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Backstory to Abe's Snap Election – the Secrets of Moritomo, Kake and the “Missing” Japan SDF Activity Logs
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2025
Extract
Prime Minister Abe Shinzo announced his call for national elections on Monday, September 25. News reports explained that he deemed the timing right due to a recent bounce in public support triggered by threats from North Korea and by the severe weakness of the political opposition. Abe was especially eager to strike before Tokyo Governor Koike Yuriko had time to organize a strong national party. By acting decisively to win the October 22 election, he would secure another four years of LDP power.
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- Copyright © The Authors 2017
References
Notes
1 See here and here (as well as other mainstream news reports).
2 Thomas Blanton, “The World's Right to Know”
3 See Lawrence Repeta, “Japan's News Media, The Information Disclosure Law, and The Fukushima Nuclear Disaster,” March, 2015
4 See Helen Hardacre, Shinto and the State, Princeton University Press, 1989, esp. p. 108.
5 Kyodo News obtained a copy of the handwritten letter. An image of the letter accompanies the Japan Times report, here
6 See Mizohata Sachie, “Nippon Kaigi: Empire, Contradiction, and Japan's Future”
7 Asahi Shimbun, Feb. 24, 2017.
8 Much of the subsequent dispute over this event concerned Kagoike's claim that she also delivered a donation of 1 million yen to the school on behalf of Abe Shinzo. She denied delivering the donation and there were no witnesses, so the truth of the matter is unresolved.
9 “Kagoike also alleged that in October 2015 he sought Abe Akie's influence in extending a 10-year lease for a plot of land that he later purchased to build the elementary school, Mizuho no Kuni. In October the same year, he said he left a message on her phone asking for help. Her secretary Saeko Tani, who eventually replied via fax, said that despite efforts to negotiate with the Finance Ministry, they couldn't get the deal he had hoped for.” See here.
10 Shukan Kinyobi, Mar. 24, 2017.
11 See full Japan Times article here. See handy timeline of key events here. In the perverse logic for which Japan's bureaucrats are famous, the Ministry continued to deny Kimura's information request even though the price had become public information. According to the Asahi, the Ministry defended non-disclosure on the ground that Moritomo Gakuen strenuously opposed its release. In a separate statement, Moritomo denied doing so. Asahi Digital, Mar. 14, 2017. As a matter of law, Moritomo's opinion is irrelevant. Japan's disclosure law requires disclosure unless one of eight statutory exemptions applies.
12 Japan's open government activists hailed the adoption of the national Public Records and Archives Management Act (“Public Records Act”) as a milestone in government accountability. When that law took effect on April 1, 2011, government agencies were legally required to make and preserve records of their decisions for the first time. Information requesters everywhere are painfully aware that if no record exists, there's nothing to request. The Public Records Act applies to all significant government decisions, including laws, Cabinet resolutions and other government actions. Public Records and Archives Management Act, Law No. 66 of 2009. The government translation of the Act is available here.
13 Text of the Diet testimony is carried in the August, 2017 edition of Joho Kokai Digest, a publication of Information Clearinghouse Japan, p.1. See additional article here. Records not subject to the Ministry's “less than one year” rule are treated very differently. In line with the philosophy of the Public Records Law, government records cannot easily be destroyed. Disposal must be approved by the Prime Minister's office. This requirement took on special importance during the debate over Japan's “Specially Designated Secrets” Law in 2013. The people need not worry about willful destruction of secret documents, it was said, because the procedure established by the Public Records Law would apply; disposal would have to be approved by the Prime Minister's office. See here.
14 In an op-ed published in the Asahi, Miyake declared the Ministry's action a clear violation of the Public Records Act. Miyake is one of Japan's most prominent open government activists and has served as a public member of several government panels related to the information disclosure and public records laws. Miyake, Haiki wa ihō, fukugen se yo (Disposal is Illegal, Restore (the Records)!), Asahi Shimbun, May 13, 2017.
15 Miki is chairperson of jōhō kōkai clearinghouse (Information Clearinghouse Japan), an NGO founded by activists whose twenty-year campaign led to adoption of Japan's information disclosure law. See the group's website here.
