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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2025
This summer, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PAC) held the first oral hearings in the case brought by the Philippines against China concerning the South China Sea. Before considering any substantive issues, the PAC has to decide whether it has jurisdiction to issue a ruling. Earlier, the closing weeks of 2014 had seen three significant developments, with Hanoi making a submission to the PAC, Beijing publishing a position paper (while not submitting it to the Court), and the United States issuing a position paper of its own. We can also mention the continued interest in the South China Sea by other countries, including India and Russia. Taken together, it means that the time may have arrived to take stock of the arbitration case, updating our previous summer of 2013 piece “Manila, Beijing, and UNCLOS: A Test Case?”. At stake is not only this arbitration case, or even the entire South China Sea, but the role of international law in contributing to peaceful solutions to territorial conflicts, specifically whether it can help accommodate changes in relative power without recourse to military conflict.
1 Shannon Tiezi, “In the Philippines' South China Sea Case, Is International Law on Trial?”, The Diplomat, 14 July 2015, available here.
2 A. Calvo, “Manila, Beijing, and UNCLOS: A Test Case?”, The Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, Volume 11, Issue 34, No. 11, 26 August 2013, available here. Also published by The Asia Times, 3 September 2013.
3 Zuraidah Ibrahim and Kristine Kwok “Beijing rejects Hanoi's legal challenge on Spratly, Paracel islands disputes”, The South China Morning Post, 13 December 2015, available here.
4 This section of the paper is an updated version of A. Calvo, “South China Sea Arbitration: Vietnam Makes Submission to Court” China Policy Institute Blog, University of Nottingham, 29 December 2014, available here.
5 “China's position paper on South China Sea”, China Daily, 7 December 2014, available here.
6 A. Calvo, “Manila, Beijing, and UNCLOS: A Test Case?”, The Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, Volume 11, Issue 34, No. 11, 26 August 2013, available here.
7 “CHINA: MARITIME CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA”, Limits in the Seas, No 143, Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 5 December 2014, available here
8 Jose Katigbak, “US expects China, Philippines to abide by UN ruling”, The Philippine Star, 4 October 2015, available here
9 “Remarks by MOFA Spokesperson Le Hai Binh on the South China Sea Arbitration case”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet Nam, 11 December 2014, available here
10 Prashanth Parameswaran “Vietnam Launches Legal Challenge Against China's South China Sea Claims”, The Diplomat, 12 December 2014, available here
11 “Australian Professor Carlyle Thayer also spoke to the South China Morning Post, saying that Vietnam's move was a way for the country to put forward her interests, adding that this amounted to ‘a cheap way of getting into the back door without joining the Philippines’ case'” Zuraidah Ibrahim and Kristine Kwok “Beijing rejects Hanoi's legal challenge on Spratly, Paracel islands disputes”, The South China Morning Post, 13 December 2015, available here
12 “Gregory Poling, South East Asia analyst at Washington-based think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies, believes that Vietnam's statement had the same goal as ”the Chinese position“, namely to ”ensure that the justices hearing the case consider the arguments contained in the document, but do so in a way that is less provocative than Vietnam actually joining“” An Dien, “Vietnam dismisses China's position paper on East Sea claims”, Thanh Nien News, 12 December 2014, available here
13 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei's Remarks on Vietnam's Statement on the Chinese Government's Position Paper on Rejecting the Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal Established at the Request of the Philippines for the South China Sea Arbitration”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 12 December 2014, available here
14 Carl Thayer, “China and Vietnam Eschew Megaphone Diplomacy”, The Diplomat, 2 January 2015, available here
15 “Viet Nam, China agree to restore, develop ties”, website of Vietnam's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 August 2014, available here
16 Carl Thayer, “China and Vietnam Eschew Megaphone Diplomacy”, The Diplomat, 2 January 2015, available here
17 “Commentary: China, Vietnam capable of managing differences”, Xinhua, 26 December 2014, available here
18 “China, Vietnam agree to properly settle maritime disputes”, Xinhua, 27 December 2014, available here
19 “China, Vietnam agree to properly settle maritime disputes”, Xinhua, 27 December 2014, available here
20 Carl Thayer, “How Vietnam Woos China and India Simultaneously”, The Diplomat, 28 October 2014, available here
21 Carlyle A. Thayer, “Background Briefing: Vietnam: Party Secretary General to Visit China”, Thayer Consultancy, 12 March 2015, available here
