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The Spanish Colonial Military: Santo Domingo 1701-1779*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 December 2015
Extract
It is generally recognized that the grave military reverses of 1762 impelled Charles III “to place his American Empire on a competitive military footing.” A crucial element in this process was the “expansion of the regular, or veteran garrisons. . . .” This is not to say, of course, that there were no military establishments in the Indies before the Seven Years War. Indeed, as Allan J. Kuethe points out:
Ferdinand VI (1746-1759) had inherited from his father, Philip V (1700-1759) a promising defense system that had to its credit a dramatic victory over the British at Cartagena in 1741. But misplaced confidence arising from that very triumph … lulled Ferdinand into an unimaginative perpetuation of his father's system. . . .
Yet, how different was this “promising defense system” from that put into place after 1762?
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- Copyright © Academy of American Franciscan History 2003
Footnotes
The cut off date of this paper is an attempt to restrict the focus to Spanish colonial concerns. Although the French populated a part of the island unofficially for decades and a treaty was signed in 1777 recognizing French sovereignty, 1779 is when negotiations between the Spanish and French Crown begin with the ultimate goal of handing over the Spanish side of the island to the French, which occurred in 1799.
References
1 Kuethe, Allan J. Cuba, 1753–1815, Crown, Military, and Society (Gainesville: Univ. of Florida Press, 1957) p. X.Google Scholar This understanding dates from the very beginnings of Bourbon military reform literature. McAlister, Lyle N. made the same point in his book The Fuero Militar in New Spain, 1764–1800 (Gainesville: Univ. of Florida Press, 1957),Google Scholar and extended it by asserting that the secret committee for imperial defense which was struck at that time insisted on the need to create colonial armies, an understanding which has now made its way to textbooks. See, for example: Burkholder, Mark and Johnson, Lyman L. Colonial Latin America (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1998) 4th edition, p. 272.Google Scholar The second crucial aspect of these reforms, of course, was the establishment of a disciplined militia system, but this is an entirely different issue.
2 Kuethe, , Cuba, 1753–1815, Crown, Military, and Society, p. 3 Google Scholar
3 For a recent treatment of the island in the eighteenth century see: Gascon, Margarita, The Military of Santo Domingo: Kinship, Economic Activities, and Political Power in Peripheral Society, unpublished M.A. at the Univ. of Ottawa in 1991 Google Scholar and ‘The Military in Santo Domingo, 1720–1764,’ in HAHR 73 (August 1993), pp. 431–452.
4 See Marichal, Carlos and Mantecón, Matilde Souto ‘Silver and Situados: Spain and the Financing of the Spanish Empire in the Caribbean in the Eighteenth Century,” HAHR 74 (November 1994) pp. 587–613 CrossRefGoogle Scholar for a more in depth look at the situados and their economic importance in intra American trade.
5 Escudero, Antonio Gutiérrez, V Centenario del Descubrimiento de America: Población y Economía en Santo Domingo (1700–1746) (Seville: Diputación Provincial de Sevilla, 1985) p. 57.Google Scholar The population was approximately 50,000 to 55,000 people between 1760 and 1774.
6 AGI Santo Domingo leg. 941 refers to a real cédula in an answer from Francisco de la Rocha Ferrer on 25 April 1729. Parishes outside of the capital were so unattractive that colored curates were often appointed.
7 Burkholder, Mark and Chandler, D.S., From Impotence to Authority: The Spanish Crown and the American Audiencias, 1687–1808 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1977), pp. 224–227 Google Scholar in Appendix X.
8 The statistics are drawn from the reviews of 1763 because they contain the largest amount of officerships for the fijo of all of the reviews.
9 The various wars the Spanish participated in: Spanish Succession 1701–1715, of the Quadruple Alliance 1717–1720, Siege of Gíbraltar 1727–1728, Polish Succession 1733–1736, Jenkins Ear, the lead in to the War of Austrian Succession 1739–1748, Seven Years War 1762–1763, undeclared war against Portugal 1776–1777, and the War of American Independence 1779–1781, account for 41 years of war out of 81 in all for the period under discussion.
