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Extended optima and equilibria for continuous games

III. Comparison with bargaining experiments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

D. J. Gates  and
M. Westcott
D. J. Gates
Affiliation:
C.S.I.R.O. Division of Mathematics and Statistics, P.O. Box 1965, Canberra, ACT 2601
M. Westcott
Affiliation:
C.S.I.R.O. Division of Mathematics and Statistics, P.O. Box 1965, Canberra, ACT 2601
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Abstract

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The new optima and equilibria discussed in the preceding two papers are compared with the results of bargaining experiments between two and three players performed by Fouraker and Siegel. Experiments where players have complete or incomplete information are considered. There is clear evidence that the new optima are operating, and that traditional optima–Cournot, Pareto and competitive (threat)–are less satisfactory in explaining the course of the whole bargaining process.

Type
Research Article
Information
The ANZIAM Journal , Volume 23 , Issue 2 , October 1981 , pp. 210 - 227
Copyright
Copyright © Australian Mathematical Society 1981

References

[1]Fouraker, L. E. and Siegel, S., Bargaining behaviour (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1960).Google Scholar
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