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The Date of IG II2 1604

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 September 2013

Michael Clark
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Abstract

The generally accepted date (377/6) of the earliest Athenian naval inventory of the fourth century B.C., IG II2 1604, rests upon an unsafe restoration and several improbable assumptions. The fact that a Secretary 377/6 is named as trierarch on 1604 casts severe doubt on the accepted date. Indeed, the small number of allotted triremes on 1604 strongly suggests a date before the outbreak of war in 378. The record on 1604 of an Athenian trireme borrowed by the Chian Antimachos, which is easily associated with the negotiations at the very foundation of the Athenian Confederacy, seems to date 1604 to 379/8. Thus it is unlikely that the new series of inventories began only in 378/7 as a consequence of that foundation; the absence from the Navy Lists of outstanding debts datable before 378/7 indicates perhaps a successful collection of naval debts in that year. The existence of a substantial number of newly constructed triremes on 1604 discredits the view that the Peace of 387/6 banned all naval activity in Greece. New readings on Tod 117 demonstrate that Athens continued to deploy ships during the Peace. Its terms, which were not particularly harsh on Athens, more closely resembled those rejected in 392, which did allow trireme-building, than those of 371 and later. Anyhow these later Koinai Eirenai, like the Peace of Antalcidas, prohibited, not all military activity, but only warfare among the signatory states.

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Annual of the British School at Athens , Volume 85 , November 1990 , pp. 47 - 67
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Copyright © The Council, British School at Athens 1990

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References

1 August Boeckh, , Urkunden ueber das Seewesen des Attischen Staates (Berlin, 1840)Google Scholar [Henceforth referred to as Boeckh] 22, 58f. I also abbreviate the following by author, except as noted: Accame, Silvio, La lega ateniese (Rome, 1941)Google Scholar; Beloch, K.J., Griechische Geschichte 2 (Strasburg/Leipzig/Berlin, 1912–1927)Google Scholar; Cawkwell, G.L., ‘The foundation of the second Athenian Confederacy,’ CQ N.S. 23 (1973) 47–60 [Cawkwell (1973)]CrossRefGoogle Scholar; id., ‘The King's Peace,’ CQ N.S. 31 (1981) 69–83 [Cawkwell (1981)]; Davies, J.K., ‘The date of IG II2 1609,’ Historia 18 (1969) 309–33 [Davies]Google Scholar; id., Athenian Propertied Families (Oxford, 1971) [APF;] Jordan, B., The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 1975)Google Scholar; Koehler, Ulrich, ‘Aus den attischen Seeurkunden,’ AM 6 (1881) 21–39Google Scholar; Lewis, D.M., ‘Notes on Attic Inscriptions,’ BSA 49 (1954) 17–50Google Scholar; Ryder, T.T.B., Koine Eirene (Oxford, 1965)Google Scholar; Sinclair, R.K., ‘The King's Peace and the employment of military and naval forces 387–378,’ Chiron 8 (1978) 29–54Google Scholar; Tod, M.N., A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions II (Oxford, 1948).Google Scholar Unless otherwise noted, all references in Xenophon are to Hellenica.

2 Cp. APF # 9667.

3 Cp. Boeckh 277.

4 Cp. IG II2 1611.16f., 1622.493–6 and passim.

5 Tamiai do indeed infrequently appear among naval debtors. Cp. IG II2 1622.444–77.

6 IG II2 1622.435–9. Where I have left a blank, Kirchner followed Koehler in restoring the archon's name in l. 437 as Κα[λλὲου

Kirchner also first abbreviated γενὸμενος and ἀρχον- τος Aside from the archon, Koehler IG II 803 had virtually the same text as Boeckh Urkunde 10. For ease of reference hereafter I give only the line numbers in IG II2. The appearance of his sons as heirs in the following lines makes the restoration of Mantias' name secure.

7 Cp. Boeckh 22.

8 Koehler 29. Cp. his comments in IG II, fasc. 2, p. 168.

9 I exclude from consideration lines containing numerals because single strokes of e.g. obols require little space; the longest such example, at l. 460, τοπεὶα ὲπὶ ναῦς ΔΓΙΙΙΙ does not really fill 20 normal letter spaces.

10 Already seen by Boeckh 381.

11 Regrettably, the top of col. d was broken off and misplaced sometime before Kirchner's edition. I have seen no squeeze with these lines preserved.

