¹ Longley, Kyle, “Peaceful Costa Rica, The First Battleground: The United States and the Costa Rican Revolution of 1948,” The Americas, 50:2 (October 1993), p. 173–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Costa Rican historian Schifter, Jacobo, Las alianzas conflictivas, (San José: Libro Libre, 1986)Google Scholar, a translation of his 1983 U.S. doctoral dissertation at Columbia University, made essentially the same argument. Schifter, however, portrayed an active U.S. policy with intervention beginning in 1947, rather than the reactive policy Longley describes. See also Coatsworth, John H., Central America and the United States, (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994), p. 59–63 Google Scholar. Bell, John Patrick, Crisis in Costa Rica: The 1948 Revolution. Latin American Monographs, No. 24, (Austin: University of Texas, 1971). pp. 48 Google Scholar, 142, 150. Leonard, Thomas, The United States and Central America 1944–1949: Perceptions of Political Dynamics, (University, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1984), p. 45 Google Scholar, believed Department officials “clearly understood” the manipulation of the Communist issue, and, p. 166, that the Department remained an observer in Central America until 1949 (he did not specifically address intervention). See footnotes 2 and 3 below.

² Bell, , Crisis in Costa Rica, p. 150 Google Scholar gave credibility to this idea, LaFeber, Walter, Inevitable Revolutions, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1984), p. 102 Google Scholar and Leonard, Thomas, Central America and the United States: The Search for Stability, (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1991), p. 128 Google Scholar, have repeated the charge. I discuss this in depth below.

³ Quesada, Máximo, Picado’s Secretary of Government and Police, quoted in Miguel Acuña, El 48, (Tibas, Costa Rica: Litografía e Imprenta LIL, 2nd ed. 1990), p. 265.Google Scholar The range of conclusions Costa Ricans reach regarding the exact nature of U.S. intervention is revealing. Acuña, p. 105–6, and Oscar, Aguilar B., Costa Rica y sus hechos políticos de 1948, 2nd ed. (San José: Editorial Costa Rica, 1993), pp. 336–37Google Scholar, 373, arrived at strikingly different conclusions. While Aguilar claimed that the U.S. asked Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza to invade Costa Rica in March but had reversed itself by April, Acuña, whose work is based on interviews with people from every faction of the conflict, emphasized the crucial domestic pressures, yet still felt the U.S. played a “double game,” and abandoned Picado. Both of these authors dismiss more extravagant Communist Party claims. (See, for example, Vanguardia Popular, Cómo y por qué cayó la democracia en Costa Rica, n.p.: n.d., p. 10–11). Schifter made crucial errors perhaps because of this sense that the U.S. must have intervened. One example (p. 227) is Schifter’s citation of a 1947 State Department document, in which a Costa Rican official noted only that Mexico had not sold arms to Picado, to prove U.S. obstruction of arms sales. de Lemus, Vladimir De la Cruz Historia General de Costa Rica, Vol IV (San José: Euroamericana de Ediciones, 1987), p. 389–462 Google Scholar, combined the various interventionist arguments concluding that “the North Americans went looking for an incident that would favor North American intervention,” p. 453.

⁴ Longley, , “Peaceful Costa Rica,” p. 162.Google Scholar

⁵ Quotes from Longley, , “Peaceful Costa Rica,” p. 150 Google Scholar, especially regarding arms sales and the U.S. response to Guatemala and Nicaragua, Schifter made essentially the same arguments. On U.S. advance knowledge of uprising see Longley, , “Peaceful Costa Rica,” p. 167 Google Scholar; Schifter, , Las alianzas, 234–6Google Scholar, 259; Coatsworth, , Central America and the United States, p. 61 Google Scholar (also footnotes 13 and 15 below).

⁶ See Bell for a general overview of these events. On Figueres’ independence from the rest of the Opposition see Ameringer, Charles, Don Pepe: A Political Biography of Jose Figueres of Costa Rica, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1978), p. 48.Google Scholar Figueres wrote that, except Ulate, who suspected something, Opposition leaders knew nothing about his plans. Figueres sent Ulate an invitation to join the uprising two days before it began, but this was rejected; Figueres, José, El Espíritu del 48. (San José: Editorial Costa Rica, 1987), p. 134, 147.Google Scholar

⁷ Bell, , Crisis in Costa Rica, p. 33, 65;Google Scholar Aguilar, , Costa Rica, p. 58–64 Google Scholar; Baker, James, La Iglesia y el sindicalismo en Costa Rica, (San Jose: Editorial Costa Rica, 1978).Google Scholar

⁸ National Archives of the United States, Record Group 59, 818.00/2-1048, Davis to Secretary State, 10 February 1948; 818.00/2-1348, Vice Consul Alex Cohen to Secretary of State, 13 February 1948, [henceforth cited N.A.]. The Embassy recognized that fraud had occurred, but did not feel that it had changed the outcome of the vote. Bell, Crisis in Costa Rica, chap. 6, contains an interesting discussion supporting Calderonista assertions.

⁹ The rebels tried to convince Costa Ricans that the U.S. would intervene on their behalf, and made several unsuccessful attempts to get direct aid from the U.S. See, for example, N.A.818.00/4-1448, Memorandum of Conversation, Alberto Oreamuno, Robert Woodward, Deputy Director, Office of American Republic Affairs (ARA), and Robert Newbegin, Chief, Division of Central America and Panama Affairs (CPA), 14 April 1948. Oreamuno, a Figueres associate, called the U.S. non-intervention policy nonsense and suggested that the U.S. allow rebels to use U.S. arms and that Davis put diplomatic pressure on Picado. “Dr. Oreamuno was given no encouragement.”

¹⁰ Richard D. McKinzie, Oral History with Thomas C. Mann, June 12, 1974, p. 30. The Harry Truman Presidential Library, Independence Missouri, [henceforth cited as Truman Library].

¹¹ N.A.818.00/3-148, Cohen to Secretary of State, 14 March 1948. Schifter, , Las alianzas, p. 237–38Google Scholar. Ulate blamed the U.S. for the war, because Davis’ cautious reaction to the election stimulated Calderonista’ intransigence, N.A.818.00/5-548, Davis to Secretary of State, 5 May 1948.

