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The Generalship of P. Quinctilius Varus in the Clades Variana

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 December 2019

Daniel Morgan
Daniel Morgan*
Affiliation:
University of [email protected]
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Abstract

The clades Variana was a major Roman defeat, occurring over three days of fighting in AD 9. Three Roman legions and several units of auxiliaries were destroyed, and their commander, Publius Quinctilius Varus, died at the climax of the fighting. Suetonius said that the army paid the price for its general's temeritas and neglegentia, and many other commentators, both ancient and modern, have condemned Varus as a general ever since. This paper re-evaluates Varus’ competence as a general by re-examining the extensive literary and archaeological evidence for the clades, with reference to comparative literary evidence that shows how Roman generals usually reacted in comparable situations. It will be argued that Varus’ aggressive march towards a rumoured rebellion with a large baggage train, his re-organisation of the baggage train, his change of course westwards, and even his fatal advance into the defile at Kalkriese, were logical decisions in the context of standard Roman military responses to crisis. It is shown that Varus was hamstrung by intelligence and logistical limitations that were not peculiar to him but were systemic to the Roman army at the time. Varus’ generalship is thus contextualised as relatively competent, although uninspired.

Keywords

Roman armyRoman tacticsTeutoburg Forestclades VarianaVarusGermaniaArminius
Type
Research Article
Information
Antichthon , Volume 53 , 2019 , pp. 87 - 107
Copyright
Copyright © The Australasian Society for Classical Studies 2019

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References

1 Schlüter, W., ‘The Battle of the Teutoburg Forest: Archaeological Research at Kalkriese near Osnabrück’, in Creighton, D. and Wilson, R.J.A. (eds.), Roman Germany: Studies in Cultural Interaction (Portsmouth, RI 1999) 125–59Google Scholar, at 154. September: Schlüter, W., ‘Die archäologischen Untersuchungen in der Kalkrieser-Niewedder Senke’, in Schlüter, W. et al. (eds.), Kalkriese—Römer im Osnabrücker Land: Archäologische Forschungen zur Varusschlacht (Bramsche 1993) 1–51Google Scholar, at 45.

2 Sheldon, R.M., ‘Slaughter in the Forest: Roman Intelligence Mistakes in Germany’, Small Wars & Insurgencies 12(3) (2001) 1–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 23–24; Wolters, R., ‘Die Schlacht im Teutoburger Wald: Varus, Arminius und das römische Germanien’, in Baltrusch, E. et al. (eds.), 2000 Jahre Varusschlacht: Geschichte—Archäologie—Legenden (Berlin 2012) 3–21Google Scholar, at 11.

3 Schlüter, ‘Untersuchungen’ (n. 1) 45.

4 Wolters, Cherusci: R., Die Schlacht im Teutoburger Wald: Arminius, Varus und das römische Germanien (München 2008) 119–121Google Scholar. Arminius: Vell. Pat. 2.118–19.

5 Tac. Ann. 1.61, 12.27; Dio Cass. 56.21. Most Roman captives were probably executed after the battle (Vell. Pat. 2.119.4; Tac. Ann. 1.61).

6 Suet. Aug. 23; Dio Cass. 56.23–24. Also see von Schnurbein, S., ‘Augustus in Germania and his New “Town” at Waldgirmes East of the Rhine’, JRA 16(1) (2003) 93–107Google Scholar, at 105.

7 The worst criticisms began with Velleius Paterculus (D. Timpe, Arminius-Studien [Heidelberg 1970] 123). See Vell. Pat. 2.117–19; Flor. 2.30.31; Dio Cass. 56.18–19. Suetonius claimed that his defeat was ‘nearly fatal’ to the empire (Aug. 23) and sharply criticised Varus for temeritate et neglegentia (Tib. 18). Tacitus was less critical (fato et vi Armini cecidit, Ann. 1.55; infelici manu, 1.61). Modern critics: E.P. Baltrusch, ‘P. Quinctilius Varus und die bella Variana’, in Baltrusch et al. (eds.) 2000 Jahre Varusschlacht (n. 2) 117–31, at 131; Benario, H.W., ‘Bellum Varianum’, Historia 35(1) (1986) 114–15Google Scholar; Sheldon (n. 2) 30. More sympathetic views: Syme, R., The Roman Revolution (Oxford 1939, repr. 2002) 511Google Scholar; Wolters (n. 2) 10.

8 Suetonius’ criticisms probably represent the contemporary view of Varus’ failures: Timpe (n. 7) 120–21.

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10 On the location, see n. 51.

