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Dominated strategies in searching for evolutionary stable strategies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

P. Breen
Affiliation:
Slab and Plate Product Division, B. H. P. Steel, Pt. Kembla, N. S. W. 2505, Australia.
W. Henderson
Affiliation:
Applied Mathematics Department, University of Adelaide, G.P.O. Box 498, Adelaide, S.A. 5001, Australia.
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Abstract

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The paper asks and answers the question “When does dominance of a particular strategy play a role in the search for evolutionary stable strategies?” The answer is much less obvious than would appear at first glance.

When there is strict dominance of a pure strategy, it is clear that the dominated strategy should never be employed in any conflict. However, when the dominance is not strict it is less obvious that the strategy should not be used. The research was originally intended to clear up this grey area in the theory of evolutionary stable strategies, but it has turned out to be of more than simply academic interest. The result can be used, with varying degrees of success, to simplify the search procedure for these evolutionary stable strategies when a reward matrix is given.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Australian Mathematical Society 1988

References

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