¹² N.A.818.00/3-548, First Secretary Andrew Donovan to Secretary of State, 5 March 1948; N.A.818.00/3-1348, Davis to Secretary of State, 13 March 1948; N.A.818.00/-548, Davis to Secretary of State, 5 March 1948. Private Papers of Nathaniel P. Davis, box 1, diary 20 March 1948, Truman Library, [henceforth Davis diary]. Davis felt the expression of the Department’s hopes for a peaceful settlement was a “futile gesture,” given the state of war, but he followed instructions.

¹³ On the Costa Rican government’s lack of forewarning see Acuña, , El 48, pp. 108–9Google Scholar, 153; Aguilar, , Costa Rica, pp. 323–26Google Scholar; Ameringer, , Pepe, pp. 50 Google Scholar; Schifter, , Las alianzas pp. 276–77Google Scholar. Schifter, , Las alianzas, pp. 234–6Google Scholar, 259, based his conclusion that the U.S. knew in advance of the war on the erroneous idea that the Costa Rican rebels received arms shipments from Guatemala in the weeks preceding the outbreak of war, (I discuss this point later in the paper). Coatsworth, , Central America and the United States, p. 61 Google Scholar, repeats Schifter’s view. On Longley’s argument that the U.S. had forewarning see footnote 15 below. For Davis’ initial reaction to the fighting see, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Volume IX, (Washington D.C., 1972), p. 493–94 [henceforth FRUS, year and volume number]; N.A.818.00/3-1548, Davis to Secretary of State, 15 March 1948. The C.I.A. document is excerpted in Edelman, and Kenen, , eds., The Costa Rican Reader, (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), p. 112.Google Scholar

¹⁴ In their first military action, on March 12, the insurgents commandeered commercial airplanes in the small San Isidro regional airport, two of the pilots were Americans. FRUS, 1948, IX, p. 493; N.A.818.00/3-1748, Davis to Secretary of State, 17 March 1948.

¹⁵ Longley, , “Peaceful Costa Rica,” p. 167 Google Scholar, mistakenly places the Attache’s trip in the days before fighting broke out. As evidence he cites only an interview with Alberto Martén, Figueres’ second in command (indicating that Bruce Masis backed up this affirmation). I interviewed Mr. Martén (September 19 and 20, 1994), but unfortunately Mr. Masis died in 1993. Martén stated that he remembered Hughes’ visit, but the Attaché had not been at the base until after fighting started. Again, the State Department documents cited below clearly place the trip after fighting began.

¹⁶ N.A.818.00/3-1548, Davis to Secretary of State, 15 March 1948, (despatch no. 125); N.A.818.00/ 3-1548, Davis to Secretary of State, 15 March 1948, (telegram 92); Schifter, , Las alianzas p. 261 Google Scholar. The arms reportedly came from both Panama and Guatemala, Hughes also reported a vastly exaggerated figure for rebel troop strength (2,000 as opposed to well under 500). There are no specific figures on rebel troop strength at the outset of war. Figueres, , El Espiritu del 48 pp. 147–48Google Scholar, 162, wrote only that he had “not even the hint of an army,” but received a rapid response to his radio broadcasts for more troops after fighting began. Figueres told Guatemalan President Juan José Arévalo that he had 500 men in December 1947, de Lemus, de la Cruz, Historia general de Costa Rica, p. 444 Google Scholar, but he surely exaggerated to secure arms. Ameringer, Charles D., The Democratic Left in Exile, (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1974), p. 76 Google Scholar, says only that the army “eventually” reached 700 men. Oral interviews with participants indicate a number below 200, Acuña, , El 48, pp. 160–67.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Martén interview with the author, 20 September 1994. Longley, , “Peaceful Costa Rica,” pp. 167–68Google Scholar, cited no evidence of further contact. Hughes’ activities should be studied in greater depth as the perception exists that he was personally sympathetic to the rebels, see Bell, , Crisis in Costa Rica, p. 209 Google Scholar, fn 27; Acuña, , El 48, p. 190 Google Scholar; Longley, , “Peaceful Costa Rica,” p. 192 Google Scholar, fn 94. Yet, State Department officials commenting on post war complaints by the former Costa Rican Foreign Minister, noted that the Department “ha[d] no reason to believe” that the Attaché had acted to favor the rebels. N.A. Lot file 58D18, “Records of the Office of Middle American Affairs,” box 1, folder “CPA, General, 1848, Costa Rica,” Memo from William Tapley Bennett, CPA, to Paul C. Daniels, Director, ARA, 15 September 1948 [henceforth cited as N.A. Lot file, with folder title].

¹⁸ See, for example, FRUS, 1948, IX, pp. 496–501, Davis’ despatches demonstrate that he was not involved in the negotiations or their content. N.A.818.00/4-548, Davis to Secretary of State, 5 April 1948; Schifter, , Las alianzas, pp. 274–76.Google Scholar

¹⁹ N.A.818.00/4-248 Davis to Secretary of State, 2 April 1948; N.A.818.00/4-448, Davis to Secretary of State, 4 April 1948. Neither Davis nor the rebels proposed the discussions or decided their content, yet Longley, , “Peaceful Costa Rica,” p. 170 Google Scholar, misleadingly wrote that Davis “arranged [these] discussions” to “comply” with a March 21 request for U.S. “arbitration” by Alex Murray, a “close associate” of Figueres. Davis, along with the British Minister, met with Murray, but the U.S. took no action as a result of the encounter and Davis apparently was not aware of Murray’s connections to Figueres (see Davis diary 21 March and 16 April 1948). Murray had been sent to the front as an official government emissary. Davis’ records of the meeting with Murray (Davis diary 21 March 1948; N.A.818.00/3-2148, Davis to Secretary of State, 21 March 1948) contain no mention of a request to arbitrate, a role the U.S. was careful to avoid.

²⁰ N.A.818.00/4-548, Davis to Secretary of State, 5 April 1948.

²¹ N.A.818.00/4-;1148, Davis to Secretary of State, 11 April 1948; Davis diary 11 & 12 April 1948, Davis carefully stated to both Calderonistas and Opposition members that “the most [he] could do would be to provide the place and the opportunity for all parties to get together and thrash out their own difficulties.”