22 “Party leader Nguyen Phu Trong to visit China”, Voice of Vietnam, 2 April 2015, available here
23 “Vietnam celebrates 65th anniversary of Vietnam-China ties”, China Daily, 17 January 2015, available here
24 “Meeting marks 65th anniversary of Vietnam-China diplomatic ties”, Voice of Vietnam, 16 January 2015, available here
25 “Vietnam, China holds meeting on cooperation in drug prevention”, China Daily, 15 October 2014, available here
26 This issue, although not directly connected to the South China Sea, is particularly relevant because it is security related and shows that while tensions remain, the border between the two countries is not experiencing the sort of clashes experienced at sea. Also connected to security, the “fourth round of negotiations on an agreement on free navigation at the mouth of the Bac Luan River between Vietnam and China” took place in January 2015, “China, Vietnam talk free navigation”, Voice of Vietnam, 29 January 2015, available here
27 Military exchanges also continued in recent months, with for example Lieutenant General Vo Van Tuan (Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Vietnam People's Army) welcoming a delegation from the “Peacekeeping Office of the Ministry of National Defence of China, led by its Chairman Major-General Li Tian Tian” on 30 December 2014 “Vietnam, China promote cooperation on peacekeeping”, People's Army Newspaper, 31 December 2014, available here
28 “China, Vietnam navies to continue joint patrol in 2015”, China Military Online, 31 December 2014, available here
29 Carl Thayer, “China-Vietnam Establish Defense Hot Line – What's Next?”, cogitASIA, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 23 October 2014, available here
30 Carl Thayer, “How Vietnam Woos China and India Simultaneously”, The Diplomat, 28 October 2014, available here
31 Stephen Blank, “Russia and Vietnam Team Up to Balance China”, The National Interest, 7 April 2014, available here
32 “Multilateral diplomacy helps Vietnam protect sovereignty: PM”, Tuoi Tre News, 13 August 2015, available here
33 “Vietnam sends envoy to China to smooth tensions”, AP, 25 August 2014, available here
34 Roberto Tofani, “Psychological warfare in the South China Sea”, Asia Times, 10 April 2013, available here
35 Li Dexia and Tan Keng Tat, “South China Sea disputes: China has evidence of historical claims”, Vietnam Law Magazine, 15 August 2014, available here
36 Nguyen Hong Thao, “East Sea: Why not examine the historical evidences?”, Vietnam Law Magazine, 22 October 2014, available here
37 For example Anshan Li, in A History of Overseas Chinese in Africa to 1911, writes that “He had the opportunity to come into contact with merchants from various countries. While inquiring about customs of various countries, he also reviewed and compared various types of maps and books” and cites Zhao Juguo's autobiography, where he stated “Assigned to this post here recently, I spend all day reading various foreign maps … I listed names of these countries and their customs” Anshan Li, A History of Overseas Chinese in Africa to 1911, (New York: Diasporic Africa Press, 2012), p. 30
38 “Lam Dong hosts an exhibition of Vietnam's sovereignty over Truong Sa and Hoang Sa archipelagos”, Voice of Vietnam, 9 September 2015, available here
39 Duy Chien, “Western witnesses of Vietnam's sovereignty over Hoang Sa”, VietNamNet Bridge, 26 June 2014, available here
40 Another French source is a 1701 letter by Priest Tartre to Higher Father, which is included in the book “Collection of the amusing letters about Asia, Africa and America” (Episode III, republished in 1843). Concerning Hoang Sa (Paracel) it reads: “The ship weighed anchor and with tail - wind reached the Paracel Shoal shortly. Paracel was an archipelago of the An Nam Kingdom. It was an awful submerged shoal ranging across hundreds of miles and witnessing several shipwrecks – It runs parallel to the coastline of Cochinchina (Dang Trong) …”.
41 Jacob Ramsay, Mandarins and Martyrs: The Church and the Nguyen Dynasty in Early Nineteenth Century Vietnam, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), p. 28
42 A. Salles ed., “Le Mémoire sur la Cochinchine de Jean-Baptiste Chaigneau”, Bulletin des Amis du Vieux Hué, No. 2, 1923, p. 257
43 hite Paper on the Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) Islands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Vietnam, 1975, available here
44 “Vietnam Official Stance on Vietnam Sovereignty over Hoang Sa Archipelago”, Vietnam Pictorial, 9 July 2014, available here
45 “Vietnam's sovereignty over Hoang Sa, as reported in early 20th century newspapers”, The Vietnam Times, 21 July 2014, available here
46 Hong Thao Nguyen, “Vietnam's Position on the Sovereignty over the Paracels & the Spratlys: Its Maritime Claims”, Journal of East Asia & International Law 1 (2012), available here, p. 187-188
47 “The Cairo Declaration (1943) and Vietnam's sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel Archipelagos”, National Defence Journal, 27 March 2015, available here
48 François Guillemot, “Mer et îles du Viêt-Nam: une vision ”dai vietnamienne“ de l'histoire”, Mémoires d'Indochine, 10 July 2015, available here. The blog entry contains links to the full documentary on Youtube.