12 To replace KA with ΚΛ in l. 437 requires no special pleading. Abbreviations of archontos are frequent on 1622. On the other hand, genomenos is always spelled out. There are only two certain appearances of the tamias kremaston on the Navy Lists: Laing, D.Google Scholar, Hesperia 37 (1968) lines 341 f.Google Scholar, and IG II2 1629.464 f. No less obscure, however, is the tamias eis ta neoria; the only certain occurrence of this title happens to follow directly after Mantias' record here, at 1622.444 ff. This fact may help to explain the readiness of past editors to restore line 436 with far too many letters. Infrequently the inscriptions identify an official merely as tamias – cp. e.g. 1622.574; apparently in these cases the tamias trieropoiikon is meant. That becomes clear at 1628.10–14, for example. Cp. Boeckh 60.

13 I know of no one who has stated this besides J.K. Davies, APF #9667, p. 367.

14 IG II2 1622.379–85: τὰδε παρὰ τῶν ἀρξὰν/των ὲν τοῖς νεωρὶοις/εὶσπὲπραχται ὲπὶ/Εὺβοὺλου ὰρχονιος/χαὶ Λυχὶ[σ]χου χαὶ Πυ/θοδὸτου χαὶ Σωσιγὲ/vους and 406–11, 493–6. For a useful discussion of the repayment of naval debts, see Davies 313–18.

15 See also note 16.

16 1604.29f.: Δηλιὰς χαινὴ τριὴραρ φιλῖνος φλυεὺς ὴσχωτ [αι—] ταῦτα φιλῖνον δεὶ παραθεῖ[ναι] On Philinos, see also below.

17 Boeckh 197, on the other hand, held that these passages report damages from past trierarchies, still to be made good.

18 Cf. however Boeckh 278 f. for this and what follows.

19 Boeckh p. 277, arguing on the basis of two references to the harbour of Mounichia (1604.72, 98). See however Koehler 28–30, and Kolbe, Walther, ‘Zur athenischen Marineverwaltung,’ AM 26 (1901) 377–418 at 378–80.Google Scholar An examination of the five vacant letter spaces at line 72 has made clear that severe wear on the surface of the stone will have obliterated any letters that might have been inscribed; Boeckh's restoration there remains possible.

20 IG II2 1604.36, 53, 69, 72, 94 and 95 (Prote). It appears that reuse of the stone as a water channel has cut the stele roughly down the middle. The inscribed face of the preserved part of the stele measures 0.450 m. across. The original very likely measured no more than 1 m. in all; see Laing, D.R. Jr, ‘A reconstruction of IG., II2, 1628,’ Hesperia 37 (1968) 244–54 at 249f.Google Scholar Thus we can be fairly confident that no more than 50–55 letters have disappeared to the left of the preserved text, which itself spans around 48 letter-spaces. Because, therefore, the naming of trireme and trierarch usually requires more than 30 letter-spaces, most ships that are allotted on 1604 leave unmistakable traces of the fact – even when the ship name itself does not appear on the preserved half of the stele. Incidentally, because the letters on IG II2 1605 clearly are smaller than those on 1604, Laing's hypothesis (245 note 4) that the fragments of 1604 and (the probably later) 1605 once belonged to the same stele appears to have no consequence for the date of 1604. That the 6 triremes were allotted cannot be disproven, but is not necessarily likely.

21 Cp. Tod p. 66.

22 Cp. Xen. 5.4. 34.

23 Indeed, Aristotle AP 24.3 mentions νῆες δὲ φρου- ρὶδες εῖχοσι evidently in relation to the Peloponnesian War.

24 Robbins, Frank E., ‘The cost to Athens of her Second Empire,’ CP 13 (1918) 361–88 at 373–6Google Scholar, argues that in the fourth century the regular peacetime fleet comprised ca. 10–13 triremes; he compares the fleet of 13 ships outfitted during the Corinthian War to guard Attica against Aeginetan raids (Xen. 5.1.5), and the twelve triremes allowed to Athens under the peace terms of 404 (Xen. 2.2.20; Andocides 3. 12; Plut. Lysander 15). Eddy, Samuel K., ‘Athens' Peacetime Navy in the Age of Perikles,’ GRBS 9 (1968) 141–56 at 149–52Google Scholar concludes that the peacetime fleet in the fifth century employed 16 triremes (partly on the basis of Thuc. 1.116.1).

