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Disorder, Wild Cattle, and a New Role for the Missions: The Banda Oriental, 1776–1786

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2015

Julia Sarreal*
Affiliation:
Arizona State University, Phoenix, Arizona

Extract

Upon assuming office in 1784, Viceroy Nicolás del Campo, Marqués de Loreto, observed that ruin threatened the Guaraní missions in the viceroyalty of Río de la Plata. Scholars concur that after the Jesuit expulsion in 1768, the missions fell into disrepair and lost their important role in regional affairs. This change marked a significant shift. Until the late eighteenth century, the Guaraní missions attracted the largest indigenous population of all of Spain's Catholic missions and served an important economic and political role in the Río de la Plata region. During the last third of the century, the Guaraní missions declined as a result of Crown reforms that spurred transatlantic trade and reshaped the missions. Expenses far surpassed revenues, buildings and infrastructure deteriorated, distributions of material goods to the Indians decreased, and fewer Guaraní inhabited the missions.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Academy of American Franciscan History 2011

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References

I am grateful to Susan Socolow, Lyman Johnson, Julio Djcndcrcdjian, Alex Borucki, Enrique Cotclo, Fabricio Prado, and the two anonymous reviewers for insightful comments and suggestions. I also received valuable feedback from both participants and the audience when presenting a preliminary version of this essay in the panel titled “Imperial Rule and Colonial Agency in Bourbon Río de la Plata” during the 2010 annual meeting of the Conference on Latin American History. I am also grateful for the support and guidance of John Coatsworth and John Womack in the early stages of my research.

1. In the missions, “the disappearance of the Jesuits caused the way of Ufe which they had instituted to suffer rapid disintegration.... The population of Misiones was suffering a swift collapse.” Tulio Halpern–Donghi, Politics, Economics and Society in Argentina in the Revolutionary Period, trans. Richard Southern (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 18. “… with the expulsion of the Jesuits from the Spanish dominions in 1768 the system [of the Guaraní missions] was abruptly disrupted. Henceforth the condition of the Indians in Paraguay and Uruguay was a constant preoccupation of the central authorities in Madrid and the viceregal government in Buenos Aires.” John Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration, 1782–1810: The Intendant System in the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata (London: Athlone Press, 1958), p. 186. Maeder’s title clearly indicates the missions’ decline. Maeder, Ernesto J.A., Misiones del Paraguay: conflictos y disolución de la sociedad Guaraní (1768–1850) (Madrid: Editorial MAPFRE, 1992).Google Scholar Barbara Ganson acknowledges that “the economic history of the missions during the post–Jesuit period was not simply one of deterioration,” but she docs not fully explore how this occurred. Ganson, Barbara, The Guarani Under Spanish Rule in the Río de la Plata (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 137.Google Scholar

2. From 1776 to 1786, cuero exports from Rio de la Plata totaled 4,322,257 hides. During the same years, the general administration of the 30 Guarani missions received almost 640,000 hides that generated over 820,000 pesos in sales revenues. For total Rio de la Plata export numbers from 1776 to 1778, see Jumar, Fernando Alberto, Le commerce atlantique au Rio de la Plata, 1680–1778, 2 vols. (Villenueve-d’Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2000).Google Scholar For total Rio de la Plata export numbers from 1779 to 1784, see Garavaglia, Juan Carlos, Economía, sociedad y regiones (Buenos Aires: Ediciones de la Flor, 1987), p. 95.Google Scholar For Buenos Aires export numbers from 1785 to 1786, see Moutoukias, Zacarías, “El crecimiento en una economía colonial de antiguo régimen: reformismo y sector externo en el Río de la Plata, 1760–1796,” Arquivos do Centro Cultural Calouste Gulbenkian 34 (1995), pp. 804–05.Google Scholar Montevideo export figures from 1785 to 1786 can be calculated as 53 percent of total Río de la Plata exports, based on the breakdown of exports between the two ports per Garavaglia, Economía, sociedad y regiones, p. 95. For descriptive and quantitative data about the Guaraní missions’ cuero production, see Sarreal, Julia, “Globalization and the Guaraní: From Missions to Modernization in the Eighteenth Century” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2009).Google Scholar

