² Coll, Ghost Wars, 225.

¹¹³ Scott, American War Machine, 94-105; Peter Dale Scott, The War Conspiracy: JFK, 9/11, and the Deep Politics of War (Ipswich MA: Mary Ferrell Foundation Press, 2008), 98-103.

¹¹⁴ Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, 145.

¹¹⁵ Thomas Goltz, Azerbaijan Diary: A Rogue Reporter's Adventures in an Oil-Rich, War- Torn, Post-Soviet Republic (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), 272-75. Cf. Mark Irkali, Tengiz Kodrarian and Cali Ruchala, “God Save the Shah,” Sobaka Magazine, May 22, 2003, here. A fourth operative in MEGA Oil, Gary Best, was also a veteran of North's Contra support effort. For more on General Secord's and Major Aderholt's role as part of Ted Shackley's team of off-loaded CIA assets and capabilities, see Jonathan Marshall, Peter Dale Scott, and Jane Hunter, The Iran-Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in the Reagan Era (Boston: South End Press, 1987), 26-30, 36-42, 197-98.

¹¹⁶ It was also a time when Congress, under pressure from Armenian voters, had banned all military aid to Azerbaijan (under Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act). This ban, reminiscent of the Congressional ban on aid to the Contras in the 1980s, ended after 9/11. “In the interest of national security, and to help in ‘enhancing global energy security’ during this War on Terror, Congress granted President Bush the right to waive Section 907 in the aftermath of September 11th. It was necessary, Secretary of State Colin Powell told Congress, to ‘enable Azerbaijan to counter terrorist organizations’” (Irkali, Kodrarian and Ruchala, “God Save the Shah,” Sobaka Magazine, May 22, 2003).

¹¹⁷ Goltz, Azerbaijan Diary, 272-75; Peter Dale Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 7. As part of the airline operation, Azeri pilots were trained in Texas. Dearborn had previously helped Secord advise and train the fledgling Contra air force (Marshall, Scott, and Hunter, The Iran-Contra Connection, 197). These important developments were barely noticed in the U.S. press, but a Washington Post article did belatedly note that a group of American men who wore “big cowboy hats and big cowboy boots” had arrived in Azerbaijan as military trainers for its army, followed in 1993 by “more than 1,000 guerrilla fighters from Afghanistan's radical prime minister, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.” (Washington Post, 4/21/94] Richard Secord was allegedly attempting also to sell Israeli arms, with the assistance of Israeli agent David Kimche, another associate of Oliver North. See Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War, 7, 8, 20. Whether the Americans were aware of it or not, the al- Qaeda presence in Baku soon expanded to include assistance for moving jihadis onwards into Dagestan and Chechnya.

¹¹⁸ Cooley, Unholy Wars, 180; Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War, 7. These important developments were barely noticed in the U.S. press, but a Washington Post article did belatedly note that a group of American men who wore “big cowboy hats and big cowboy boots” had arrived in Azerbaijan as military trainers for its army, followed in 1993 by “more than 1,000 guerrilla fighters from Afghanistan's radical prime minister, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.” (Washington Post, April 21, 1994]. The Azeri “Afghan Brigade” was formally dissolved in 1994, after which it focused more on sabotage and terrorism (Cooley, Unholy Wars, 181),

¹¹⁹ As the 9/11Commission Report notes (58], the bin Laden organization established an NGO in Baku, which became a base for terrorism elsewhere. It also became a transshipment point for Afghan heroin to the Chechen mafia, whose branches “extended not only to the London arms market, but also throughout continental Europe and North America (Cooley, Unholy Wars, 176].

¹²⁰ Rubin, Afghanistan from the Cold War, 86.

¹²¹ Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 67. Cf. Ali Soufan, Black Banners, 565 (murder of Anwar Sadat, watch list]; Berger, Jihad Joe, 24 (watch list].

¹²² Lawrence Wright, Looming Tower, 180; cf. Paul L. Williams, Al Qaeda: brotherhood of terror ([Parsippany, NJ?]: Alpha, 2002], 117.

¹²³ “A Soldier's Shadowy Trail In U.S. and in the Mideast,” New York Times, December 1, 1998, here.