²² N.A.818.00/4-1148, Davis to Secretary of State, 11 April 1948. Schifter, , Las alianzas, pp. 280–81.Google Scholar

²³ N.A.818.00/4-1148, Davis to Secretary of State, 11 April 1948.

²⁴ N.A.818.00/4-1248, Acting Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett to Davis, 13 April 1948.

²⁵ N.A.818.00/4-1248, Davis to Secretary of State, 12 April 1948. N.A.818.00/4-1248, Lovett to Davis, 12 April 1948.

²⁶ Davis diary 13 April 1948; N.A.818.00/4-1248, Davis to Secretary of State, 12 April 1948, in his diary and despatches, Davis did not separate his role from the role of the Diplomatic Corps but wrote of the Diplomatic Corps (“We”), and thus it is difficult to specifically speak of Davis’ role here.

²⁷ Davis diary 13 April 1948.

²⁸ Ibid. The group of diplomats together transmitted the message to Figueres, and, Davis wrote in his diary “somewhat to our surprise Figueres agreed.” Davis and the Corps had taken seriously Figueres’ unwillingness to negotiate. In this light, the diplomats had put more pressure on Figueres than on the Government; Picado had already agreed to resign, while the rebels had constantly demanded unconditional surrender.

²⁹ Davis diary 14 April 1948; Acuña, , El 48, p. 325 Google Scholar. Picado noted that Figueres’ election would not favor the end of hostilities, nor would it be constitutional. Picado’s alternative was his own resignation with that of the fist two vice-presidents, leaving third vice-president Santos Herrera, an elderly man with little political power, as constitutional president until the term ended. Acuña, , El 48, pp. 291–304 Google Scholar, felt that the peace treaty was favorable to all sides, but that Figueres did not comply with the conditions regarding treatment of the Calderonistas, creating problems later. See also de Lemus, de la Cruz Historia general de Costa Rica, pp. 462–68Google Scholar, Bell, Crisis in Costa Rica, epilogue.

³⁰ N.A.818.00/4-1548, Davis to Secretary of State, 15 April 1948.

³¹ On Somoza-Calderón relations see N.A.817.00/12-3047, Chargé in Nicaragua Maurice Bernbaum to Secretary of State, 30 December 1947 and Edelman, Marc, “The Somozas’ Properties in Northern Costa Rica,” in Edelman, and Kenen, eds., pp. 242–49Google Scholar. On Somoza’s January anti Guatemala hysteria see N.A.817.00/1-3048, Bernbaum to Secretary of State, 30 January 1948; in spite of his spy network, Somoza apparently had no information regarding Figueres’ plans in Costa Rica.

³² Ameringer, , Democratic, p. 72–74 Google Scholar; Gleijesis, Piero, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944–1954, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 112.Google Scholar

³³ Longley, , “Peaceful Costa Rica,” p. 164 Google Scholar, see also Schifter, , Las alianzas, pp. 234, 236, 262.Google Scholar

³⁴ Schifter, , Las alianzas, pp. 267–68Google Scholar; N.A.818.00/3-1548, Davis to Secretary of State, 15 March 1948; N.A.818.00/3-1548 Office Memorandum Bennett to Newbegin, Woodward and Daniels, 16 March 1948; N.A. 818.00/3-1848, Bernbaum to Secretary of State, 18 March 1948; N.A.818.00/3-2448, Davis to Secretary of State, 24 March 1948; N.A.818.00/4-248, Davis to Secretary of State, 2 April 1948; N.A.818.00/4-1348, Bernbaum to Newbegin, 13 April 1948; N.A.818.00/3-1548 Bernbaum to Secretary of State, 15 March 1948; N.A.818.00/4-1148, Bernbaum to Secretary of State, 11 April 1948. The armed forces contained just 330 men, they were supported, however, by various police forces totalling almost 2000 members. The Vanguardia Popular Volunteer soldiers Somoza claimed he was going to put down, probably numbered over 1000, but were poorly armed. N.A.818.00/4-1246, Johnson to Secretary of State, 12 April 1946; N.A.818.00/5-1346, “Report on Political Factors in Costa Rica,” 31 May 1946.

³⁶ N.A.818.00/3-2248, Bernbaum to Secretary of State, 22 March 1948; Schifter, , Las alianzas, p. 268 Google Scholar, on March 22 Bernbaum received oral instructions the State Department to indicate strongly to Somoza U.S. concern over the situation, which Somoza may have heard through his wire tap. Bernbaum never actually met with Somoza who had already cancelled his plans. N.A.818.00/3-2248, Memorandum of telephone Conversation Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa and Woodward, 22 March 1948.

³⁷ FRUS, 1948, IX, pp. 500, 505–06. Within Costa Rican literature the idea has been propagated that the U.S. State Department was behind Somoza’s offer. See Aguilar, , Costa Rica, p. 338 Google Scholar; de Lemus, de la Cruz, Historia general de Costa Rica, pp. 453–56.Google Scholar Somoza’s rockly relations with the U. S. and his inability to acquire arms from that source since 1945 help to explain his unwillingness to provide arms (rather than soldiers) to Costa Rica. See Millet, Richard, Guardians of the Dynasty, (New York: Orbis Books, 1977), pp. 181–2Google Scholar, 201–13; Clark, Paul C., Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and the Somoza Garcia Regime, 1933–1956 (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Alabama, 1988).Google Scholar

³⁸ N.A.818.00/4-1348, Newbegin to Acting Secretary of State Lovett, 13 April 1948.

³⁹ Around 30 exiles (especially Dominican, Nicaraguan, Honduran) accompanied these arms and aided Figueres’ war effort. In Costa Rica the exiles took the name Caribbean Legion during the rebel attack on Limon (in spite of the fact that only two exiles participated in this action), creating the false impression of a unified, cohesive group. Their assistance was crucial, but cannot be termed official aid from any government. See Figueres, , El espíritu del 48, p. 155 Google Scholar; Acuña, , El 48, pp. 357–58Google Scholar; Argello, Rosendo, Doy Testimonio, (Managua: Dilesa, 1987), pp. 67–72 Google Scholar. While Argello asserted that there were hundreds of Nicaraguans (who Figueres insisted be disguised as Costa Ricans), his bitter post-war antagonism toward Figueres casts doubt on this. Figueres “swears” that only 18 foreigners helped him. I arrived at my figure by combining different sources, and comparing names, giving more weight to statements by Dominican Miguel A. Ramirez (in Acuña, El 48), principal figure among the exiles.