49 Tessa Jamandre, “Philippines offers Sabah to win Malaysia's support for UN case vs China”, The Philippine Star, 30 March 2015, available here
50 “Pnoy inspects FA-50 to be delivered next year”, Tankler, 14 December 2014, available here
51 Sudhi Ranjan Sen, “India to Sell Warships to Vietnam, Increase Footprints in South China Sea”, NDTV, 19 December 2014, available here
52 “U.S. Pacific Fleet leader visits Vietnam to boost ties”, TuoitreNews, 17 December 204, available here
53 Elena L. Aben, “Vietnam warships visit Manila”, Manila Bulletin, 25 November, available here
54 “1st meeting of Philippines-Viet Nam Joint Commission on concluding a Strategic Partnership held in Manila”, website of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, 30 January 2015, available here. For a summary of existing defense cooperation agreements between Vietnam and the Philippines, and more details about the November 2014 port visit, see Carl Thayer, “Vietnam's Navy Crosses the Line”, The Diplomat, 2 December 2014, available here.
55 Carl Thayer, “The Philippines and Vietnam Forge a Strategic Partnership”, The Diplomat, 10 March 2015, available here.
56 Carl Thayer, “The Philippines and Vietnam Forge a Strategic Partnership”, The Diplomat, 10 March 2015, available here
57 Scott Cheney-Peters, “Patrolling International Skies: Understanding Joint Air Patrols”, AMTI Brief, Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative, 29 July 2015, available here
58 Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, “Can China Defend a ‘Core Interest’ in the South China Sea?”, The Washington Quarterly, Volume 32 Issue 2, Spring 2011, pp. 45-59, available here
59 See in this regard “China's declaration of key interests misinterpreted”, Beijing Review, 26 August 2013, available here and “Beijing's reluctance to classify publically the South China Sea as an outright core interest should not be interpreted as it backing down from the dispute as a whole” Paul B. Stares, “Is the South China Sea, like Taiwan, a core national interest now for China?”, Ask CFR Experts, Council on Foreign Relations, 29 July 2013, available here
60 Or now that Chiang Kai-shek seems to be enjoying some sort of rehabilitation in China, the 1943 Cairo conference. Jeremy Taylor “Xikou, Zhejiang and Chiang Kai-shek”, Nottingham University Chinese Policy Blog, 24 September 2012, available here
61 “Position Paper of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines”, website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 7 December 2014, available here
62 A. Calvo, “Japan Quietly Leads on Increased Recognition of Taiwan”, Shingetsu News Agency News, 26 July 2012, Shingetsu News Agency, available here
63 “Southern Bluefïn Tuna Case between Australia and Japan and between New Zealand and Japan, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility. Decision of 4 August 2000”, 4 August 2000, p.43, para. 57, website of the United Nations, available here
64 “China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea”, Limits in the Seas, No 143, Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs - Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, US Department of State, 5 December 2014, available here
65 “China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea”, Limits in the Seas, No 143, Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs - Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, US Department of State, 5 December 2014, pp. 11 and 23-24, available here
66 “China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea”, Limits in the Seas, No 143, Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs - Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, US Department of State, 5 December 2014, p. 1, available here
67 Note Verbale CML/17/2009, Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China before the UN, website of the UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS), 7 May 2009, available here and Note Verbale CML/18/2009, Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China before the UN, website of the UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS), 7 May 2009, available here
68 “China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea”, Limits in the Seas, No 143, Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs - Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, US Department of State, 5 December 2014, p. 1, available here
69 L. Jinming and L. Dexia, “The Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the South China Sea: A Note”, Ocean Dev't & Int'l L., Volume 34, 2003, pp. 287-95, p. 289-290.