11 For example, A. Rost and S. Wilbers-Rost, ‘Kalkriese—Archäologische Spuren einer römischen Niederlage’ in Baltrusch et al. (eds.) 2000 Jahre Varusschlacht (n. 2) 163–76, at 168, 170–72; Wolters (n. 2) 11–12.

12 There are other minor extant sources on the clades, including the poets Ovid and Manilius as well as Strabo, Frontinus, and Orosius. However, the first three of these writers are vague and do not detail the battle. Frontinus does not mention the battle but describes fighting in the aftermath (Str. 3.15.4). Orosius is a late source, heavily influenced by Velleius (Timpe [n. 7] 118–19, 125). These sources are not useful for analysing the battle.

13 Timpe (n. 7) 120–21.

14 Ibid., 123.

15 Suetonius (Tib. 18.1–2) elaborates on Tiberius’ extra precautions upon campaigning in Germany in AD 10. These may represent specific responses to perceived failings by Varus.

16 Callies, H., ‘Bemerkungen zu Aussagen und Aussagehaltung antiker Quellen und neuerer Literatur zur Varusschlacht und ihrer Lokalisierung’, in Wiegels, R. and Woesler, W. (eds.), Arminius und die Varusschlacht (Paderborn 1995) 175–83Google Scholar, at 176; also see Wolters (n. 4) 110–11.

17 Wolters (n. 4) 11; Woodman, A.J., Velleius Paterculus: The Tiberian Narrative (2.94–131) (Cambridge 1977) 192Google Scholar. Also see Vell. Pat. 2.104–14.

18 Vell. Pat. 2.119.1–4. Velleius may have been brief here, as he intended to write at greater length later (2.119.1).

19 Vell. Pat. 2.117.2, 119.2. Also see Baltrusch (n. 7) 119.

20 See Timpe (n. 7) 123–25; Woodman (n. 17) 188, 203–4.

21 Knowledge: Timpe (n. 7) 119. Lack of detail: Callies (n. 16) 176.

22 Vell. Pat. 2.119.2 (inclusus silvis, paludibus, insidiis). On egrediendi, see Woodman (n. 17) 199. It is almost a technical military term, referring to withdrawal or disengagement.

23 This is possibly the result of a transcribing error in the word immunis (Woodman (n. 17) 199–201). Why would Varus give such an order but fight to the death (Tac. Ann. 1.61)?

24 Baltrusch (n. 7) 117, 122; Timpe (n. 7) 125; Wolters (n. 4) 147.

25 Wolters (n. 4) 147–49; contra Baltrusch (n. 7) 131, who does accept that Varus was somewhat competent in military matters.

26 Rediscovery of the battlefield: Tac. Ann. 1.60–65.

27 Timpe (n. 7) 119, 125.

28 Tac. Ann. 1.60–62. See Großkopf, B., Rost, A., and Wilbers-Rost, S., ‘The Ancient Battlefield at Kalkriese’, in Harbeck, M., von Heyking, K., and Schwarzberg, H. (eds.), Sickness, Hunger, War and Religion: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (2012) 91–111Google Scholar, at 95.

29 Grethlein, J., Experience and Teleology in Ancient Historiography: ‘Futures Past’ from Herodotus to Augustine (New York 2013) 133CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Also see Goodyear, F.R.D., The Annals of Tacitus, Books 1–6, Volume II: Annals 1.55–81 and Annals 2 (Cambridge 1981) 65Google Scholar, and Koestermann, E., ‘Die Feldzüge des Germanicus 14–16 n. Chr’, Historia 6(4) (1957) 429–79Google Scholar, at 479.

30 Koestermann (n. 29) 444; Timpe, D., ‘Geographische Faktoren und politische Entscheidungen in der Geschichte der Varuszeit’, in Wiegels, R. and Woesler, W. (eds.), Arminius und die Varusschlacht: Geschichte—Mythos—Literatur (Paderborn 1995) 13–27Google Scholar, at 26.

31 Tac. Ann. 1.63–65; cf. Wilbers-Rost, S., ‘The Site of the Varus Battle at Kalkriese. Recent Results from Archaeological Research’, in Morillo, A., Hanel, N., and Martin, E. (eds.), Limes XX: XX Congresso internacional de estudios sobre la frontera romana. Vol. 3 (Madrid 2009) 1339–46Google Scholar, at 1343.