¹²⁴ Phil Karber, Fear and faith in paradise: exploring conflict and religion in the Middle East (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012], ZZ; cf. Wright, Looming Tower, 164-65.

¹²⁵ Summers, The Eleventh Day, 393: “Citing a U.S. intelligence source, the author Simon Reeve reported as much in 1999 - well before it became an issue after 9/11.”

¹²⁶ Summers and Swan, The Eleventh Day, 394.

¹²⁷ Coll, The Bin Ladens, 399-401. Cf. Geoffrey Wawro, Quicksand: America's pursuit of power in the Middle East (New York: Penguin Press, 2010]: “Osama mixed business and religion. He committed to build an airport at Port Sudan;” Karber, Fear and faith in paradise: “Bin Laden promised the people of Sudan an airport at Port Sudan.”

¹²⁸ Wright, Looming Tower, 165.

¹²⁹ The text of the State Department paper of August 14, 1996, “State Department Issues Factsheet on Bin Ladin,” is reproduced in Brisard and Dasquié, Ben Laden: la vérité interdite, 257-58.

¹³⁰ The Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan and the Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt were both founded in 1977 with official approval by Prince Mohammed al-Faisal al-Saud, a graduate of Menlo College in California. Cf. “Sudan Islamic Banking,” Photius, here: “The Faisal Islamic Bank, whose principal patron was the Saudi prince, Muhammad ibn Faisal Al Saud, was officially established in Sudan in 1977 by the Faisal Islamic Bank Act. The ‘open door’ policy enabled Saudi Arabia, which had a huge surplus after the 1973 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC] increas127 in the price of petroleum, to invest in Sudan. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood and its political arm, the National Islamic Front, played a prominent role on the board of directors of the Faisal Islamic Bank, thus strengthening the bank's position in Sudan.”

¹³¹ Dreyfuss, Devil's Game, 180-81.

¹³² Jane's Intelligence Review, August 1, 2001; quoted in Scott, Road to 9/11, 356.

¹³³ John Crewdson, “Swiss Officials Freeze Bank Accounts Linked to Supporters of Terrorist Groups.” Chicago Tribune, November 3, 2001, Cf. Ahmed, War on Truth, 98; Financial Times, November 29 2001: “A US State Department report in 1996 and a French investigation into the bank separately concur that bin Laden invested $50m in the bank on his arrival in Sudan in 1991, an allegation Mr Ismail [of the bank] denies.” Cf. also Brisard, Ben Laden: La Verité Interdite, 119-21, 308-10, etc.

¹³⁴ Coll, The Bin Ladens, 413. There is a brief reference to the State Department White Paper in Bergen, Holy Wars, Inc. (2001), 83: “Bin Laden…sank $50 million of his own money into the Al-Shamal Islamic Bank in Khartoum” (cf. 264n). The controversial author Yossef Bodansky links both the Faisal Islamic Bank and the Al-Shamal Bank to significant jihad activities, as well as possible drug trafficking (Bodansky, Bin Laden, 42-43).

¹³⁵ Lance, Triple Cross, 157-59, citing State Department Cable 1994STATE335575.

¹³⁶ Steve A. Yetiv, The petroleum triangle: oil, globalization, and terror (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2011), 114-15.

¹³⁷ Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 108. At ease in Saudi Arabia, Khalifa became a misleading source, rather than a topic of inquiry, in privileged bin Laden books like Lawrence Wright's The Looming Tower (112-13, 450).

¹³⁸ Anonymous [Michael Scheuer], Through our enemies’ eyes, 151.

¹³⁹ Lance, Triple Cross, 161, citing personal interview.

¹⁴⁰ Lance, Triple Cross, 162.

¹⁴¹ Lance, Triple Cross, 157-58.

¹⁴² Khalifa also “headed the Muslim World League office in Peshawar in the 1980s. In 1988, he moved to Manila and opened a branch office of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth [an allied royal creation]” (Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan, 198).

¹⁴³ Baer, Sleeping with the Devil, 167, 140.

¹⁴⁴ Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan, 179-82, 195-99.

¹⁴⁵ Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, 93.