10 Johnston, Victoria Stapells, Corsairs of Santo Domingo: A Socio-Economic Study, 1718–1779, unpublished M.A. thesis at the University of Ottawa in 1985.Google Scholar
11 Spain first recognized French sovereignty over Saint-Domingue only in 1777.
12 For further information see: Pons, Frank Moya, Historia Colonial de Santo Domingo (Santiago: Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra, 1976).Google Scholar
13 There were no more than fifty-two such posts in all.
14 The fixed regiment was a sedentary unit that manned a fortified presidio. The troops generally were concentrated within that area and received military training. This is in comparison to the cavalry, volunteer and militia regiments in the colonies, which met haphazardly to practice maneuvers and drills when they were not occupied with their main means of livelihood.
15 Pons, Moya, Historia Colonial de Santo Domingo, pp. 109–129.Google Scholar Raya was the term used by Spain to refer to the frontier with Saint-Domingue. The word “frontier” was avoided because it implied legal recognition of a situation to which the Spaniards were not reconciled until 1779.
16 The author did not find a specific plan of defense for the island. It would seem, from incidents prior to this period, that defense was mainly reliant on endemic diseases and the protection of the fortified city by mounted guns.
17 Pons, Moya, Historia Colonial de Santo Domingo, pp. 81–126,Google Scholar 236–237.
18 There is some evidence of this for the review of 1777. This would, of course, be reasonable given the fact that militias were not established on the island until after the Bourbon Reforms of 1763.
19 de Salas Lopez, Fernando, Ordenanzas Militares en España e Hispanoamérica (Madrid: MAPFRE, 1992), p. 51 Google Scholar
20 Fernandez, Juan Madera, Ejército y Milicias en el Mundo Colonial Americano (Madrid: MAPFRE, 1992), pp. 93–94.Google Scholar
21 In the early half of the eighteenth century the plana mayor is a military review of all assets by name and rank in a certain regiment. Later, the description not only includes the latter but also how many men are invalid, sick, handicapped, and how many weapons and ammunition the regiment has at its disposition.
22 Lopez, Salas, Ordenanzas Militares en España e Hispanoamérica, p. 96,Google Scholar Ordenanzas Militares en España e Hispanoamérica, pp. 48, 54–55
23 Fernández, Madera, Ejército y Milicias en el Mundo Colonial Americano, p. 48:Google Scholar “… the necessity to totally reorganize American defense, dignify the military institution and extol the praises of a career in arms as proper and exclusive to Royal Service.”
24 AGI Santo Domingo leg. 237, Real Cédula, San Ildefonso, 10 Sept. 1738: Reglamento para la Guarnición de la Plaza de Santo Domingo, en la Isla Española, Castillos y Fuertes de su Jurisdicción.
25 AGI Santo Domingo leg. 237, Real Cedula, San Ildefonso, 10 Sept. 1738: Reglamento para la Guarnición de la Plaza de Santo Domingo, en la Isla Española, Castillos y Fuertes de su Jurisdicción. Interestingly, the cavalry was to serve on horseback as well as on foot and was to be outfitted with lightweight boots. There were provisions for two cavalry companies that would patrol the North and South of the Island. The companies were to be rotated yearly and composed of: one captain, one lieutenant, one sub-lieutenant, two sergeants, four corporals, forty-three soldiers and a trumpeter.
26 AGI Santo Domingo leg. 237, Real Cédula, San Ildefonso, 10 Sept. 1738: Reglamento para la Guarnición de la Plaza de Santo Domingo, en la Isla Española, Castillos y Fuertes de su Jurisdicción.
27 The article does not cover the period after 1779 in order to restrict its focus to the colonial period under Spanish rule. Subsequently, the island is handed over to the French Crown and therefore deals with a different political stage. However, for further knowledge on the military in that period, please see: Demorizi, Emilio Rodriguez, Milicias de Santo Domingo, 1786–1821 (Santo Domingo: Editora del Caribe, 1978).Google Scholar As well, the records studied in this article are more complete than are those cited by Juan Marchena Fernández, who only reviewed the records for 1763 and 1779 (which he cites as 1777).
28 The addition of sergeants to the study is mainly due to the fact that the position was not terminal for the period covered and that many went on to become captains or higher. Cadets are listed as they also counted as a starting position from where most moved up in the military structure.
