The history of the Church in Mexico has seen an ongoing confrontation between the secular and the regular clergy. During various periods one or the other side would achieve ascendency, only to decline at a later date. The religious orders have chronicled the exploits of their brothers and friars, yet to this day the activities of the secular clergy have remained largely unknown. One critical period in the development and expansion of the secular clergy occurred between the promulgation of the Ordenanza del Patronazgo in 1574 and the end of the sixteenth century. In this quarter century many of the basic institutions of the diocesan establishment came into being, and in general the whole ecclesiastical hierarchy felt the changes. This essay specifically will focus on the implementation of the Ordenanza del Patronazgo and its effect on the secular clergy.

No statue of Juan Nepomuceno Moreno stands today in Bogotá. Most Colombians have never heard of him, and probably only a few scholars could identify him as a Llanero patriot who fought in the battles of Boyacá and Carabobo. Yet it is not too much to say that in May 1831, the action of this obscure caudillo from Casanare might have changed the course of Colombian history. Already in Venezuela and Argentina, José Antonio Páez and Juan Manuel de Rosas had used the plains as a springboard to unseat the urban elite and take command of their nations. Now Moreno, fresh from a stunning defeat of the forces of Rafael Urdaneta at Cerinza and poised in Zipaquirá with an army of fierce Llaneros, threatened to invade Bogotá, overthrow Bolívar's successor, and impose his own dictatorship. While historians agree that the events of 1831 mark a turning point in the evolution of Colombian politics, they have yet to analyze the role played by Moreno. An examination of his career suggests that his failure to seize control stemmed not only from his own personal limitations as a leader, but was also conditioned by two important trends of nineteenth century Colombian history—the subordination of the Llanos frontier to the highlands, and the emergence of a political system dominated by civilian caudillos.

French royal officials, speculators such as John Law, and the French Crown itself had placed great hopes in the development of the tobacco industry in French Louisiana. Some officials even anticipated that Louisiana tobacco might someday be grown in sufficient quantities to supply all the needs of the French Tobacco Monopoly. These lofty expectations were never realized although tobacco production did reach 400,000 pounds in 1740.

By the time of the transfer of the colony to Spain in 1766 the perils of war and erratic shipping had almost killed the industry. Most planters had switched to the more profitable production of indigo. Historian Jacob Price claims that the failure of the French government's efforts to develop the tobacco trade resulted from a misunderstanding about costs. In Louisiana, he writes, labor was expensive and freight dear, yet French authorities expected Louisiana tobacco to be competitive in price in the French market with Virginia tobacco, grown in an established market, with abundant labor, and much closer to Europe. Fortunately, the Spanish officials had no such illusions.

Upon the fall of the long-time Mexican dictator Porfirio Díaz in May 1911, the Madero-ledrevolutionary movement found itself with the first opportunity in more than thirty-five years to create a broad-based democratic movement in Mexico. Although his victory was made possible by wide support from the lower class and parts of the middle, Madero proved himself to be philosophically unable to accede to the substantive socio-economic and political reforms they demanded. This attitude, clearly demonstrated during the 1911 interim, led to great dissatisfaction and even outright rebellion. The resulting disillusionment with Madero during these few months severely undermined the viability of his presidency which was eventually cut short by Victoriano Huerta.