¹ Camp, Roderic A., “The Cabinet and the Técnico in Mexico and the United States,” Journal of Comparative Administration (August 1971), 188–213 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cochrane, J., “Mexico’s New Científicos: The Díaz Ordaz Cabinet,” Inter-American Economic Affairs, (Summer, 1967), 61–72 Google Scholar; Gruber, Wilfried, “Career Patterns of Mexico’s Political Elite,” Western Political Quarterly, (September, 1971), 467–482 Google Scholar; Camp, Roderic A., “The Middle-Level Technocrat in Mexico,” The Journal of Developing Areas (July 1972), 571–582 Google Scholar; Conklin, John G., “Elite Studies: The Case of the Mexican Presidency,” Journal of Latin American Studies, 5:2, 247–269 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Peter H. Smith, “Continuity and Turnover Within the Mexican Political Elite, 1900–1971,” paper presented at the IV International Congress of Mexican Studies, Santa Monica, California, October 17–21, 1973.

² Cline, H. F., The United States and Mexico (2nd ed., Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963)CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Mexico: Revolution to Evolution, 1940–1960 (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); Needler, M. C., “The Political Development of Mexico,” American Political Science Review, (June 1961), 308–12CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Padgett, V. L., The Mexican Political System (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966)Google Scholar; and Scott, Robert E., Mexican Government in Transition (Rev. ed., Urbana: University of Illinois, 1964).Google Scholar

³ Brandenburg, Frank, The Making of Modern Mexico (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964)Google Scholar; Goodspeed, Stephen S., “El papel del jefe del ejecutivo en México,” Problemas Agrícolas e Industriales de México, 7 (January-March 1955), 13–208 Google Scholar; Johnson, Kenneth F., Mexican Democracy: A Critical View (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971)Google Scholar; and Gruber, “Career Patterns.” See also Casanova, Pablo González, Democracy in Mexico (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).Google Scholar

⁴ Gruber, , “Career Patterns,” 472–481.Google Scholar

⁵ This assertion is based on Camp interviews with former public officials in Mexico, May-June, 1974.

⁶ This list could conceivably be extended but as it stands it is comprehensive in our opinion.

⁷ See Mabry, Donald J., Mexico’s Acción Nacional: A Catholic Alternative to Revolution (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1973).Google Scholar

⁸ Based on the list of political elites above.

⁹ Our data was gathered from biographical dictionaries, newspapers, magazines, personal interviews and correspondence, and official sources. The method of collection and the sources are described in Camp, Roderic A., Mexican Political Elites, 1935–1973 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1975).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Mabry, , Mexico’s Acción Nacional, 143–144.Google Scholar This data was supplemented by further research into biographical dictionaries.

¹¹ Drake, Paul, using a much smaller sample in his study of “Mexican Regionalism Reconsidered,” Journal of Inter-American Studies & World Affairs, (July 1970),CrossRefGoogle Scholar concluded that over time presidential home states are overrepresented among PRI elites. However, Camp has found that only during and immediately after a presidential term is his home state overrepresented among PRI elites. In the case of Puebla, that was only true of President Manuel Avila Camacho (1940–46), in whose administration 8% of the elites came from Puebla followed by 6% in the next administration (1947–52), as compared with an average representation in PRI elites of 3.7% from 1935–1973. President Gustavo Diáz Ordaz, however, did not favor his home state (Puebla), appointing only 3% during his administration compared to an average figure of 3.7% elites from Puebla from 1935–73. See “A Reexamination of Political Leadership and Allocation of Federal Revenues in Mexico, 1934–1973,” paper prepared for delivery at the 5th National Latin American Studies Conference, San Francisco, California, November 14–17, 1974.

¹² Gruber, , “Career Patterns,” 475.Google Scholar

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Camp, “The Middle -Level Technocrat.”

¹⁵ We recognize that UNAM has been the degree source for most university-educated Mexicans but we believe that UNAM still supplies a disproportionate share of Mexican elites. For evidence of this see the article on “Education and Career Contacts of Mexican Governors since Cárdenas,” Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs (November 1974).

¹⁶ Gruber, , “Career Patterns,” 476, 480–481.Google Scholar

¹⁷ It should be noted that such examples are usually the result of personal friendship with an important PRI elite. Aquiles Elorduy was President Alemán’s professor at UNAM, highly respected by the president and several of his cabinet members who were also former students, which not only made such a switch possible, but probably explains why it occurred. See Novo, Salvador, La Vida en Mexico en el periodo presidencial de Miguel Alemán (Mexico: Empresas Editoriales, 1967), p. 743.Google Scholar

¹⁸ See the Camp articles cited above and Greenburg, Martin, Bureaucracy and Development: A Mexican Case Study (Lexington: D. C. Heath, 1970).Google Scholar

¹⁹ See Mabry, , Mexico’s, p. 34, for evidence of this contact among PAN elites, and Roderic A. Camp, “Education and Political Recruitment in Mexico: The Alemán Generation,” (Unpublished manuscript) for similar examples among PRI elites.Google Scholar

²⁰ Population statistics based on Wilkie, James W., The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social Change Since 1910 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California, 1967), 241.Google Scholar

²¹ Verner, Joel G., “Educational Backgrounds of Latin American Legislators,” Comparative Politics (July 1974), 617–634.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²² Verner, , “Educational Backgrounds,” 621.Google Scholar