3. The frontier was a zone of contact, conflict, and interaction between Indians and Europeans. It was a place where Spanish imperial administration and the associated economic and cultural practices did not prevail. Contested boundaries between colonial domains distinguished borderlands frontiers. Adelman, Jeremy and Aron, Stephen, “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History,” American Historical Review 104, no. 3 (June 1999), p. 816.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4. The primary sources frequendy use the term campo to describe the region where the disorder occurred. “Countryside,” while implying a degree of human imprint untrue for the Banda Oriental campo in the late eighteenth century, is the simplest English translation. For the purpose of this essay, countryside refers to land, largely without title but not uninhabited, where Indians and mixed-race people lived and maintained themselves by hunting, gathering, and/or subsistence farming. The land and resources (primarily wild cattle) of the countryside remained largely uncontested until the onset of economic growth gave them value.

5. Not all of the viceroys1 memorias specifically use the word “disorder,” but their descriptions of the conditions in the Banda Oriental foil in line with what other contemporary authors describe as disorder. Memorias de los virreyes, pp. 12–13, 62–64, 117, 234–39, 274, 388–90, and 497–500.

6. The two viceroys who did not write memorias were Pedro Melo de Portugal, who died in office, and his replacement, Antonio Olaguer Feliú. Both Melo and Olaguer Feliú tried to combat the disorder in the Banda Oriental. de Touron, Lucia Sala, Torre, Nelson de la, and Rodríguez, Julio C., Evolución económica de la Banda Oriental, 2nd ed. (Montevideo: Ediciones Pueblos Unidos, 1968), p. 84.Google Scholar

7. The Spanish government ordered viceroy Vcrtiz to take measures to stop Portuguese cattle theft. Alden, Dauril, “The Undeclared War of 1773–1777: Climax of Luso-Spanish Platine Rivalry,” The Hispanic American Historical Review 41, no. 1 (1961), p. 63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Charles III and the Council of Indies corresponded with viceroy Loreto and superintendent Francisco de Paula Sanz about efforts to resolve the disorder in the Banda Oriental. “Expediente sobre el arreglo y resguardo de la campaña de este virreynato,” Archivo General de la Nación, Buenos Aires (hereafter cited as AGN), Sala IX, 30–3–9; various correspondence mentioned in Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration, pp. 96–99.

8. Studies of the supposed perpetrators—the gauchos—indirectly discuss the disorder. Ricardo, E. Rodríguez Molas, Historia social del gaucho (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Marú, 1968).Google Scholar

9. The derogatory term gauderio was often used interchangeably with gaucho. Although the use of gauderio in reference to the Banda Oriental disorder most frequently meant a person who engaged in illegal activity, not all individuals called gauderios were criminals. More generally, the term implied an independent and marginalized individual who engaged in irregular pastoral work. Ibid., pp. 43–44, 66–69, and 136–41.

10. Ibid., p. 68.

11. Cesar, Guilhermino, Historia do Rio Granile do Sul: Periodo Colonial (Porto Alegre: Editora Globo, 1956), p. 87;Google Scholar Cortcsâo, Jaime, Alexandre de Gusmâo c o Tratado de Madrid, Part 1, vol. 2 (Rio de Janeiro: Ministerio das Relaçôcs Exteriores, Instituto Rio-Branco, 1950), p. 39.Google Scholar

12. As quoted in Alden, Dauril, Royal Government in Colonial Brazil; with Special Reference to the Administration of the Marquis of Lavradio, Viceroy 1769–1779 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), p. 468.Google Scholar

