¹ Whittakei, J.‘Numenius and Alcinous on the First Principle’, Phoenix 32 (1978), 144–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar His view had previously been expressed in ‘Moses Atticizing’, Phoenix 21 (1967), 196–201.

² Whittaker (1978), 144–5 and 154.

³ For his interest in Jewish religion see frs. la, lc, 8, 9, 10a, 56 (des Places, sub-sequently abbreviated dP) = frs. 9a, 37, 17, 18, 19, 34 (Leemans, subsequently abbreviated L). See also Whittaker (1967), passim.

⁴ In particular Plutarch and his predecessor Ammonius, De E apud Delphos 392a ff., but see also Seneca,Ep. 58. 17 and Albinus in Proclus, In Tim. 1. 219. 9–10 (Diehl), where the αίτια is perhaps God, and cf. [Alcinous], Didasc. 10. 3 (164. 30 Hermann) where God is ούσιότης.

⁵ Dodds, E.R.proposed ό μέν ye α (= πρώτος) ώκ in ‘Numenius and Ammonius’, Fondation Hardt Entretiens 5 (1957), 15;Google ScholarThillet, P. proposed ò μέν in Numenius, Fragments, ed. des Places, E. (Paris 1973), 108;Google ScholarDillon, J.suggested (possibly for the sake of convenience rather than out of conviction) ò μέν , The Middle Platonists (London 1977), 368 n. 1.Google Scholar

⁶ Cf. frs. 3.8, 11.11, 16.14, 23.4, 26.32, 26.99 dP.

⁷ Dodds, loc. cit., and others; for further references see the note of des Places, p. 108.

⁸ Loc. cit. n. 5: the Timaeus was the most influential of all Greek philosophical works at this time, and since the chief speaker of the Timaeus was a noted Pythagorean it must have had a special significance for those who, like Numenius, claimed to follow Pythagoras.

⁹ Whittaker (1978), 150 cites Baltes, M.‘Numenios von Apamea und der Platonische Timaios’, Vigiliae Christianae 29 (1975), 241–70,CrossRefGoogle Scholar as authority for his belief that the term ‘lawgiver’ was a standard description of the second God in Numenius’ time. Baltes, however, gives him little support, for 262 n. 89 says nothing about standard terms for any entity. It mentions the words ‘secundum deum, latorem legis’ at Calcidium, In Tim. 188 (212. 24 Waszink), which, like other elements in Calcidius, were believed by Waszink and others to have a Numenian origin (though Baltes does suggest a wider Middle Platonic background for this epithet). In any case this passage associates three divine entities with the law: ‘summus deus iubet, secundus ordinat, tertius intimat’ (213. 5 Waszink), and cf. custos legis of the third God at 213 .2. Related in some unknown manner to this passage of Calcidius is Apuleius, De Platone 1. 96. 7 (Thomas), which is concerned with Apuleius’ first God and first Providence. Baltes also mentions [Alcinous], Didascalicus 16. 2 (Louis), 172. 8 (Hermann), which actually concerns Ti. 41–2. The term’s appearance here in the very unoriginal physical chapters of the Didascalicus should alert us to the fact that it depends upon traditions of Timaeus-interpretation like the majority of chapters 12–22. The evidence available allows us to conclude only that ‘lawgiver’ may have been a regular term for the demiurge; for although [Alcinous’] first God is relatively inert there is nothing to suggest that the demiurge is separate from him, and much to suggest that this demiurge of the physical chapters is merely a personification of the first principle of the meta-physics (chapters 8–11) κατά τον elκòrα λòγου (cf. 12. 2: 167. 24 H). At 14. 3 (169. 31–3 H) the demiurge awakens and converts the intellect of the world-soul, while at 10. 3 (165. 1–3) the first God does so. Note too that, as in the Timaeus, the demiurge is primarily a creator and arranger of soul, complicated physical constructions being left to subordinate Gods: this leaves only minor difficulty in the demiurge’s identification with an inert first God. We should recall that Plato places limitations on his demiurge’s activity at Ti. 42e: ò μέν δήäπama ταύτα δίατάξας ίμβνΐν iv τώ έαυτού κατά τρόπον ήθεί- μένοντος δè…

¹⁰ Seneca,EP. 94. 38 = Posidonius, F 178 (Kidd).

¹¹ Both the address to the young Gods at 41a-d, and, more particularly, his revealing of ‘fated laws’ at 41e-42d, show the clarity, brevity, and authority which Posidonius expects from a lawgiver’s utterances.

¹² 41c(cf.41e)and42d.

¹³ Even though they turn èirì την τύν ξώων δημιουργίαν, 41c.