32 It is notable that the terrain described in the ambush of Caecina is similar to that found at Kalkriese. In particular, compare Tacitus’ emphasis (Ann. 1.64) on marshes and waterlogged ground disrupting Roman formations to the similar situation at the site of the clades (Schlüter, ‘Battle’ [n. 1] 128–29). Also see Timpe (n. 7) 26.

33 Manuwald, B., ‘Politisches Ungeschick oder vorbestimmtes Verhängnis? Cassius Dios Bericht über die Varus-Schlacht’, in Lehmann, G. and Wiegels, R. (eds.), Römische Präsenz und Herrschaft im Germanien der augusteischen Zeit (Göttingen 2007) 431–49Google Scholar, at 431.

34 Wolters (n. 2) 11; ref. Manuwald (n. 33) 438.

35 Manuwald (n. 33) 440, 442.

36 See Dio Cass. 56.24.2–5; Manuwald (n. 33) 446. Conversely, such weather was fairly typical in that area and at that time of year (Murdoch, A., Rome's Greatest Defeat: Massacre in the Teutoburg Forest [Stroud, Gloucestershire 2008] 107Google Scholar).

37 Schlüter, ‘Battle’ (n. 1) 128–31. It is possible that there was some earlier fighting further south and southeast, in which the ground was undulating and more heavily forested.

38 Swan, P.M., The Augustan Succession: An Historical Commentary on Cassius Dio's Roman History Books 55–56 (9 B.C.–A.D. 14) (Oxford 2004) 261Google Scholar.

39 See Dio Cass. 56.20–21. Dio does not mention the marshy, waterlogged ground. Tac. Ann. 1.63–64 is much closer to the reality. Perhaps Dio described the terrain from further southeast where the fighting could have started.

40 Schlüter, ‘Battle’ (n. 1) 154. Size: Rost, A. and Wilbers-Rost, S., ‘Weapons at the Battlefield of Kalkriese’, Gladius 30 (2010) 117–36Google Scholar, at 118. Cf. Cestius Gallus’ retreat from Jerusalem in AD 66 (Joseph. BJ 2.546–51). On the third day of his retreat, Gallus' hard-pressed forces advanced at around half their normal speed (see Gichon, M., ‘Cestius Gallus’ Campaign in Judea’, PalEQ 113 [1981] 50, 59, 61–62Google Scholar). At Kalkriese, the Roman army was attacked over a distance of at least 15 kilometres, running east to west (Rost and Wilbers-Rost [op. cit.] 133). Tacitus’ mention (Ann. 1.60–61) of multiple camps discovered at the site of the clades also suggests multiple days of fighting, although squaring this temporally and spatially with Dio's account is not straightforward (Swan [n. 38] 264).

41 Tac. Ann. 1.61; Dio Cass. 56.21.5. Also see Swan (n. 38) 266.

42 Dio Cass. 56.21.2; cf. Swan (n. 38) 265. Also see Großkopf, Rost, and Wilbers-Rost (n. 28) 102–3; Schlüter, ‘Untersuchungen’ (n. 1) 46–47.

43 Swan (n. 38) 250.

44 Manuwald (n. 33) 439; Timpe (n. 7) 123–25.

45 Dio Cass. 56.19.4–5, 20.1–2. The place from which Varus departed is not known. Murdoch (n. 36) 99 suggests Minden. Regarding the location of the rumoured rebellion, the Angrivarii appear likely candidates considering Varus’ northerly direction of march (Murdoch [n. 36] 103).

46 Schlüter, ‘Untersuchungen’ (n. 1) 45. On Roman tactics against rebellions, see Goldsworthy, A., The Roman Army at War: 100 B.C.–A.D. 200 (New York 1996) 90–95Google Scholar. The unsettled nature of Germania may have required the civilians to be brought into winter quarters with the army for their protection. On the fighting role of auxiliaries see Lendon, J.E., Soldiers and Ghosts, A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity (New Haven 2005) 242Google Scholar.

47 Dio Cass. 56.21.1. Most Roman bases were to the southwest (see Murdoch [n. 36] xi).

48 Dio Cass. 56.21.2–4.

49 Ibid., 56.21.5–22.2.

50 Schlüter, ‘Untersuchungen’ (n. 1) 20.

51 See Moosbauer, G. and Wilbers-Rost, S., ‘Kalkriese—Ort der Varusschlacht?’ in Weigels, R. et al. (eds.), Die Varusschlacht: Wendepunkt der Geschichte? (Stuttgart 2007) 23–36Google Scholar, at 34–36; Schlüter, ‘Battle’ (n. 1) 154. The numismatic evidence is key and, on these grounds, there remains some dispute over the location of the battle, as some finds at Kalkriese might be associated with the Roman army of Germanicus that operated years later (see Wolters [n. 4] 167–173, cf. Tac. Ann. 1.60–62). However, no coins have been found later than AD 9, suggesting that these coins were left there around the time the clades, probably during the clades itself (Schlüter, ‘Battle’ [n. 1] 150–54).