¹⁴⁶ Baer, Sleeping with the Devil, 69; Aaron Mannes, Profiles In Terror: The Guide To Middle East Terrorist Organizations (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 41.

¹⁴⁷ Kumar Ramakrishna (ed.), After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2003), 139.

¹⁴⁸ Wesley J. L. Anderson, Disrupting Threat Finances: Utilization of Financial Information to Disrupt Terrorist Organizations in the Twenty-First Century (S.l.: BiblioScholar, 2012), 14.

¹⁴⁹ Girma Yohannes Iyassu Menelik, Europe: The Future Battleground of Islamic Terrorism (Mūnchen: GRIN-Verlag, 2010), 95.

¹⁵⁰ Kohlmann, Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe, 41-42. Before being captured in Pakistan, Ramzi Yousuf was being sheltered by his maternal uncle Zahid al-Shaikh, a principal with Mercy International (Lance, 1000 Years for Revenge, 189). Mercy International was another Islamic NGO involved in recruiting “international volunteers” for the war in Bosnia (Richard Labévière, Dollars For Terror: The United States and Islam (New York: Algora, 2000), 151.

¹⁵¹ Larry Niksch, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U. S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2007), CRS-4.

¹⁵² Peter L. Bergen, The Osama Bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of Al Qaeda's Leader (New York: Free Press, 2006), 444.

¹⁵³ 9/11 Commission Report, 73; citing Joint Inquiry Report (classified version), 324-28. Cf. pp. 146, 148: “In 1992, KSM… moved his family to Qatar at the suggestion of the former minister of Islamic affairs of Qatar, Sheikh Abdallah., In January 1996, well aware that U.S. authorities were chasing him, he left Qatar for good.”

¹⁵⁴ Robert Baer, Sleeping with the Devil, 18-19, 194-96. Baer heard from another member of the al-Thani family, former police chief Hamad bin Jasim bin Hamad al-Thani, that when KSM came from the Philippines, Abdallah bin Khalid gave him 20 blank Qatari passports. Later, “As soon as the FBI showed up in Doha” in 1996, the emir ordered Abdallah to move KSM out of his apartment to his beach estate, and eventually out of the country (pp. 195-96).

¹⁵⁵ Brian Ross and David Scott, “Al Qaeda Ally? Member of Qatari Royal Family Helped Senior Al Qaeda Official Get Away,” ABCNEWS.com, February 7, 2003, here.

¹⁵⁶ 9/11 Commission Report, 488; citing Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 23, 2003.

¹⁵⁷ 9/11 Commission Report, 171. A Sarajevo paper confirmed that KSM worked for a relief group in Bosnia that “was just a cover for the Cairo-based Islamist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood” (Adnkronos, January 20, 2009, here).

¹⁵⁸ “How Saudi Arabia and Qatar are the Tortoise and the Hare of the Middle East,” The Atlantic, August 27, 2013, here. Qatar's motives for this support seem to be the same as Saudi support earlier, for protection at home: “By aligning itself with [the Brotherhood] Qatar could extend its influence and protect itself from revolution on its own soil, turning the Muslim Brotherhood into an ally rather than a threat” (Frida Ghitis, “Qatar's Risky Bet on the Muslim Brotherhood,” World Policy Review, January 31, 2013).

¹⁵⁹ E.g. Kimberley N. Trapp, State Responsibility for International Terrorism (New York : Oxford University Press, 2011), 51.

¹⁶⁰ Lance, Triple Cross, 2 53; emphasis in original. Lance does discuss the role of Qatar's Sheikh Abdullah in helping KSM to escape the FBI (Cover up: what the government is still hiding about the war on terror [New York: Regan Books, 2004], 168-69).

¹⁶¹ Lance, Triple Cross, 342.

¹⁶² Summers and Day, The Eleventh Day, 410-15, 559-62; Former Senator Bob Graham, Keys to the Kingdom, 131-32; cf. David B. Ottaway, The king's messenger: Prince Bandar bin Sultan and America's tangled relationship with Saudi Arabia (New York: Walker & Company, 2008), 198-99.

