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Corruption, Inefficiency, and Imperial Decline in the Seventeenth-Century Viceroyalty of Peru*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 December 2015

Kenneth J. Andrien
Kenneth J. Andrien*
Affiliation:
The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio
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Extract

The methodological problems involved in studying the political role of corruption and inefficiency have long baffled historians of seventeenth-century Spanish America. Complaints by contemporaries about various forms of corruption (fraudes), abuses (abusos), bribery (cohecho), and other forms of corruption (mala administratión), abound in the extant archivai documents of the period. In addition, successive viceroys and royal inspectors (visitadores) frequently charged that colonial officials were too stupid, lazy, or inexperienced to carry out their duties efficiently. One visitador in 1683, for example, described the administrative practices of high-ranking treasury officials in the viceregal capital of Lima as “la más ciega y descuidada que se ha visto en muchos siglos,” and went on to recommend that such officials be “despoblados de sus plazas, poniendo in su lugar personas capazes y inteligentes.”

Type
Research Article
Information
The Americas , Volume 41 , Issue 1 , July 1984 , pp. 1 - 20
Copyright
Copyright © Academy of American Franciscan History 1984

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Footnotes

*

The author wishes to thank John J. TePaske, Mark A. Burkholder and John C. Rule for their helpful comments and criticisms.

References

1 Archivo General de Indias (hereafter cited AGI), Lima, 288, Juan de Saiceta y Cucho to crown, Lima, December 12, 1682; November 14, 1683. Throughout this article I have used the term corruption to mean the conscious violation of legally prescribèed modes of behavior by public officials in order to advance their own well being or that of some particular interest group. I have used inefficiency to mean the unwillingness or inability of public officials to fulfill their legal responsibilities.

2 Earlier works dealing with political corruption as a manifestation of imperial decline are the following: Borah, Woodrow, “Latin America, 1610–1660,” in vol. 4 of The New Cambridge Modem History, ed. by Cooper, J.P. (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 707–726 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ots Cápdequi, J.M., El estado español en las Indias (Mexico City, 1941)Google Scholar; Parry, J.H., The Sale of Public Offices in the Spanish Indies Under the Habsburgs, (Berkeley, 1953).Google Scholar

3 Some revisionist treatments of the empire that view corruption as playing a more positive role in colonial politics are the following: Morse, Richard M., “The Heritage of Latin America,” in Hartz, Louis, ed., The Founding of New Societies (New York, 1964), pp. 123–177 Google Scholar; Sarfatti, Magali, Spanish Bureaucratic Patrimonialism in America (Berkeley, 1966)Google Scholar; Phelan, John Leddy, “Authority and Flexibility in the Spanish Imperial Bureaucracy,” Administrative Sciences Quarterly 5 (July 1960), 47–65 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Moreno, Frank J., “The Spanish Colonial System: A Functional Approach,” Western Political Quarterly 20 (June 1967), 308–320.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For studies that apply these general models on a regional level see: Barbier, Jacques A., “Elites and Cadres in Bourbon Chile,” Hispanic American Historical Review 52 (August 1972), 416–435 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Reform and Politics in Bourbon Chile, 1775–1796 (Ottawa, 1980); Schwartz, Stuart B., “Magistracy and Society in Colonial Brazil,” Hispanic American Historical Review 50 (November 1970), 715–730,CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Sovereignty and Society in Colonial Brazil: The High Court of Bahia and its Judges, 1609–1751 (Berkeley, 1973); Phelan, John Leddy, The Kingdom of Quito in the Seventeenth Century: Bureaucratic Politics in the Spanish Empire (Madison, 1967)Google Scholar; Lynch, John, Spain Under the Habsburgs, vol. 2 (Oxford, 1969), pp. 163–169 Google Scholar; Poole, Stafford, “Institutionalized Corruption in the Letrado Bureaucracy: The Case of Pedro de Farfán,” The Americas 38 (October 1981). 149–172.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 These characteristics are typical of Max Weber’s patrimonial form of authority. For a detailed discussion of this concept see Weber’s, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. Parsons, Talcott (New York, 1964), pp. 352–358;Google Scholar and Economy and Society, vol. 3, trans. Roth, Guenther and Wittich, Claus (New York, 1968), pp. 1006–1104.Google Scholar A modification of Weber’s forms of authority that is very useful to historians is Eisenstadt, S.N., The Political Systems of Empires (New York, 1963).Google Scholar Eisenstadt traces the evolution of a new form of political authority, the historical-bureaucratic regime. It is important because it provides a model that is not static, but takes into consideration historical changes.