⁴⁰ FRUS, 1948, IX, p. 85, the U.S. began to question Guatemala on this matter before March 18. On March 19, the State Department informally expressed to both Nicaragua and Guatemala its concern over intervention in Costa Rica, and Secretary of State Marshall asked Ambassador Kyle to indicate the “deep concern” the U.S. felt over the reports, FRUS, 1948, IX, p. 497; N.A.818.00/3-1948, Memorandum of Conversation Nicaraguan Ambassador Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa and Daniels, 19 March 1948.

⁴¹ FRUS, 1948, IX p. 499; N.A.818.00/3-2348, Jack D. Neal, Chief, Division of Foreign Activity Correlation to various, 30 March 1948. N.A.Lot File, folder, “Central American Peace,” Memorandum from Robert Wilson, CPA, to Woodward, July 27, 1948.

⁴² N.A.818.00/4-1348, First Secretary in Guatemala Milton K. Wells to Secretary of State, 13 April 1948. See also the incredulity of State Department Officials to Dominican claims that Figueres’ arms came from Arévalo; N.A.818.00/4-148 Memorandum of Conversation Luis F. Thomen Dominican Republic, Jose Villanueva, Second Secretary Dominican Embassy, Woodward, Hauch, Spencer, 1 April 1948. Costa Rican rebels also denied that the Arévalo Government provided arms, N.A.818.00/3-2948, Memorandum of Conversation, Bennett and Gonzalo Facio, 29 March 1948.

⁴³ In early 1948 alone, for example, there were rumors of plots against other countries coming from Venezuela, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Guatemala and Nicaragua (Costa Rica, in fact, is not mentioned in these rumors of revolutionary and exile attacks). FRUS, IX, 1948, p. 153–165; N.A.731.39/1-2248, Marshall to U.S. Embassy Venezuela, 22 January 1948; N.A.810.00/2-948, Memorandum of Conversation, Oscar Morales L., Military Attaché of Guatemalan Embassy and Newbegin, 9 February 1948; 814.00/3-1948, Acting Secretary of State Thorp to U.S. Embassy Guatemala, 19 March 1948; N.A.810.00/7-2247, Office Memorandum Willard F. Barber, Chief, CPA to Woodward and Wright, 22 July 1947; FRUS, IX, 1948, pp. 166–67; N.A.714.17/2-2048, Marshall to Kyle, 20 February 1948; N.A.810.00/1-1748, Marshall to American Diplomatic Officers, 17 January 1948; N.A.810.00/5-1248, Marshall to Certain American Diplomatic Officers, 12 May 1948.

⁴⁴ For example see, FRUS, 1947, VIII, p. 643-57; N.A.837.00/9-2647, U.S. Ambassador Cuba, R. Henry Norweb to Secretary of State, 26 September 1947; Ameringer, , Democratic, pp. 64–72 Google Scholar, on Cuba’s support to the “Cayo Confites” plot against the Dominican Government in 1947.

⁴⁵ 714.15/7-645 Byrnes to U.S. Embassy Guatemala, July 6, 1945 and 714.15/10-1245 U.S. Ambassador Honduras, John D. Erwin to Secretary of State, October 12, 1945. FRUS, 1949, II, p. 444–49 & 454–57; N.A.839.00/7-2649, U.S. Ambassador Guatemala, Richard C. Patterson to Secretary of State, 26 July 1949; Ameringer, , Democratic, pp. 87–95.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Quote from N.A.711.14/8-1748, “Department of State Policy Statement, Guatemala,” August 17, 1948, pp. 2–3, the Department felt Guatemalan activity “encourage[d] chaotic and disorderly international conditions” and “endeavored to discourage the Guatemalan Government … by direct expressions of concern.” N.A.Lot File, folder, “CPA, General, 1948, Guatemala,” Memorandum of Conversation, Francisco Linares Aranda, Guatemalan Embassy and Robert E.Wilson, CPA, July 23, 1948. The OAS would become an important tool for multi-lateral pressure to control the tense Caribbean situation, beginning with a Calderonista invasion attempt on Costa Rica from Nicaragua in December 1948.

⁴⁷ Somoza clearly hoped for U.S. intervention to end the Figueres threat in Costa Rica, N.A.818.00/3-1848, Bernbaum to Secretary of State, 18 March 1948. N.A.818.00/3-2348 Marshall to U.S. Embassy Managua, 24 March 1948; N.A.818.00/4-1148, Bernbaum to Secretary of State, 11 April 1948. Typical of Somoza’s tendency to involve the U.S. were his instructions to his delegation at Bogota regarding the April 17 invasion, stating that the U.S. Embassy had been informed (implying U.S. consent), a statement that irked the State Department, N.A.818.00/4-1948, Lovett to Daniels, 19 April 1948.

⁴⁸ N.A.818.00/4-1648 Bernbaum to Secretary of State, 16 April 1948. N.A.818.00/4-1748 Memorandum of Conversation Bernbaum and Newbegin, 19 April 1948; N.A.818.00/4-1648, Davis to Secretary of State, 16 April 1948.

⁴⁹ For diverse views of Picado’s understanding of Somoza and Calderón’s intent see Schifter, , Las alianzas, p. 278–79Google Scholar, Ameringer, , Democratic, pp. 61–62 Google Scholar; Aguilar, , Costa Rica, pp. 366–70Google Scholar; Acuña, , E1 48, p. 267.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Schifter, , Las alianzas, pp. 269 Google Scholar, 279. Somoza had informed the U.S. Chargé that Costa Rica had authorized intervention, stating that he would notify the Embassy before taking any action; N.A.818.00/4-1648, Bernbaum to Secretary of State, 16 April 1948.

⁵¹ Davis diary 18 April 1948; N.A.818.00/4-2448, Bernbaum to Secretary of State, 24 April 1948.

