¹ Prange, Pearl Harbor, 515. Morgan recounted this to Prange in an interview in October - 1976.

² Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 259; Prange, At Dawn We Slept, 689; Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor, -392.

³ Prange, Pearl Harbor, 552; Goldstein and Dillon, The Pearl Harbor Papers, -121.

⁴ Goldstein and Dillon, The Pearl Harbor Papers, -122.

⁵ The conflicting images of Japan at the turn of the century emerge vividly in several lavishly illustrated units on the “Visualizing Cultures” website produced at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology by John W. Dower and Shigeru Miyagawa. See visualizingcultures.mit.edu, and particularly “Throwing Off Asia” (in three parts), “Asia Rising,” and “Yellow Promise/Yellow Peril.” The latter two units are based on Japanese and foreign postcards of the Russo-Japanese War in the Leonard Lauder Collection at the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, and “Yellow Promise/Yellow Peril” is particularly illuminating on the ambiguous European response to Japan's stunning emergence as a powerful imperialist -power.

⁶ Business Week, September 1, 1945. This ad is reproduced in John W. Dower, “Graphic Japanese, Graphic Americans: Coded Images in U.S.-Japanese Relations,” in Akira Iriye and Robert A. Wampler, eds., Partnership: The United States and Japan, 1951-2001 (Kodansha International, 2001), 304-5.

⁷ For general treatments of these matters, see Akira Iriye, Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897-1911 (Harvard University Press, 1972); also Spector, Eagle against the Sun, esp. chs. 1-5. The 127 tests and revisions of Orange are noted in ibid., -57.

⁸ On the B-17 bombers, see Prange, Pearl Harbor, 145-52, 290-93; also Spector, Eagle against the Sun, 74-75. The three Pearl Harbor alerts are described in detail in Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor, 71-169.

⁹ See, for example, Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941 (Cornell University Press, 1987).

¹⁰ Prange, Pearl Harbor, 537, 555-56; Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor, 336-38; E. Kathleen Williams, “Air War, 1939-41,” in Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. 1: Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942(University of Chicago Press, 1948), 79-80. On the development of the Mitsubishi Zero as seen from the Japanese side, see the translated account by the chief designer Jiro” Horikoshi, Eagles of Mitsubishi: The Story of the Zero Fighter (Washington University Press, 1980); also Akira Yoshimura, Zero Fighter (Praeger, 1996).

¹¹ Prange, Pearl Harbor, 550, 569; H. P. Willmott, The Second World War in the Far East (Smithsonian Books, 1999), 54, 66, 78, 83-84; Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Indiana University Press, 1973), -276.

¹² For an archives-based analysis of World War II in Asia that is acutely sensitive to (and quotable about) Anglo racism, see Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War against Japan, 1941-1945 (Oxford University Press, 1979). American racism vis-à-vis Asians was complicated by the positive attitude many Americans had come to hold toward China by the late 1930s. Although “anti-Oriental” movements and legislation constitute a deep stain in U.S. history of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, sympathy toward the Chinese in their struggle against the Japanese was strong—a development that derived in considerable part from the exceedingly effective positive image of the Chinese purveyed by popular writers such as the Nobel Prize-winning Pearl Buck. I address these matters at length in War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (Pantheon, 1986).

¹³ It is worth keeping in mind that surprise attacks have been common in modern times. These include the attack by Germany on the Soviet Union in 1941; by North Korea on South Korea in 1950, and soon after this the entry of the People's Republic of China into the Korean War; and the Tet offensive in the Vietnam War in -1968.

¹⁴ For examples of the bedrock assumptions noted here, see Ike, Japan's Decision for War, 78, 80, 82, 148, 152, -160.

¹⁵ Ike, Japan's Decision for War, 238, -246.

¹⁶ Katharine Sansom, Sir George Sansom and Japan: A Memoir (Diplomatic Press, 1972), 156 (MacArthur's quote).

¹⁷ Goldstein and Dillon, The Pearl Harbor Papers, 155. For the Missouri surrender ceremony, see Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 14: Victory in the Pacific (Little, Brown, 1960), 362-63. The flag that had been flying over the Capitol on December 7 had previously been displayed at Casablanca (where the Allied policy of “unconditional surrender” was announced in February 1943), Rome, and -Berlin.

¹⁸ Japan's vision of what was needed to be secure and self-sufficient escalated steadily after the Manchurian Incident of 1931, with huge leaps taking place in 1937, with the invasion of China; in mid-1940, with the movement of Japanese forces into northern French Indochina; and of course in 1941, when the “move South” precipitated the attack on Pearl Harbor. As the empire expanded, so inevitably did the political rhetoric that accompanied it. Thus, the proclaimed “New Order” of 1938 (embracing Japan, China, and the puppet state of Manchukuo) metamorphosed into the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in 1940. Until around 1936, advocates of the “move South” fought a vigorous internecine battle with proponents of a “move North” against the Soviet Union, aimed at seizing the strategic resources of the Soviet Far East. (The Japanese army was more inclined to “move North” than the navy.) The “move North” argument continued to be advocated up to the eve of the Pearl Harbor attack, and the Americans were well aware of this from their intercepts of the Japanese diplomatic code. This was yet one more distraction—one more example of “noise”—that compounded the analysis of Japan's intentions. Some high-level U.S. planners (such as Rear Admiral Richmond Turner of the War Plans Division) were so fixated on the “move North” possibility that, in the eyes of later critics, they seriously impeded balanced intelligence analysis; Prange, Pearl Harbor, 326-31, is strong on this. For a close analysis of the “rational” quest for autarky or autonomy that drove Japanese expansion from the Manchurian Incident to the war with China, see James B. Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930-1938 (Princeton University Press, 1966).

