¹ Morris Janowitz makes this crucial general distinction in the preface to his short study of the military in new nations. The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), v–vi.

² It should be clear that I do not intend to categorize all Central American military establishments as newly evolving institutions. While it is true that the larger, more highly developed countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Chile have generally produced the most well-established military organizations, certain Central American republics have followed suit. For example, military organizations in Guatemala and El Salvador have institutional histories which are just as impressive as those of the larger Latin American nations. Based upon my own research, I would have to say that the only military organizations in Central America which fall clearly and unequivocally within the “newly evolving” category are those of Honduras and Panama. In addition to this article, see my “Military Reformism in Panama: New Directions or Old Inclinations,” Caribbean Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3 (October 1972).

³ In summing up Honduran politics, Stokes, William S. states that, “It must be repeated emphatically that the cacos, gazistas, fiebres, serviles, cachuracos, coquimbos, calandrocas, timbucos, reds, greens, blues, conservatives, and liberals, were not political parties but factions.… The factions were mostly armed bands owing blind alltgiance to a caudillo.,” Honduras: An Area Study in Government, (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1950), 226–27.Google Scholar

⁴ The famous Honduran strongman Tiburcio Carías Andino, who dominated national politics from 1933 until 1949, offers a classic example of this process of auto-selection. At the age of sixteen, he apprenticed as a kitchen helper in his family’s band of guerrillas. By 1907, he was in command of a Liberal detachment working with the forces of the Nicaraguan caudillo José Santos Zelaya. Later, as the most powerful political figure in Honduras, he legalized his status as a Honduran general. Krehm, William, Democracia y tiranías en el Caribe, (Argentina: Editorial Pernaso, undated), 129.Google Scholar

⁵ Memoria del Secretaría del Estado presentado al Congreso Nacional, (Tegucigalpa: Tipografía nacional, 1914), in Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Honduras: 1910–1929, (The National Archives, GSA: Washington, 1966).

⁶ Sanso, Aro, Policarpo Bonilla (Mexico: Imprenta Mundial, 1963), 47–50.Google Scholar

⁷ Huntington, Samuel has defined institutions as “stable recurring patterns of behavior,” “Political Development and Political Decay,” World Politics, 17 (April 1965), 394.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸ Boletín del Ejército, I, No. 2 (October 15, 1913), 35–38.

⁹ MajorNájera, Cornelio Piñeda, “Milicias del Departamento de Gracias.” Boletín del Ejército, 2, No. 20 (April 15, 1915), 627–28.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Reglamento de servicio militar obligatorio, in Records of the Department of State, op. cit., 13.

¹¹ Memoria del Secretaría del Estado, in Records of the Department of State, op. cit., 13.

¹² “Discurso pronunciado per el subteniente Manuel Salgado Z. en el acto de la inauguración de la academía militar.” Boletín del Ejército, V, No. 36 (February, 1917), 1084.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Palmer, Frederick. Central America and its Problems (London: T. Werner Laurie, undated), 34.Google Scholar

¹⁵ By the year 1911, however, there were very few of the original contingent of Dávila’s cadets left to dismiss from the Army. Between 1907 and 1911,100 cadets deserted and 100 were released for bad conduct out of a total of 279 students, “Discurso pronunciado por el subteniente Manuel Salgado Z,” op. cit.

¹⁶ Boletín de las Fuerzas Armadas de Honduras, I, Nos. 9, 10, and 11 (November, December, January, 1959–60), 12.

¹⁷ Stokes, op. cit. 185. U. S. Lend Lease figures for Honduaros reflect this emphasis on the Air Force. Of a total of $285,000 in aid, $179,000 went for planes, engine parts, and general support equipment, Theodore F. Whiting. Todd, Correi I., and Croft, Anne P., “The United Statss Army in World War II: Lend Lease,” (Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1952), 13–17.Google Scholar

¹⁸ “Breve análisis de la enseñanza militar actual en Honduras,” Revista Militar, I, No. 3 (July-December, 1961), 13.

¹⁹ Revista Militar, IV, No. 8 (January-June, 1964), 15.

²⁰ In 1957, requirements held that a prospective cadet had to be at least 15 years old, have a sixth grade education, be single, at least 5’ 7” tall, and have no police record. In 1960, the minimum age was raised to 18. “Reorganización de la Escuela Militar,” Revista Militar, I, No. 3 (July-December 1961), 24.

²¹ Revista Militar, II, No. 4 (January-May 1962), 10.

²² For example, the Brazilian Military Academy had only two applications per position during the period from 1950 to 1965. As Alfred Stepan points out, the lack of attractiveness of the military career in Brazil is probably a function of more numerous and better paying jobs in commerce and industry. Conversely, one could argue that the current attractiveness of the military career in Honduras reflects the low level of economic development and job diversification, Stepan, Alfred, Patterns of Civil-Military Relations: The Brazilian Political System (Princeton: The Princeton University Press, 1971), 132.Google Scholar

²³ Caesar Sereseres, “Indicators of Training Impact on Military Development in Latin America” (Unpublished Research Paper, 1970), 18. It should be noted that these figures may tend to overemphasize the U. S. impact somewhat because many Honduran officers have taken more than one course. Thus, the total number of officers exposed to U. S. training may be significantly lower.