25 See note 16.

26 IG II2 14 10.2; 14 11.7.

27 Cf. Davies 331.

28 Rhodes, P.J., The Athenian Boule (Oxford, 1972) 135.Google Scholar

29 Lykurgos Leok. 37: οὶ ὰφειμὲνοι τοῦ στρατεὺεσθαι ἒνεχα τοῦ βουλεὺεσθαι ὺπὲρ τῆς πὸλεως See Rhodes, loc. cit., 13.

30 At 20.18 and 26–7, however, he says that nobody at all is exempt.

31 See Arist. AP 49.4, MacDowell, D.M., ‘The law of Periandros about symmories,’ CQ 36 (1986) 438–49 at 441 n.18CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Rhodes, P.J., ‘Problems in Athenian Eisphora and liturgies,’ AJAH 7 (1982) 1–19 at 10.Google Scholar

32 Brilliant, Cp. Maurice, ‘Trierarchia,’ in Dictionnaire des Antiquités V, edd. Daremberg, , Saglio, (Paris, 1912) 442–65 at 451Google Scholar, Jordan 79f, and Dem. 51.8.

33 Rhodes, Cp. P.J., Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia (Oxford, 1981) 682.Google Scholar

34 So also Davies, APF C1 (p. 586).Google Scholar Athens evidently lent the same trireme later to Thebes (IG II2 1607.155f). The lending of ships to Thebes (cp. IG II2 1605.12; 1607.49) and Chalcis (1629.516ff., 800), while not precisely parallel to the present case, is nevertheless indicative of the Athenian attitude towards cooperation with allies. See also Appendix I on Antimachos.

35 Accame 27–47; Burnett, A.P., ‘Thebes and the expan sion of the second Athenian Confederacy: IG II2 40 and IG II2 43,’ Historia 11 (1962) 1–17, especially 1–3Google Scholar; Cawkwell (1973) 48–56. A respectable account can be patched together from Diodoros 15.28.1–4 and 29.5–8.

36 Pritchett, W.K., CSCA 5 (1972) 164–9Google Scholar = SEG 32.50. Cf. Hornblower, S., Mausolus (Oxford, 1982) 126 n. 161 = SEG 33–75.Google Scholar

37 Just as in the case of Methymna. See Tod 122.5.

38 The same inference informs the restoration in the Byzantine alliance of 378, Tod 121.6–7: τὴν [δὲ συμμαχὶαν εὶ/]vαι αὺτ[οῖς χαθὰπερ Χὶοις On the whole question, see Accame 32–5.

39 Cp. Tod. p. 66.

40 IG II2 40.10 and p. 657 note 40. The circumstances surrounding this alliance are much debated. Ehrenberg, Victor, ‘Zum zweiten attischen Bund,’ Hermes 64 (1929) 322–38 at 331f.Google Scholar, held that the treaty also included Mytilene (Cp. lines 11, 19). Cf. however Accame p. 38, Burnett, op. cit. note 35, 3–9, and Cawkwell (1973) p. 49.

41 The number 17 is given at line 1. That may have been the number of Athenians taking the oath. Cf. however A. Andrewes and Lewis, D.M., ‘Note on the Peace of Nikias,’ JHS 77 (1957) 177–80, esp. 177 note 2.Google Scholar

42 Besides Antimachos, the only other ally known to be involved in the negotiations with Thebes was a Mytilenaean (see note 40). See also Accame 14 on the creation of the Confederacy.

43 See Alexandri, , ADelt. 25.2 (1) (1970) p. 60Google Scholar and plate 56a for a preliminary publication. Lewis, Cp. D.M., reviewing Inscriptions de Délos in Gnomon 47 (1975) 717–19 at 718fGoogle Scholar. I am grateful to Professor Lewis for bringing this unpublished inscription to my attention.

44 Insc. de Délos 98. (= IG II2 1635 = Tod 125) 35. For all this, see Lewis, ibid.

45 Inscriptions de Délos: Période de l'Amphictyonie Attico-Délienne; Actes Administratifs (89–104.33) (Paris, 1972) p. 43.