¹⁶³ 9/1 1 Commission, ”Appendix A: The Financing of the 9/11 Plot, Staff Report, Terrorist Financing, 1.”Despite persistent public speculation, there is no evidence that the hijackers who initially settled in San Diego, Mihdhar and Hazmi, received funding from Saudi citizens Omar al Bayoumi and Osama Bassnan, or that Saudi Princess Haifa al Faisal provided any funds to the hijackers either directly or indirectly. A number of internal FBI documents state without reservation that Bayoumi paid rent on behalf of Mihdhar and Hazmi, a claim reflecting the initial view of some FBI agents. More thorough investigation, however, has determined that Bayoumi did not pay rent or provide any funding to the hijackers.”

¹⁶⁴ 9/11 Commission Report, 266-72 (272).

¹⁶⁵ Rory O'Connor and Ray Nowosielski, “Who Is Rich Blee?” 911Truth.org, September 21, 2111; Rory O'Connor and Ray Nowosielski, “Insiders voice doubts about CIA's 9/11 story,” Salon, October 14, 2111, here. O'Connor and Nowosielski add corroboration from former Counterterrorism Chief Richard Clarke. “Clarke said he assumed that ‘there was a high-level decision in the CIA ordering people not to share that information.’ When asked who might have issued such an order, he replied, ‘I would think it would have been made by the director,” referring to Tenet — although he added that Tenet and others would never admit to the truth today “even if you waterboarded them.’

¹⁶⁶ Kevin Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots (Walterville, OR: TrineDay, 2011); cf. Peter Dale Scott, “9/11 as a Deep Event: How CIA Personnel Helped Allow It To Happen,” in James R Gourley, ed., The 9/11 Toronto Report: International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 (Seattle, WA: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2012), 109-27. According to Fenton (pp. 72-79), the post-9/11 cover-up of Wilshire's behavior was principally the work of one person, Barbara Grewe, who worked first on the Justice Department Inspector General's investigation of Wilshire's behavior, then was transferred to two successive positions with the 9/11 Commission's staff.

¹⁶⁷ On August 29, less than two weeks before 9/11, this interference led one FBI agent, Steve Bongardt, to predict accurately that “someday someone will die” (9/11 Commission Report, 259, 271; Lawrence Wright, Looming Tower, 352-54; Scott, American War Machine, 203).

¹⁶⁸ Lawrence Wright, “The Agent,” New Yorker, July 10 and 17, 2006, 68; cf. Wright, Looming Tower, 339-44; discussion in Scott, The War Conspiracy, 355, 388-89.

¹⁶⁹ Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots, 383-86.

¹⁷⁰ Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots, 48. Cf. Lawrence Wright, “The Agent,” New Yorker, July 10 and 17, 2006, 68; quoted approvingly in Peter Dale Scott, American War Machine, 399.

¹⁷¹ Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots, 371, cf. 95.

¹⁷² Quoted in Jeremy Scahill, Dirty Wars, 21.

¹⁷³ Tom Wilshire, July 23, 2001, in “United States v. Zacarias Moussaoui (No. 01-455), Substitution for the Testimony of ‘John.’” U.S. Court for the District of Alexandria, July 31, 2006; quoted in Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots, 274, 401.

¹⁷⁴ Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots, 276.

¹⁷⁵ Berger, Ali Mohamed, 17; citing Wayne Parry, “Mysterious pair in custody perplexes federal investigators,” Associated Press, November 11, 2001; Falasten M. Abdeljabbar, “Neighborhood tired of suspicions and fear,” The Jersey Journal, December 18, 2001.

¹⁷⁶ Robert Hanley and Jonathan Miller, “4 Transcripts Are Released In Case Tied to 9/11 Hijackers,” New York Times, June 25, 2003.

¹⁷⁷ Berger, Ali Mohamed, 18; citing John Kifner, “Kahane Suspect Is a Muslim With a Series of Addresses,” New York Times, November 7, 1990; Transcript, Sealed Bail Hearing, US v. El- Atriss, November 19, 2002. The transcripts were unsealed after a lawsuit by several organizations including the New York Times and the Washington Post.

¹⁷⁸ Wayne Parry, “September 11 Fake ID Suspect Flees U.S.,” Associated Press, July 31, 2003, here.

