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Anti-Base Movements in South Korea: Comparative Perspective on the Asia-Pacific

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 May 2025

Andrew Yeo
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Much recent discussion on anti-base opposition in the Asia-Pacific has focused on island-wide protests against the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma. By uniting in mass demonstrations against the construction of a new U.S. base, and by staging a multi-year round the clock demonstration at the proposed site of the new base, Okinawans put pressure squarely on Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama to keep his campaign pledge to move Futenma air base off the island. However, shortly after the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan, which South Korea and the U.S. charge was the work of a torpedo launched by a North Korean submarine, Hatoyama reversed his pledge. The Japanese government bowed to U.S. pressure, agreeing to move forward with earlier plans to relocate Futenma within Okinawa to smooth over U.S.-Japan relations.

Type
Research Article
Information
Asia-Pacific Journal , Volume 8 , Issue 24 , June 2010 , e2
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Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BYCreative Common License - NCCreative Common License - ND
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivatives licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is unaltered and is properly cited. The written permission of Cambridge University Press must be obtained for commercial re-use or in order to create a derivative work.
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Copyright © The Authors 2010

References

Notes

1 For instance, see the following recent articles appearing in The Asia-Pacific Journal: Gavan McCormack, “Ampo's Troubled 50th: Hatoyama's Abortive Rebellion, Okinawa's Mounting Resistance and the US-Japan Relationship (Parts 1-3)” The Asia-Pacific Journal, 22-3-10, May 31, 2010; Yoshio Shimoji, “The Futenma Base and the U.S.-Japan Controversy: an Okinawan Perspective,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, 18-5-10, May 3, 2010.

2 Martin Fackler, “90,000 Protest U.S. Base on Okinawa,” New York Times. April 25, 2010. Additional solidarity rallies took place in various locations in the United States and Japan. Link.

3 For more on global anti-base struggles, see Chalmers A. Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004; Catherine Lutz, The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against U.S. Military Posts. N.Y.: New York University Press, 2009; Andrew Yeo, “Not in Anyone's Backyard: The Emergence and Identity of a Transnational Anti-Base Network.” International Studies Quarterly 53, no. 3 (2009): 571-94; Wilbert Van der Zeijden, “Building the Global No-Bases Movement.” Peace Review 22, no. 2: 106 - 12.

4 For information on U.S. overseas basing and global force posture, see the Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure's Report to Congress. “Interim Report of the Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States.” Arlington, VA: Overseas Basing Committee, 2005.

5 For a comparative study of South Korean antibase movements, see Kageyama Asako and Philip Seaton, “Marines Go Home: Anti-Base Activism in Okinawa, Japan and Korea,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, 14-1-10, April 5, 2010; For a survey of South Korean anti-base movements in Korean, see Ko You-kyung. 2005. “Hanguk-ui banmi-gun-giji undong-gwa dongasia yundae” (Anti-U.S. military base movements and East Asian solidarity). In Bipan Sahoehak Daehoe (8th Meeting). 4-5 November 2005, 297-310. Seoul: College of Social Science, Seoul National University.

6 The U.S. had no direct role suppressing mass demonstrations in Gwangju. However, because South Korea's military chain of command was subordinate to USFK, South Koreans often note that the unleashing of the ROK 20th Division implied U.S. complicity, or at least acquiescence to Chun Doo Hwan's decision to brutally crackdown on protestors. See Park Kun-Young, “80 nyun-dae hanguk-ui banmijooui, byun-hwa, jeonmang, geuligo ham-eui.” (South Korean Anti-Americanism, Change, Prospects, and Togetherness). Presented at Perspectives of Social Science in the 1980s from a 21st Century Perspective. Seoul, South Korea. October 7, 2005.

7 Ko You-Kyoung, “Hanguk-ui banmi-gun-giji undong-gwa dongasia yundae” (Anti-US military base movements and East Asian solidarity). In Bipan Sahoehak Daehoe (8th Meeting), November 2005 (Seoul: College of Social Science, Seoul National University 2005), 297.

8 Ko 2005, 298; Andrew Yeo, “Local-National Dynamics and Framing in South Korean Anti-Base Movements.” Kasarinlan 21, no. 2 (2006): 34-69. This attempt to unify local anti-base activists nationally coincided with the emergence of regional anti-base solidarity in the Asia-Pacific in the mid-1990s between activists in the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea.