70 “China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea”, Limits in the Seas, No 143, Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs - Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, US Department of State, 5 December 2014, p. 3, available here
71 “However, as with so many other contested islands of the postwar era, the treaty specified neither precise limits nor the final designation of the disposed territories” Kimie Hara, “Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in United States–Japan–China Relations”, The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 13, Issue 28, No. 2, July 13, 2015, available here
72 “China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea”, Limits in the Seas, No 143, Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs - Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, US Department of State, 5 December 2014, pp. 4-7, available here
73 “China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea”, Limits in the Seas, No 143, Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs - Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, US Department of State, 5 December 2014, pp. 8-10, available here
74 This passage reflects the US traditional position “In December 1986, the u.s. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, published ”Navigation Rights and the Gulf of Sidra,“ in GIST, a reference aid on u.s. foreign relations. The study discussed the history of u.s. responses, dating to the 18th century, to attempts by North African States to restrict navigation in these waters. The GIST stated, in part, that: Current law and customs: By custom, nations may lay historic claim to those bays and gulfs over which they have exhibited such a degree of open, notorious, continuous, and unchallenged control for an extended period of time as to preclude traditional high seas freedoms within such waters. Those waters (closed off by straight baselines) are treated as if they were part of the nation's land mass, and the navigation of foreign vessels is generally subject to complete control by the nation”, J. Ashley Roach and Robert W. Smith (Editors), “Excessive Maritime Claims”, International Law Studies, Volume 66, p. 30, available here
75 The text cites a number of cases, among them “Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Norway), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18), p. 130, 133, 138, 142”, which is available here
76 Available, together with related documents here
77 Text of these and other articles of UNCLOS available here
78 “China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea”, Limits in the Seas, No 143, Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs - Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, US Department of State, 5 December 2014, p. 10, available here
79 A short naval and diplomatic summary can be found in “Barbary Wars, 1801–1805 and 1815–1816”, website of the Office of the Historian, US Department of State, available here
80 “The United States's conflicts with the Barbary States (Algiers, Morocco, Tripoli, and Tunis) from 1784-1815 gripped the young nation, featured bold attempts by American policymakers to defend U.S. trade in the Mediterranean region and assert leadership in international affairs, set important precedents in American foreign relations (including the first U.S.-supported coup attempt that generated the line ”to the shores of Tripoli“ in the Marine Corps Hymn), provided vital naval training for the War of 1812, and helped create an early sense of American exceptionalism”. Jason Zeledon, “Home”, Barbary Warfare. All about America's wars with the Barbary Pirates, available here
81 “China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea”, Limits in the Seas, No 143, Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs - Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, US Department of State, 5 December 2014, pp. 11-14, available here
82 “The PRC's territorial sea refers to the waters adjacent to its territorial land. The PRC's territorial land includes the mainland and its offshore islands, Taiwan and the various affiliated islands including Diaoyu Island, Penghu Islands, Dongsha Islands, Xisha Islands, Nansha (Spratly) Islands and other islands that belong to the People's Republic of China. The PRC's internal waters refer to the waters along the baseline of the territorial sea facing the land”, Article 2, Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 25 February 1992, available here.
83 Note Verbale CML/8/2011, Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China before the UN, website of the UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS), 14 April 2011, available here
84 Declaration on China's Territorial Sea, reproduced in “Straight Baselines: People's Republic of China”, Limits in the Seas, No 43, Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs - Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, US Department of State, 1 July 1972, pp. 2-3, available here
85 For a discussion of China's naval ambitions and capabilities, and possible directions, see Andrew S. Erickson, “China's Main Mission: South China Sea, Not Syria”, The National Interest, 5 October 2015, available here
86 “China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea”, Limits in the Seas, No 143, Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs - Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, US Department of State, 5 December 2014, pp. 14-15, available here
87 “China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea”, Limits in the Seas, No 143, Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs - Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, US Department of State, 5 December 2014, pp. 15-22, available here
88 Article 14, Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act, 26 June 1998, website of the United Nations, available here
89 Note Verbale CML/8/2011, Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China before the UN, website of the UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS), 14 April 2011, available here
90 “It is known to all that China has sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and their surrounding waters, including the Ren'ai Reef”, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang's Regular Press Conference on March 10, 2014”, website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 10 March 2014, available here
91 Taken from C.R. Symmons, Historic Waters in the Law of the Sea: A Modern Re-Appraisal, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), p. 145.