13. In part, accessibility and transportation difficulties explain this difference. A dense network of rivers and streams characterize the Banda Oriental. Despite the abundant sources of water, most rivers, including the River Negro, were not easily navigable due to shallow depth, slow currents, and circuitous paths. Kleinpenning, Jan M.G., Peopling the Purple Land: A Historical Geography of Rural Uruguay, 1500–1915 (Amsterdam: CEDLA, 1995), pp. 910.Google Scholar

14. Ibid., p. 50.

15. Ibid., p. 49.

16. According to Jorge Gelman, during the brief period when they showed preference toward small landholders in response to the disorder, royal officials created the base for rural violence after independence. Gelman, Jorge, Campesinos y estancieros: una región del Rió de la Plata a fines de la época colonial (Buenos Aires: Editorial los Libros del Riel, 1998), pp. 124—35.Google Scholar Julio Djederendjian builds on Gclman’s analysis to show that settlement policies dating back to 1777 did not resolve land ownership disputes, but rather sparked new tensions between great absentee estancieros, small–scale local estancieros, and poor settlers without legal title. Djenderedjian, Julio, “Roots of Revolu–tion: Frontier Settlement Policy and the Emergence of New Spaces of Power in the Río de la Plata Borderlands, 1777–1810,” Hispanic American Historical Review 88, 4 (2008), pp. 639–68.Google Scholar In an earlier work, Lucia Sala de Touron, Nelson de la Torre, and Julio C. Rodriguez, point to the underlying causes of the disorder—royal officials implemented the arreglo de los campos in an effort to protect cattle herds and develop cattle production. But like Gelman and Djendcrendjian, Sala de Touron, de la Torre, and Rodríguez focus on land distribution patterns rather than the variety of policies used to staunch the disorder. They also do not address why such policies were ineffective. Sala de Touron, de la Torre, and Rodríguez, Evolución económica.

17. Moutoukias, Zacarías, “El crecimiento en una economía colonial de Antiguo Régimen,” p. 780.Google Scholar Hides continued to be the main regionally produced export until the early 1860s. Amaral, Samuel, The Rise of Capitalism on the Pampas: The fotancias of Buenos Aires, 1785–1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 248.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Silver was the only other item of any importance exported from the Río de la Plata region, but silver originated from the Andes, not the local area.

18. For sources, see footnote 2.

19. Garavaglia, , Economia, sociedad y regiones, pp. 17, 95.Google Scholar

20. Anonymous, , “Noticias sobre los campos de la Banda Oriental,” Madrid, 1794, Revista histórica 18: 5254 (Feb. 1953), p. 363.Google Scholar

21. Wild cattle were extinct in the Buenos Aires countryside in 1718 and practically extinct in the Banda Oriental by 1743. Coni, Emilio A., Historia de las vaquerías de Río de la Plata, 1555–1750 (Buenos Aires: Editorial Devenir, 1956), pp. 36, 79.Google Scholar By 1750, wild cattle had almost disappeared in the pampas region, which included all of Uruguay. Barsky, Osvaldo and Djendcredjian, Julio, Historia del capitalismo agrario pampeano, vol. 1 (Buenos Aires: Universidad de Belgrano: Siglo Veintiuno Editores Argentina, 2003), pp. 75, 143.Google Scholar Thomas Whigham claims that wild herds disappeared from Corrientes soon after the 1720s, but does not cite his sources. Whigham, Thomas, “Cattle Raising in the Argentine Northeast: Corrientes, c. 1750–1870,” Journal of Latin American Studies 20, 2 (1988), p. 315.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

22. Although Jorge Gelman studies an area that includes the region discussed in this paper (River Negro and River Yi), he claims that hunting cattle entered into crisis in the 1740s and that individuals had to look for other ways to make a profit. Gelman, , Campesinos y estancieros, pp. 33, 43.Google Scholar See also Amarai, , The Rise of Capitalism, pp. 910;Google Scholar Garavaglia, Juan Carlos, Pastores y labradores de Buenos Aires: una historia agraria de la campaña bonaerense, 1700–1830 (Buenos Aires: Ediciones de la Flor, 1999), pp. 216–17;Google Scholar and Brown, Jonathan C., A Socioeconomic History of Argentina, 1776–1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 37.Google Scholar

