Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-s2hrs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-09T13:57:28.407Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

The Naumachia Near Amorgos in 322 B.C.1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 September 2013

N. G. Ashton
Affiliation:
University of Western Australia

Extract

On 7 Metageitnion of the Athenian year 322/1 B.C. a military engagement near Krannon, some 15 kilometres south-west of Larissa in Thessaly, marked the end of the so-called Lamian War in which a majority of the Greek mainland poleis, temporarily united under Athenian leadership, had attempted to terminate the Macedonian domination and to reassert their rights to individual autonomy. Although significant in that it heralded the final miscarriage of the Hellenic revolt, none the less the battle at Krannon was, in itself, a comparatively minor struggle in which the Greek forces, after an initial success, capitulated with surprising rapidity to the Macedonian commander-in-chief Antipater. That this war, in which the Hellenic armies had held the upper hand during the initial stages, should have concluded with such an insignificant clash of arms, is understandable only in the light of events at sea. The key battles which signalled the end of hopes for an overall Greek victory in their struggle for autonomy were naval ones—the most crucial being the naval confrontation determined near the island of Amorgos in the Sporades, some time prior to the battle of Krannon.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Council, British School at Athens 1977

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

2 For the date see Plutarch, , Dem. 28, 1Google Scholar; Cam. 19, 8.

3 Schmitt, H. H., Die Staatsverträge des Altertums iii (Munich, 1969) 24–5Google Scholar no. 413 provides a synopsis of the συμμαχία and the sources for it. To his otherwise exhaustive catalogue of references should be added: Pausanias vi 4, 6–7; vii 6, 3–4; x 3, 3; Plutarch, , Pyrrh. 1, 6Google Scholar: Hesperia ii (1933) 397–8 = EM 12736.

4 That ἐλευθερία and αὐτονομία were the catch cries of the Greeks in the Lamian War is demonstrably clear. Both slogans appear in the extant contemporary sources, and are also echoed in the derivative ones. For examples of the use of ἐλευθερία see Hypereides, Epit. cols, v, vi, vii, ix, xiii; IG ii2. 467, 7–8; PH ib. no. 15. 122, 138; Diodoros xviii 9, 1 and 5; 12, 3; Plutarch, , Phoc. 26, 1Google Scholar; the Suda s.v. ‘Λαμία’ Justin xiii 5, 5 (libertatem). For αὐτονομία Hypereides, Epit. col. ix; Diodoros xviii 9, 5.

5 On the ease of the Macedonian victory note the comments of Plutarch, Phoc. 26, 1 and the battle account at Diodoros xviii 17, together with the observations of Schaefer, A., Demost' und seine Zeit iii 2 (Leipzig, 1887) 384 n. 2.Google Scholar

6 In fact, the only known military defeat suffered by the Hellenic armies in this war is the battle at Krannon. All previous land confrontations had resulted in reverses for the Macedonians or their allies, e.g. at Plataea; south of Lamia (prior to the siege); north of Lamia (after the siege was lifted); and an abortive attempted invasion of Attica through Rhamnous.

7 There can be little doubt that the final, decisive naval engagement was that near Amorgos. The Marmor Parium, in its record of the significant stages of the Lamian War, mentions only this naumachia (FGH ii B no. 239 B. 9) and the incident recounted by Plutarch, (Demetr. 11, 45Google Scholar) indicates the importance attached to the battle by the Athenians of the time.

8 Diodoros xviii 15, 9 notes that many ships were destroyed in the final stages of the naval war. Amorgos is not mentioned at all by Diodoros in his passing references to affairs at sea, but further corroboration of extensive fleet damage there is to be found in mention of τά ναυάγια at Plutarch, , Demetr. 11, 5Google Scholar and in the anecdote concerning the Macedonian admiral Kleitos at Plutarch, Moralia 338 A.

9 On Athens' capabilities at sea after the Amorgos disaster see Hauben, H., ‘An Athenian Naval Victory in 321 B.C.’, ZPE xiii (1974) 61–4Google Scholar, where the concluding sentence reads: ‘This meant a rehabilitation—meagre, to be sure—of the Athenian navy after the terrible setbacks of 322.’

