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Cicero Fam. 5.8 and Fam. 15.5 in the Light of Modern Politeness Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 May 2015

Hall Jon*
Affiliation:
University of Otago

Extract

Cicero, like most of us, lived his life subject to certain rules of politeness. What he said and how he behaved were subtly shaped by the circumstances and expectations of the society in which he moved. This fact strikes us most forcefully perhaps in his correspondence, where we can discern at first hand the result of these pressures on aristocratic manners. And yet these letters necessarily challenge our interpretative skills. For we bring to them today views of politeness that may well be very different from those of Cicero himself. The potential for cross-cultural misunderstanding yawns wide.

In this article I would like to discuss two letters in particular which seem to me to have fallen victim to cross-cultural confusion: Fam. 5.8 from Cicero to M. Crassus and Fam. 15.5 from M. Cato to Cicero. In both cases, misinterpretation arises primarily, I believe, from the form of linguistic politeness used in them. Modern scholars, it is true, often show an awareness that Roman aristocrats possessed their own peculiar norms of politeness; but few have tried to examine these in detail or consider why they took the precise form that they did.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Australasian Society for Classical Studies 1996

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References

1 Discussions of Roman manners in Cicero's letters have tended to be descriptive in approach rather than interpretative. See e.g. Miller, Anna B., Roman Etiquette of the Late Republic as Revealed by the Correspondence of Cicero [PhD Dissertation] (Pennsylvania 1914).Google Scholar Kroll 59-81 provides numerous insights into aristocratic behaviour, but his conclusion (81) that it was the ‘senatorial tradition’ that created these conventions of politeness does not really get to the heart of the matter. Mayer, R., ‘Horace on good manners’, PCPhS n.s. 31 (1985) 3346Google Scholar offers some important observations on the importance of social etiquette among Roman aristocrats, but is not concerned with the subject of politeness itself. For scholarly awareness of polite conventions, see e.g. Bailey, D.R. Shackleton, Cicero's Letters to Atticus 6 (Cambridge 1967) 228Google Scholar; Brunt, P.A., ‘Amicitia in the Late Republic’, in The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays (Oxford 1988) 378Google Scholar; Gruen, Erich S., The Last Generation of the Roman Republic (Berkeley 1974) 354 (with n.201)Google Scholar.

2 Powell, J.G.F., Cicero: Laelius, On Friendship and The Dream of Scipio (Warminster 1990) 22.Google Scholar

3 Norms of politeness have received considerable attention in recent years from students of pragmatics. In general the aim has been to explore with greater precision the intuitive generalisations that arise on the basis of cross-cultural encounters. For useful summaries and bibliographies, see Tracy, K., ‘The Many Faces of Facework’, in Giles, H. and Robinson, W.P. (eds), Handbook of Language and Social Psychology (Chichester 1990) 209–26, esp. 218-19; Kasper, 198-201Google Scholar; Sifianou, M., Politeness Phenomena in England and Greece: a Cross-Cultural Perspective (Oxford 1992) 1214, 49-56Google Scholar; Brown and Levinson 33-5. For interesting discussions of specific cultures, see Argyle, M., ‘Rules for Relationships in Four Cultures’, Australian Journal of Psychology 38 (1987) 309–18Google Scholar; Barnlund, Dean C. and Araki, Shoko, ‘Intercultural Encounters: The Management of Compliments by Japanese and Americans’, Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 16 (1985) 926Google Scholar; Wierzbicka, Anna, ‘Different Cultures, Different Languages, Different Speech Acts’, Journal of Pragmatics 9 (1985) 145–78Google Scholar; Blum-Kulka, S., ‘Indirectness and Politeness in Requests: Same or Different?’, Journal of Pragmatics 11 (1987) 131–46Google Scholar; Holmes, Janet, ‘Compliments and Compliment Responses in New Zealand English’, Anthropological Linguistics 28 (1986) 485508.Google Scholar

4 See the useful discussion in Wistrand 23-34. Cato seems consistently to have voted against the awarding of supplications and triumphs in cases prior to that of Cicero. On his support of Bibulus’ supplicatio, see below.

5 See summary in Wistrand 24. Wistrand alone (34), describing it as a ‘very kind letter indeed’, recognises its elements of politeness, although he does not approach them from a theoretical point of view.

6 While Cicero's pleasant remarks in his reply to Cato (Fam. 15.6) can be dismissed as diplomatic posturing, there is no reason to suspect that his comments to Atticus here are not a true representation of his feelings. His sole aim is to provide a pragmatic assessment of the political situation with regard to his triumph (not to mouth friendly comments in the hope that they will be relayed to Cato). Moreover, he feels no reservations about vituperating Cato in a later letter to Atticus (Att. 7.2.7, discussed below).

