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Sensible Particulars in Plato's Ontology*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 May 2015

F.C. White
F.C. White*
Affiliation:
University of Tasmania
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Extract

In this paper I wish to argue as follows. Plato held, and stressed very strongly from the start, that the Forms are not subject to change. He seemed to hold that in this lies their main contrast with the sensible world. But at times, particularly in the middle dialogues, he was inclined to argue that the inferiority of the sensible world lies elsewhere; namely, in the fact that its objects are the bearers of opposite (contrary or contradictory) properties. I will argue, first, that this latter claim in its simplest and most direct form is inconsistent with other important claims made by Plato; second, that recent attempts to make the argument tighter and more consistent are unsuccessful. I will end by trying to show that what remains of the ‘argument from opposites’ when a number of necessary qualifications have been made, still leads to a clear and useful distinction between Forms and particulars.

Type
Research Article
Information
Antichthon , Volume 10 , 1976 , pp. 8 - 21
Copyright
Copyright © Australasian Society for Classical Studies 1976

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Footnotes

*

Numbers in square brackets used in the footnotes refer to the list of references given at the end of the article.

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