92 “China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea”, Limits in the Seas, No 143, Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs - Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, US Department of State, 5 December 2014, p. 11, available here
93 “Treaty of Peace Between the United States and Spain; December 10, 1898”, website of The Avalon Project, Yale University, available here
94 “Treaty between the Kingdom Spain and the United States of America for cession of outlying islands of the Philippines [1900]”, website of the Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines, available here
95 A. Calvo, “No Place for China in Russia's New Military Doctrine?”, China Policy Institute Blog, University of Nottingham, 30 December 2014, available here
96 “Having decided to make a maximum effort against the Tatars, Sophia and Golitsyn suspended all other Russian territorial ambitions. The momentum of the advance to the Pacific was abruptly halted. By the mid-seventeenth century, Russian soldiers, traders, hunters and pioneers had reached and conquered the basin of the Amur River, which makes a vast looping circle around the territory now known as Manchuria. For years, under increasing Chinese pressure, frontier soldiers had been sending desperate appeals to Moscow for reinforcements. But Sophia, reducing her commitments, sent not reinforcements, but a diplomatic mission headed by Fedor. Golovin to work out a peace with the Manchu Dinasty. The negotiations took place in the Russian frontier post of Nerchinsk on the upper Amur River. Golovin was at a disadvantage; not only had Sophia ordered him to make peace, but the Chinese brought up a large fleet of of heavily armed junks and surrounded the fort with 17,000 soldiers. In the end, Golovin signed a paper which gave the whole of the Amur basin to China. Subsequently, the Russians claimed that the treaty had been based not on justice, but on the presence of so much menacing Chinese military force. In 1858 and 1860, the tables were turned, and Russia took back 380,000 square miles of territory from an impotent China. Not all Russians approved this claim. After all, the Treaty of Nerchinsk had been honored for 180 years; all this time, the territory had been Chinese. But Tsar Nicholas I approved, proclaiming, ‘Where the Russian flag has once been hoisted, it must never be lowered.‘”, Robert K. Massie, Peter the Great: His Life and World, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1986), pp. 87-88
97 A. Calvo, “Russia and South Korea: the economic and geopolitical rationale for a natural gas pipeline”, China Policy Institute Blog, University of Nottingham, 4 November 2014, available here
98 A. Calvo, “Can Russia Assist Japan in Fueling Its Energy Future? ”, Journal of Energy Security, July 2012 Issue, 23 July 2012, available here
99 “ロシア首相：北方領土の軍備強化 択捉島 で表明”, Mainichi Shinbun, 22 August 2015, available here
100 “The More the Merrier: Russia Expands its Territory Further Into Okhotsk Sea”, Sputnik News, 22 August 2015, available here
101 Although we have to bear in mind that while looking toward the West in seeking inspiration to reform Russia, Peter the Great devoted great efforts, once peace with his Western foes had been achieved, towards the East and the South. Robert K. Massie, Peter the Great: His Life and World, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1986), pp. 840-850
102 “He adhered to an ethnic hierarchy in his revolutionary politics. For him, Germans were culturally superior to Britons and French, who in turn were superior to Finns; and, of course, Finns had a distinct edge over the Russians”, Robert Service, Lenin: a Biography, (London: Pan Books, 2010), p.389
103 A. Calvo, “The other ‘pivot’: Is Russia also rebalancing towards the Pacific?”, China Policy Institute Blog, University of Nottingham, 28 January 2015, available here
104 Stephen Blank, “Russia and Vietnam Team Up to Balance China”, The National Interest, 7 April 2014, available here
105 A. Calvo, “The Kremlin seeks a greater role on Korean Peninsula”, China Policy Institute Blog, University of Nottingham, 18 February 2015, available here
106 Alex Calvo, “Russian perceptions of China in the Arctic”, Nottingham University Chinese Politics Blog, 23 March 2015, available here
107 “Defense Ministry rejects proposal to buy submarines from Russia”, Focus Taiwan, 18 March 2015, available here
108 Mu Chunshan,“Why Doesn't Russia Support China in the South China Sea?”, The Diplomat, 21 June 2014, available here
109 “Vietnam's third Russian sub to arrive next month”, Thanh Nien News, 20 November 2014, available here
110 Duy Khanh, “Vietnam to build more Russian missile boats”, Thanh Nien News, 19 November 2014, available here
111 “Russia, Vietnam agree on simplified Cam Ranh port entry for Russian warships”, TASS, 27 November 2014, available here
112 Rakesh Krishnan Simha, “Why the Bear is back in Vietnam”, Foreign Policy News, 12 June 2015, available here