46 IG I3 498–500.

47 Davies 313 f.

48 Dem. 22.44. The collections undertaken by Androtion and the epimeletai are usually assigned, without much evidence, to the Social War. Androtion's reform of the temple treasuries, which I would be reluctant to date before the collection of arrears (cp. Dem. 22.48), Lewis #13 43ff. has contemplated pushing back into the 360s. The question of the date of the collection of arrears itself, however, is so complicated that little can be said here. The thorough study by Croix, G.E.M. de Ste. (‘Demosthenes' τίμημα and the Athenian eisphora in the fourth century B.C.’ C/Med 14 (1953) 30–70 esp. 47f.)Google Scholar greatly weakens the basis on which Kahrstedt, U. (‘Die athenischen Symmorien,’ in Forschungen z. Gesch. d. ausgeh. 5. und d. 4. Jahrhunderts (Berlin, 1910) 207–33 at 212–5)Google Scholar had dated Androtion's collections to 374. De Ste. Croix may be right to bring the date down to ca. 357. In any case, one of the eisphora debtors, a certain Telestes, must have died in the meantime, while another was still alive in the late 340s (Dem. 22.60 and IG II2 1622.165ff.). My own argument remains valid whatever the precise date of Androtion's activities.

49 See Cawkwell (1973) 52–4; (1981) 74–6. Cf. Hornblower, S., Mausolus (Oxford, 1982) 186Google Scholar; The Greek World 479–323 BC (London, 1983) 198f. Cf. however Sinclair and Lewis, D.M., Sparta and Persia (Leiden, 1977) 147 n. 80.Google Scholar

50 Xen. 5.1.31; Diodoros 14.110.3 gives similar but less specific terms. References collected in Bengtson, H., Die Staatsvertraege des Altertums II (Munich and Berlin, 1962) 242Google Scholar (except that Didymos col. 7, 19 refers to the abortive peace of 392).

51 The Peace probably directed that the cities were to be eleutherous kai autonomous (Tod 118.20 f., Isoc. 4.117, Polybios 4.27.5), and may have connected peace to friendship (cp. Tod 118.9–16). In addition, Xenophon's statement (5.1.36) that the Spartans were prostatai of the Peace, though problematic, points to the possibility of a clause about adjudicating and enforcing the treaty's provisions. Cp. Cawkwell (1981) 71.

52 See note 49.

53 Xen. 5.4.34: οὶ ᾿Αθηναῖοι ὲπὺλωσὰν τε τὸν Πειραιᾶ ναῦς τε ὲναυπηγοῦντο τοῖς τε Βοιωτοῖς πὰση προθυμὶα ὲβὸηθουν Diod. 15.29,7: οὶ ᾿Αθηναῖοι . . . ὲψηφὶσαντο λελὐσθαι τἀς απονδὰς ὑπὀ Λαχεδαιμονίων. χρίναντες δὲ πολεμεῖν αὐτοῖς στρατηγοὺς μὲν ὁπλίτας χαταλέξαι δισμυρίους ἱππεῖς δὲ πενταχοσίους ναῦς δὲ πληρῶσαι διαχοσίας

Diodoros unmistakably implies that the naval activity as well as the other measures constituted a single process, the mobilization appropriate before a large war. Similarly, Xenophon's own highly selective account of the Athenian reaction, including the shipbuilding, need not indicate what the Peace of Antalcidas had until then prohibited — notwithstanding Cawkwell's ingenious inference. Incidentally, Diodoros' ναῦς διαχοσὶας πληρῶσαι is certainly wrong. Probably he or his source has garbled an Athenian decree something like ὲχατὸν (? cf. Polybios 2.62) δὲ χατασχευὰζεσθαι ναῦς Thus, we can reconcile Xenophon's account with that of Diodoros. As for the Piraeus gates, see below.

54 No regularly allotted trireme on 1604 is known to have been ‘old’. Thus all the ca. 15–20 allotted triremes were probably ‘new’. In addition, some ⅙ of the unallotted triremes on the preserved half of 1604 are ‘new’. If this ratio held over the entire original inscription, then in all there would have been ca. 13 ‘new’ triremes that were unallotted.

55 So Sinclair, 50f. And much less, because some of the ‘new’ ships on 1604 are allotted, could Athens have built them all in the spring of 378.

56 ‘New’ and ‘old’ in Lysias 28.4 are polemical and tell us little.