⁵² Davis diary 16, 17 & 18 April 1948; N.A.818.00/4-1948, Davis to Secretary of State, 19 April 1948, Schifter, , Las alianzas, p. 280 Google Scholar also indicates that Somoza’s actions brought Picado down rather than propping him up, Acuña, El 48, chapter 20.

⁵³ Longley, , “Peaceful Costa Rica,” p. 168 Google Scholar. The State Department knew that Somoza would receive the full impact of U.S. messages as they were aware that he had tapped the Embassy’s phone. The Department also apparently played a role in an unfavorable broadcast on NBC to pressure Somoza indirectly. N.A 717.18/4-2148, Bernbaum to Newbegin, 21 April 1948. N.A.818.00/4-1748 Memorandum of Conversation, Bernbaum and Newbegin, 19 April 1948.

⁵⁴ N.A.818.00/4-1748, Lovett to Bogotá Delegation, 17 April 1948.

⁵⁵ N.A.818.00/4-1948, Memorandum of Conversation Daniels, U.S. Delegation Bogotá, and Woodward. Longley, , “Peaceful Costa Rica,” p. 166 Google Scholar, erroneously stated that: “U.S. officials at the Bogotá Conference secured the passage of a resolution condemning Nicaragua and urging its immediate retirement from positions in Costa Rica.” In fact, the Conference took no action except a rather belated investigation, and Marshall noted that he was put in an “embarrassing situation” by the Venezuelan initiative, FRUS, 1948, IX, pp. 52–8.

⁵⁶ N.A.717.18/4-2148 Memorandum of Conversation Sheldon T. Mills, Chief, Division of North and West Coast Affairs, Newbegin, Venezuelan Ambassador Dr. Gonzalo Carneval, and Venezuelan Counselor Dr. Francisco Alvarez-Chacin, 21 April 1948.

⁵⁷ Quote from Longley, , “Peaceful Costa Rica,” p. 166 Google Scholar. Coatsworth, , Central America and the United States, p. 62 Google Scholar, and Schifter, , Las alianzas, p. 270 Google Scholar, furthermore, tied Somoza’s March 22 decision not to send troops to his subsequent invitation to the Inter-American Conference, but the American Republics had already voted to invite him on March 8, FRUS, 1948, IX, p. 99 & 107–8; N.A.817.01/12-3147 Daniels to Chiefs of Division of ARA, 31 December 1947; Leonard, , Search for Stability, p. 123 Google Scholar; Clark, , Diplomatic Relations, pp. 348–56.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Quote from N. A.FW818.00/4-1348, Memorandum of Conversation Costa Rican Ambassador Francisco P. de Gutiérrez and Newbegin, 13 April 1948; N.A.818.00/4-1348, Memorandum of Conversation Gutiérrez Lovett and Newbegin, 13 April 1948.

⁵⁹ N.A.818.00/4-1348, Lovett to Daniels, Bogotá Delegation, 14 April 1948.

⁶⁰ N.A.FW818.00/4-1348, Newbegin to Lovett, 13 April 1948; N.A.818.00/4-1348, Lovett to Daniels, 14 April 1948.

⁶¹ N.A.818.00/8-747, Chargé John Williard Carrigan to Secretary of State, 7 August 1947. For Mexican action against rebels, see Figueres, pp. 103;6; N.A.818.00/2-2047, U.S. Ambassador Costa Rica, Johnson to Secretary of State, 20 February 1947. The 1948 arms shipment to the Government from Mexico apparently was an open rumor, Ameringer, , Exile, p. 77 Google Scholar reported that these arms reached Costa Rica, citing the New York Times of April 6, 1948.

⁶² Longley, , “Peaceful Costa Rica,” pp. 163–64Google Scholar & 172, see also Schifter, , Las alianzas, p. 227 Google Scholar. N.A.818.00/3-2248, Marshall to Diplomatic Representatives in American Republics, 22 March 1948. This circular telegram, expressing the U.S. non-intervention and the hope that other “parties to Habana Convention of 1928” would also comply with their duties in this respect was the routine approach to these matters. Marshall sent a similar circular on January 17, 1948, in response to reports of “revolutionary plotting” (in this case, apparently regarding Guatemalan assistance to Nicaraguan revolutionary exiles), FRUS, 1948, IX, p. 158.

⁶³ As evidence that the U.S. pressured El Salvador, Longley, , “Peaceful Costa Rica,” p. 164 Google Scholar, cited only Davis March 5 diary entry on a conversation with the El Salvadoran Chargé. The Salvadoran noted that his instructions were to use “what influence he could to further Dr. Calderón’s victory.” (He was referring to Calderón’s claims of election victory, as the war had not yet begun.) Davis’ description of his reply to a direct inquiry by the Salvadoran does not indicate pressure: “I thought it would serve little purpose for him to try to do anything to bring about a Calderón presidency. If I were he, I would do nothing until a president actually is elected and installed and then consider what action to take.” Davis’ advice for the Salvadoran matched his own approach in early March. Once the war began, however, El Salvadoran foreign policy would have dictated a “neutral policy;” it was respected as the only truly neutral Central American government, N.A.813/6-2348,U.S. Ambassador El Salvador, Albert F. Nufer to Secretary of State, 23 June 1948.

⁶⁴ Quote from N.A.818.00/3-1848 U.S. Chargé Honduras, Harold Montamat to Secretary of State, 18 March 1948, the Chargé noted in a conversation with the Honduran Foreign Minister that the U.S. “obviously would not recommend that the Honduran government do or not do anything.” Honduran foreign policy involved suspicion of Guatemala, trying to remain isolated from Central American intrigue, and aligning itself almost completely with the U.S., all of which were aimed at keeping dictator Tiburcio Carías in power, N.A.815.00/10-247, Montamat to Secretary of State, 2 October 1947; N.A.816.00/4-1248, Nufer to Secretary of State, 12 April 1948; N.A.815.00/3-2548, Montamat to Secretary of State, 25 March 1948.

