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Justice in Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannus
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 May 2015
Extract
Justice is a theme common to both of Sophocles' Oedipus plays, but it is subjected to scrutiny from two quite different viewpoints. The mythical Oedipus was pre-eminently suited to be an example of the workings of universal justice, as Sophocles conceived it, both because his crime and its discovery might be presented as a vivid dramatic event, and because Oedipus' very existence confronted the starkest questions of justice and morality, innocence, guilt and criminal intent. So rich was this broad theme that Sophocles treated it on two occasions, far removed from each other in time and spirit, yet the dramatist was able to derive new elucidation of the universe in his second encounter. But critics generally are unwilling to face the issues of justice and guilt squarely. The O. T., especially, gives rise to much embarrassment or plain evasion, yet only by facing Sophocles' actual presentation of the problem and assessing it on Sophocles' own terms can we arrive at a satisfactory response to the predicament of Oedipus – a response which will affront neither our intellect nor our morality.
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- Copyright © Australasian Society for Classical Studies 1976
References
1 Cf. Prof. Gellie, G.H., Sophocles, A Reading (Melbourne, 1972), pp. 94–95Google Scholar; for a different view, Vellacott, P.H., ‘The guilt of Oedipus’, G & R (1964), 137–148.Google Scholar
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12 See Dodds, loc. cit. (note 4 above).
13 O.T. 109 
, 290 
, 561 
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24 ‘
can surely be taken as a reflection on Oedipus (note the balance with 
and 
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.
25 And see O.T. 255-8.
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31 Dodds, loc. cit.; Adkins, A.W.H., Merit and Responsibility (Oxford, 1960), pp. 101-2.Google Scholar
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34 See Knox, B.M.W., Oedipus at Thebes (New Haven, 1957), p. 39Google Scholar.
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36 Rep. 380 a-c.
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45 Ibid. pp. 94-5.
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47 Cf. Lloyd-Jones, H., The Justice of Zeus (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1971), p. 128.Google Scholar