29 Sergeants were normally listed as 1 st and 2nd class, but for the purpose of quantifying the data the two categories have been melded together
30 AGI Santo Domingo leg. 941 refers as already noted to a real cédula in an answer from Francisco de la Rocha Ferrer on 25 April 1729: “The representation made (by the cabildo of Santo Domingo) that (so its nobility would not feel diminished), Your Majesty is pleased to give orders for the military positions of Sergeant-Major, Captain of Infantry, alcalde of the main fortified town, the positions of Comptroller and Treasurer of the Royal Finances, and the Secretary of the Royal Tribunals to appoint, as these positions are vacated, persons of noble lineage, natives of those kingdoms … that Your Majesty upon reaching the Throne keep in mind the referred representation so as to favor the City. …”
31 AGI Santo Domingo leg. 260, 4 Jan. 1724–30, is one example among many of the complaints sent to the King about the lack of noble families.
32 AGI Santo Domingo leg. 319 Cabildo Eclesiástico to Santo Domingo and SD316 Archbishop to VM. The only information that the author has on church-military relations is through these particular correspondences with the Council of the Indies about curate positions and the two mutinies that occur over pay. The latter only reveals the military resource of claiming sanctuary during the mutiny over their lack of pay.
33 The companies of blacks are in Spanish terms companies de pardos, which, in Santo Domingo, were armed due to the lack of white companies and therefore manpower. These companies performed the labor that presidarios did in other areas.
34 AGI Santo Domingo leg. 259, 23 Dec. 1725 and leg. 257, 1723–4.
35 AGI Santo Domingo leg. 1093, 1095, and 1092.
36 As a discussion on the elite families is beyond the scope of this article, although small overviews are provided in certain sections of this article, a good source for further knowledge on elite families in the eighteenth century is the collection of volumes by Larrazabal Blanco Familias Dominicanas.
37 The following work speaks of the lack of application of the reform to put intendancies in Santo Domingo: I. Domínguez, Jorge, Insurrection or Loyalty: The Breakdown of the Spanish American Empire (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1980), p. 77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
38 The only evidence of a mass promotion in the period under study is in 1762 for all those that were transferred and fought valiantly in Cuba as reinforcements.
39 AGI Santo Domingo leg. 1093 and 1095. The data is specifically taken from the previous regimental postings or ranks of the officers.
40 AGI Santo Domingo leg. 1093. The specific hoja de servicio of Don Manuel Villaurutia. The Villaurutia family was a very wealthy, successful, and well-known white Creole family. Antonio and his sons Antonio and Jacobo were Audiencia oidores. Ciro, another son, was the canon of the Cathedral in Mexico. Many of the great-grandsons of Antonio either entered the military or the law. The whole family is covered in the following pages, 360–363. Manuel, the youngest son, was a sickly boy that served the first two years of his military career without pay. From the entry position of cadet he was promoted to Captain, just after the review of 1763, only to die of zarina in 1769.
41 Lists of merits when applying for royal service were common practice. Essentially, the candidate would postulate for a position by offering the merits of his royal service (if he had any) and that of any of his family members, implying that he should be allowed to continue to serve the King.
42 AGI Santo Domingo leg. 1056, 9 junio 1705.
43 The information is cross-referenced with Heninge, David P., Colonial Governors: From the Fifteenth Century to the Present (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), pp. 336–337.Google Scholar
44 AGI Santo Domingo leg. 281, 21 Nov. 1707.
45 Ibid. The carta simply reads: “El presidente SM, acerca del testimonio de los autos obrados en razón de haberse negado a Don Antonio de Coca Landeche a prestar cien pesos a las Cajas Reales para el socorro de la infantería de este presidio.”
46 AGI Santo Domingo leg. 281 Landeche to VM, 24 Apr. 1714.
47 Stapells-Johnson1, Victoria, Corsairs of Santo Domingo: A Socio-Economic Study, 1718–1779 (unpublished M. A. from the Univ. of Ottawa, Ottawa, 1985)Google Scholar and Stapells-Johnson, Victoria, Los Corsarios de Santo Domingo, 1715–1779: Un Estudio Socio-Económico (España: Departamento de Geografía y Historia, 1992).Google Scholar
48 Ibid.
49 AGI Santo Domingo leg, 1093, 1095 and 1092. The average age was determined through a compilation of every rank's years of service and then converted into an average for the entire fijo.
50 The decline in years is usually associated with a rejuvenation and expansion of the military in modern terms and is therefore the logical conclusion for this period.
51 This notion is in direct contradiction of Juan Marchena Fernandez's description of ranks on pages 70–76. The only commonality of all authors dealing with the officers in Santo Domingo is that the sergeants were treated in certain regards, as if they were commissioned officers, although this defies the very underpinning of the position.