9 Oh Doo-hui, “Ajik kkeun-naji ahn-eun SOFA gaejeong undong” [The unfinished SOFA revision movement] In Nogunri eseo Maehyangri kkaji [From Nogunri to Maehyangri] (Seoul: Deep Freedom Press, 2001), 202; Katharine H. S. Moon, “South Korean Civil Society and Alliance Politics.” In Strategy and Sentiment: South Korean Views of the United States and the U.S.-ROK Alliance, edited by Derek Mitchell (Washington D.C.: CSIS, 2004), 146.

10 Organized local resistance to Kooni Firing Range had existed since the late 1980s. On July 1988, residents from eight villages surrounding Kooni Range formed a joint action committee, filing a formal complaint against the South Korean government. See Yeo 2006 for more discussion of anti-base protests in Maehyangri.

11 Interview with Maehyangri Residents' Task Force secretary general Chun Mankyu. January 5, 2006.

12 Kim Jong-Il. 2001. “Maehyangri Pokgyeok-jang peh-swae tujaeng-ui pyung-gga-wa hyang-hu junmang” (An Overview of the Maehyangri Movement and Its Future Prospect).

13 A former Korean Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA) researcher who investigated safety issues at Kooni on behalf of the MND admitted that noise pollution was blatantly obvious. Interview with former KIDA official. Seoul, South Korea. November 9, 2005

14 Interview with MND Director of Policy Planning. Seoul, South Korea. December 19, 2005.

15 For USFK training on Chikdo island, see this link. [last accessed 6/1/10].

16 See Andrew Yeo, “U.S. Military Base Realignment in South Korea.” Peace Review 22, no. 2: 113-20.

17 The MND announced that South Korea would provide 3.005 acres of land to USFK. See Yoon Kwang-Ung. “Migun-giji ijeong sa-eob gwallyeon beu-ri-ping” (Briefing on issues related to the USFK base relocation project). May 3. 2006. Ministry of National Defense. Available here.

18 Activists supporting the Sanrizuka anti-airport struggle in Japan also used this embedding strategy. Some activists became farmers in the local communities while supporting the movement over many years. I thank Mark Selden for pointing this out.

19 Yoon-hyeong Kil, “Yeongwonhi dol-ee-kilsoo eobs-eu-lee: jakjeon-meong yeo-myeong-ui hwang-sae-ul.” [The point of no return: Operation: “Hwangs-ae-ul at Dawn”] Hankyeoreh 21, May 16, 2005. p.14.

20 Min-Jung Lee and Ahn Hong-Gi, “Doduri 32 chae modu cheolguh.” [32 buildings in Doduri all destroyed]. OhMyNews. September 12, 2006.

21 For coverage of the Pyeongtaek anti-base movement since 2007, see this link.

22 Interview with Ko You-kyoung, Secretary General of National Campaign for Eradication of Crimes by USFK. January 10, 2006.

23 Interview with KCPT steering committee member. December 9, 2005.

24 Transcript of Prime Minister Han Myeong-Sook's national address. Seoul, South Korea. May 12, 2006. Available here [last accessed 6/2/10].

25 Blaine Harden, “South Korean voters opt for ‘reason over confrontation’ with the North.” Washington Post. June 5, 2010.

26 Jeju's island geography is another contributing factor.

27 Currently, the South Korean military is subordinate to a U.S. commander under the Combined Forces Command structure.

28 See Hwang Doo-hyong. “Lawmaker urges U.S., S. Korea to begin talks on OPCON transfer delay.” Yonhap News. March 25, 2010.

29 “Understanding Security Relations on the Korean Peninsula: South Korea's Strategic Perceptions on the Region and Beyond.” East Asia Institute. April 23, 2010, p.2.

30 “58 percent support Hatoyama's resignation over Futenma fiasco.” Mainichi Daily News. Other polls conducted in March and April also suggest respondents slightly favoring Futenma's relocation outside of Okinawa. See the Mansfield Foundation's public opinion poll database.

31 For a recent discussion on the justification for U.S. presence in Okinawa, see Sheila Smith. “More mature basing policy needed in Japan.” Asahi Shimbun. June 5, 2010.

32 Lisa Linda Natividad and Gwyn Kirk, “Fortress Guam: Resistance to US Military Mega-Buildup,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, 19-1-10, May 10, 2010.

33 See Gavan McCormack, “The Battle of Okinawa 2009: Obama vs Hatoyama,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, 46-1-09, November 16, 2009.

34 Anti-base networks in the Asia-Pacific region have been intact since at least 1997. See Ellen-Rae Cachola, Gwyn Kirk, Lisa Natividad, and Maria Reinat Pumarejo, “Women Working across Borders for Peace and Genuine Security.” Peace Review 22, no. 2: 164-70.

35 For a comparison of the two movements in Korean, see this link.

36 For the full letter to President Obama, see this link.