23. Garavaglia, andGelman, , “Rural History of the Río de la Plata,” pp. 75105.Google Scholar

24. Halpern-Donghi, , Politics, Economics and Society in Argentina, pp. 2223.Google Scholar

25. Dobrizhoffer, Martin, An Account of the Abipones, an Equestrian People of Paraguay, trans. Sara Henry Coleridge, vol. 1 (London: John Murray, 1822), pp. 220–22;Google Scholar Brown, , A Socioeconomic History of Argentina, p. 37.Google Scholar

26. “Carta de Juan de Escandón al Padre Andres Marcos Burriel,” Madrid, June 18, 1760, in Juan de Escanden S.J. y su carta a Barrici (1760), ed. Furlong, Guillermo (Buenos Aires; Ediciones Teoria, 1965), p. 110.Google Scholar

27. Only six or eight missions had sufficient cattle supplies to distribute meat on a daily basis without shrinking their estancias. Cardiel, José, Las misiones del Paraguay, ed. Ollero, Héctor Sáinz (Madrid: Dastin Historia, 1989), p. 76.Google Scholar

28. Coni, , Historia de las vaquerías de Rio de la Plata, p. 30.Google Scholar

29. The letter by cacique Francisco Tarara is discussed in the report dated June 12, 1784, by general administrator La7.cano to viceroy Loreto about the suspension of cuero production, AGN IX 17–7–2.

30. 1772 census by Mariano Ignacio de Larrazabal, AGN IX 18–8–7.

31. Manuel de Labardén to Pedro de Cevallos, Buenos Aires, July 2, 1760, AGN IX 21–1–7.

32. Report by the general administrator to viceroy Loreto about the suspension of cuero production, Buenos Aires, 12 June 1784, AGN IX 17–7–2.

33. Letter from Gregorio Espinosa, November 15, 1770, in Pereda, Stembrino E., Paysandii en el siglo XVIII, época de su resurrección y origen de su nombre (Montevideo: El Siglo Ilustrador, 1938), pp. 181–84.Google Scholar

34. Report about the fixed costs of each mission, Buenos Aires, December 21, 1776, AGN IX 17–6–3.

35. Report by the general administrator to viceroy Loreto about the suspension of cuero production, Buenos Aires, 12 June 1784, AGN IX 17–7–2.

36. Ibid.; Carta de Juan Angel de Lazcano al Señor Governador Intendente General, Buenos Aires, 24 July 1784, AGN IX 17–8–1.

37. Report by the general administrator of the mission pueblos, Buenos Aires, 4 Jan. 1773, AGN IX 17–6–3.

38. Testimony of Joaquín del Pino, Montevideo, 16 Feb. 1776, AGN IX 17–6–3.

39. Montoya, Alfredo J., Cómo evolucionó la ganadería en la época del virreinato (Buenos Aires: Plus Ultra, 1984), pp. 250–51.Google Scholar Castro Callorda had been active in the region for at least a decade. In a letter dated April 5, 1773, Castro Callorda describes conditions in the River Yi region in 1765 and 1766, based on his personal experience. Pintos, Aníbal Barrios, Historia de la ganadería en cl Uruguay, 1574–1971 (Montevideo: Biblioteca Nacional, n.d.), p. 112.Google Scholar

40. Christoval de Castro Callorda to the governor y captain general, n.d. AGN IX 17–6–3. Seventy–five years later, Rio Grande do Sul ranchers continued to voice similar complaints. Bell, Stephen, Campanha Gaucha: A Brazilian Ranching System, 1850–1920 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 57.Google Scholar

41. Ibid.

42. Decree by governor Vertiz, Buenos Aires, January 9, 1773, AGN IX 17–6–3.

43. Report by Juan Angel Lazcano to the governor and captain general, Buenos Aires, n.d., AGN IX 17–6–3.

44. Report by the general administrator to viceroy Loreto about the suspension of cuero production, Buenos Aires, 12 June 1784, AGN IX 17–7–2.