¹⁹ The 9-11 Commission Report, 341-42; Clarke, Against All Enemies, ch. 6 (133-54), esp. 148. Terrorist attacks on U.S. targets abroad also mark this period, of course, notably those in Beirut (1982), Libya (“Pan Am 103” in 1988), Somalia (1993, later identified as involving Al Qaeda), Saudi Arabia (1995-96), and Kenya and Tanzania (1998, instigated by Al Qaeda).

²⁰ This timetable for planning the Pearl Harbor attack has been extracted from Prange, At Dawn We Slept, 15, 27-28, 101, 106, 157-58, 223-31, 299, 309, 324, 328, 345, 372. On Al Qaeda's planning, see The 9-11 Commission Report, -365.

²¹ Warren I. Cohen, “The Role of Private Groups in the United States,” in Borg and Okamoto, Pearl Harbor as History, 421-58. The well-known scholars of Far Eastern affairs who urged conciliation with Japan included Payson Treat, A. Whitney Griswold, and Paul Clyde; ibid., 452-53. Cohen concludes his detailed study with the observation that “the American people remained overwhelmingly opposed to involvement in the Far Eastern conflict or in any war”; ibid., -456.

²² Grew abandoned his general policy of appeasing Japan in a famous “green light” cable to the State Department on September 10, 1940, but continued to maintain hope that U.S. responsiveness to Japan's perceived interests would strengthen the influence of “moderates” within the Japanese government. His September 1941 advocacy of “constructive conciliation” came in conjunction with proposals for a personal meeting between Roosevelt and Prime Minister -Konoe.

²³ Mira Wilkins, “The Role of U.S. Business,” in Borg and Okamoto, Pearl Harbor as History, 341-76. This excellent analysis includes useful tables and charts. For the Fortune opinion poll, see 350-51; Wilkins speculates that the poll, published in September 1940, was probably conducted in early July—just before the Roo-sevelt administration imposed the first serious restrictions on strategic -exports.

²⁴ Steve Coll's Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (Penguin, 2004), won the Pulitzer Prize. See esp. 9293, 97-98 on Casey; 90, 104 on translation of the Qur’an; 11, 125-37, 149-51, 175 on weapons and other support for the Afghan fighters; and 155 on moral support for the nonAfghan mujahideen. The U.S. role in playing midwife to the mujahideen is also documented in vivid detail in Robert Dreyfuss, Devil's Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam (Metropolitan, 2005), esp. ch. 11. The photograph of President Reagan meeting with mujahideen “freedom fighters” from Afghanistan is reproduced on the cover of Eqbal Ahmad, Terrorism: Theirs and Ours (Seven Stories Press, 2002).

²⁵ Benazir Bhutto, Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy, and the West (HarperCollins, 2008), ch. 3, esp. 81-85, 149-55. Bhutto's secret role in providing covert aid to the Taliban is noted in Coll, Ghost Wars, 289-94, 298-300.

²⁶ Bin Laden, Messages to the World, 48 (March 1997), 65, 82 (December 1998), 109 (October 21, 2001), 192-93 (February 14, 2003). On the absence of counterinsurgency doctrine and training, see chapter 5 (notes 176-178 of this book).

²⁷ Clifford J. Levy, “Poker-Faced, Russia Flaunts Its Afghan Card,” New York Times, February 22, -2009.

²⁸ Freeman is quoted in Dreyfuss, Devil's Game, 290-91 (from an April 2004 interview with the author).

²⁹ Scheuer, Imperial Hubris, 197-98.

³⁰ Clarke, Against All Enemies, 30-32, -232.

³¹ The 9-11 Commission Report, 339-48.

³² The 9-11 Commission Report, 364; Hersh, Chain of Command, 91-92; Michael A. Sheehan, Crush the Cell: How to Defeat Terrorism without Terrorizing Ourselves (Crown, 2008), 6, 14. Jack Goldsmith, a conservative lawyer who became head of the president's Office of Legal Counsel in October 2003, devotes an entire chapter of his book to the role of “fear bordering on obsession” in driving post-9-11 administration policies; The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment inside the Bush Administration (Norton, 2007), ch. 3 (esp. 7176), also 165-67.

³³ Nathaniel Pfeffer, “Japanese Superman? That, Too, Is a Fallacy,” New York Times Magazine, March 22, 1942. In a book written many years ago, I dwelled at length on images of the enemy from both sides of the war in the Pacific, including the metamorphoses of the Japanese from little men to supermen. See War Without Mercy, esp. ch. 5 (“Lesser Men and Supermen”). This is not a unique phenomenon, and need not involve race. A similar “little men to supermen” transformation took place, for example, in the so-called missile-gap crisis that followed the Soviet test of an intercontinental ballistic missile in -1957.