52 Wilbers-Rost (n. 31) 1348.

53 Großkopf, Rost, and Wilbers-Rost (n. 28) 102.

54 Rost and Wilbers-Rost (n. 11) 174.

55 Wilbers-Rost (n. 31) 1341.

56 Schlüter, ‘Battle’ (n. 1) 128–31; Schlüter, ‘Untersuchungen’ (n. 1) 20–24.

57 Schlüter, ‘Battle’ (n. 1) 128; Schlüter, ‘Untersuchungen’ (n. 1) 20.

58 Wilbers-Rost (n. 31) 1342–43; Schlüter, ‘Battle’ (n. 1) 139; ‘Untersuchungen’ (n. 1) 24, 30.

59 Schlüter, ‘Untersuchungen’ (n. 1) 36.

60 Moosbauer and Wilbers-Rost (n. 51) 24.

61 Schlüter, ‘Untersuchungen’ (n. 1) 32.

62 In an article by N. Müller-Scheeßel that summarises recent debate (‘Die Fundverteilungen von Kalkriese “Oberesch” im Rahmen einer “Schlachtfeldarchäologie”: Neue Aspekte zur Interpretation des Fundplatzes’, EAZ 53 [1/2] [2012] 108–21, at 120–21) it is noted that some (such as Schlüter) have recently argued for the view that the rampart was Roman, while others (eg. Rost and Wilbers-Rost) continue to argue that it was a German construction). Salvatore Ortisi, currently heading the dig site at Kalkriese, theorises that the extant remnants of the German rampart might be part of a Roman camp and is attempting to confirm this idea in his current excavations (D. Crossland, ‘Unearthing the Mysteries of the “Battle that Created Germany”’, DW, 25 July 2017. https://p.dw.com/p/2h4JW). However, it has long been recognised that the rampart was built according to Roman techniques, with Arminius’ Roman-trained auxiliaries probably doing most of the work (Murdoch [n. 36] 111–12; Timpe [n. 7] 108–10). Ortisi would have to explain why Roman equipment fragments are only found in front of the wall and in the collapsed parts of the wall, rather than behind it, as if they were attacking, rather than defending (cf. Wilbers-Rost, S., ‘The Battlefield of Kalkriese: The Rampart at the Site “Oberesch” During and After the Battle’, in Hodgson, N., Bidwell, P., Schachtmann, J. [eds.], Roman Frontier Studies 2009: Proceedings of the XXI International Congress of Roman Frontier Studies [Oxford 2016] 571–76Google Scholar, at 573–74).

63 Rost (n. 31) 1343.

64 Großkopf, Rost, and Wilbers-Rost (n. 28) 104.

65 Rost and Wilbers-Rost (n. 11) 174; Rost and Wilbers-Rost (n. 40) 133.

66 Rost and Wilbers-Rost (n. 40) 133.

67 F. Stark, ‘Legionäre konnten wohl der Varusschlacht entfliehen’, Welt, 9 June 2016. https://www.welt.de/geschichte/article156088468/Legionaere-konnten-wohl-der-Varusschlacht-entfliehen.html.

68 Schlüter, ‘Battle’ (n. 1) 131–33.

69 A. Rost, ‘Remains of the Roman Baggage Train at the Battlefield of Kalkriese’, in Hodgson, Bidwell, and Schachtmann (eds.), Roman Frontier Studies 2009 (n. 62) 559–64, at 560.

70 Wilbers-Rost (n. 31) 1342.

71 Timpe (n. 7) 118.

72 Cf. Tac. Ann. 1.61; Dio Cass. 56.21.1; Wilbers-Rost (n. 62) 575. Cf. Crossland (n. 62).

73 Cf. Grethlein (n. 29) 136, Goodyear (n. 29) 96.

74 Cf. Plut. Ant. 48.5; Joseph. BJ 2.541–42, 544–45.

75 Grethlein (n. 29) 136.

76 Moving westward: Rost and Wilbers-Rost (n. 40) 133; Schlüter, ‘Battle’ (n. 1) 154. On Varus’ suicide, cf. Tac. Ann. 1.61 and Dio Cass. 56.21.5.