10 Droysen, J. G., Geschichte des Hellenismus ii 2 (Gotha, 1877) 68Google Scholar = ii3 (Basel,:1952) 40 n. 19.

11 Above, n. 7. The relevant section of the text is: καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ναυμαχίας τῆς γενομένης Μακεδόσιν πρὸς Άθηναίους περὶ Άμοργὲν ἥν ἐνίκων Μακεδόνες.

12 Will, E., Histoire politique du monde hellénistique (323–30 av. J.C.) i (Nancy, 1966) 28Google Scholar; cf. the similarly expressed sentiments of Beloch, K. J., Griechische Geschichte iv 2, 1 (Berlin and Leipzig, 1925) 73.Google Scholar There is virtual unanimity that the defeat near Amorgos marks the end of Athens' era of greatness. As a selective sampling: Amit, M., Athens and the Sea—A Study in Athenian Sea Power (Collection Latomus lxxiv, 1965) 94Google Scholar; Bengtson, H., Griechische Geschichte von den Anfängen bis in die römische Kaiserzeit 3 (Munich, 1965) 361–2Google Scholar; Burn, A. R., Alexander the Great and the Hellenistic Empire (London, 1947) 257Google Scholar; Cary, M., A History of the Greek World from 323 to 146 B.C. (London, 1932) 8Google Scholar; Cloché, P., La dislocation d'un empire (Paris, 1959) 34Google Scholar; Ferguson, W. S., Hellenistic Athens (London, 1911) 1718Google Scholar; Johnson, A. C., AJA xvii (1913) 516Google Scholar; Tarn, W. W., CAH vi. 458Google Scholar; Wilcken, U., Alexander the Great (translated by Richards, G. C., New York, 1967) 268.Google Scholar

13 Diodoros xvii 111, 1–4; xviii 8–13; 14, 4–15; 16, 4–18.

14 Athenian fleet sizes are given at xviii 10, 2 and 15, 8; Macedonian at 12, 2 and 15, 8; and a single reference to naval engagements at 15, 9

15 FGH ii B no. 239 B. 9; Plutarch, , Demetr. 11, 4Google Scholar; Moralia 338A.

16 See below, notes 35 and 54.

17 Both the Marmor Parium loc.cit. and Diodoros xviii 2, 1 place the decisive naval battle(s) in the year in which Kephisodoros was the eponymous archon at Athens.

18 IG ii2. 1604–32, with additional fragments published by Schweigert, E., Hesperia viii (1939) 1725Google Scholar and ix (1940) 343–5. On the matter of SEG x 354 and 355 see Blackman, D., GRBS x (1969) 207Google Scholar n. 82 and Laing, D. R. Jr, Hesperia xxxvii (1968) 254 n. 23Google Scholar. I am deeply grateful to Mr. D. J. Blackman, then of Bristol University, who gave generously of his time and knowledge in a discussion of aspects of the Tabulae Curatorum Navalium. Also I am indebted to Dr. D. M. Lewis of Christ Church, Oxford, who provided access to the squeeze collection of the Ashmolean Library and gave valuable advice concerning the epigraphical and literary sources for the Lamian War.

19 The naval inventories were first published by Boeckh, A., Urkunden über das Seewesen des Attischen Staates (Berlin, 1840)Google Scholar. D. R. Laing, Jr., op. cit. 244 notes 1 and 2 gives a succinct outline of the discovery of the stelai and of the subsequent republications of the tabulae.

20 At the Epigraphical Museum the assistance rendered to me by the Director, Mrs. Peppas-Delmousou, and her staff, was of the highest order. I cannot thank them enough.

21 As indicated, for example, by the use of the verb form παρεδομεν within the formula (see below).

22 In all extant cases of the fully fashioned formula, ἀριθμός is the opening word—and in earlier instances never further back than the second word.

23 IG ii2. 1611, 3–9; 1613, 284–302; 1624, 125–9. The opening words of these three formulae are, respectively: [ἀ]ριθμὸς τριήρων; [σύμπας] ἀριθμὸς τριήρω[ν]; σύμπας [ἀ]ρ[ιθμὸς] τριήρων.

24 IG ii2. 1627, 266 ff.; 1628, 481 ff.; 1629, 783 ff.; 1631, 167 ff.

25 . IG ii2. 1628, 483–8; 1629, 786–800; 1631, 168–71.

26 IG ii2. 1627, 271–4; 1628, 492–4; 1629, 804–7.

27 By virtue of elision this line reads τετρήρεις δ᾿ ἐμ κ.τ.λ. in the formulae of IG ii2. 1627 and 1629.

28 There is the unique insertion of a total for πεντήρεις at IG ii2 1629, 811.

29 Due to the above interpolation in IG ii2. 1629 (see previous note) the stonecutter found it necessary to re phrase slightly this element of the Arithmos formula to avoid ambiguity. The text is: τετρήρεις δ᾿ ἐμ πλῶι.

30 Followed in one instance by an explanation of an unusually acquired quadrireme—that of Harpalos at IG ii2. 1631, 174.

31 I do not include the πεντήρεις numbers recorded in this inscription. On the one hand, there is no parallel in the Arithmos formula, and in addition a careful autopsy of the stone at this point has revealed an unusual textual corruption which will be the subject of a separate study.

32 Commentary on the text, where it is at variance with that published in IG ii2. 1631:

Line 167—The final nu of τῶν is to be seen, and should no longer be enclosed in square brackets. From comparison with the constant basic element (1) of the developed formula it is apparent that the engraver accidentally omitted the definite article τοῑς between ἐν and ἐν νεωρίοις. 〈τοῐς〉 should therefore be read in the text.

Line 169—Following A. Boeckh, op. cit. 520–2,(ώνιος) added to complete what was, no doubt, a deliberate abbreviation of the demotic.

Line 172—[ἐν μ]ὲν as restored in IG is unacceptable. In the light of all other examples of this formulaic element, the restoration must be [ἐμ μ]ὲν.

Line 173—IG records the number of quadriremes in the dockyards as :!: indicating the numeral as uncertain. However, both colons are clearly visible on the stone, with sufficient intervening space for only one numeral. At precisely the midpoint between the colons is the bottom third of a vertical stroke, so that the reading is :1: making it virtually certain that the original inscription was the numeral I. Also in this line the mu of ἐμ is quite discernible and should no longer be bracketed.

33 Above n. 14.

34 Diodoros xviii 10, 2.

35 Wesseling, P., Diodorus Siculus ii (Amsterdam, 1746) 264 n. 83.Google Scholar But it should be noted that trireme numbers are recorded before quadriremes in the tabulae, and it could be that the numerals came to be transposed in Diodoros' text.

36 IG ii2. 1627, 275–8; 1629,808–12. A. Schaefer, op. cit. 360 n. 2 observed the necessity of accepting the emendation in view of the quadrireme and trireme numbers in the naval inventories for 325/4 B.C. and 323/2 B.C.—the correct conclusion although based in part on Boeckh's incorrect transcription of the total trireme numbers recorded in the inventory of 323/2 B.C. (IG ii2. 1631, 171). It is surprising that M. Cary, op. cit. 381, in an appendix entitled ‘The Naval Operations of the Lamian War’, retained Diodoros' figures of 200 quadriremes and 40 triremes in the face of the evidence contained in the naval lists, which are cited in support of the over-all numbers.

37 No other literary sources provide evidence concerning the composition of the Athenian fleet in this revolt. The only additional information on numbers is provided by Justin xiii 5, 8: Igitur Athenienses contracto XXX milium exercitu et ducentis navibus bellum cum Antipatro, cut Graecia sorte evenerat, gerunt, manifestly echoed by Orosius iii 23, 15: Primi Athenienses contracto XXX milium exercitu et ducentis navibus bellum cum Antipatro, cui Graecia sorte venerat, gerunt.

38 Such as protecting the grain supply route (Diodoros xv 34, 3; Xenophon, , HG v 4, 61Google Scholar: IG ii2. 1628, 37–42) and providing patrols to counter piracy (IG ii2. 1623, 276 ff.). See Jordan, B., The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period (California Classical Studies) xiii (1975) 23–4.Google Scholar

39 Another five instances of sets of four consecutive deltas occur in IG ii2. 1631. They are to be found in lines 255, 256, 452, 457, and 516, ranging in over-all width from 0·22 m. to 0·025 m.

40 Alternative restorations are epigraphically tenable of course, e.g. = 89; = 179; but all give a higher number of quadriremes at sea than that suggested, and there is no evidence to indicate that Athens had a fleet of even 90 quadriremes (the next highest possible supplement) at this time. Between 330/29 B.C. and 325/4 B.C. the numbers of these ships did increase from 18 to 50 (n. 36 above), a build-up of 32 quadriremes in 5 years. However, to accept other than the restoration proposed here, it would be necessary to vizualize an increase of at least 40 such ships in a two-year period!

41 IG ii2. 1629, 801.

42 On the incidence see D. Blackman, op. cit. 199 n. 56.

43 M. Amit, op. cit. 113: B. Jordan, op. cit. 98–9.

44 κατ[ὰ χειμ]ῶνα [δι]εφ[θά] ρθαι—IG ii2. 1631, 118–19:κ[ατ]ὰ χειμῶ[να] διαφθαρῆ[ναι]—IG ii2. 1631, 142–3: κατὰ χειμῶνα ἀπολωλέναι—IG ii2. 1631, 344–6.

45 325/4 B.C.—IG ii2. 1631, 116–38 = IG ii2. 1629, 746–80. 324/3 B.C.—IG ii2. 1631, 141–7. 323/2 B.C.—IG ii2. 1631, 343–50.

46 IG ii2. 1631, 184 ff.

47 Numerous examples can be found in the naval inventories. As an indication of the practice, each of the reference points cited in n. 45 is able to be dated to a specific year by virtue of this custom.

48 Inter alia from IG ii2. 1631, 353–5 εἰσαγόντω〈ν〉 αὐτὸν τῶν νεωρίων ἐπιμελητῶν τῶν ἐπ᾿ Ἀντικλέους ἂρχοντος (= 325/4 B.C.); 368–70 τοὺς τῶν νεωρίων ἐπιμελητὰς τοὺς ἐφ᾿ Ἡγησίου ἄρχοντος (= 324/3 B.C.).

49 Instance the verb form παρέδομεν in element (3) of the Arithmos formula.

50 The known ratios of triremes at sea are 52 out of 392 (330/29 B.C.), 32 out of 360 (326/5 and 325/4 B.C.) and [?+?]+34 out of 315 (323/2 B.C.). For quadriremes 10 out of 18 (330/29 B.C.), 7 out of 50 (325/4 B.C.) and [4]9 out of 50 (323/2 B.C.).

51 Diodoros xviii 15, 8.

52 A detailed examination of the vexed question of the sequence and location of the various naval engagements of the Lamian War is not pertinent here. It is sufficient to recall that Leonnatos had crossed with reinforcements from his satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia in order to relieve Antipater at Lamia, and that a crossing of the Hellespont with such a force is likely to have involved the removal of an Athenian naval blockade. Mention in two Athenian honorary decrees of the late fourth century B.C. of an apparent naval defeat in the Hellespont could be reference to the occasion of Leonnatos' crossing in spring 322 B.C. (IG ii2. 398 and 493). On the problem of naval operations in the war, note especially Walek, T., Rev. Phil., xlviii (1924) 2330.Google Scholar

53 See the text on p. 4.

54 If the Athenians did carry out their original intention to commission 240 ships for the war, then the ‘new’ figure of 170 cannot represent the over-all fleet size in 322 B.C., as this would entail a loss of more than 70 vessels in the first half of the struggle, and the total numbers of 315 triremes and 50 quadriremes in the Arithmos formula of IG ii2. 1631 do not allow for such a degree of loss. T. Walek, op. cit. 24–6, argued that the fleet which had been given the task of guarding the Hellespont was built up to 170—a conclusion supported, I believe, by the likely restoration IG ii2. 1631, 172 (see below, p. 9). In this case, the attempt by P. Wes-seling, op. cit. 269 n. 4 to emend the text of Diodoros xviii 15, 8 to read διακοσίας καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα rather than ἑκατὸν ἑβδομήκοντα should be rejected. There is no explanation for the alleged error in transcription, and the argument that a total higher than 240 is required was based on the misconception that 170 is meant to signify over-all numbers in commision in 322 B.C.

55 The statement at Diodoros xviii 15, 9 is ambiguous and permits either interpretation.

56 Above, n. 8.

57 Above, n. 17.

58 With 49 quadriremes and a number well in excess of 34 triremes ([?+?]+34) at sea, the percentage of the total war fleet on duty at the end of 323/2 B.C. is markedly higher than in the other years for which figures are available (see above, n. 50).

59 This is, of course, the emended figure at Diodoros xviii 10, 2. The 200 naves of Justin xiii 5, 8 and Orosius iii 23, 15 are best interpreted as a record of the trireme numbers only.

60 Note the clause of the ψήφισμα relating to mobilization of the Athenian citizen body: στρατεύσασθαι δὲ πάντας Ἀθηναίους τοὺς μέχρι ἐτῶν τεσσαράκοντα καὶ τρεῐς μὲν φυλὰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν παραφυλάττειν, τὰς δ᾿ ἑπτὰ πρὸς τὰς ὑπερορίους στρατείας ἑτοίμους εῑναι (Diodoros xviii 10, 2). Further indication of the degree of participation in the war effort is provided by IG ii.2 554, 12–14 where it is recorded that the Athenians subsequently honoured a metic, Euxenides of Phaselis. Among other benefactions he had provided twelve ναῦται during the Lamian War. Commentary on this inscription and the role played by Euxenides is to be found in Thomsen, R., Eisphora (1964) 237–8Google Scholar; Pečírka, J., The Formula for the Grant of Enktesis in Attic Inscriptions (1966) 85–9Google Scholar; B. Jordan, op. cit. 224.

61 Despite the failure to prevent the crossing of Leonnatos and his relief force, Athens could not afford to abandon he attempt at a naval blockade of the Hellespont, due to he numbers of Macedonian infantry in Asia and Asia Minor under the command of the erstwhile generals of Alexander. That the fleet there was again unsuccessful in his venture is apparent from the later crossing of Krateros, with upwards of 10,000 troops (Plutarch, , Phoc. 26, 1Google Scholar; Dioloros xviii 16, 4).

62 From Diodoros xviii 12, 2 we learn that in 323 B.C. Antipater had a fleet of 110 triremes as an adjunct to his and force in Greece. It appears likely that the fleet of Kleitos in 322 B.C. was a separate contingent, and that Anipater would still have had up to 110 ships in commission around the mainland in 322 B.C. (so T. Walek, op. cit. 25— for a contrary opinion note M. Cary, op. cit. 381–2). For a parallel to Athens having over 200 ships at sea in ime of war note Thucydides iii 17, 2 where in 428 B.C. the total was 250.

63 A. Schaefer, op. cit. 381 n. 2 and K.J. Beloch, op. cit. 73 n. 1 referred, in passing, to the naval lists in their discussions of the dating of the decisive naval confrontations.

64 K. J. Beloch, ibid, suggested tentatively that the battle near Amorgos could have been fought early in 322/1 B.C. However, even allowing for Diodoros' unreliability in matters of chronology (for example he relates all the engagements of the Lamian War under 323/2 B.C., including the battle of Krannon, Antipater's settlements with the Greek poleis, and the post-war campaign against the Aetolians), none the less the Marmor Parium places the battle squarely in 323/2 B.C. In the light of such corroborative evidence and the complete absence of evidence to the contrary there is no alternative to assigning the battle near Amorgos to the archonship of Kephisodoros.

65 Plutarch, Demetr. 11, 4–5; Moralia 799F—800A. On Stratokles' family background and career see Kirchner, J., Prosopographia Attica ii (1903) no. 12938Google Scholar; Berve, H., Das Alex anderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage ii (1926) 364Google Scholar no. 724; Davies, J. K., Athenian Propertied Families 600–300 B.C. (1971) 494–5.Google Scholar That Stratokles had sufficient standing and Frechheit in Athens at this time can be inferred from Deinarchos i. 1 and 20–1 where he is attested as having played a leading role as a public prosecutor in the trials which followed the Harpalos affair—early in 323 B.C. (contra A. Schaefer, op. cit. 382 n. 1).

66 Plutarch, , Demetr. 11, 5Google Scholar = δύο ἡμέρας; Moralia 800A: τρεῑς ἡμἑρας.

67 The Athenian Year (1961) 132, 240–1 and reaffirmed convincingly in TAPA xcv (1964) 212–28—a confidence shared by Lewis, D. M., JHS lxxxiii (1963) 195.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

68 CPh xlii (1947) 235–43; and implied more recently in The Choiseul Marble (California Classical Studies (1970) 66).

69 Chronology of the Ancient World (1968) 37.

70 Hamilton, J. R., Plutarch, Alexander: A Commentary (1969) 81.Google Scholar

71 Reproduced by Bickerman, op. cit. 110–42.

72 The Athenian Year 133.