7 See Shackleton Bailey 327-8.

8 While most pragmatic research focuses on spoken conversations, written documents have also been used as data. For the use of modern texts, see Cherry, Roger D., ‘Politeness in Written Persuasion’, Journal of Pragmatics 12 (1988) 6381Google Scholar; Sifianou (n.3). For the application of pragmatics to Plautus, see Cohen, Rip, ‘Speech Acts and Sprachspiele: Making Peace in Plautus’, in de Jong, I.J.F. and Sullivan, J.P. (eds), Modern Critical Theory and Classical Literature (Leiden 1994) 171205Google Scholar. See also Horrocks, G., ‘Pragmatics and Classics’, Joint Association of Classical Teachers Review2 16 (1994) 1316.Google Scholar

9 See e.g. Holmes 3. Other terms include ‘transactional’ and ‘interactional’; see Kasper 205.

10 The phenomenon was originally termed ‘phatic communion’ by Malinowski; see Malinowski, B., ‘The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages’, in Ogden, C.K. and Richards, I.A. (eds), The Meaning of Meaning (London 1930 3) 296336, esp. 309-16Google Scholar; also Laver, John, ‘Communicative Functions of Phatic Communion’, in Kendon, A., Harris, R.M. and Key, M.R. (eds), Organization of Behavior in Face-to-Face Interaction (The Hague/Paris 1975) 215–38Google Scholar. On routine formulas, see Ferguson, Charles A., ‘The Structure and Use of Politeness Formulas’, Language in Society 5 (1976) 137–51Google Scholar; Coulmas, Florian, ‘On the Sociolinguistic Relevance of Routine Formulae’, Journal of Pragmatics 3 (1979) 239–66.Google Scholar

11 Cf. Mey, Jacob L., Pragmatics: An Introduction (Oxford 1993) 22–5 and 196-8Google Scholar, who notes that early linguists were heavily influenced by the philosophical-grammatical approach in which the issue of the ‘truth value’ of statements was paramount. In the case of Classical scholarship, we may suspect also the influence of the rationalist 'scientific method’ of textual critics. See Brink, C.O., English Classical Scholarship: Historical Reflections on Bentley, Porson and Housman (Cambridge 1986) 14 and 198 for the traditionGoogle Scholar.

12 See introductory note above. On the influence of the theory (and a general review), see Coupland, N., Grainger, K. and Coupland, J., ‘Politeness in Context: Intergenerational Issues [review article]’, Language in Society 17 (1988) 253–62, esp. 253CrossRefGoogle Scholar: ‘the theory of politeness is becoming a virtual movement’. For criticisms of the model on various levels, see n.14 below.

13 This model in turn builds upon Goffman's studies of face-to-face interaction. See Goffman, Erving, ‘On Face-Work: an Analysis of Ritual Elements in Social Interaction’, in Laver, J. and Hutcheson, S. (eds), Communication in Face to Face Interaction (Harmondsworth 1972) 319–46Google Scholar; originally published in Psychiatry 18 (1955) 213–31Google Scholar. Cf. Brown and Levinson 61.

14 Brown and Levinson 101. They further distinguish two types of ‘face concerns’: the individual's desire that his or her rights and desires not be impeded by others (termed ‘negative face’); and, the natural and constant desire that his or her projected self image be approved of and supported (termed ‘positive face’). The validity of this dichotomy has with some justification been challenged; see Matsumoto, Yoshiko, ‘Reexamination of the Universality of Face: Politeness Phenomena in Japanese’, Journal of Pragmatics 12 (1988) 403–26Google Scholar; Kasper, ; Fraser, Bruce, ‘Perspectives on Politeness’, Journal of Pragmatics 14 (1990) 219–36Google Scholar; Nwoye, Onuigbo G., ‘Linguistic Politeness and Socio-cultural Variations of the Notion of Face’, Journal of Pragmatics 18 (1992) 309–28Google Scholar. Indeed, Meier, A.J., ‘Passages of Politeness’, Journal of Pragmatics 24 (1995) 381–92Google Scholar has recently called for a complete change of paradigm. But the influence of face-concerns in general upon polite behaviour remains, in my opinion, unassailable, and provides a powerful heuristic tool; cf. Kasper 194.