57 IG II2 1623.294 ff.; 1628.81 ff. We might even compare the ‘select’ class of ships of mid-century inventories, which seems to comprise all triremes built in the six most recent years; see IG II2 1611.106–34, and Morrison, J.S. and Williams, R.T., Greek Oared Ships (Cambridge, 1968) 248.Google Scholar

58 Cp. Sinclair 49 on the fleet strength in 386.

59 Diod. 14.85.2. There is no rationale for suspecting this number in Diodoros, despite Swoboda, s.v. ‘Konon III’ in RE, Bd. 11, 1327–8. These 80 are in addition to the ca. 12 allowed by the Peace of 404; Xen. 2.2.20. Cf. Diod. 13.107.4.

60 Cp. Xen. 4.8.9. Most modern accounts of Conon's activities have failed to notice that Conon almost certainly maintained ‘his’ fleet, after returning to Athens, through Greek rather than Persian contributions; cp. Jacoby, FGrH III. 1 (Text) 516 and n. 12.Google Scholar

61 Despite Meyer, E., Gesch. d. Alterthums 5.4 (1902) 258, and Beloch III. 1.84 and 88Google Scholar, whose supposition that the Persian fleet dispersed homeward after the arrest of Conon is difficult, anyhow, to reconcile with the implications of Lysias 19.29 and Andocides 3.12, 14, and 39.

62 There were 2 fleets of 10 or more ships each sent to Cyprus (Xen. 4.8.24, 5.1.10), fleets of 40 and 8 ships in the Aegean (Diod. 14.94.2, Xen. 4.8.25, 34), at least another 13 guarding Attica (Xen. 5.1.5) and perhaps as many as 20 (Xen. 5.1.19–20), and an unknown number guarding the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf (Xen. 4.6.14).

63 Xen. 4.8.24, 5.1.27.

64 At least 32 in the Hellespont (Xen. 5.1.7), at least 10 in Gyprus (5.1.10), 13–20 guarding Piraeus and Attica (5.1.5, 19 f.), and perhaps several more in the Corinthian Gulf (4.6.14). Cf. however F.E. Robbins, op. cit. note 24, 366, who estimates a total of only 50 triremes. The crux is in whether or not to believe Diodoros' assertion (14.94.3) that Thrasyboulos lost 23 of his 40 ships in a storm. As Beloch contends, III. 1.90 note 2, the silence in Lysias' Ergokles about this disaster speaks strongly against Diodoros' story.

65 Andocides 3.12, 14. Philochoros, Cp.FGrH 328 F 149.Google Scholar Most useful is the commentary of Jacoby ad loc, which underlines the contradictions in ancient testimony about peace negotiations conducted during the Corinthian War.

66 Probably the occasion when Artaxerxes honoured him with the gift of a scented garland (Plut. Artax. 22.1) Diod. 14.110.2 says that the Spartans ‘sent Antalcidas to Artaxerxes’ to treat for peace. Underbill's, Cp.G.E. comments, Xenophon Hellenica (Oxford, 1906)Google Scholar, on 5.1.6, and Lewis, D.M., Sparta and Persia (Leiden, 1977) 147.Google Scholar At any rate, the rescript came down from the King himself (Xen. 5.1.30).

67 Xenophon Ages. 9.2 remarks about the King's ostentatious slowness in conducting negotiations.

68 See Beloch III.2.224f. for the chronology of naval activity in this period.

69 Thus the disagreement between ancient testimony suggesting that Spartan reverses made them eager for peace (Diod. 14.110.2, Plut. Artax. 21.4. Cp. Isoc. 14.41, Xen. 5.1.36 and Plato Menexenus 245e) and that which indicates that Athenian weakness compelled her reluctantly to accept the Peace (Xen. 5.1.29. Cp. Diod. 14.110.4 and Aristides Panath. 293).

70 Notwithstanding Cawkwell (1981) 76 n. 25.

71 Tod 117.20 f. (with Hoeck's restoration from the apparatus, and my own new readings in line 21): περὶ τῶν νεῶ [τ]ῶ[v περ]/ιπλεσ[ῶν Cp. Sinclair 48.

72 Isocrates' statement (4.115) that pirates controlled the seas around 380 cannot have been true, despite Cawkwell (1981) 74, and indicates simply the level of hyperbole to which the orator could sink; cf. McKechnie, Paul, Outsiders in the Greek cities in the fourth century BC (London, New York, 1989), 105.Google Scholar Incidentally, I think that the change of career of Macartatos in Isaeus 11.48f., though probably datable to this period, proves nothing about either the level of piracy or restrictions on Athenian naval activity by the Peace.