⁶⁵ Longley, , “Peaceful Costa Rica,” p. 163 Google Scholar. The closest that the government got to a clear victory was a brief occupation of San Isidro del General on March 21–23. Acuña, , El 48, pp. 66–69 Google Scholar, 200–1; Bell, , Crisis in Costa Rica, pp. 188 Google Scholar; 157–64; Ameringer, , Pepe, p. 49–53 Google Scholar; Schifter, , Las alianzas, p. 276–77Google Scholar; Bakit, Oscar, Cuentos Mariachis, (San Jose: Editorial Costa Rica, 1990), pp. 25–31 Google Scholar; Cuadra, Abelardo Hombre del Caribe, 2nd ed. (San Jose: EDUCA, 1979), p. 251–264 Google Scholar; Figueres, , El Espíritu del 48, pp. 160 Google Scholar, 179, 185, 244–45. Picado himself commented on the incompetence of his troops in the battle of El Tejar on April 13; only 50 government troops fought while “the other 300 remained in the rearguard,” drinking, sacking, or lying face down; quoted in Acuña, , El 48, p.258 Google Scholar. The Communists noted that Government military leaders engaged in all-out banditry, Vanguardia Popular, Cómo y por qué, p. 9.

⁶⁶ N.A.818.00/4-248 Davis to Secretary of State, 2 April 1948. N.A.818.00/4-848, Cohen to Secretary of State, 8 April 1948.

⁶⁷ Aguilar, , Costa Rica, p. 332 Google Scholar, Acuña, , El 48, p. 66 Google Scholar, Ameringer, , Pepe, p. 53 Google Scholar, Bell, , Crisis in Costa Rica, p. 192 Google Scholar, support the Communist contention. N.A.818.00/4-1246, Johnson to Secretary of State, 12 April 1946; N.A.818.00/5-1346, “Report on Political Factors in Costa Rica,” 31 May 1946, p. 45–6; N.A.818.00/11-846, Johnson to Secretary of State, 8 November 1946, reported a purge of Vanguardia members from police and military forces.

⁶⁸ N.A.818.00/4-1348, Bernbaum to Newbegin, 13 April 1948. See also, N.A.818.00/6-2448, Davis to Secretary of State, 24 June 1948, there was already concern that these arms would be used by Calderonista exiles in Nicaragua to attack Figueres, as indeed they were in December 1948. Aguilar, , Costa Rica, pp. 322 Google Scholar, 350–53; Figueres, , El Espíritu del 48, p. 279 Google Scholar. Acuña, , El 48, p. 68 Google Scholar, interviewed the Chief of Staff who noted that the Government had few arms, but also that René Picado, President Picado’s brother and Secretary of Public Security, had ordered that boxes containing machine guns not be distributed. Picado, Even, El pacto de la Embajada de México, (Managua: Editorial Centroamericana, 1950), p. 12 Google Scholar, said the Government had arms on April 19 to continue the struggle, but that he wanted to end the bloodshed.

⁶⁹ Longley, , “Peaceful Costa Rica,” p. 162.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ FRUS, 1945, IX, pp. 194–7.

⁷¹ Schifter, , Las alianzas, pp. 226, 287.Google Scholar Even after Figueres’ victory, the U.S. continued to demand payment before discussing arms sales. FRUS, 1948, IX, pp. 526–28. See also Pach, Chester, Arming the Free World: The Origins of the United States Military Assistance Program, 1945–1950, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), pp. 30 Google Scholar, 41–62, until mid-1947 the State Department advocated limiting arms sales to Latin America in general. Costa Rica, furthermore, was listed in 1947, as one of six Latin American countries that could not make weapons purchases without affecting domestic spending because of the critical economic situation, p. 51.

⁷² N.A.818.00/2-1347, Johnson to Secretary of State, 13 February 1947; Quote from N.A.818.00/3-2747, Office Memorandum Bennett to Wise, Woodward and Briggs, 7 April 1947.

⁷³ N.A.818.00/2-1347, State Department to the Costa Rican Embassy, 28 February 1947.

⁷⁴ N.A.818.00/8-747, Carrigan to Secretary of State, 7 August 1947, Rene Picado noted that Argentine arms were too expensive, yet certainly the U.S. was not the only possible source for arms. Belgium, Denmark, England, Switzerland, Brazil, Argentina, all sold arms to Latin America, N.A.810.24/8-2847, Kirk to Secretary of State, 28 August 1947; N.A.810.24/1-2247, Marshall to U.S. Embassy Bern, 22 January 1947; N.A.816.00/1-2348, Murat W. Williams to Secretary of State, 23 January 1948; 839.113/1-348, Marshall to Embassy Ciudad Trujillo, 3 January 1948. In 1947-48 Nicaraguan “middle-man” activities in arms sales from France to Israel, helped Somoza acquire arms and profits, Klich, Ignacio, “Latin America, the United States and the Birth of Israel; The Case of Somoza’s Nicaragua,” Journal of Latin America Studies, 20 (November 1988), 398–400 Google Scholar. Picado, El pacto, p. 7 Google Scholar, noted the Costa Rican Congress and public’s reluctance to supply funds for defense.

⁷⁵ Schifter, , Las alianzas, pp. 226–8Google Scholar, 249, notes that the arms were provided to balance the arms acquired by the Opposition, but again he erroneously assumed that Figueres’ arms were at issue. In fact, if the Department meant to balance the arms supply on both sides, a doubtful contention, U.S. officials were more likely concerned about Ulate who told the Embassy that he had a limited amount of arms, and might acquire more; N.A.818.00/8-2047, Chargé Carrigan to Secretary of State, 20 August 1947, but again, Ulate was not expected to start any violence.

⁷⁶ N.A.818.00/8-2247, Cohen to Secretary of State, 22 August 1947. Schifter, , Las alianzas, pp. 274–76Google Scholar noted that the State Department believed Ulate to be the real leader of the Opposition. As Longley wrote, p. 167, the Department was aware that Figueres made two trips to acquire arms in the Caribbean in 1947, however, he failed to note Department reports that Figueres had been unsuccessful; N.A.818.00/7-1047, U.S. First Secretary and Vice Consul to Costa Rica, John W. Carrigan to Secretary of State, 10 July 1947; N.A.818.00/7-1147, Carrigan to Secretary of State, 11 July 1947, the Costa Rican government was also aware of these trips. Figueres’ acquisition of arms from Guatemala was a surprise last minute development as exiles from several countries were competing for them ( Figueres, , El Espíritu del 48, pp. 140–41Google Scholar, 195–97; Ameringer, , Pepe, p. 51 Google Scholar) and details continued to be unclear long after the war ( Ameringer, , Democratic, p. 74 Google Scholar). Even after the war the CIA was still uninformed about some of the most crucial aspects, CIA, “The Caribbean Legion,” ORE 11–49, March 17, 1949, President’s Secretary File, Truman Library, p. 4–5, for example, contains no mention of the formal pact of 1947, nor does it correctly assess the responsibilities Figueres incurred.