¹⁴ Fr. 7. 5–7 dP (16 L) shows Numenius willing to concede that Plato might not quite agree with his doctrine of ‘that which is’ (possibly recalling Soph. 248a ff.), but he thinks the Timaeus gives Pythagoras’ view (cf. Eudorus in Stobaeus, Ecl. 2. 49.19–20 [Wachsmuth] ).

¹⁵ Fr. 15. 9–10 dP (24 L) depicts the influence of the first God as simply pouring forth, άναχεϊται etc τα δλα.

¹⁶ LSJ give Od. 9. 108 and Hesiod, Op. 22 for the contrast with άρόω. Xen. Oec. 11. 16 implies a substantial difference between φοτεύεαι and σπείρεα•, as does Mem. 2.1.13. An important passage for comparison is Plato Phdr. 276e–7a: φυτεύει και σπείρει μετ έπαττήμης λόγους οί èawoK τω τε ψυτεύσαντι βοηθειν ικανοί και ούχι Άκαρποι, αλλά ίχοντες σπέρμα … This may explain the connexion between fr. 13 and fr. 14 dP (22/23 L).

¹⁷ For the first God is απλούς, fr. 11. 12 dP (20 L), and order is one of his gifts, fr. 15. 9 dP (24 L). An assessor has kindly pointed out that, as both a unifying principle of ontology and an epistemological principle, the Stoic σπερματικός λόγος can be thought of as a divine seed linking some if not all of these possible gifts to man. It appears at SVF 2. 205. 24–30 as a principle of rest, and it is certainly a life-principle (SVF 2. 218. 1–3)4 in the late second century it was the seminal principle of soul (Marc. Aur. 4. 14, 6. 12), and the relevance of the doctrine to the intellectual world in which Numenius moved should not be doubted. Plutarch’s, Osiris (De Iside et Osiride 371a ff.),Google Scholar also being λόγος, has a similar wide range of gifts to bestow upon Isis in the form of a seed or efflux (372f): order, stability, health (371b), knowledge, virtue, and form (374f). In Quaest. Plat. 1001a the seed which Plutarch’s God sows is a seed of life and soul, and also a seed of intelligence, reasoning, and harmony (1001c).

¹⁸ He is fr. 16. 9 dP (25 L), and imparts his goodness to others, fr. 19 dP (28 L).

¹⁹ Others participate in him only τύφρονεϊν, fr. 19. 4 dP (28 L) and he communicates έπιοτήμη, fr. 14 dP (23 L). He is νούς, fr. 16. 2 dP (25 L), but νοϋς appears to come to man via the demiurge, fr. 12.14–16 dP (21 L).

²⁰ His rest is communicated in the form of ή μονή ή άώιος and the preservation of the whole, fr. 15 DP (24 L).

²¹ He is linked with , fr. 22 dP (T25 L), though this fragment requires cautious treatment: see below.

²² Frs. 3. 5–12, 4a. 6–7, 4a. 17–32, 5. 19–28 dP (12, 13, 14 L). Note that Calcidius, when making his second God a lawgiver (above n. 9), makes his first God the source ‘ex qua ceteris omnibus quae sunt, substantia ministrata’.

²³ Fr. 44 dP (T36 L): this appears also in the passage of Calcidius discussed below.

²⁴ Fr. 52. 65–7 dP(T30L).

²⁵ Significant parts of this commentary are now generally agreed to be dependent upon Numenius, whether directly or indirectly (e.g. via Porphyry). I concern myself only with sections marked as stemming from Numenius by Waszink, J.H.Plato Latinus 4 (London/Leiden 1962), an edition of Calcidius, In Tim.Google Scholar

²⁶ ‘Inseparabilis corporum comes’, 31 (80. 12 Waszink).

²⁷ If only because of the temptation to identify the indivisible ούσία with the of Ti. 27d on the basis of the κατά ταύτά, 28a, cf. 35a, which may lead one to connect the divisible obaia with τό γνγνόμενον which is , 28a. This caused some ancient commentators to identify it with matter, see Plutarch, De An. Proc. 1022f and Calcidius 29 (79. 11 Waszink); it is a development of this view which led Plutarch and Numenius to identify this ούσία with the soul-powers of primeval matter.