73 For example, although surviving fragments preserve no reference to triremes, the decree concerning the Lemnian cleruchy (Stroud, , Hesperia 40 (1971) 162–73 # 23, esp. lines 9, 15)Google Scholar clearly envisaged the use of some state ships. Cawkwell (1981) 76 has admitted the possibility that for peaceful purposes such as this Athens might have been allowed the use of her ships.

74 Cp. Tod 117, 118 and 119.

75 Tod 118.28–30.

76 Cp. note 59, and Cawkwell (1981) 76.

77 This recognized probably by Hornblower, S.The Greek World 479–323 B.C. (London, 1983) 198Google Scholar, who thus ventured that the Peace of 387/6 required Athens to ‘dismantle’ her Navy! Cf. however Plato Menexenus 245 e.

78 See also Appendix II on the diadikasia documents.

79 Diod. 15.38.2 (375); Diod. 1550.4 and Xen. 6.3.18 (371). Indeed, Cawkwell (1981) 74 will have it both ways: If Diodoros is confused and has retrojected his discussion of 371 back to 375, that also would show that the two peace treaties were similar. There is further confusion. By his own reckoning Timotheos set sail with 60 triremes in 373 while Athens remained at peace with Sparta; see Cawkwell, , ‘Notes on the Peace of 375/4,’ Historia 12 (1963) 84–95 at 85f.Google Scholar The only reasonable explanation of this and of other evidence, as I shall argue below, is that all these peace treaties recognized the right of member cities to deploy their forces against states not party to the treaty.

80 Phil. FGH 328 F 151. I do not see that an argument from silence in Isocrates 8.16 amounts to anything; cf. Cawkwell (1981) 72.

81 See below and note 93.

82 Cawkwell (1981) 76. See above.

83 Cp. Xen. 5.1.35: Λαχεδαιμονὶοις μὲν δὴ χαὶ ᾿Αθηναὶοις χαὶτοῖς συμμὰχοις οὒτω . . . εὶρὴνη ὲγὲνετο (386). See Appendix III on the applicability of these treaties' provisions.

84 Cp. Xen. 5.1.36, Plut. Ages. 23.5, and Ryder 25 f. for 386. In general, see the rather later comments of Isocrates Panath. 160 and Dem. 15.28f. See also Seager, Robin, ‘The King's Peace and the balance of power in Greece, 386–362 B.C.,’ Athenaeum 52 (1974) 36–63Google Scholar, and Hampl, Franz, Die Griechischen Staatsvertraege des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr. Geb. (Leipzig, 1938) 80 f., 87 f.Google Scholar

85 Cp. Ryder 40, 69. He has demonstrated (8–15) that already in the fifth century the Spartans were accustomed to employ autonomy clauses against rival hegemones. Cp. especially Thuc. 5.29–33 (for 421); 5.77.5–81.1 (for 417); Xen. 3.2.21–31 and Diod. 14.17.4–12, 34.1 (around 400).

86 Cp. Xen. 6.5.2: ὲὰν δὲ τις στρατεὺη ὲπὶ τινα πὸλιν τῶν ὸμοσασῶν τὸνδε τὸν δρχον βοηθὴσω παντὶ σθὲνει

87 Thus, for example, in 362 Sparta first tried in vain to exclude Messene from the oaths, then chose to remain ekspondos (‘at war’) itself – hoping for an opportunity to recover its former helots (Polybios 4.33.8 f., Plut. Ages. 35.2 f.). Cawkwell (1973) 53 apparently concedes that parties to the Peace were free to attack ekspondoi.

88 When Xenophon (6.3.19) reports Agesilaos' too ready offer to exclude the Thebans from the truce in 371, the menace of remaining ekspondos becomes perfectly clear. Cf. also Diod. 15.51.1: ‘No city could fight on Thebes’ behalf because they had all agreed to the ‘Common Peace'.’