⁷⁷ N.A.818.00/3771948 Memorandum of conversation Gutiérrez, Daniels and Newbegin, 19 March 1948.

⁷⁸ FRUS, IX, 1948, p. 504–5; N.A.Lot File, folder “CPA, General, 1948, Costa Rica,” Memorandum of Conversation, Gutiérrez and Newbegin, April 5, 1948.

⁷⁹ In an April 6 conversation with the Department, again, Gutiérrez failed to request arms or any U.S. aid, rather he made a veiled pitch to Department officials for support for his candidacy, noting his opposition to the Vanguardia role in government. Schifter, Jacobo, Las alianzas, pp. 265–66Google Scholar, accused Gutiérrez of undercutting Picado’s position. N.A.818.00/4-848, Woodward to Daniels, April 8, 1948. N.A.818.00/4-1348 Memorandum of Conversation Gutiérrez, Lovett and Newbegin, 13 April 1948.

⁸⁰ Ibid., & N. A. FW818.00/4-1348, Memorandum of Conversation between Gutiérrez and Newbegin, 13 April 1948; Gutiérrez was easily dissuaded by Newbegin’s comment that the UN process was “cumbersome and that immediate action could not probably be expected.” N.A.818.00/5-1548 Memorandum of Conversation Gutiérrez, Newbegin and Murray Wise, Assistant Chief, CPA, 15 April 1948; N.A.Lot File, folder “CPA, General, 1948, Costa Rica,” Memorandum of Conversation, Jaime Fonseca Mora Costa Rican Chargé, Newbegin and Bennett, April 19, 1948. The Costa Rican Chargé noted that Gutiérrez had been extremely short on funds as he had not been paid for two months.

⁸¹ Acuña, , El 48, pp. 163–64Google Scholar & 173–75. See also N.A.818.00/3-2148, Davis to Secretary of State, 21 March 1948; Davis noted that Picado had not talked to his Foreign Minister at any length over the issue of Guatemalan arms.

⁸² Longley, , “Peaceful Costa Rica,” p. 163.Google Scholar

⁸³ Early in the conflict, former ally, Archbishop Sanabria, demanded Picado’s immediate departure as a “sine qua non” of any settlement, N.A.818.00/4-248, Davis to Secretary of State, 2 April 1948. The rest of the church hierarchy was generally anti-Calderón. Aguilar, , Costa Rica, p. 322 Google Scholar; N.A.818.00/4-1348, Davis to Secretary of State, 13 April 1948.

⁸⁴ Picado, , El pacto, pp. 5–18 Google Scholar; Popular, Vanguardia, Cómo y por qué, pp. 11–12 Google Scholar. Picado notified Calderón and Mora of his decision to resign in a letter with vague references to “international forces” and possible “affronts to Costa Rica.” Acuña, El 48, chap. 20, and Aguilar, , Costa Rica, pp. 383–86Google Scholar, discuss this letter and conclude that Somoza’s intervention or its possible consequences (the Guatemalan response) weighed most heavily on Picado’s mind.

⁸⁵ On Davis’ direct assurances to the Government regarding U.S. non-intervention, see for example, Davis diary 13 & 14 April 1948; N.A.818.00/4-1348, Davis to Secretary of State, 13 April 1948. On U.S. citizens see above and FRUS, 1948, IX, p. 501; N.A.818.00/3-1948, Davis to Secretary of State, 19 March 1948; N.A. 818.00/4-1348, Davis to Secretary of State, 14 April 1948.

⁸⁶ Costa Rican scholars have rejected the idea that the U.S. was preparing an invasion from Panama. Aguilar, , Costa Rica, p. 386 Google Scholar; Acuña, , El 48, p. 265 Google Scholar. Schifter, Las alianzas, chap. 8, rejects it by omission. However, it has been passed on by U.S. scholars: Bell, , Crisis in Costa Rica, p. 150 Google Scholar; LaFeber, , Inevitable Revolutions, p. 102 Google Scholar; Leonard, , Search for Stability, p. 128 Google Scholar. Longley, , “Peaceful Costa Rica,” p. 172 Google Scholar, cites Bell, but only in regard to the “rumor” as a factor in Picado’s resignation. Quote from N.A., Military Reference Branch, Record Group 319, Records of the Army General Staff, P & O 091 LA, Memo for the record, 15 April 1948, and/Wd. 16 April 1948. N.A.818.00/4-1548, State Department to Embassy Costa Rica, 16 April 1948.

⁸⁷ Longley, , “Peaceful Costa Rica,” p. 172 Google Scholar, cited Bell, , Crisis in Costa Rica, p. 150 Google Scholar, who cited a 1964 Costa Rican unfootnoted secondary source, Guardia, R. Fernández, Cartilla histórica de Costa Rica, (San José: Lehmann, 1984). Fernandez’s book, the equivalent of a high school history text, included this rumor beginning in the 1957 edition (the revisions in the 1957 edition are not credited to any author, and Fernández died in 1950). Bell also mentions the Communist publication, Cómo y por qué, p. 11, which says only that Figueres acquired planes from the canal zone, a charge with no basis in fact.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Picado, , El pacto, pp. 5–18 Google Scholar, published in 1949 and 1950, does not mention any threat from the U.S. Ambassador, or troops in Panama, rather Picado noted that the members of the Diplomatic Corps received thanks for their valiant efforts to end the war. See also Acuña p. 125, for a statement by Picado’s Secretary of Government and Police. Harrison, Fernando Soto, Qué pasó en los años 40, (San José: EUNED, 1991), pp. 318–322 Google Scholar, contains personal letters Picado wrote in late 1948 and 1949. See, Vanguardia Popular, Cómo y por qué, although this publication is not dated it was clearly written shortly after the war; Fallas, Carlos Luis, et al., Redactora, Comisión, Calderón Guardia, José Figueres y Otilio Ulate a la luz de los últimos acontecimientos políticos, (San José: n.p., 1955).Google Scholar