52 The comparison does not include the review of 1749 because it lacks the dates of promotion by rank, thereby only providing the number of years of service, the end result of a detailed career.
53 AGI Santo Domingo leg. 1095.
54 AGI Santo Domingo leg. 1093. The reference is made to the specific hoja de servicio of this officer.
55 AGI Santo Domingo leg. 1095. The reference is made to the specific hoja de servicio of this officer.
56 Although most historians, and especially Marchena, have professed a steady increase in Creoles at the officer rank while still maintaining an almost uniform peninsular holding of the highest commissioned offices, the data in this article refutes this observation. Of course, Santo Domingo, as stated previously, was in a peculiar situation as regards its white population.
57 The Dominicans are a reference to native sons.
58 AGI Santo Domingo leg. 1093. The reference is made to the hojas on the captains only. The data is based on an addition of their time in each rank, thereby giving the total years of service. However, to make the calculation more accurate, the months were transformed into percentage points over the year. The reason for this is that time in rank, when it came to months, was sometimes given as more than twelve months. For example: 3 months = .25 of the year, 9 months = .75 of the year. Thus, 10.25 + 3.75 = 14 years of service.
59 AGI Santo Domingo leg. 1095. The reference is made to the hojas on the captains only.
60 Idem.
61 Idem.
62 Idem.
63 The Lieutenant Colonel was 75 years old at the time of this review.
64 The Lieutenant Colonel was 55 years old in 1777. His recent promotion can only indicate that he was following in his predecessors’ footsteps.
65 A reference to Burkholder, Mark A and Chandler, D.S., From Impotence to Authority; The Spanish Crown and the American Audiencias, 1687–1821 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982).Google Scholar
66 The data are in conflict with p. 114 of Marchena's book, Oficiales y Soldados en el Ejército de América. He concludes that most of the officers came from Andalucía and Castilla. This, as the lists show, was not the case in Santo Domingo.
67 AGI Santo Domingo leg, 1093 and 1095. The average age was calculated in normal mathematical fashion by adding all of the ages and dividing them by the number of individuals. The process was repeated for each category of officer.
68 AGI Santo Domingo leg, 1093 and 1095. The age of the cadets is not as anomalous as one might suppose due to a lack of opportunity to demonstrate their worthiness of promotion in battle and the availability of promotions themselves. Another factor that may explain the figures is the very slow expansion of the military in that particular area and the seeming unwillingness of native officers to transfer to other regiments.
69 These last data can be subject to an analysis at a particular level as well as at a general level, since the average age is based on only one Lieutenant Colonel at both dates.
70 This conclusion was also reached by Juan Marchena Fernandez Oficiales y Soldados en el Ejército de América.
71 The table is directly compatible with the findings of Oficiales y Soldados en el Ejército de América, p. 182.
72 It is hard to determine the battalions from which these regiments came, as the information is not available to the author and, in any case, would be beyond the scope of this article.
73 AGI Santo Domingo leg. 1093, hojas de servicio.
74 AGI Santo Domingo leg. 1095, hojas de servicio.
75 The 1725 review does not contain any of the information that has been tabulated in these categories. It is therefore not to be found in any of the tables or graphs in this section. This noticeable difference furthers the idea that this first document is non-routine, as opposed to the others that are. AGI Santo Domingo leg. 1093 and 1095, hojas de servicio.
76 It contributes to the debate in the literature on the kind of men they were and their general physical state.
77 Burkholder, Mark A and Chandler, D.S., Biographical Dictionary of Audiencia Ministers in the Americas, 1687–1821 (Greenwood Press: Westport, 1982), 362–363.Google Scholar
78 As one recalls, the earlier reviews contain less information than the more recent ones. The sporadic information of the 1749 review must be dealt with carefully as the majority of the percentage is in the blank category.
79 Of course, negative feedback was bound to occur given the two mutinies of 1741 and 1757. For further information on these please see: Juan Marchena Fernandez, Oficiales y Soldados en el Ejército de América and Margarita Gascon, The Military in Santo Domingo, 1720–1764.
80 The percentage of men in the categories of “regular” and “good/excellent” have been added together to total all capable men.
81 Application means the ability to follow the chain of command and the exactness in carrying out his tasks.
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