45. Castro Callorda confiscated 4,666 undocumented cuero/and produced 85,600 cueros. The accounting body of the 30 missions, the general administration, recorded these cueros in 1776 and 1777. Accounting receipts and debits and credits for mission Yapeyú, AGN IX, 17–6–4.

46. Report by the general administrator to viceroy Loreto about the suspension of cuero production, Buenos Aires, 12 June 1784, AGN IX 17–7–2.

47. Cevallos named Barquin on March 12, 1778. Pintos, Barrios, Historia de la ganadería en el Uruguay, p. 113.Google Scholar

48. Juan Angel de Lazcano to Francisco de Paula Sanz, Buenos Aires, October 31, 1785, AGN IX 17–8–1.

49. Cevallos organized the issues that most demanded resolution into 15 categories, one of which was slaughter for hides (faenas de cueros). “Memoria de Pedro de Cevallos a su sucesor,” Buenos Aires, June 12, 1778, in Memorias de los virreyes, p. 12.

50. Vértiz mentions various villas founded along waterways for this specific project. “Memoria de Juan José de Vértiz y Salcedo a su sucesor,” Buenos Aires, March 12, 1784, in Memorias de los virreyes, pp. 62–64.

51. Ibid.

52. Vértiz and the representatives of Yapeyú agreed on the salary amounts. The commander received 35 pesos per month and the cavalry received 12 pesos, with the condition that they provide their own horses, salt and meat necessary for their subsistence. Only when they went to the Portuguese frontier or other remote place would they receive tobacco and yerba maté rations, with hardtack or biscuits for the officials. Juan Angel de Lazcano to Francisco de Paula Sanz, Buenos Aires, 31 Oct. 1785, AGN IX 17–8–1.

53. “Memoria de Juan José de Vértiz y Salcedo a su sucesor,” Buenos Aires, March 12, 1784, in Memorias de los virreyes, p. 117.

54. Prado, Fabricio, “In the Shadows of Empires: Trans–Imperial Networks and Colonial Identity in Bourbon Rio de la Plata” (Ph.D. diss., Emory University, 2009), p. 175 Google Scholar

55. Sala de Touron, de la Torre, and Rodriguez speculate that Vértiz probably considered mission cuero production and patrols useful for cleansing the region, but they do not go any further in their analysis or support for such a claim. Sala de Touron, de la Torre, and Rodríguez, Evolución económica, p. 56.

56. Juan Angel de Lazcano to Francisco de Paula Sanz, Buenos Aires, October 31, 1785, AGN IX 17–8–1.

57. Report by Francisco de Ortega y Monroy to Francisco de Paula Sanz, Buenos Aires, August 23, 1784, AGN IX 30–3–9.

58. Juan Angel de Lazcano to the viceroy, Buenos Aires, September 22, 1778, AGN IX 30–3–9.

59. Reports written by the procuradores generales or representatives of the Montevideo and Santo Domingo Soriano cabildos. Report by Bernardo Sancho Larrea, Buenos Aires, September 25, 1778, and report by Josef de Nabas, Buenos Aires, September 30. 1778, AGN IX 30–3–9.

60. Instructions from the corregidor, administrator, other deputies of Yapeyú, and the general administrator of the missions to Domingo dc Ygarzabal, Buenos Aires, November 9, 1778, AGN IX 7–7–3.

61. Yapeyú Entrada y Venta, AGN IX 17–6–4, AGN IX 17–5–2, AGN IX 18–7–5; Account of cuero production under the oversight of don Domingo Ygarzabal, AGN IX 7–7–3.