113 “Beijing has repeatedly demanded that Moscow terminate energy explorations in the South China Sea, clearly responding to Russia's visibly enhanced interests in Southeast Asia. In 2012 Russia announced its interest in regaining a naval base at Cam Ranh Bay, a step probably connected to joint Russo-Vietnamese energy projects off Vietnam's coast, and a means of checking China in the South China Sea. Gazprom also signed a deal to explore two licensed blocks in Vietnam's continental shelf in the South China Sea, taking a 49 percent stake in the offshore blocks, which hold an estimated 1.9 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and more than twenty-five million tons of gas condensate. Those actions precipitated Beijing's demand that Moscow leave the area. However, despite its silence, presumably to avoid antagonizing China, Moscow stayed put. Russia has subsequently increased support for Vietnam regarding energy exploration in the South China Sea and, perhaps more ominously from China's standpoint, in arms sales and defense cooperation”. Stephen Blank, “Russia and Vietnam Team Up to Balance China”, The National Interest, 7 April 2014, available here
114 “Dmitry Medvedev's interview with Vietnamese media”, website of the Russian Government, 5 April 2015, available here
115 Nhina Le and Koh Swee Lean Collin, “Vietnam and Great Power Rivalries”, The Diplomat, 31 March 2015, available here
116 For a warning on the dangers of pushing Russia to cooperate with China in the South China Sea, see Harry J. Kazianis, “Russia Could Make South China Sea a Chinese Lake”, The National Interest, 26 February 2015, available here
117 Which should not be taken literally as implying that India is not looking carefully in other directions. “India is surrounded by security concerns all around” Sonia Roy, “Indian Foreign Policy and Terrorism (Post 9/11)”, blog of Sonia Roy, 11 January 2010, available here. While some explanations of the policy are overtly, and to a large extent understandably, enthusiastic, see for example the following quote from Professor Brahma Chellaney “For India, the Look East policy is a strategic imperative, India has to look East, because looking West India sees only trouble -Pakistan, Afghanistan, all the way up to Iraq and Jordan. So looking West is not useful. Looking East is better, because looking East means you engage with the more dynamic economies and with democracies like Indonesia, Japan, Korea, these are important countries for India now”, Uwe Hoering, Interview with Brahma Chellaney, website of Stiftung Asienhaus, 3 July 2014, available here. India has never stopped paying attention to countries such as Iraq. Sonia Roy “Iraq”, in P.R. Kumaraswam (editor), Persian Gulf 2013: India's Relations With the Region, (New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2014), pp. 107-126. See also A.N. Ram (ed.), Two Decades of India's Look East Policy: Partnership for Peace, Progress and Prosperity, (New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs, 2012), available here.
118 “‘What India is belatedly seeking to do is to improve its defenses by upgrading its logistics,’” said Brahma Chellaney, an analyst who tracks the India-China relationship at the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi, in an e-mail. ‘By building new railroads, airports and highways in Tibet, China is now in a position to rapidly move additional forces to the border to potentially strike at India at a time of its choosing.’“ ”India Digs Under Top of the World to Match Rival“, Lydia Polgreen, New York Times, 31 July 2010, available here
119 Radhakrishna Rao, “A Boost to BrahMos”, website of CLAWS (Centre for Land Warfare Studies), 15 December 2014, available here
120 Alex Calvo, “Abe's Election Good News for Japan-India Ties”, Shingetsu News Agency News, 21 December 2012, Shingetsu News Agency, available here
121 Brahma Chellaney, “From a nonaligned to multialigned India?”, Nikkei Asian Review, 15 December 2014, available here
122 Brahma Chellaney, “Reshaping India's diplomacy”, The Japan Times, 18 January 2015, available here
123 Tweets by Saurav Jha, @SJha1618, 24 January 2015.
124 Dhruva Jaishankar “Anti-Americanism is dead”, Indian Express, 27 January 2015, available here
125 Dhruva Jaishankar “Anti-Americanism is dead”, Indian Express, 27 January 2015, available here
126 Tweet by Manimugdha Sharma, @quizzicalguy, 26 January 2015.
127 Direct communication to the author by Manimugdha Sharma, 26 January 2015.
128 “U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region”, website of The White House, 25 January 2015, available here
129 “Mr. Modi's suggestion of fresh security cooperation linking the two with Japan and Australia would bring back a short-lived effort involving the four democracies that began in 2007. Known as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, it drew protests from China and was abandoned a year later with a change of government in Australia” Peter Baker and Gardiner Harris, “U.S. and India Share Sense of Unease Over China”, The New York Times, 27 January 2007, available here