16 See an interview with Miki on Moritomo and Kake here. (July 15, 2017)
17 That suit is ongoing. The next court hearing is scheduled for October 19. When the suit was filed, Miki's attorneys sought an order from the court that the Ministry stop the regularly scheduled deletion of digital files in order to preserve evidence (shōkō hozen). The request was denied.
18 Maekawa later explained that he was first approached by reporters from NHK, who appeared at his door. (Source)
19 An English version of an Asahi editorial set out many key elements of the story. See it here.
20 The Cabinet is charged with administration of special strategic economic zones, while the Ministry of Education and Science holds authority to issue licenses for educational facilities.
21 See here.
22 Japan's National Strategic Special Zones are part of the “Japan Revitalization Strategy,” or the third arrow of Abenomics. Businesses operating in the zones are said to benefit from deregulation. See the Cabinet website here. See additional article here. The Japan Times described some of the special incentives offered to Kake Gakuen: “ The municipal government of Imabari now plans to offer a plot of land valued at ¥3.68 billion to Kake Gakuen for free to build the new campus. The city office and the Ehime Prefectural Government also plan to subsidize up to ¥9.6 billion to help Kake Gakuen build new department facilities.” (source)
23 Asahi Shimbun, May 18, 2017, p.2 (translation by the author).
24 “Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide moved to cast doubt on the credibility of the documents as early as May 17, calling them ‘anonymous objectionable documents.‘ As if to back this up, education minister Matsuno Hirokazu announced two days later that the ministry couldn't confirm the documents existed.” (source) As reported by the Japan Times, “The education ministry has reported to us that they could not confirm existence of the documents in question after conducting investigation,” Suga told a news conference. Suga also said that Cabinet Office officials have all denied that they mentioned “the prime minister's intent” or “the highest-level” officials at the Prime Minister's Office as alleged in the papers. “The prime minister has also told me that he hasn't given any instructions like that, either,” Suga said. (source)
25 Asahi Shimbun, May 18, 2017, p.14.
26 Asahi Shimbun, May 20, 2017, p.1.
27 See here.
28 See here.
29 For background on government influence over Japan's news media, see Jeff Kingston, Press Freedom on Contemporary Japan (Routledge, 2017). Koichi Nakano neatly summarizes the situation: “Abe also gained the enthusiastic backing of the Sankei and Yomiuri newspapers, which acted as media cheerleaders for his policies and pit bulls for his critics.” Nakano, “Political Dynamics of Contemporary Japanese Nationalism,” in Kingston, Asian Nationalisms Reconsidered (Routledge, 2016), p. 168.
30 According to reports, the press conference was announced only thirty minutes beforehand, but was nonetheless attended by more than one hundred reporters and Maekawa was accompanied by a lawyer.
31 See here.
32 See here.
33 This rebuttal made the front page of the Asahi's evening edition. Asahi Shimbun, May 25, 2017 (eve. ed.), p. 1.
34 Ibid.
35 See here.
36 See here and here.
37 One reason given for the Ministry's withholding of the documents is its narrow definition of “administrative records” required to be released under the disclosure law. Legal scholars -the nation's experts on the meaning of such terms - cried foul. For example, Usaki Masahiro, professor emeritus of Dokkyo University Law School, explained that if the documents were created during the course of work and if they were shared among Ministry officials, then they meet the definition of administrative documents and are subject to disclosure. Asahi Shimbun July 7, 2017. But the Ministry's strained interpretation of the law made little difference. Copies of the documents had been presented in the Diet and leaked to the press and published alongside news stories for all to see.
38 See here.
39 See here.
40 There is a lengthy interview with Fuse Yūjin here. (“日報問題の火付け役 布施祐仁氏が “PKO隠蔽工作” を斬る”), March 27, 2017.
41 Miki Yukiko points out that Kono's Diet constituency is in Kanagawa and the Kanagawa Shimbun carried a lengthy article on the mystery of the daily activity logs in late December.
42 See here.
43 Fuse himself has noted the importance of Kono's intervention. See here.
44 See here.
45 See here.
46 See here.
47 In mid-July Jiji Press reported that Abe's support rate had plunged to 29.9% while the non-support rate had risen to 48.6% (source) (July 14/17, 2017). See additional article here.
48 The text of the Report is available here.
49 See here. (Aug. 18, 2017)
50 Joho Kokai Digest No. 4 (Aug. 2017), p. 22.