62. Ygarzabal patrolled the countryside with Figueredo’s troops in June 1779 and in 1780. Report on the embargoes by Domingo Ygarzabal, Montevideo, October 21, 1784, AGN IX 7–7–3.

63. In total, Soto sent more than 320,000 cuero/from Paysandú to the general administration between 1769 and 1786. Yapeyú Entrada y Venta, AGN IX 17–5–2, AGN IX 17–6–4, AGN IX 17–7–1, AGN IX 18–6–6, AGN XIII 47–2–56, AGN XIII 47–3–21, AGN IX 18–7–5. Although a written contract has not been located, Soto’s formal duties likely included both cuero production and armed patrols. Several sources refer to Yapeyú funding 30 to 40 troops to assist Soto. Report by Montevideo and the general administrator of the thirty missions about their livestock, 1783, AGN IX 33–2–3; Juan de San Martin to capitan general Juan José de Vértiz, San Borja, August 26, 1776, AGN IX 17–6–3.

64. Guillermo Furlong, S.J. Cartografia Jesuitica del Ri;o de la Plata (Buenos Aires: Talleres S. A. Casa Jacobo Peuser, 1936).Google Scholar Yapeyú’s territory reached the Negro River, per the testimony about the Jesuit expulsion, AGN IX 229–4. Yapeyú’s estancia extended 20 leagues (almost 70 miles) north of the River Negro. Francisco de Ortega to Francisco de Paula Sanz, Buenos Aires, 27 July 1784, AGN IX 18–7–6.

65. Juan Angel de Lazcano to the viceroy, Montevideo, June 1783, AGN IX 17–3–4.

66. Vértiz formally gave his approval on August 5, 1783. Report by Juan Angel de Lazcano to Francisco de Paula Sanz, Buenos Aires, October 31, 1785, AGN IX 17–8–1.

67. Copy of contract signed by Juan Angel dc Lazcano and Antonio Pcreyra, Montevideo, June 28, 1783, AGN IX 20–5–5.

68. San Miguel Entrada y Venta, AGN IX 17–3–4, AGN IX 18–6–1; Documents provided by Antonio Percyra in the balance of his debit and credit account. AGN IX 20–5–5.

69. Revello, José Torre, Juan José de Vértiz y Salcedo:gobernador y virrey de Buenos Aires, ensayo basado en documentos inéditos del Archivo General de Indias (Buenos Aires: Imprenta de la Universidad, 1932), pp. 3738.Google Scholar

70. “Memoria del Marqués de Loreto a su sucesor,” Buenos Aires, February 10, 1790, in Memorias de los virreyes, p. 234.

71. Sala de Touron, de la Torre, and Rodríguez, Evolución económica, p. 84.

72. How to deal with the Banda Oriental disorder became a major bone of contention between viceroy Loreto and superintendent Sanz. The dispute escalated to the point that both pursued independent policies. Complaints about duplicated efforts reached the Council of the Indies and in 1786, the king issued an order that clarified the division of power between viceroy and superintendent in relation to contraband and the countryside. Two of the main sticking points were whether or not to investigate and punish past perpetrators of the disorder and the division of oversight powers between the viceroy and the superintendent. Lynch, , Spanish Colonial Administration, pp. 9598.Google Scholar

73. Francisco de Ortega y Monroy to Francisco dc Paula Sanz, July 7, 1784, AGN IX 18–7–6; Francisco de Ortega y Monroy to Francisco de Paula Sanz, Buenos Aires, August 23, 1784, AGN IX 30–3–9.

74. Sala de Touron, Rodríguez, and de la Torre, Evolución económica, p. 32.

76. For general maps showing how the ownership of Banda Oriental land evolved, see Sala de Touron, Rodríguez, and de la Torre, Evolución económica. For a detailed listing of archival data about Banda Oriental land transactions, see Pivel Devoto, Juan E., Colección de documentos para la historia econòmica y financiera de la República Oriental del Uruguay, voi. 1 (Montevideo: Ministerio de Hacienda, 1964).Google Scholar

76. Francisco de Ortega y Monroy to Francisco de Paula Sanz, July 7, 1784, AGN IX 18–7–6; Francisco de Ortega y Monroy to Francisco de Paula Sanz, Buenos Aires, August 23. 1784, AGN IX 30–3–9.