¹⁷⁹ Berger, Ali Mohamed, 18; citing Robert Hanley and Jonathan Miller, “4 Transcripts Are Released In Case Tied to 9/11 Hijackers,” New York Times, June 25, 2003; Wayne Parry, “Judge releases transcripts in Sept. 11 fake IDs case,” Associated Press, June 24, 2003. The New York Times story is worth quoting further: “*Mr. Atriss was a co-founder of a Jersey City check-cashing company, Sphinx Trading Company, that had bank accounts with millions of dollars and had as a co-owner Waleed Abouel Nour, whom the F.B.I. had identified as a terrorist. That business was at the same location, on Kennedy Boulevard, used as a mailing address by several of the hijackers and earlier by Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, whose followers were convicted of the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center.”

¹⁸⁰ Peter Dale Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War, 53. Cf. David E. Spiro, The Hidden Hand of American Hegemony: Petrodollar Recycling and International Markets (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1999), x: “In 1974 [Treasury Secretary William] Simon negotiated a secret deal so the Saudi central bank could buy U.S. Treasury securities outside of the normal auction. A few years later, Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal cut a secret deal with the Saudis so that OPEC would continue to price oil in dollars. These deals were secret because the United States had promised other industrialized democracies that it would not pursue such unilateral policies.

¹⁸¹ See e.g. Michael Quint, “Saudi Prince Becomes Citicorp's Top Stockholder.” New York Times, February 22, 1991.

¹⁸² Andrew Scott Cooper, The Oil Kings: How the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia Changed the Balance of Power in the Middle East (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011), 275, etc.; Scott, Road to 9/11, 33-34.

¹⁸³ F. William Engdahl, A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order (London: Pluto Press, 2004), 173; Andrew Gavin Marshall, “The Imperial Anatomy of Al-Qaeda. The CIA's Drug-Running Terrorists and the ‘Arc of Crisis.’” Global Research, September 4, 2010, here. Cf. Scott, Road to 9/11, 86-89.

¹⁸⁴ “Halliburton to Move Headquarters to Dubai,” New York Times, March 11, 2007, here. Halliburton made this announcement after it was “being investigated by different government agencies for various allegations of improper business dealings, and it is in the cross hairs of Democrats in Congress for alleged overbilling” (ABC News, March 12, 2007, here).

In 2013185 hotel conglomerate Starwood, operating Sheraton and Westin hotels, announced a similar move for a month as “a grand experiment” (Business Insider, April 11, 2013, here).

¹⁸⁵ Energy analyst Roger Read said that if Halliburton “formally incorporates itself in the U.A.E., the banking mecca of the Middle East, company profits will soar…. ‘You'd probably be looking at a tax savings of several hundred million [dollars]. … It's a win for the shareholders’“ (ABC News, March 12, 2007, here).

¹⁸⁶ “Egypt Is Arena for Influence of Arab Rivals,” New York Times, July 9, 2015, here

¹⁸⁷ “Secret Desert Force Set Up by Blackwater's Founder,” New York Times, May 14, 2011, here.

¹⁸⁸ David E. Sanger and Nicole Perlroth, “After Profits, Defense Contractor Faces the Pitfalls of Cybersecurity,” New York Times, June 15, 2013, here).

¹⁸⁹ Kevin Phillips, Wealth and Democracy: a political history of the American rich (New York: Broadway Books, 2002), 71.

¹⁹⁰ “Nye Denies Inquiry ‘Cleared’ Morgan, New York Times, February 10, 1936;

¹⁹¹ Summers with Swan, Arrogance of Power, 283; Baer, Sleeping with the Devil, 43 (briefcase); Renata Adler, “Searching for the Real Nixon Scandal,” Atlantic [December 1976], 76-84 Rebozo's bank).

¹⁹² Russ Baker, Family of secrets: the Bush dynasty, the powerful forces that put it in the White House, and what their influence means for America (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009), 304; citing Craig Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud, 34.

¹⁹³ Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud, 101.

¹⁹⁴ Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud, 122; cf. Scott, Road to 9/11, 176-78.