89 That seems clear from events late in the 380s involving Olynthos. Although this city probably had an alliance with Athens during the Corinthian War (Isaeus 5.46) and thus became a party to the Peace of Antalcidas, I see no evidence to show that Acanthos and Apollonia took part in either the war or the Peace. Had they not, we can more easily explain the Olynthians' readiness to attack them, as well as the willingness of Athens and Thebes to seek an alliance with the aggressors (Xen. 5.2.15). This, I think, is also the right explanation of ‘the conspicuous absence’ (cp. Seager, op. cit. note 84, 41) of any direct mention of the autonomy-clause of the Peace of Antalcidas in the Xenophontic speech of the Acanthian ambassador appealing to the Spartans for defensive assistance (Xen. 5.2.12–19; because the Acanthians were not party to the Peace, Xenophon could not justify Spartan intervention in appeal to its principles. Of course, Xenophon is entirely capable of overlooking more subtle points of discourse (cf. Lewis, D.M., Sparta and Persia (Leiden, 1977) 112 n. 34).Google Scholar But is he so hopelessly dense as to ignore the protection promised by the Peace (cp. Xen. 5.4.1)?

90 An Athenian stele honouring Dionysios I and his sons in this year twice mentions the Peace in terms that must indicate its continued force; Tod 133.8–10, 21–6. Cp. the Assembly's instructions to Timotheos in 366 (Dem. 15.9). Interestingly, the Athenian alliance with Dionysios of 368/7 contains a clause expressly forbidding the bearing of arms against each other's territory (Tod 136.24–30; the inscription likely dates before January 367 – see Lewis 37f.) – superfluous if the protection of the ‘Common Peace’ had indeed been universal.

91 Aischines 2.26–9; Dem. 23.149. Cp. Diod. 15.71.3 (for a force sent with 30 ships to aid Alexander of Pherai against the Thebans in 368); Xen. 7.1.36 (for the Persian reaction in 367). See Beloch III.1.182 and 194, III.2.247.

92 Aischines 2.32. It is less likely that the ‘congress’ concerned the Spartan/Athenian alliance negotiated in 369; cf. Cawkwell, , ‘The Common Peace of 366/5 B.C.,’ CQ 11 (1961) 80–6 at 80f.CrossRefGoogle Scholar That Amyntas was still alive at the time of the congress supports a date before 368. Also relevant is the statement of Demosthenes (19.137) that the Persian King again (palin) recognized the subjection of Amphipolis to Athens after she had executed the ambassador Timagoras (following the King's arrogant peace proposal in 367).

93 Cp. the speech given to Kallistratos by Xenophon (6.3.14–8), which strongly suggests the same thing for the Peace of 371. See also Diod. 15.60.1–2: ‘Jason of Pherai persuaded the Thessalians to lay claim to the hegemony of Greece … for it happened that the Spartans had suffered a great disaster at Leuctra, and the Athenians lay claim only to the hegemony of the sea ((τῆς χατὰ θὰλατταν ἀρχῆς ἀντὲχεσθαι cp. Diod. 15.46.1 (373) οὶ δὲ Λαχεδαιμὸνιοι τὴν ὲΧουσαν τοῖς ἀντεΧομὲνοις τῆς θαλὰττης) . . . so the Thessalians put forward Jason as hegemon of them all …’ Despite Diodoros' date (370/69), the episode appears to belong to 371; cp. Beloch III.2. 237f. Xenophon (7.1.1–14) and Diodoros (15.67.1) are reconcilable with, if not indicative of, a Spartan recognition of Athens' hegemony of the sea already in 371 or 375.

94 Cawkwell (1973) 51 f., 54; (1981) 74 f.

95 Among other measures taken; see note 53.

96 For prospoiesamenos, cp. Xen. Anab. 4.3.20.

97 Cf. however Denniston, J.D., The Greek Particles2 (Oxford, 1959) 231.Google Scholar

98 See note 53.

99 ᾿Ανεπὺλωσαν perhaps. It would have been the simplest matter for Xenophon to have indicated a shift to a new policy with an adverbial phrase (τὸτε πρῶτον) for example.

100 We do not know if the Piraeus Wall was complete everywhere in 386; indeed Xenophon's apulotos might mask other fundamental deficiencies in the port's defenses. For a full discussion of possible Piraeus-scenarios, see Sinclair 31–4.

101 I am grateful to D. Peppa-Delmousou and C. Karapa-Molisani for their assistance throughout the scorching summer of 1987 and again in 1989 while I studied in the Epigraphical Museum in Athens, and to Professor D.R. Laing for fruitful discussions concerning these naval inscriptions. Also I thank Professor D.M. Lewis for correcting some errors in an earlier draft of this paper. Wherever mistakes remain, it will be found that I have heedlessly neglected his good advice.