77. Ibid.

78. Juan Angel de Lazcano to the intendant governor, September 15, 1784, AGN IX 21–4–8.

79. Félix de la Rosa ordered an end to all Yapeyú cuero operations on September 29, 1784. Gregorio de Soto, Paysandú, November 5, 1785, AGN IX 24–1–1.

80. The government also confiscated significant quantities of cuero from the missions. Only after validating the missions1 legal ownership were the hides sold. Due to this delay, the missions continued to recognize cuero revenues from the peak period as late as 1802 to 1804.

81. de Touron, Sala, Rodríguez, , and Torre, de la, Evolución económica, pp. 99101;Google Scholar “Memoria de Loreto,” Buenos Aires, February 10, 1790, in Memorias de los virreyes; and carta de Domingo Ygarzabal, September 15, 1784, AGN 1X21–4–8.

82. Azara, Félix de, “Carta de Félix de Azara a Benito de la Mata Linares,” Batovi, December 5, 1800, in Escritos fronterizos (Madrid: Ministerio de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación, ICONA, 1994), pp. 227–28.Google Scholar

83. Anonymous, , “Noticias sobre los campos de la Banda Oriental,” pp. 418, 518.Google Scholar

84. Touron, Sala de, Rodríguez, , and Torre, de la, Evolución económica, p. 99.Google Scholar

85. The case against Pcrcyra is a reminder that one must always question the accuracy and honesty of the account books. Details or numbers might be omitted or included unnecessarily. Used with caution, the account records reveal valuable information about the missions’ economic activities and performance. Pivcl Devoto, Juan E., Ratees coloniales de la revolución oriental de 1811, 2nd ed. (Montevideo: Editorial Medina, 1957), pp. 2528;Google Scholar de Touron, Sala, Rodríguez, and Torre, de la, Evolución econòmica, pp. 100–02, 137–38;Google Scholar Betancur, Arturo Ariel, Contrabando y contrabandistas: historias coloniales (Montevideo: Arca, 1982), p. 23; and various legajos in AGN IX.Google Scholar

86. A tragedy of the commons unfolded, with the added caveat of the border with the Portuguese. Such a tragedy occurs when multiple parties independently pursue their own self–interest and as a result, overuse and ultimately destroy a shared limited resource. The typical tragedy–of–the–comnions story begins in a pasture that is commonly shared by all. On one hand, each herder captures its full benefits each time he lets an additional animal graze. On the other hand, the damage caused by the additional grazing animal is shared equally among all herders. The key point is that the costs and benefits of grazing are unequally shared. Each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain by adding as many livestock as he can to the pasture. The compounded result is overgrazing, degradation, and ruin of the pasture. Hardin, James Garrett, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162 (1968), pp. 1243–48.Google ScholarPubMed

87. Frega, Ana, Pueblos y soberanía en la revolución Artiguista: la región de Santo Domingo Soriano desde fines de la colonia a la ocupación portuguesa (Montevideo: Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, 2007), pp. 3538.Google Scholar

88. Anonymous, , “Noticias sobre los campos de la Banda Oriental,” p. 363.Google Scholar

89. “Memoria del Nicolás de Arredondo a su sucesor,” Buenos Aires, March 16, 1795, in Memorias de los virreyes, p. 388.

90. “Memoria del Marqués de Aviles a su sucesor,” Buenos Aires, May 21, 1801, in Memorias de los virreyes, p. 499. The main contraband that came from Brazil was tobacco. Slaves, cloth, and other items were of less importance. Betancur, Contrabando y contrabandistas, p. 76.

91. see footnote 2 for sources.