⁸⁹ N.A.818.00/3-548, Davis to Secretary of State, 5 March 1948; Davis diary 20 March & 14 April 1948. Again, Davis entered these mediation efforts as part of a group, and other members of the group exercised prominent roles. The Mexican Ambassador hosted the negotiations and provided lodging to the rebel emissary when he spent the night in San José. The Mexican representative also took the primary role in defusing a situation in which a government supporter, and veteran of the Spanish Civil War, threatened to bomb San José, Davis diary 15 April 1948, Aguilar, , Costa Rica, p. 376 Google Scholar. The head of the Corps was the Papal Nuncio, and Catholic Church influence in Costa Rican was great.

⁹⁰ This idea originated due to an error in Bell’s highly respected and influential work on the Costa Rican civil war. Bell, , Crisis in Costa Rica, p. 54 Google Scholar, cited La Nación, 28 May 1949, to make this claim, but the newspaper says only that Davis was being transferred to Hungary after his period in Costa Rica. The error has been often repeated and has had a great impact on Costa Rican historiography: Schifter, , Las alianzas, pp. 253–54Google Scholar used it as one of his principal arguments; LaFeber, , Inevitable Revolutions, p. 100 Google Scholar; de Lemus, de la Cruz, Historia General de Costa Rica, p. 435 Google Scholar; Bolaños, Manuel Rojas, “La Política,” in Historia general de Centroamérica, Vol. 5, Brignoli, Hector Pérez, ed. (Madrid: Ediciones Siruela, 1993), p. 91 Google Scholar; Contreras, Gerardo and Cerdas, José Manuel, Los años 40, San José: Editorial Porvenir, 1988), p. 160.Google Scholar

⁹¹ Letter from Davis to Christian Ravndal, Director Office of Foreign Service, August 21, 1947. Folder, Ambassador to Costa Rica, Box 1, Davis Papers, Truman Library. This folder contains various letters to State Department officials to garner support for his case. See also Department of State, Bibliographic Register, Washington D.C. 1951, p. 110.

⁹² Longley, , “Peaceful Costa Rica,” pp. 150, 162, 163.Google Scholar

⁹³ FRUS, 1947, VIII, p. 589–91; Davis diary 2 April 1948, reports that Ulate and Mora had reached an agreement on a compromise candidate to present to Figueres; N.A.818.00/4-348 Davis to Secretary of State, 3 April 1948, predicts a possible “alliance” between Ulate’s party and Vanguardia. Leonard, , United States, p. 34.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ Longley, , “Peaceful Costa Rica,” p. 171 Google Scholar, footnote 86. Davis’ diary and despatches contain many calm references to Mora’s important and positive contributions (see for example, Davis diary 2, 3, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19 April 1948 and following footnote). Davis called Mora “conciliatory” in these talks, Davis diary 15 April 1948. N.A.818.00/4-2248, Davis to Secretary of State, 22 April 1948, sums up Mora’s role. Although Davis saw negative, and typically “Communist” traits in the man, he also had high praise, “he has impressed me as a level-headed and intelligent leader dedicated to a liberal and unobjectionable social legislative program.”

⁹⁵ Davis diary 15, 16, 18 & 19 April 1948; N.A. N.A.818.00/4-1548, Davis to Secretary of State, 15 April 1948; N.A.818.00/4-x1648, Davis to Secretary of State, 16 April 1948; Picado, , El pacto, p. 18 Google Scholar. Figueres, , El Espíritu del 48, pp. 270–75Google Scholar & 280, Acuña, , El 48, pp. 263–76.Google Scholar

⁹⁶ Davis diary 20 March & 18 April 1948; N.A.818.00/3-2148, Davis to Secretary of State, 21 March 1948; N.A.718.19/4-3048, U.S. Ambassador Panama, Carlos C. Hall to Secretary of State, 30 April 1948; N.A.818.00/5-448, Davis to Secretary of State, 4 May 1948; Davis noted that Vanguardia’s “potential influence is naturally greatly reduced for the moment. There is every reason to believe, however, that the party organization . . . remain[s] intact and it is a safe assumption that unless the pledges of the agreement which ended the civil war are flouted, it will be able to take an active part in the campaign for delegates to the constituent assembly.” In spite of this, the State Department already on May 3, noted that there should be no question of continuing diplomatic relations, in keeping with the recent resolution on recognition taken at the Bogota conference, FRUS, 1948, IX, 113, 525.

⁹⁷ In an interview with Acuña, , El 48, pp. 274–76Google Scholar; Núñez stated that the repression was the result of Costa Rican internal pressures. Figueres’ own moderately “leftist” domestic social goals and foreign policy goals increased his need to appease the U.S. as well as domestic actors. Bayo, Alberto, Tempestad en el Caribe, (Mexico: n.p., 1950), p. 83 Google Scholar, wrote that Figueres vetoed using Communists in anti-Somoza plots to avoid arousing U.S. suspicion. N.A.818.00/4-1648, Cohen to Secretary of State, 16 April 1948, noted that Figueres position was “socialistic” and virtually identical to Vanguardia; Leonard, , United States, p. 40.Google Scholar

⁹⁸ Rabe, Stephen G., Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1988), p. 8.Google Scholar

⁹⁹ Rabe, , Eisenhower and Latin America, pp. 15–22, 29–34Google Scholar; LaFeber, “Thomas C. Mann and the Devolution of Latin American Foreign Policy: From the Good Neighbor Policy to Military Intervention,” In McCormick, Thomas J. and LaFeber, Walter, eds. Behind the Throne: Servants of Power to Imperial presidents, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), pp. 169–76Google Scholar; Smith, Gaddis, The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1945–1993, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), p. 68ffGoogle Scholar; Wood, Bryce, The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985)Google Scholar, set the moment of transition from Good Neighbor to interventionist after Truman left office.