77 Cf. Tac. Ann. 1.64. Also see Timpe (n. 30) 26.

78 Moosbauer and Wilbers-Rost (n. 51) 28; Wilbers-Rost (n. 62) 573–75; Schlüter, ‘Untersuchungen’ (n. 1) 37.

79 Moosbauer and Wilbers-Rost (n. 51) 33. The archaeological evidence cannot elaborate on the number of women or children, but can confirm the presence of at least a few women.

80 Rost (n. 69) 563. The archaelogical finds from these carts are fragmentary (ibid., 561). On two- and four-wheeled carts, see Roth, J.P., The Logistics of the Roman Army at War (264 BC–AD 235) (Boston 1999) 211–12Google Scholar. Both two- and four-wheeled variants were pulled by only two animals and their carrying capacities were not drastically dissimilar.

81 Dio Cass. 56.19.3–4; Schlüter, ‘Untersuchungen’ (n. 1) 45.

82 Roth (n. 80) 114, 211. Cf. Caes. BGall. 2.17, 2.24.

83 Timpe (n. 30) 20; Roth (n. 80) 201.

84 Dio Cass. 56.21.1. On what a ‘baggage train’ generally included, see Roth (n. 80) 115.

85 Caesar approved of this technique in an emergency (Caes. BGall. 5.33).

86 Temporarily: Livy 3.28.1. Permanently: Livy 4.39.6; 8.1.5–6.

87 Joseph. BJ 2.544–46. As Dio implies (56.21.1), Varus must have kept some of his baggage (Rost [n. 69] 561). Recent archaeological finds imply the presence of a ballista in the Senke, which suggests that Varus might also have kept some of his war machines (Stark [n. 67]).

88 Engels, D.W., Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army (Los Angeles 1978) 131–32Google Scholar, 153–56.

89 Vell. Pat. 2.119.2. Also see Woodman (n. 17) 199.

90 See Murdoch (n. 36) xi.

91 Timpe (n. 30) 20.

92 Varus probably had wagons of wounded soldiers (Rost [n. 69] 561, cf. Caes. BAfr. 21). In ideal circumstances, mule-driven carts could travel between 20 and 30 kilometres per day (Roth [n. 80] 211), but conditions in Germania were far from ideal.

93 An army could only operate further than 80 to 100 kilometres from a supply base by grazing their animals (Roth (n. 80) 129, 198, 201). This was impractical in Varus’ situation. Horses, and other baggage animals, required a full rest day of grazing every five to seven days (Engels [n. 88] 154–55).

94 Schlüter, ‘Untersuchungen’ (n. 1) 46.

95 Roth (n. 80) 81.

96 Ibid., 88.

97 Schlüter, ‘Untersuchungen’ (n. 1) 45.

98 Sheldon (n. 2) 29–30.

99 See Murdoch (n. 36) xi.

100 Polyb. 9.14.2–4. Also note Caes. BGall. 1.41.4, and Plut. Crass. 21.

101 Austin, N.J.E. and Rankov, N.B., Exploratio: Military and Political Intelligence in the Roman World from the Second Punic War to the Battle of Adrianople (London 1995) 108Google Scholar, 135, 168–69, 246; contra Sheldon (n. 2) 29–30.

102 Varus’ other auxiliary troops did not have the local knowledge of Arminius’ auxiliaries: Timpe (n. 7) 110.

103 Assuming Varus fully understood the perils of the Kalkriese path, perhaps he could have taken a westward path further south, avoiding the defile at Kalkriese (see Schlüter, W., ‘Archäologische Zeugnisse zur Varusschlacht? Die Untersuchungen in der Kalkrieser-Niewedder Senke bei Osnabrück’, Germania 70 (1992) 307–402Google Scholar, at 311). But even if he could have, this would simply have exposed his forces to the sort of hills and forests that Dio describes (56.20.1–4, 21.2) as being so debilitating to Varus’ army.

104 Livy 38.40.6–15, 38.49.5–13.

105 N.b. Tac. Ann. 1.64–65.

106 Goldsworthy (n. 46) 53. It might have been reasonable for Varus to expect the Germans to attack, but not to commit themselves too heavily. Again, note Tac. Ann. 1.63–64.

107 Schlüter, ‘Untersuchungen’ (n. 1) 36, 46.

108 Cf. Schlüter, ‘Battle’ (n. 1) 131.

109 For instance, Drusus the Elder had found himself trapped in a defile in 11 BC, but he escaped through German laxity (Dio Cass. 54.33.3–4).