²⁴ The total military strength figure which I have arrived at is considerably higher than most competing estimates, including the figure of 5640 that was given to me by the U. S. Military Advisory Group in Tegucigalpa. The reason is that I have included the Presidential Honor Guard (First Infantry Brigade) and also the Special Security Corps, for reasons that will be explained later.

²⁵ Population figures according to the Honduran Census of 1961.

²⁸ These statistics come from biographical sketches of 35 Honduran cadets from the Academy classes of 1967 and 1970. It should be noted that, in spite of the relatively high degree of military urbanization in relation to Honduran society in general, the degree of urbanization is very low in relation to other Latin American military establishments. For comparative purposes, see Ropp, Steve C., “The Military and Urbanization in Latin America,” Inter-American Economic Affairs, 24, No. 2 (Autumn 1970).Google Scholar

²⁷ Lyle McAlister uses a similar argument in analyzing the class background qf Peruvian officers, “Peru” in McAlister, Lyle, Maingot, Anthony P., and Potash, Robert, The Military in Latin American Sociopolitical Evolution: Four Case Studies (Washington: Center for Research in Social Systems, 1970), 33.Google Scholar

²⁸ Additionally, one cannot rule out Carlos Contreras’ assertion that the failure of the Liberal Party to regain control over the presidency may have been intimately linked to the purchase in 1929 by United Fruit Company of 300,000 shares of Cuyamel Fruit Company stock. Since Cuyamel had traditionally been the main source of Liberal Party funding (in return for economic concessions once the Party was in power), the elimination of the company may have effectively deprived the Liberals of their economic power base, Contreras, Carlos A., Entre el Marasmo (Tegucigalpa, 1970), 12.Google Scholar

²⁹ Labor unions were banned by law in Honduras until 1954.

³⁰ This adoption of a moderately reformist position by the Liberal Party was represented in the person of Ramón Villeda Morales who served as President from 1959 until 1963.

³¹ As Carías grew older, challenges to his authority not only began to arise from the Liberal camp but also from within the ranks of his own National Party. When he attempted to run for re-election in 1954, he was opposed by his old vice-president Abraham Williams, who had established his own independent base of power within the Party.

³² I have yet to read an account of the Honduran military coups of either 1957 or 1963 which did not refer to them as the work of a traditionally powerful and auto-nomous institution bent on preserving age-old privileges. In this regard, see my paper entitled “Misunderstanding the Military: North American and Honduran Perspectives on the Nature of Honduran Militarism,” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Rocky Mountain Council on Latin American Studies, Missoula, Montana, April. 1973.

³³ Most of my information as to specifics of the coup comes from a book by Lucas Paredes entitled Los Culpables. Of particular interest is a long letter which the exiled Velasquez Cerrato wrote to members of the military junta to justify his behavior during the coup, Paredes, Lucas, Los Culpables (Tegucigalpa: Imprenta Honduras, 1970), 217–21.Google Scholar

³⁴ Lucas Peredes devotes a considerable amount of attention to discussing the issue of who was responsible for provoking the military coup of 1957 and develops theories which would seem to exhaust most of the possbiilities. First, he suggests that political opponents within either the Liberal or National parties may have been responsible. Furthermore, the U. S. Ambassador is portrayed as possibly having had a hand in the affair because Lozano was opposed to Honduran membership in the newly-formed Central American Common Market. After exploring these possibilities and finding no truly satisfactory explanation, he suggests that perhaps Lozano inspired the coup himself, being tired of the burdens of office, Paredes, op. cit., passim.

³⁵ This information as to the legal status of the Armed Forces and on various military regulations comes primarily from the Ley Constitutiva de las Fuerzas Armadas. The law, approved by Congress in 1970, is highly significant because it represents the first attempt since 1954 to codify the structure, rights, and obligations of the Armed Forces. Prior to 1970, laws and regulations were widely scattered and little known. The recent codification thus represents a further step in the institutionalization process.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ For example, Edwin Lieuwen comments as follows concerning military behavior after the 1957 coup: “The heady young rebels … had no intention of surrendering the armed forces’ traditional role as political arbiters or of allowing the civilian authorities to meddle, in any way, with their institutions,” Generals vs. Presidents (New York: Praeger, 1964), 65.

³⁸ “Breve análisis de la enseñanza militar en Honduras,” Revista Militar, I, No. 3 (July-December 1961), 13.

³⁹ Carías, Marco Virgilio also makes this point in ‘’‘Honduras,” Revista Mexicana de Sociología, 32 (May-June 1970), 604.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Carlos Contreras claims that it was not the Liberals as a whole that the Army feared but rather Liberal presidential candidate Rodas Alvarado who threatened to turn the Armed Forces into the political tool of his party. In fact, Contreras maintains that Villeda Morales promised in a secret meeting with high ranking officers to protect the autonomy of the Armed Forces in return for the presidency. According to Contreras, the existence of this secret agreement explains why Villeda Morales often refused to give credence to warnings of impeding coups. Villeda knew that if such a coup came, it would not be during his administration. Indeed, the coup did not take place until two months after the end of his term. Contreras op. cit., 71–72.