²⁸ Fr. 7 dP (16 L) serves to identify these terms. It seems odd that any ούσία should be regarded as less than ö<5, and this problem in the tradition may first have in-spired the description of matter as öντως ούκ öν, the öντως explaining the term ούσία. Such a principle may underlie the four-fold division of ontology at Proclus, In Tim. 1. 233 (Diehl), where ideas, soul, bodies, and matter are really being, not really being, not really not-being, and really not-being respectively. The öντως in both cases refers to original ontological principles of the universe as opposed to their subsequent products. This classification which Proclus attributes to ο¡ παΧαιαί probably precedes Moderatus the first-century Pythagorean (see Simpl. In Phys. 230. 34 ff. [Diels] ), and I am tempted to connect it with Crantor, whose four-fold ontology underlies his interpretation of the ούσίαι of the Platonic world-soul (Plut. De An. Proc. 1012f), and who interpreted the divisible ούσία as matter (see Cherniss, H.Plutarch’sMoralia (Loeb) vol. 13, pt. 1. 215 note e).Google Scholar

²⁹ This is simply the function-pattern of the world-soul, through which the demiurge must now operate. For ιδέa= ούσία (fr. 16. 1 dP [25 L]), and the ούσία which is created is none other than the ‘anima mundi rationabilis’. The notion of the world-soul as an ιδέα had been found in Speusippus (fr. 40 Lang) and followers of Posidonius (Plut. De An. Proc. 1023 b-c), but ιδέα is surely not meant in the standard Platonic sense. Numenius shows this in the fragment under consideration, where he distinguishes the ούσία of the (i.e. stemming from the) first God from that of the (stemming from the) second: this may be a distinction between the indivisible and combined ούσίαι of Ti. 35a, between the static essence of the intell-igibles deriving from supreme Good and an essence associated with motion.

³⁰ Fr. 12. 17–22 dP (21 L), cf. άπερίοπτος èavroù, fr. 11. 18 dP (20 L), and περιωπήν, fr. 12. 20 dP (cf. Polit. 272 e 5). Baltes discusses the connexion, op. cit. (n. 9 above) 261–2. But the cosmic phases of the myth of the Politicus are less important than the support which it gives for the notion that the creator God, though beginning the creation-process (αύτης πρώτον τής κυκλήσβως ηρχβν, 271 d 3), leaves the organization of its parts to subordinate divinities. He oversees the progress of the universe long after he has ceased any demiurgic activity, just as the demiurge of the Timaeus oversees rather than continues the creation-process after 42e.

³¹ 32 c 8, 39 e 9, 76 c 7, 74 c 6 , cf. 38 c 8, 76 d 7.

³² May I venture at this point to suggest what Numenius himself may have written with regard to 39e, and which would have been sufficient to provoke Proclus’ comments: και τω μεν ττρώτω κοινωνεί κατά την τοΰ δ έστι ξώον τάξιν, έαυτώ δε κατά την του νοϋ, τω δε τρίτω κατά τήν του διανοουμένου, ó μεν γάρ πρώτος έν προσχρήσει τοΰ δευτέρου νοεϊ, ò 6è èv προσχρησει του τρίτου δημιουργεί. The very text of 39e is quite enough to explain Proclus’ rather paradoxical (and perhaps sarcastic) use of the term νους διανοούμενος. He may be pointing out that whatever is thinking discursively here it is still the same divine intelligence of the the creator God. I do not believe Proclus has any information to offer us on the gender of διανοούμενον, because that information was not included in the Numen-ian text, but I do believe that he was right in supposing the middle sense of the verb to be used rather than the passive. Moreover it is highly unlikely that Proclus follows Numenius directly here. Inaccuracies may have arisen through Proclus’ having misunderstood reports from Porphyry (see Baltes, loc. cit. 269–70) or from Iamblichus’ work against Amelius and Numenius (Proclus, In Tim. 2. 277. 27 ff. [Diehl] : see Baltes n. 117 for this suggestion of H. Krause).

³³ To prefer to believe Proclus at fr. 22, where he is obscure and still thinks in Amelius’ terms (for he speaks only of three minds, and associates this triad with Amelius’ triad of demiurgic minds [see 103. 19 Diehl] ), and to reject fr. 21, where he is clear and has little excuse for confusion, would be ridiculous unless other evidence points to the third God as a νους διανοούμενος rather than as the κόσμος. Only fr. 11. 13–20 dP (20 L) might offer support; but even here it is in combination with matter that the third God becomes an entity distinct from the second. Since the 2nd/3rd God is One and matter is a Dyad, and since the combination of One and Dyad creates the universe in fr. 52 dP (T30 L), the 3rd God is even here the universe. I take the unity of the 2nd/3rd Gods to be inspired by the link of the 2nd and 3rd hypotheses of Plato’s Parmenides at 155 e 4–5, in the belief that the first three of these hypotheses, showing three different pictures of a One, have inspired Numenius’ three Gods.

³⁴ Thus Eusebius will not have been tempted to quote the Timaeus-based analogy which preceded fr. 13, for he can scarcely accept the Platonic notion of ‘young Gods’ which this would have involved.