Speech-act theory starts from the premise that the minimal unit of spoken communication is not the word or sentence but the production of words or sentences in the performance of certain kinds of acts, such as challenging, entreating, apologising, thanking, or rebuking. Some speech acts may be expressed quite economically, in a few words (for example, ‘I congratulate you’); others require a sequence of sentences or syntactic chunks to achieve their illocutionary function—that is, to fulfil the intention of the speaker. In a recent paper, drawing on two fields of study outside Classics—cognitive psychology and discourse analysis—I examined a single set of speech acts recorded in the Homeric epics: the rebukes which Homer's characters address to one another in the course of the Iliad and the Odyssey. In that paper I demonstrated that all speeches in Homer which we identify as rebukes share a common structure, or format, and that this format is remarkably similar to the format to which we ourselves—in middle-class communities in the Western world—refer when, for example, we chastise a child. And I proposed that this notion of format-based speech may be extended perhaps even to the full range of speech acts observable in this everyday world and in the Homeric epics, of which apologies, challenges, words of consolation, and refusals of invitations are examples.

Modern scholars have expressed divergent views on the role played in Athenian law courts by , ‘the most just opinion,’ which the dikasts swore to observe in the heliastic oath. The most common view is that this embodied a principle of equity under which the precise letter of the law could be overridden. Hirzel and Vinogradoff are the leading advocates of this view. A variant has been proposed by Jones and Plescia, whereby this was not the intention of the oath, but it was used by speech-writers and accepted by the jury-courts in this fashion.

A minority view is advanced by Meyer-Laurin, Wolff and Meinecke, that ‘the most just opinion’ was only a subsidiary means of decision, applied only when the law gave no guidance on a particular point. Biscardi proposes a middle way, in that ‘most just opinion did not override the letter of the law but was used as a principle of equity in the interpretation and formulation of the laws.’

‘What men will fight for seems to be worth looking into’

H.L. Mencken

Historians have long studied warfare, albeit within a selective framework that includes dates, places, and the description of tactics. Moreover, explanations of ‘why’ and ‘how’ conflicts occur seldom deviate from the political or the long term strategic outlook. It is only recently that we have come to qualify the effect war has on combatants and civilians alike, and how actions and choices in war can also be explained by the stresses to which participants are exposed. Studies such as Jonathon Shay's Achilles in Vietnam and Lawrence Tritle's From Melos to My Lai in part demonstrably link such psychological trauma with the destructive and savage actions undertaken by soldiers in the conflicts of every epoch. It seems reasonable, therefore, that our growing understanding of combat psychology in the twentieth century A.D. may help us unravel problematic events in history, or at least provide a new way to approach old questions.

This paper falls into two parts. The first explores the nature of the honour (if not unprecedented, outstanding) paid to Popilia circa 100 B.C.; the second speculates about the content of the panegyric pronounced on that occasion.

In 390 B.C., according to Livy, the Roman senate, in recognition of female generosity during the preceding Gallic siege, declared that women were to share with men the rights to funeral laudationes: matronis gratiae actae honosque additus ut earum sicut virorum post mortem sollemnis laudatio esset. The record is straightforward but the item is suspect because of the variant traditions which parallel it.

Suetonius and Cassius Dio give assessments of the emperor Titus which are, at first sight at least, contradictory: for Suetonius he was ‘natura benivolentissimus’, but for Dio . The most recent treatment of Titus’ handling of financial affairs takes issue with earlier commentators who considered Titus extravagant and incompetent and offers a positive conclusion: ‘Titus’ financial acumen must be recognised; the economy did not suffer during his reign … he was well aware of the need to observe the formalities and appear to be generous, and at the same time ensure that he had the funds to be so’. Jones reaches his verdict on the basis of a range of numismatic, epigraphic and literary evidence, without, however, any detailed analysis of Suetonius’ section on Titus’ personal kindness. An examination of this material will strengthen Jones’ conclusions and cast light on Suetonius’ compositional skills.

In spite of their amorphous appearance Martial's books of epigrams are carefully crafted, especially at the beginning of the volumes where the poet typically sets the scene and outlines ideas to be expanded in the body of the collection. Any analysis of the opening of Book 1, however, is complicated by the likelihood that the surviving text is a revised version (subsequently published as part of a codex edition of two or more books), the original having been released on its own in traditional roll form. So, among others, 1.1 and 1.2 are generally considered to be later additions, written for the compendium, leaving 1.3 as the first epigram and intended introduction of the original book. Regardless of the date of the first two epigrams, 1.3 does seem in both tone and content to perform a prefatory role, as Citroni especially has argued.