⁴¹ These North Coast business interests tend to be oriented toward the United States while more traditional business families, headquartered in Tegucigalpa, continue to rely-on the political parties as their power base. Thus, business interests co-exist in two major but not mutually exclusive camps.

⁴² Vivas, Rafael Leíva, Un país en Honduras (Tegucigalpa: Offset Calderon, 1970), 87–112.Google Scholar

⁴³ I have borrowed the term “disorganized regime” from the work of David Ronfeldt who identifies this as one of the four main forms which civil-military coalitions normally take in America, Latin, “Patterns of Civil-Military Rule” in Einaudi, Luigi, ed., Latin America in the 1970s (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1972), 87–93.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ This is a role that the military traditionally played in Brazilian politics, and most other Latin American nations have experienced occasions when the military fulfilled such a political function, Johnson, John J., The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford: The Stanford University Press, 1964), 177.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ The Special Security Corps now has responsibility for all police and security functions to include regulation of transit, border patrol, and rural areas patrol. The Corps includes a Department of Transit, a National Investigations Division, and various rural and frontier units. There is a regional office in each of the eighteen Departments, “Organización del Cuerpo Especial de Seguridad,” Revista Militar (January-June, 1964). 48–49.

⁴⁷ There are frequently political undertones to military performance in the area of internal security. Thus, it has not been uncommon for the Army and Special Security Corps to temporarily stand aside in cases of urban and rural disorder. Such non-action has the effect of bringing military pressure to bear on the incumbent political regime, and of reasserting the autonomy and political power of the Armed Forces.

⁴⁸ Acción cívica, 1965, 12.

⁴⁹ As a direct response to the Soccer War, the Honduran Army has created one new mobile unit (the First Artillery Battalion), purchased a number of Belgian automatic weapons to replace the M-l, and has been given the U. S. Strategic Communications facility (STRATHCOM) in Honduras. These developments, plus the addition of fifty new jeeps, gives the Honduran Army a maneuverability and firepower that it previously lacked.

⁵⁰ As is the case with military organizations in many underdeveloped countries, the Honduran Army is topheavy with senior officers (there were 31 full colonels as of 1971). Furthermore, some of these officers view their positions as political sinecures which allow them to continue such practices as paying their solders less than they are alloted and pocketing the difference. Aside from adopting a modern retirement system, the problem of excess officers could be alleviated by eliminating certain regional military structures. However, when such plans have been suggested in the past by U. S. military advisors, they have invariably received little attention.

⁵¹ Use of the term “permeable military centrality” to describe a particular pattern of civil-military relations was suggested to me by the work of A. R. Luckham. Luckham maintains that one of the most important aspects of any social organization is the extent to which its boundaries with its environment are open to outside penetration. This determines, for example, the extent to which a particular organization can be influenced or controlled by its environment, Luckham, A.R., “A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations,” Government and Opposition. 6, No. 1 (Winter 1971).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵² John J. Johnson’s work reflects somewhat similar views with regard to the benefits of military participation during periods of social transition in various major Latin American nations (1890-1930). However, his conclusions seem to be based on the assumption that it was the increased professionalization and middle class consciousness of military officers that allowed them to view new political aspirants with some degree of equanimity. My point is that it is the combination of modern perspectives with a relatively high degree of traditional political sensitivity and permeability which may have allowed the military in these countries to facilitate political evolution, The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford: The Stanford University Press, 1964), passim.

⁵³ This linkage between personalism and institutionalization has also been noted in the case of President Dávila. It seems to be a frequent occurrence during the early phase of the institutionalization process.

⁵⁴ Luca Paredes” views concerning the coup against Lozano are extreremly instructive on this point. After examining all of the possible groups that might have initiated the coup (dissident National or Liberal politicians, the U. S. Ambassador, or Lozano himself), he concludes his analysis with two questions: “Quien o quienes derrocaron a Lozano Díaz. Cual fué la poderosa fuerza que decidió la caida de Lozano?” What do such remarks indicate? They seems to suggest that Lucas Paredes, because of his traditional perspective of the military as a weak and purely instrumental force in Honduran politics, simply could not believe that there may have been no “poderosa fuerza” behind the miitary at all, and that the military itself was responsible for the coup. Paredes, op. cit., 244–46.

⁵⁵ Leiva Vivas, op. cit., 135.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 126.

⁵⁷ Many Liberals accepted or even supported the coup because their Nationalist archenemy, Ricardo Zúñiga, was removed from his position as Minister of Government.

⁵⁸ Evidence from the Colombian experience of the mid-fifties seems to indicate that the formation of national front governments by traditional political parties is a natural structural response to the growing power of the military. When the Colombian Liberals and Conservatives finally discovered that Rojas Pinilla and the Army were using traditional political antagonisms to further their own position, they formed the United Front Government.