110 Tac. Ann. 2.20. Germanicus was in command of eight legions (Ann. 2.17).

111 Stark (n. 67).

112 Tac. Ann. 1.65. On military servants, see Roth (n. 80) 108–9. There could have been several thousand present (ibid., 114). Cf. Livy 67.2.

113 Ibid., 109.

114 Ibid., 108–9.

115 Also note Tac. Hist. 3.25.

116 Rost and Wilbers-Rost (n. 11) 121; Schlüter, ‘Untersuchungen’ (n. 1) 36; Sheldon (n. 2) 30.

117 If the rampart was German, the Romans would have needed to attack it and there is evidence that they did (Moosbauer and Wilbers-Rost [n. 51] 28; Wilbers-Rost [n. 62] 573–75; Schlüter, ‘Untersuchungen’ [n. 1] 37).

118 Schlüter, ‘Battle’ (n. 1) 131–33.

119 Schlüter, ‘Battle’ (n. 1) 150–54; Großkopf, Rost, and Wilbers-Rost (n. 28) 104–5. Note that the remains of the Roman wagons were not found in the same place as the coin hoards (Rost [n. 69] 563). It is interesting that the soldiers had time to bury their belongings.

120 Tac. Ann. 1.61; Dio Cass. 56.21.5. Also see Rauh, S.H., ‘The Tradition of Suicide in Rome's Foreign Wars’, TAPA 145(2) (2015) 383–410Google Scholar, at 400; Swan (n. 38) 266.

121 Gilliver, C.M., ‘Battle’, in Sabin, P., Van Wees, H., and Whitby, M. (eds.), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare. Vol. II: Rome from the Late Republic to the Late Empire (New York 2007) 122–57Google Scholar, at 136–37.

122 Cf. Caes. BGall. 2.25, 7.85–88; Tac. Ann. 1.65.

123 Dio Cass. 56.21.5–22.1. The death of an army's general was a severe psychological shock that could easily trigger a rout (Sabin, P., ‘Battle’, in Sabin, P., Van Wees, H., and Whitby, M. (eds.), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare. Vol I: Greece, the Hellenistic World and the Rise of Rome (New York 2007) 399–433Google Scholar, at 431–32).

124 Sheldon (n. 2) 30. Also see Lienemann, J., ‘Der Oberesch am Kalkrieser Berg’, in Schlüter, W. et al. (eds.), Kalkriese-Römer im Osnabrücker Land: Archäologische Forschungen zur Varusschlacht (Bramsche 1993) 73–79Google Scholar, at 79.

125 See A. Goldsworthy, ‘War’, in Sabin, Van Wees, and Whitby (eds.), Cambridge History (n. 121) 76–121, at 95–98.

126 Goldsworthy (n. 46) 92.

127 Cf. Schlüter, ‘Untersuchungen’ (n. 1) 45.

128 Cf. Sheldon (n. 2) 17.

129 Varus probably understood that the Germans were unlikely to offer a pitched battle.

130 Caecina, finding himself in a comparable situation in AD 15, utilised similarly aggressive tactics, but with the crucial advantage of greater forces than had been possessed by Varus (Tac. Ann. 1.65). When Germanicus faced another comparable ambush in AD 16, he had a mammoth force of eight legions at his disposal (Tac. Ann. 2.17).

131 ‘Auf den Spuren der Römerschlacht am Harzhorn’, NDR, 7 January 2015. https://www.ndr.de/geschichte/schauplaetze/Die-Roemerschlacht-am-Harzhorn,roemerschlacht100.html.

132 Stark (n. 67).

133 Austin and Rankov (n. 101), 245–46.

134 Wells, C.M., The German Policy of Augustus: An Examination of the Archaeological Evidence (Oxford 1972) 238–39Google Scholar.

135 When Drusus had been trapped by Germans in a defile in 11 BC, he was simply allowed to escape through enemy laxity (54.33.3–4), but Arminius was a more disciplined ambusher (n.b. Tac. Ann. 1.68). He was just as capable in a pitched battle (Tac. Ann. 2.17, 45–46). Varus had allegedly been warned about Arminius (Tac. Ann. 1.55, 67–68; cf. Swan (n. 38) 258), but if this actually occurred, Varus probably chose to stay out of what will have seemed an internal German dispute (Sheldon [n. 2] 15) and gave Arminius the benefit of the doubt by virtue of his professional position in the army (Timpe [n. 7] 104).

136 Vell. Pat. 2.119.3, 120.5. Cf. Tac. Ann. 1.61.