15 Brown and Levinson 61.

16 Brown and Levinson 187-90; cf. Lakoff, Robin, ‘The Logic of Politeness; or, Minding Your P's and Q's’, Proceedings of the Ninth Regional Meeting, Chicago Linguistic Society (1973) 292305, esp. 299Google Scholar; Holtgraves, Thomas, ‘Interpreting Questions and Replies: Effects of Face-Threat, Question Form, and Gender’, Social Psychology Quarterly 54 (1991) 1524, esp. 15-17Google Scholar.

17 Brown and Levinson 70.

18 See e.g. Holmes 22-4.

19 Modern historians not infrequently refer to a Roman aristocrat's desire to ‘save face’ (in the non-specialised sense of the term) in situations where his dignitas is at stake. See e.g. Kelly, J.M., Studies in the Civil Judicature of the Roman Republic (Oxford 1976) 93111Google Scholar; and Keaveney, A., Lucullus: A Life (London 1992) 163Google Scholar, on Cicero's decision to retreat into exile. This desire is closely related to the concern for personal ‘honour’, a feature that has received considerable attention in studies of Greek society. See e.g. Walcot, P., Greek Peasants Ancient and Modern: A Comparison of Social and Moral Values (Manchester 1970) 5776Google Scholar.

20 The importance of aristocratic dignitas at Rome has of course long been recognised. For a convenient bibliography and discussion of relevant sources, see Hellegouarc'h 388-420, esp. 408: ‘[La dignitas] est la notion aristocratique par exemple'. Cicero makes the point strikingly (Phil. 10.20): ‘nos ita a maioribus instituti atque imbuti sumus, ut omnia consilia atque facta ad dignitatem et virtutem referamus.’

21 See Hellegouarc'h 362-89 for the aristocrat's célébrité and the need for image projection. Again Cicero states the case memorably (Planc. 66): ‘feci ut postea quotidie me praesentem viderent, habitavi in oculis; pressi forum.’ Cf. also Q. Cicero, Comment. Pet. 52, and good comments in May, James M., Trials of Character: The Eloquence of Ciceronian Ethos (Chapel Hill 1988), esp. 162–6CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22 Hellegouarc'h 404-5; Kroll 59-66; Wiseman, T.P., ‘Competition and Co-operation’, in Wiseman, T.P. (ed.), Roman Political Life 90 B.C.-A.D. 69 (Exeter 1985) 319Google Scholar.

23 Cf. Simmel, Georg, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, trans. Wolff, K. (Glencoe, III. 1950) 321Google Scholar: ‘A sphere of this sort is placed around a man by his “honor” … the radius of this sphere marks, as it were, the distance whose trespassing by another insults one's honor … In regard to the “significant” [“great”] man, there is an inner compulsion which tells one to keep at a distance and which does not disappear even in intimate relations with him.’ Cf. Sailer, Richard, ‘Corporal Punishment, Authority, and Obedience in the Roman Household’, in Rawson, B. (ed.), Marriage, Divorce, and Children in Ancient Rome (Oxford/Canberra 1991) 144–65, esp. 152-3Google Scholar.

24 Cf. MacMullen, R., ‘Personal Power in the Roman Empire’, AJPh 107 (1986) 512–24, esp. 514Google Scholar, where it is asserted that the great men of Rome indicated their rank through ‘a general air of noli me tangere’.

25 It has long been recognised that the power-relationship between speaker and addressee is often reflected in language, particularly in the terms of address used. See Brown, R. and Gilman, A., ‘The Pronouns of Power and Solidarity’, in Sebeok, T. (ed.), Style in Language (Cambridge, Mass. 1960) 253–76Google Scholar. For a summary of the issue, see Brown and Levinson 22-5; for a bibliography of discussions of honorific speech (reigo) in Japanese, see Kasper 196-7. Brown and Levinson's contribution to the subject has been to expand the scope of inquiry beyond mere terms of address and to identify the influence of face upon politeness (especially in relationships where power differences are not so clear-cut).

26 For the connection between honos and dignitas, see Hellegouarc'h 383-7. Cicero makes a point of acknowledging Antonius’ respectful tone (Att. 14.13B.2): ‘litterae vero tuae cum amantissime turn honorificentissime scriptae’.

27 On hedging strategies, see Brown and Levinson 113-14.

28 For similar examples of rudeness at which Cicero takes offence, cf. Att. 6.3.6; Att. 6.1.7;Att. 11.24.4.

29 Cf. Miller (n. 1)54.

30 Note in this respect the contrast that emerges between Caesar's diligence in his attentions to Cicero (Att. 8.11.5) and Pompey's neglegentia at this time (although, as Att. 7.2.5 and Att. 7.4.2 show, the latter had been more assiduous a few months earlier).

31 Cf. also Cicero's attempts to mitigate the threat to Appius’ face implied by his own short letter at Fam. 3.2.2. See also Fam. 11.25.2; Fam. 11.24.1; Brut. 1.14.1.

