Published online by Cambridge University Press: 19 January 2015
This paper examines Apuleius' Apologia from the perspective of its legal context. The paper asks three questions: first, what was the legal situation in relation to the property issues central to the motivations of Apuleius' accusers? Second, what would the legal effects of a conviction have been on these property concerns? And, finally, what light do our answers to these questions shed on the Apologia itself? The applicable legal rules suggest both that some of the concerns of the prosecutors were ill-founded and that the prosecution would have achieved little in a legal sense in terms advancing their alleged ends. These observations suggest several potential conclusions: first, that Apuleius' accusers sincerely believed their accusation of magic and thought that it was only the magical skill of Apuleius that threatened their aspirations to Pudentilla's estate. Conversely, it may be that the accusers were simply ignorant about the law, vindictive towards Apuleius, or both. Third, that Apuleius has misrepresented his accusers' motivations. Finally, these conclusions on matters of law could even be taken to suggest that the speech does not represent a genuine case, but rather is a work of fiction concocted by Apuleius for literary purposes.
Thank you to Dr Eric Ghosh, Catherine Kim, Professor J.F. Matthews and Carlos Noreña, and the anonvmous journal referees for helpful suggestions on this paper.
1 On the dating see the bibliography in Bradley, K., ‘Law, Magic and Culture in the Apologia of Apuleius’, Phoenix 51 (1997) 203–23CrossRefGoogle Scholar. at 203 n. 1.
2 For an earlier related study see Norden, F., Apulejus von Madaura und das römische Privatrecht (Leipzig 1912)Google Scholar. Norden, however, does not deal directly with many of the key questions addressed in this paper.
3 See Hunink, V. (ed.), Apuleius of Madauros pro se de magia (Apologia) (Amsterdam 1987) vol. 1, 25–7Google Scholar, for an outline of the debate as to whether the speech represents a real trial or not.
4 It is generally assumed that Apuleius was not condemned: see Hunink (n. 3) vol. 1, 19-20.
5 This is leaving aside the fact that Apuleius reveals in the speech that they were ignorant of some of the actual facts, such as the fact that Apuleius had not been made heir to Pudentilla's estate: Apul, . Apol. 100Google Scholar.
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21 Garnsey (n. 20) 171 and chap. 5.
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70 Buckland (n. 53) 370-1.
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72 Dig. 48.20.1 pr (Callistratus)Google Scholar. That this represented classical law, rather than Justinianic interpolation, is suggested by the title of a book by Paul extracted in the Digest, de portionibus, quae liberis damnatorum conceduntur: Dig. 48.20.7 (Paul)Google Scholar. Presumably, a book would only be required on what portions were conceded to children of the condemned if the property of the condemned was actually confiscated. See also Paul. Sent. 5.23Google Scholar.14: confiscation of property for administering a love philtre, and 5.23.18: confiscation of property for possession of books on the art of magic.
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77 Contrast the penalty of relegatio for giving an abortificant or a love philtre (Paul. Sent. 5.23.14Google Scholar) with the punishment of deportado for castrating a person (Paul. Sent. 5.23.13Google Scholar).
78 The hierarchy suggested by Pauli Sententiae makes these offences, punishable by execution alone, more serious than just administering a love philtre, the other offence implied by the speech, for which relegation is prescribed only if the victim does not die: Paul. Sent. 5.23.14-15 and 17Google Scholar.
79 See e.g. Dig. 48.22.6 pr (Ulpian), 48.22.15 pr (Marcian)Google Scholar.
80 Tit. Ulp. 22.2Google Scholar; Buckland (n. 53) 290. Slaves, though non-citizens, could be instituted as heirs provided that they were manumitted by the will: Tit. Ulp. 22Google Scholar.7ff.
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93 Dig. 24.3.31 pr (Julian).
94 Apul. Apol. 101.
95 Apul Apol. 101.6-7.
96 Tit. Ulp. 7.1. See also Dig. 24.1.
97 See Saller (n. 43) chap. 7 for illustrations of the wide range of testamentary options utilised by the Romans, and 166-8 on the testamentary freedom allowed by the laws. Pudentilla also required her tutor's assent: Gai. Inst. 2.118.
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108 On this question see Hunink (ed.) (n. 3) vol. 1, 25-7.