5 Poole, , “Institutionalized Corruption,” p. 170.Google Scholar

6 Eisenstadt, , Political Systems, pp. 287–297.Google Scholar

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9 Andrien, Kenneth J., “The Sale of Fiscal Offices and the Decline of Royal Authority in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1633–1700,” Hispanic American Historical Review 62 (February 1982), 49–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

10 According to J. I. Israel, similar levels of fiscal pressure and a movement of “nondoctrinal puritanism” to eliminate corruption and waste were two key factors contributing to the political instability of seventeenth-century Mexico. Israel, J.I., “Mexico and the General Crisis of the Seventeenth-Century,” Past and Present 63 (May 1974), 33–57 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and the same author’s Race, Class, and Politics in Colonial Mexico, 1610–1670 (Oxford, 1975).

11 The new tax levies imposed in the viceroyalty of Peru were the following: the unión de armas (a surcharge of 1% on the avería, 2% on the alcabala, and a port tax of 2 reales on each bottle of domestic wine), papel sellado (stamped paper), nieve (snow and ice), mesada (one month’s salary paid by each clerical appointee), media anata (one-half of one year’s salary and one-third of all benefits of the office), pulperías (a levy of 30 to 40 pesos each year on all new stores selling wine and provisions), donativos (forced donations), and the sale of juros (annuities), public offices, and land and land titles.

12 Bakewell, Peter J., “Registered Silver Production in the Potosí District, 1550–1735,” Jahrbuch fur Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft, und Gesselschaft Lateinamerikas 12 (1975), 94–96 Google Scholar; Pierre Chaunu, Séville et l’Atlantique (1504–1650), La Conjoncture (1593–1650), Tome VII2

13 The picture that emerges from recent seventeenth-century studies is of a century characterized by cycles of prosperity and recession, with some regions or groups indeed experiencing bad times, while others rose to greater prominence. Hoberman, Louisa S., “Elites and the Commercial Crisis in Seventeenth-Century New Spain” (unpublished paper delivered at the American Historical Association Meeting, 1980), pp. 1, 14.Google Scholar TePaske, John J. and Klein, Herbert S., “The Seventeenth-Century Crisis in New Spain: Myth or Reality,” Past and Present 90 (February 1981), 116–135.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Super, John C., “Querétaro: Society and Economy in Early Provincial Mexico, 1590–1630” (Ph.D. Diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1973)Google Scholar; Taylor, William B., Landlord and Peasant in Colonial Oaxaca (Stanford, 1972)Google Scholar; Boyer, Richard, “Mexico in the Seventeenth Century: Transition of a Colonial Society,” Hispanic American Historical Review 57 (August 1977), 455–478 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wortman, Miles, Government and Society in Central America, 1680–1840 (New York, 1982)Google Scholar; Assadourián, Carlos Sempat, “Sobre un elemento de la economía colonial: producción y circulación de mercancías en el interior de un conjunto regional,” EURE 8 (1973), 135–181 Google Scholar; Stern, Steve J., Peru’s Indian Peoples and the Challenge of Spanish Conquest: Huamanga to 1640 (Madison, 1982)Google Scholar; Spalding, Karen, De Indio a Campesino: Cambios en la estructura social del Perú colonial (Lima, 1974)Google Scholar; Hoberman, Louisa Schell, “Merchants in Seventeenth-Century Mexico City: A Preliminary Portrait,” Hispanic American Historical Review 57 (August 1977), 479–503 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cushner, Nicholas P., Lords of the Land: Sugar, Wine, and Jesuit Estates of Colonial Peru, 1600–1767 (Albany, 1980)Google Scholar; Andrien, Kenneth J., “The Sale of Fiscal Offices and the Decline of Royal Authority in the Vice-royalty of Peru, 1633–1700,” Hispanic American Historical Review 62 (February 1982), 49–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

14 Andrien, , “Sale of Fiscal Offices,” pp. 58–71.Google Scholar

15 Andrien, , “Reform, Resistance, and Imperial Decline,” pp. 8–9.Google Scholar

16 Altoaguirre, Angel, Colección de las memorias o relaciones que escribieron los virreyes del Perú acerca del estado en que dejaban las cosas generales del reino, Vol. 2 (Madrid, 1930), p. 268.Google Scholar

17 Ibid, pp. 268–271.

18 Ibid., pp. 273–281.

19 AGI, Lima, 270, Francisco Antonio de Manzolo to crown, Lima, 1664.

20 AGI, Lima, 288, Informe of tribunal of accounts, Lima, December 17, 1681; AGI, Lima, 288, “Relación que el tribunal de Lima dío al señor Juan de Peñalosa en virtud del cédula de su magd. del estado de cuentas de las cajas de este reyno y los alcances y resultas que procedieron de los fenecimientos,” Lima, November 3, 1683.

21 de Ballesteros, Tomás, Tomo primero de las ordenanzas del Perú, (Lima, 1685),Google Scholar Libro I, Título 27, Ordenanza 28.