32 Cf. Brown and Levinson 125 and 129 on this strategy, one of the most important for bolstering the addressee's social standing and image.

33 Shackleton Bailey 449.

34 As the journal's referee notes, Cato's argument may in fact be well calculated to please the man who had claimed that, as consul togatus and with the minimum of inconvenience to others, he had saved the Republic from the violence of Catiline's conspiracy.

35 On the connotations of maiestas here, see Wistrand 32-3.

36 Fam. 8.11.2 (Caelius to Cicero): ‘qui <de> te locutus honorifice non decrerat supplicationes’. Cf. Att. 7.1.8.

37 Cf. Bailey, D.R. Shackleton, Cicero (London 1971) 24Google Scholar: ‘Was this humbug written tongue in cheek?’ As Wistrand 34 notes: ‘Cato's arguments have been brushed away as almost brutally ironical quibbles.’ In fact, Cicero wins both ways: he gets his supplicatio, but he is also celebrated as a moral exemplar by the moral exemplar.

38 See Att. 7.2.6, but cf. Wistrand 37-40 for a less biased discussion of the merits of Bibulus’ achievements. In general, however, Wistrand underplays the influence upon Cato of his familial relationship with Bibulus; see Gruen (n.1) 55-7. As the journal's referee suggests, Cato here may simply be taking the opportunity to raise Bibulus profile in an attempt to eclipse Caesar's achievements. In this case, any slur upon Cicero's reputation is unintentional, and more the result of unfortunate timing than malice.

39 Bailey, D.R. Shackleton in Cicero's Letters to Atticus 3 (Cambridge 1968) 281Google Scholar remarks that this incident is a notable example of the way in which Cicero's judgement could vary according to ‘mood and context’. But such a judgement unfairly suggests an element of inconsistency and unpredictability in Cicero's actions. As we have seen, both his initial reaction and later bitterness towards Cato make good sense within the Roman aristocratic context.

40 Shackleton Bailey 327.

41 Fam. 5.8.1: ‘quantum meum studium exstiterit dignitatis tuae vel tuendae vel etiam augendae, non dubito quin ad te omnes tui scripserint’; and Fam. 5.8.5: ‘quae a me suscepta defensio est te absente dignitatis tuae’ etc.

42 See Kasper 199 and Brown and Levinson 101-3 on the link between the maximisation of compliments and their support of ‘positive face needs’.

43 On this kind of ritual ‘symmetrical’ deference, see Goffman, Erving, ‘The Nature of Deference and Demeanor’, American Anthropologist 58 (1956) 473502, esp. 479.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

44 Cf. the use of the terms ‘Heuchelei und Unaufrichtigkeit’ by Kroll 77, and his observation at 75 that ‘Schmeicheleien zu sagen, fiel dieser Zeit überaus leicht.’ For a good discussion of cultural concerns with ‘sincerity’, see Rosaldo, M.Z., ‘The Things We Do with Words: Mongol Speech Acts and Speech Act Theory in Philosophy’, Language in Society 11 (1982) 203–37, esp. 211-12CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

45 Cf. Kroll 75: ‘sie wurden im allgemeinen als das genommen, was sie waren’.

46 This is not to say, however, that a letter such as Fam. 5.8 had no consequences for Cicero's behaviour. Breaking his pledge of loyalty to Crassus would show a lack of constantia. Indeed, conventional overstatement could be cynically exploited or misrepresented by political adversaries. See Phil. 2.7 for Cicero's grievance against M. Antonius, who accused Cicero of actions inconsistent with the friendly effusions in Att. 14.13B. Cf. also Att. 8.9.1 where Cicero's generous praise of Caesar's ‘admirabilis sapientia’ (Att. 9.11 A. 1) is taken out of its conventional context and subjected to criticism by Caesar's supporters. For the general importance of constantia in political vocabulary, see Hellegouarc'h 283-5.

47 Cf. also Att. 12.5C; De Or. 1.112.

48 Cf. Fam. 5.12.6 where Cicero identifies the horns of a social dilemma for many Romans: not to offer compliments risks being viewed as invidus; to offer too many, risks accusations of being an adsentator. See also Fam. 6.7.3.

49 See Kasper 204 for the observation that a complex arrangement of variables is likely to influence politeness strategies (above and beyond the powerful influence of faceconcerns).

50 I would like to thank Assoc. Prof. G.R. Stanton and the anonymous referee for their astute suggestions, and Dr Graham McGregor of Otago University for bibliographical guidance in the field of sociolinguistics.