130 David Lang “Symbolism and strategy on 26 January”, The Strategist, 23 January 2015, available here
131 Tweets by Saurav Jha, @SJha1618, 27 January 2015.
132 Tarra Quismundo, “India backs PH arbitration bid to solve sea dispute”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 24 October 2013, available here
133 “Bilateral relations have remained conspicuously devoid of both any major issue of discord or of any significant scale of engagement during the last six decades or so” Vibhanshu Shekhar, India-Philippines Relations: An Overview, (New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2007), available here and “The relations between the two countries have been cordial, though the full potential is yet to be realized”, “India-Philippines Relations”, website of the Ministry of External Affairs, December 2013, available here
134 “Confirmed: China Is Building a Military Base Near Japan”, The National Interest, 26 January 2015, available here
135 R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The law of the sea, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), Third Edition, pp. 49-50
136 R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The law of the sea, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), Third Edition, pp. 50-51
137 R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The law of the sea, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), Third Edition, p. 51
138 James R. Holmes, “The South China Sea: ”Lake Beijing“”, The Diplomat, 7 January 2013, available here
139 Christopher J. McCarthy, Anti-Access/Area Denial: The Evolution of Modern Warfare, (Newport: US Naval War College, 2010), p. 2, available here
140 Harry J. Kazianis, “Russia Could Make South China Sea a Chinese Lake”, The National Interest, 26 February 2015, available here
141 A. Calvo, “Shored-based anti-ship missiles: when the land commands the sea”, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), 13 January 2015, available here. For the case of Japan, see A. Calvo, “Marines, Missiles, and the Iron Lady: The Military Leg in Japan's Ocean Strategy”, The Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, Volume 11, Issue 49, No. 1, 9 December 2013, available here. Concerning their potential use in the defense of Taiwan, see A. Calvo, “Anti-ship missiles in the defence of Taiwan: Limited war or people's war?”, China Policy Institute Blog, University of Nottingham, 19 August 2014, available here
142 “1st meeting of Philippines-Viet Nam Joint Commission on concluding a Strategic Partnership held in Manila”, website of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, 30 January 2015, available here
143 “Mainland China's Land Reclamation in South China Sea Not Violation of Int'l Law (A Commentary)”, Kuomintang Official Website, 5 December 2014, available here http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&num=15498
144 “Mainland China's Land Reclamation in South China Sea Not Violation of Int'l Law (A Commentary)”, Kuomintang Official Website, 5 December 2014, available here
145 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), Sixth Edition, pp. 525-528
146 Antony Allot, The Limits of Law, (London: Butterworths, 1980), p. 88
147 “Genba defends ‘pragmatic’ purchase of the Senkakus”, The Japan Times, 20 October 2012, available here
148 A. Calvo, “Why Japan should put boots on the ground on the Senkaku Islands”, Strife Blog, 25 May 2015, available here. Also published by ISN on 3 June 2015, available here.
149 Wani Yukio, “Barren Senkaku Nationalism and China-Japan Conflict”, The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol 10, Issue 28, No. 4, July 9, 2012, available here
150 “Press Conference by the Press Secretary 4 October 1996”, website of Japan's Foreign Affairs Ministry, 4 October 1996, available here
151 “尖閣諸島の灯台”, in “副大臣会見記録（平 成17年2月”, website of Japan's Foreign Affairs Ministry, February 2005, available here
152 Yuka Hayashi, “Japan's Attempts at Artificial Island Building”, Wall Street Journal, 14 May 2015, available here
153 A. Calvo, “Russia's South China Sea Approach and Search for Strategic Autonomy”, Issue Briefings 10/2015, South China Sea Think Tank, 4 September 2015, available here
154 “The More the Merrier: Russia Expands its Territory Further Into Okhotsk Sea”, Sputnik International, 22 August 2015, available here
155 “Russia plans spas on disputed isles”, Japan Times, 13 July 2012, available here
156 “Russia opens new airport on Japan-claimed Etorofu Island off Hokkaido”, Japan Times, 18 September 2014, available here
157 “The Russian navy does not have sufficient numbers of nuclear attack submarines and surface ships to defend the deployment of the newest Borey submarines in the open Pacific. The only safe option seems the semi-closed Sea of Okhotsk, guarded by the Kurile Island chain”, Pavel Felgenhauer, “The Kurile Islands: a Key to Russia's Maritime Nuclear Strategy”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 4 November 2010, available here
158 For a summary of the issues at stake, and Russian views on the dispute, see Yulia Kiseleva,“Four small islands – big fuss”, available here
159 James D.J. Brown, “Not Even Two? New developments in the territorial dispute between Russia and Japan”, The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 13, Issue 38, No. 3, September 21, 2015, available here
160 “Mainland China's Land Reclamation in South China Sea Not Violation of Int'l Law (A Commentary)”, Kuomintang Official Website, 5 December 2014, available here
161 Michelle FlorCruz, “Philippines Resumes South China Sea Construction As China Continues Reclamation”, IB Times, 26 March 2015, available here
162 Michelle FlorCruz, “Philippines Resumes South China Sea Construction As China Continues Reclamation”, IB Times, 26 March 2015, available here
163 James Harding and Sean O'Connor, “China building airstrip-capable island on Fiery Cross Reef”, IHS Jane's Defence Weekly, 20 November 2014, available here
164 A. Calvo, “1982 Falklands War: Seven Lessons for Japan”, Shingetsu News Agency, 28 June 2014, available here
165 Sam Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013)
166 Wendell Minnick, “Beijing Continues S. China Sea Expansion”, Defense News, 14 June 2014, available here
167 James Harding and Sean O'Connor, “China building airstrip-capable island on Fiery Cross Reef”, IHS Jane's Defence Weekly, 20 November 2014, available here. For a selection of satellite pictures showing Chinese construction and reclamation work, and some of the ships involved, see Matikas Santos, “In photos: China's construction of military bases in Spratlys”, The Inquirer, 17 March 2015, available here.
168 Luke Hunt, “China Challenges ASEAN with Land Fills in South China Sea”, The Diplomat, 10 March 2015, available here
169 Luke Hunt, “China Challenges ASEAN with Land Fills in South China Sea”, The Diplomat, 10 March 2015, available here
170 Simon Denyer, “U.S. Navy alarmed at Beijing's ‘Great Wall of sand’ in South China Sea”, The Washington Post, 1 April 2015, available here
171 “Jen Psaki Spokesperson Daily Press Briefing”, website of the U.S. Department of State, 9 March 2015, available here
172 Josh Rogin “U.S. Misses Real Threat of China's Fake Islands”, Bloomberg News, 2 April 2015, available here
173 Full text can be found at “Letter to Secretary Carter and Secretary Kerry on Chinese Maritime Strategy”, website of the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, 19 March 2015, available here
174 David Brunnstrom, “US senators seek strategy to stop Beijing's South China Sea reclamation”, The Sidney Morning Herald, 20 March 2015, available here
175 “Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press”, website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 8 March 2015, available here
176 Zhang Ning, “Commentary: U.S. meddling on South China Sea betrays pirate-style sense of insecurity”, Xinhua, 14 March 2015, available here
177 For a comprehensive look at Beijing's ADIZ in the East China Sea see A. Calvo, “China's Air Defense Identification Zone: Concept, Issues at Stake and Regional Impact”, Naval War College Press Working Papers, No 1, US Naval War College, 23 December 2013, available here
178 David Brunnstrom, “US senators seek strategy to stop Beijing's South China Sea reclamation”, The Sidney Morning Herald, 20 March 2015, available here
179 Tweet by @JamesKraska, dated 14 October 2015
180 “The 1935 Constitution”, website of the Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines, Available here
181 “Republic Act No. 3046 of 17 June 1961. An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines”, website of the United Nations, available here
182 R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The law of the sea, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), Third Edition, p. 48
183 Qatar v. Bahrain, I.C.J. Reports 2001, pp. 101-102, para. 205. Full text of the ruling available at “Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain)”, website of the International Court of Justice, available here
184 Nicaragua v. Colombia, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 641, para. 26. Full text of the ruling available at “Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia)”, website of the International Court of Justice, available here
185 “Southern Bluefïn Tuna Case between Australia and Japan and between New Zealand and Japan, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility. Decision of 4 August 2000”, 4 August 2000, p.43, para. 57, website of the United Nations, available here
186 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, Judgment of 26 February 2007, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 111, para. 162), website of the International Court of Justice, available here
187 Martin Murphy “Deepwater Oil Rigs as Strategic Weapons”, Naval War College Review, Spring 2013, Vol. 66, No. 2, available here
188 A. Calvo, “President Ma's Peace Initiative and the Strategic Triangle Beijing-Taipei-Tokyo”, TESS Working Papers, 31 August 2012, The Eurasia Studies Society (TESS), available here
189 A. Calvo, “Adult Wisdom: The Japan-Taiwan Fisheries Deal”, The Tokyo Diplomat, 19 April 2013, Shingetsu News Agency, available here
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