22 AGI, Lima, 276, Juan Gutiérrez Flores to crown, Lima, May 11, 1629; May 21, 1629.

23 Andrien, , “Sale of Fiscal Offices,” p. 67.Google Scholar

24 AGI, Lima, 573, Conde de Salvatierra to crown, Lima, September 9, 1651; de Mendiburu, Manuel, Diccionario histórico biográfico del Perú, Vol. 8, (Lima, 1931–38), p. 73 Google Scholar; AGI, Lima, 288, tribunal of accounts to crown, Lima, December 18, 1682.

25 AGI, Lima, 1271, Título, Madrid, January 7,1648; Ordenanzas del oficio del ensayador mayor de Lima, January 7, 1649.

26 AGI, Lima, 1271, Libro de servicio y mérito de Miguel de Rojas, Lima, January 24, 1645; Cédula, Madrid, May 15, 1651.

27 AGI, Lima, 1271, Cédula, Madrid, August 13,1646; The crown allowed that if two acceptable candidates for the post of ensayador mayor could be found, both could be named to share the responsibilities and benefits of office. In this way the two officials could oversee each others work and thus minimize the chance of fraud or mistakes.

28 AGI, Lima, 1271, Conde de Alba de Liste to crown, Lima, August 12, 1658.

29 AGI, Lima, 1271, Tomás Berjón de Caviedes to crown, Lima, November 10,1660. The political infighting continued even after the death of Francisco de Villegas, when the crown named his son Juan to succeed him. AGI, Lima, 1271, Título de Juan de Villegas, Madrid, March 15, 1670.

30 AGI, Lima, 309, Pedro de Villagómez to crown, Lima, April 28, 1634.

31 AGI, Indiferente general, 429, Cédula, Madrid, May 27, 1631; AGI, Lima, 573, Cédula, Madrid, May 27, 1631.

32 AGI, Lima, 573, Cédula, Madrid, October 13, 1650; Lorente, Sebastián, Relaciones de los virreyes y audiencias. Vol. 2 (Madrid, 1871), p. 169.Google Scholar

33 AGI, Lima, 278, Lázaro de Juloguamán to crown, Cajamarca, 1650.

34 AGI, Lima, 278, Juan de Meneses to crown, Lima, September 15, 1651.

35 AGI, Lima, 572, Crown to Marqués de Mancera, Madrid, June 9, 1644.

36 AGI, Lima, 573, Crown to Conde de Alba de Liste, Madrid, June 5, 1660.

37 Vázquez, Mateo, “Memorial del Perú de las cosas del Perú tocantes a los indios al muy ilustre señor Mateo Vázquez,” Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España, 94 (Madrid, 1889), p. 582.Google Scholar

38 AGI, Lima, 309, Pedro de Villagómez to crown, Arequipa, April 2, 1637.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Mendiburu, , Diccionario biográfico, 4, p. 309.Google Scholar

42 Ibid., p. 324.

43 AGI, Lima, 288, Juan de Saiceta y Cucho to crown, Lima, June 10,1684, November 14,1683.

44 Boxer, C.R., “Plata es sangre: Sidelights on the Drain of Spanish-American Silver to the Far East, 1550–1700,” Journal of Philippine Studies, 18 (1970), 466–469.Google Scholar

45 Austin Cole, Jeffrey, The Potosí Mita Under Habsburg Administration. The Seventeenth Century (unpublished Ph.D. diss., University of Massachusetts, 1981), pp. 115,Google Scholar 116, 274.

46 Ibid., p. 261.

47 Ibid., p. 267.

48 AGI, Contaduría, 1780A, Informe, Lima, September 1, 1665.

49 AGI, Contaduría, 1780A, Treasury officers of Lima to crown, Lima, June 20, 1639.

50 Andrien, , “Sale of Fiscal Offices,” pp. 51,Google Scholar 68.

51 Altoaguirre, , Memorias, 2, pp. 271,Google Scholar 273.

52 AGI, Lima, 280, Juan de Cornejo to crown, Lima, June 16, 1666.

53 Altoaguirre, , Memorias, 2, pp. 280–81.Google Scholar

54 Ibid., pp. 274–275.

55 Biblioteca National de Lima, Manuscritos, B1489, Residencia of the corregidor of Tarma, Lima, November 6, 1649.

56 AGI, Lima, 280, Nicolás Polánco de Santillán to crown, Lima, July 31, 1663.

57 AGI, Contaduría, 1780A, Conde de Santisteban to crown, Lima, February 12,1662, November 20, 1664.

58 Andrien, , “Reform, Resistance, and Imperial Decline,” p. 11.Google Scholar

59 AGI, Contaduría, 1780A, Conde de Santisteban to crown, Lima, February 12,1662, November 20, 1664.

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid.