Impediments to close relationships in agriculture

Birke et al. (Reference Birke, Arluke and Michael2007) point out that worker identities (including goals and responsibilities), and the identities that workers perceive in animals (e.g. as intelligent, or not; or as dangerous or not), are constructed in part by the emotional and proximal distance between humans and animals, including how animals are managed, trained, housed, handled, and the procedures they are exposed to (Farmer-Dougan & Dougan Reference Farmer-Dougan and Dougan1999). Workers may characterise the capacities of animals in ways that can allow for the belief that an animal is not harmed by certain forms of treatment or that it is not owed greater moral regard. Such factors, especially in highly industrialised systems, can reduce the possibility of perspective-taking and limit the ability for animals to express choice, autonomy, control, or natural behaviours, which can then serve to reduce workers’ perceptions of animals’ capacities and needs.

A study by Anneberg and Sandøe (Reference Anneberg and Sandøe2019) illustrates how management decisions affected how workers view and treat animals on-farms. One stockperson stated, “Where I work now, I can see they [the sows] do enjoy to be loose in deep bedding [during oestrus] so I guess it matters, but where I worked before, they were not loose during oestrus, and I never thought about it” (p 27). Thus, structural aspects of rearing systems can impede worker ability to empathise with animals. Moreover, the inability to “manoeuvre within the framework of conditions in which [farm staff] are required to work” (Anneberg & Sandøe Reference Anneberg and Sandøe2019; p 29), including a lack of appreciation from management, and a lack of control or input into how work is done, can negatively impact attitudes and behaviours towards animals (Porcher et al. Reference Porcher, Cousson-Gélie and Dantzer2004; Hassink et al. Reference Hassink, Grin and Hulsink2013; Anneberg & Sandøe Reference Anneberg and Sandøe2019).

The built environments that animals live can also undermine the ability to forge close human-animal relationships. Housing systems can restrict behaviours, and the use of some systems (e.g. gestation crates) can make it a challenge for stockpersons to interact with and view animals as individuals (Porcher Reference Porcher2011; Anneberg & Sandøe Reference Anneberg and Sandøe2019; Mills et al. Reference Mills, Payne, Saunders and Zobel2023). Moreover, the use of management practices that are aversive to the animals (e.g. cow-calf separation, castration and dehorning without pain mitigation, routine de-beaking of chicks, use of electric prods to move animals), can encourage workers to distance themselves from the subjective experiences of the animals (Wilkie Reference Wilkie2005; Porcher Reference Porcher2011; Anneberg & Sandøe Reference Anneberg and Sandøe2019). Conversely, providing animals with more physical freedom and control may improve worker perception of animals’ capacities and improve job satisfaction for workers (Pinillos Reference Pinillos2018; Johnson et al. Reference Johnson, Colpoys, Garcia, Jass, Millman, Pairis-Garcia, Rademacher, Weimer and Azarpajouh2019).

Other aspects of animal farming may impede the capacity of humans to recognise individual characteristics in animals (Wilkie Reference Wilkie2005; Buller & Roe Reference Buller and Roe2018) and the formation of human-animal attachments. For example, even if workers are motivated to attend to animals’ perspectives and individuality, demands from competing tasks with greater priority can result in worker frustration, rough handling of animals, and failure to provide materials for the expression of natural behaviours (Wilkie Reference Wilkie2005; Anneberg & Sandøe Reference Anneberg and Sandøe2019). Important to consider in these cases, is the potential for workers to experience moral injury (the negative impact on psychological wellness from events that are perceived to be ethically distressing) when standard required practices often require treatment of animals that is disrespectful (Johnson & Smajdor Reference Johnson, Smajdor, Herrmann and Jayne2019; Williamson et al. Reference Williamson, Murphy and Greenberg2022). The injury may be especially pronounced when the harms inflicted on animals are at the hands of workers who seek more respectful relationships. Furthermore, the division of the production chain (e.g. from farm to auction, to slaughter) sends vulnerable animals into exceedingly challenging situations where they experience variability in environments, in time spent with different workers, and in how they are handled (encountering people who likely differ with respect to their sense of responsibility toward animals) (Buller & Roe Reference Buller and Roe2018). Further, work in the field of critical animal studies points to the difficulty imposed by standard housing and management practices to recognise “the ways nonhuman animals resist what humans do to them” (Taylor Reference Taylor2013; p 541). Insofar as their value is recognised, caring relationships are acknowledged mainly for their preventative role in farming systems (e.g. workers may gently handle animals to reduce incidence of injury when, for example, removing calves from cows). However, these relationships are not fully recognised as subjectively important to individual animals and objectively valuable to society (Cooke Reference Cooke2019, Reference Cooke2021; Benz-Schwarzburg & Wrage Reference Benz-Schwarzburg and Wrage2023). Cooke (Reference Cooke2021) explores the ethical significance of trust in human-animal relationships within agricultural and laboratory contexts and highlights the paradox of humans intentionally building trusting connections with animals only to exploit these later. This betrayal is identified as a moral blind spot, underscoring the complexity of ethical considerations in interspecies relationships (Cooke Reference Cooke2021).

Together, these elements of animal production leave the potential for both shared negative and positive experiences between humans and animals significantly difficult to address. The lack of close human-animal relationships in industrial settings does not mean that these relationships cannot exist at all outside of contexts that are exploitative and where benefit is unidirectional (i.e. for humans only). What conditions might we expect to favour close human-animal relationships on farms? Aaltola (Reference Aaltola2019) summarises Weil and Murdoch’s emphasis on the important role that attention plays in shaping reality and moral action, saying, “[w]hen paying attention to the realities of others, we also by necessity come to note their value” (p 201). Certain kinds and practices of attention can connect us to moral action by showing us how the interests of animals may be rendered unachievable by current practices (Aaltola Reference Aaltola2019). Further empirical work can identify which conditions best enable close relationships and how the effects of such relationships can extend to other animals and humans within the same space.

Language signals what is valued in relationships and what relationships can be expected (Wilkie Reference Wilkie2005; Campbell Reference Campbell2020). Animals in agriculture are commonly referred to in relation to their status as commodities using resource language, e.g. ‘livestock’, ‘breeding stock’. These terms deindividualise animals and cause them to be seen as interchangeable, likely affecting the human-animal relationship and how they are treated. In addition, how animals respond to human handling and management is often described in mechanistic terms (e.g. improved growth rate, easy to manage; Buller & Roe Reference Buller and Roe2018). Such language focuses on causal descriptions, reinforcing “the view of animals as mere objects or vehicles of their genes and environment, pre-empting any inferences to their mental life or agency” (Webb et al. Reference Webb, Woodford and Huchard2019; p 782). In these ways, language can diminish the extent to which animals are seen to have worth beyond their instrumental value (Livingston Reference Livingston1994; p V). This language may also enculturate people to think and act in ways that impede engagement with animals as sentient individuals, and thus also challenge their ability to represent the interests of animals in decisions that affect their welfare (Franks et al. Reference Franks, Webb, Gagliano and Smuts2020).

We turn next to how we might begin to better understand and approach the perspectives of animals, looking to species and perspectives outside of farmed animals and animal welfare science.

Social psychological perspectives

SR research in human social psychology has described how close relationships develop and has identified a developmental trajectory for close relationships between humans (Higgins Reference Higgins2016). This body of work points to the importance of sharing experiences, intentions/goals, and joint action with others in helping build our sense of reality and identity (Rossignac-Milon et al. Reference Rossignac-Milon, Higgins, Echterhoff and Higgins2018). It has been suggested that similar processes are likely at play for intersubjectivity in human-animal relationships (Konecki Reference Konecki2007). For SR to occur, people must perceive that they are sharing with someone else a common inner state (e.g. a belief or feeling) about something (e.g. a person or an event) (Echterhoff et al. Reference Echterhoff, Higgins and Levine2009; Higgins Reference Higgins2016). This process begins with ‘joint attention’. For example, “when people meet a new employee at their workplace, they tend to create their impressions of the newcomer jointly with their colleagues, and they feel more confident in their impressions when others agree” (Echterhoff et al. Reference Echterhoff, Higgins and Levine2009; p 496). Thus, perceptions of reality are amplified when SR is taking place in that “events may feel more real, sensations more clear, and interpretations more certain” (Rossignac-Milon et al. Reference Rossignac-Milon, Higgins, Echterhoff and Higgins2018; p 6). Sharing reality manifests from sharing routines or practices, sharing self-guides, where both parties are able to show that they understand the rules laid out by one another, and finally, SR involves investment of the self in co-ordinated activity with those to whom one feels committed resulting in shared ways of perceiving reality (Echterhoff et al. Reference Echterhoff, Higgins and Levine2009; Rossignac-Milon et al. Reference Rossignac-Milon, Higgins, Echterhoff and Higgins2018).

While Higgin’s SR model has not yet been used to investigate human-animal relationships, other research has examined human-animal relationships using similar concepts. For example, research by Horwitz and Bekoff (Reference Horowitz and Bekoff2007) on dyadic play between humans and dogs, investigated joint attention (a component of SR). Their work analysed non-verbal interactions between dogs and humans as manifestations of shared states. As Konecki (Reference Konecki2007) points out, co-ordinated interactions like play bouts can be studied by asking the human involved in the human-dog dyad to describe emotional dimensions of their encounters with the animal (e.g. touching, body language, vocal expressions). Also relevant to the potential for SR between humans and non-humans is work using Qualitative Behavioural Assessments (QBA) showing that many people are able to draw inferences regarding subjective states in a range of animals (Rutherford et al. Reference Rutherford, Donald, Lawrence and Wemelsfelder2012; Jarvis et al. Reference Jarvis, Ellis, Turnbull, Rey Planellas and Wemelsfelder2021).

Domestic dogs are excellent subjects to understand some of the mechanisms that allow us to share realities with animals, including the capacity to recognise states in one another. From the animals’ perspective, Turcsán et al. (Reference Turcsán, Szánthó, Miklósi and Kubinyi2015) showed that dogs have the ability to recognise disgust and happiness in their owners’ facial expressions, and from the human perspective, found that children and adults were able to accurately categorise the states (angry, afraid, happy) of dogs based on acoustic cues.

The concepts of Solidarity with Animals (SWA) and empathy (i.e. acknowledgement and sensitivity to another’s experience) also overlap with the concept of SR. Amiot and Bastien’s (Reference Amiot and Bastian2015, Reference Amiot and Bastian2017) work described the nature and the strength of human-animal interactions by examining how human perceptions of overlapping identity with other species influence the degree to which people consider animals as part of their ingroup (i.e. those with whom we share values and attitudes and who we favour with moral concern). The concept of SWA involves “the sense of belonging, psychological attachment, and closeness toward other animals” (Amiot & Bastian Reference Amiot and Bastian2017; p 2) through the adoption of perspectives tuned toward what is important for the animals (e.g. their goals). Both SWA and SR focus upon outcomes of psychological closeness that humans perceive between themselves and others. Amiot and Bastien (Reference Amiot and Bastian2017) developed a measure of SWA to examine the psychology of human connections to animals and found that SWA was more predictive of positive attitudes and behaviours towards animals than other psychological scales of identification (e.g. identification with other humans or identification with nature; Stern et al. Reference Stern, Kalof, Dietz and Guagnano1995; Leach et al. Reference Leach, van Zomeren, Zebel, Vliek, Pennekamp, Doosje, Ouwerkerk and Spears2008). Amiot and Bastien (Reference Amiot and Bastian2017) point toward the implications of feeling close bonds to animals, including increasing one’s sense of obligation towards animals, consideration of their perspectives, reducing biases towards humans compared to animals, and a willingness to participate in actions to improve animals’ lives.

The idea of sharing reality with animals is perhaps most often described through concepts of emotional intelligence and empathy, which both involve the ability to relate to another’s experience, based, in part, upon the recognition “of others as minded subjects” (Webb et al. Reference Webb, Franks, Gagliano, Smuts, Mezzenzana and Peluso2023). Emotional intelligence (EI) refers to “the ability of an individual to monitor his or her emotions as well as those of others, and to use this information as a guide for thoughts and actions” (Payne et al. Reference Payne, DeAraugo, Bennett and McGreevy2016; p 115), while empathy involves the recognition of an other’s internal or subjective experiences and can thus shape the quality of the relationship (Muri et al. Reference Muri, Tufte, Skjerve and Valle2012). For example, Payne et al. (Reference Payne, DeAraugo, Bennett and McGreevy2016) suggest that dog owners scoring highest in self-reported EI are likely to have more positive relationships with their dogs (e.g. human-dog dyads presenting behaviour associated with secure attachment bonds as opposed to anxious or avoidant attachment) compared to dog owners with lower EI (Payne et al. Reference Payne, DeAraugo, Bennett and McGreevy2016).

The concepts of SR, SWA and EI provide approaches that may help people working with animals develop stronger human-animal relationships. For example, these results suggest that encouraging people to identify shared goals, show empathy, and pay closer attention to non-verbal communication (e.g. co-ordinated movements) may all have benefits.

A selection of indigenous knowledge-systems and approaches

Indigenous cultures are varied (Singh Reference Singh2023). Here, we discuss a small sample of these approaches to human-animal relationships. Kimmerer (Reference Kimmerer2013) encourages her students to approach scientific inquiry with a willingness to be taught by the subject of their inquiry; she explains that “[e]xperiments are not about discovery but about listening and translating the knowledge of other beings” (Kimmerer Reference Kimmerer2013; p 158), a view that contrasts scientific practices that emphasise control over research subjects and testing a priori hypotheses. The traditions of the Blackfoot, a First Nations tribe originating in the north west of North America, conceptualise a similar dynamic in which they regard the buffalo as their brother who teaches them how to live (Ladner Reference Ladner2003; Oetelaar Reference Oetelaar2014; Haggerty et al. Reference Haggerty, Rink, McAnally and Bird2018). Traditional Māori (indigenous Polynesian people of mainland New Zealand) ethics identifies non-human life, and also environmental features such as mountains and rivers, as people to whom one can be related (Roberts et al. Reference Roberts, Norman, Minhinnick, Wihongi and Kirkwood1995; Woodhouse et al. Reference Woodhouse, Carr, Liebergreen, Anderson, Beausoleil, Zobel and King2021). Continuity and similitude between humans and the natural world and lack of control over the environment are central to Māori understanding of the natural world (Woodhouse et al. Reference Woodhouse, Carr, Liebergreen, Anderson, Beausoleil, Zobel and King2021). As Woodhouse et al. (Reference Woodhouse, Carr, Liebergreen, Anderson, Beausoleil, Zobel and King2021) report, the “relationship between Māori and the environment is one that ties them deeply to it, further it establishes that neither animals nor the rest of the natural world, a category that includes humans, exist for the purpose of being exploited and extracted for human use” (p 3).

The language used supports these perspectives, e.g. the use of the word ‘brother’ or ‘person’ to refer to non-humans, creates a sense of mutual dependency with attendant moral obligations rooted within a kinship paradigm. Endorsing a worldview where “animals are not considered inferior to humans” (Deckha Reference Deckha2020; p 77), indigenous scholar, Margaret Robinson describes her experience and understanding of the Mi’kmaq (a First Nations tribe originating in the north east of North America) peoples’ engagement with the natural world as being predicated on beliefs that everything is connected, alive, and in possession of an identity (including plants, water, rocks, and even geographic locations; Robinson Reference Robinson2014). The moral obligations of such a world view include reciprocity and respect (e.g. giving animals the necessary conditions to flourish; taking only what you can use from the natural world) and prohibit exploitation of the natural world, including animals (e.g. treating them as objects), who are perceived as brethren (Robinson Reference Robinson2014; Woodhouse et al. Reference Woodhouse, Carr, Liebergreen, Anderson, Beausoleil, Zobel and King2021). These shifts in language and perspective echo those of other scholars, who have argued that conceiving of other beings as ‘persons’ may help us to recognise them as ‘social subjects’ (Smuts Reference Smuts2006; p 125), creating the opportunity for stronger relationships.

The linguistic aspect of this ethic is important; framing in language can go in either the direction of reducing or expanding our sense of connection to the natural world, for example, language that discusses sentient animals as commodities or resources rather than kin can reduce this sense of connection. Harari (Reference Harari2017) explains how the introduction of agricultural, economic relations (which justify exploiting animals) to the Nayaka (present-day hunter-gatherers of south India), changed their language:

Examples of some indigenous perspectives on human-animal relationships are valuable to look towards, showing those of us ensconced in other ontological stances toward the natural world that there is not a single, static, or settled view on human-animal relationships; that how we experience the natural world (including animals) can depend upon the quality of attention we give to it and the goals we value. This sample of certain indigenous ways of relating to animals is also included, first to acknowledge that the dominant view of these relationships in agricultural systems is neither static nor settled, and second, to illustrate how our attention might shift and our current views regarding farmed animals might deepen, towards better human-animal relationships.

Theriomorphism and the importance of language

If humans are willing to be taught by animals, how might we go about becoming better students? Theriomorphism encourages taking the point of view of the animal you are studying (Arnet Reference Arnet2019); this approach may allow for insights into an animal’s experiences. In this way, humans imagine the life of an animal instead of projecting their “mentalistic self into the life of a member or another species” (the latter considered a drawback of anthropomorphism; Wynne Reference Wynne2006; p 132). Learning from another involves understanding their perspective; taking an animal’s point of view thus may facilitate learning from it (Horowitz & Bekoff Reference Horowitz and Bekoff2007) and might help in the development of stronger relationships.

Adopting an other’s perspective requires communication, which between humans and animals typically takes place through non-verbal channels (Argent Reference Argent2012); a challenge, perhaps, for those who believe that oral self-report is the most convincing evidence of subjectivity and a wedge for those who believe humans to be solely capable of communicating symbolic language. Indeed, even when animals have been trained to use human language, critics have expressed scepticism regarding the use of these expressions to draw inferences regarding their mental states. A key example of this dynamic is Alex, an African Grey Parrot, who learned to use over 80 words to name objects and express concepts (Pepperberg Reference Pepperberg1999; Hesse & Potter Reference Hesse and Potter2004). Controversially, Alex also used terms seemingly to express emotions and connection; Alex’s expression of “I love you” (spoken to Pepperberg) is seen by some to be mere imitation (Weil Reference Weil2010). It is beyond the scope of this paper to determine the motivation behind Alex’s words, we encourage readers to balance two potential errors: (1) seeing the behaviours of animals as evidence of a strong human-animal relationship where none exists; and (2) ignoring strong human-animal relationships because of uncertainty as to the ‘real’ meaning of behaviours. Some uncertainty is inherent in all communication, including that among humans.

The language we use shapes our empathetic stances toward others, with both positive and negative effects. As Bastion et al. (2011) argued, “while [a]nimals and humans share many similarities… simply thinking about these similarities does not necessarily lead to increased moral concern for animals” (p 427). Research in many fields, including animal care ethics, critical animal studies, and anthrozoology (see, for example, the sociozoological scale; Arluke et al. Reference Arluke, Saunders and Irvine1996; Holmes Reference Holmes2021) has shown that beyond empathy, people must also value the subject of their concern and that, importantly, valuing is constructed: in part by social practices that reflect power relations, and in part by language. How people treat animals and, more broadly, how we extend moral concern toward others (including those we consider outside the realm of our social categories of inclusion) depends upon how the similarity is framed. Framing animals as being similar to humans highlights morally relevant capacities shared by humans and animals, triggering moral concern (Bastian et al. Reference Bastian, Costello, Loughnan and Hodson2011). Conversely, framing similarities in the reverse (i.e. humans as being similar to animals) has been used as a tactic of divisive political rhetoric. Comparing marginalised human outgroups to animals who are viewed negatively, such as rats, can result in dehumanisation and abuse (Costello & Hodson Reference Costello and Hodson2010). Thus, attention must be given to the linguistic framing and norms embedded within social and commercial practices.

Long-term field research

While the individual experience of the connection between humans and animals is only beginning to receive empirical attention within psychology (Amiot & Bastian Reference Amiot and Bastian2015), for example, through the lens of attachment theory (Rehn & Keeling Reference Rehn and Keeling2016; Hartmann et al. Reference Hartmann, Rehn, Christensen, Nielsen and McGreevy2021), some field researchers have used previously underappreciated methodologies to forge close relationships with animals. Entering into and sustaining these close research relationships often places shared perspectives with animals at centre stage and relies upon feminist approaches that prioritise qualitative evidence and relationships, empathy for the subjective states of others, and recognition of individual expressions of personality (Fraser Reference Fraser2009). Though field researchers may rely upon such forms of shared reality and intersubjectivity with non-human animals to conduct their work, the central role that these relationships play in their work is sometimes underappreciated (Webb et al. Reference Webb, Franks, Gagliano, Smuts, Mezzenzana and Peluso2023). In contrast, Barbara Smuts has written about the development and progression of her close relationships with, for example, wild baboons in East Africa (Smuts Reference Smuts2001). In doing so, Smuts has proposed a seven-level framework for the development of a relationships between humans and animals: (1) the animal has impersonal, reflexive, instinctual responses to the human; (2) the animal recognises the human as an individual separate from others within the human species; (3) the animal recognises that communication is possible with the human and thus recognises the human as a social being; (4) this opens the door to the development of a mutually beneficial relationship; (5) followed by maintenance of the relationship for its own sake; (6) where through joint action, affection often develops; and finally (7) awareness and identities are perceived to merge (Smuts Reference Smuts2001) (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Smuts’ (Reference Smuts2001) proposed framework for the development of close relationships between humans and other animals.

Smuts’ approach can be seen as a complementary to Pepperberg’s, but instead of humans asking animals to learn our language, Smuts’ approach was to learn the ways of the baboons to better communicate with them. Smuts described learning to interpret subtle signals from the baboons she studied (e.g. when to halt her approach toward the baboons), and how to send readable signals (e.g. grunts, physical responses to the baboons curiosity towards Smuts) to them so that she might enter into their physical world; her work illustrates the power of verbal and non-verbal language to set up human expectations of engagement with animals we seek to have relationships with. Some scientists may view this change in behaviour as the baboons simply becoming ‘habituated’ to her presence, implying a unidirectionality in influence with the baboons adapting to her. But Smuts argued that, if anything, “the reverse is closer to the truth” (Smuts Reference Smuts2001; p 295) because she needed to habituate (alter her behaviour to match their expectations of social interactions) to gain entrance to their world. She wrote: “The baboons remained themselves, doing what they always did in the world they had always lived in. I, on the other hand, in the process of gaining their trust, changed almost everything about myself, including the way I walked and sat, the way I held my body, the way I used my eyes and voice” (Smuts Reference Smuts2001; p 295). Smuts’ willingness to see the world, as much as possible, through the eyes and ways of the baboons was rewarded with entry into their community, allowing her to experience nuances of baboon society, including social conventions (e.g. personal space, trust, and familiarity), which led her to novel considerations of human-animal relationships.

In taking the approach of habituating to the baboons (instead of asking them to habituate to her), Smuts learned “to be more of an animal” (p 299), with the result being that the troupe seemed to accept her into their daily lives, profoundly impacting Smuts’ sense of identity (Smuts Reference Smuts2001). This idea of connecting to others by acknowledging the animal within us (Serpell Reference Serpell and Kalof2015), also appears in psychological literature on human-animal relationships, including the SWA literature discussed earlier (Amiot & Bastian Reference Amiot and Bastian2017). The idea is that humans and animals may in some ways be able to merge identities. Smuts explains, “[a]lthough ‘I’ was still present, much of my experience overlapped with this larger feeling entity. Increasingly the troupe felt like ‘us’ rather than ‘them’” (Smuts Reference Smuts2001; p 299), including the internalised feelings of the baboons’ satisfactions and frustrations and the capacity for Smuts to predict troupe movements and where they would decide to rest at the end of the day.

The intensity of Smuts’ intentional co-ordinated activity with the baboons, in tandem with her sustained attention toward the baboons’ ways, awakened a feeling of connection to “something larger” (Smuts Reference Smuts2001; p 300). Here, again, we encounter an example where a deeper connection with animals can be enriching for humans.

For any communication system, there is the open issue of what is lost in translation, but the approach of Smuts and others can be seen as more than just information transfer; it also represents the act of reaching towards another with the intention of knowing and being known by the other. In this case, the act appeared to allow for new insights that may not have been possible using other scientific approaches (Webb et al. Reference Webb, Franks, Gagliano, Smuts, Mezzenzana and Peluso2023). These approaches challenge more conventional methods (i.e. controlled experiments, pre-selected quantitative measures, and analysis focused on central tendencies in the data), but respond to the calls of others to consider alternative methods (Buller & Morris Reference Buller and Morris2003; Porcher et al. Reference Porcher, Cousson-Gélie and Dantzer2004; Fraser Reference Fraser2009). Ideally, such methods attend to context, pair quantitative measures with qualitative description and narrative data, use naturalistic observation, and look to individual differences of animals (Fraser Reference Fraser2009). Indeed, recent calls have been made to confront the taboo of empathising with the animals in scientific studies, with some authors arguing that acknowledged and cultivated relationships between humans and animals are essential for good science and that excluding these relationships perpetuates notions of human exceptionalism and the exploitation of the animals we seek to understand (Webb et al. Reference Webb, Franks, Gagliano, Smuts, Mezzenzana and Peluso2023). These alternative approaches involve attending to the affective states of animals and upon reflexivity on the part of the human, to understand the bi-directionality of human-animal engagement.