¹ Richardson, James D., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents (Washington, 1896), II, 207 Google Scholar.

² The tremendous lingering influence of Europe upon Latin American psychology is very ably demonstrated by Madariaga, Salvador de, The Fall of the Spanish American Empire (New York, 1948)Google Scholar, passim.

³ This point is emphasized in João F. Normano, The Struggle for South America (New York, 1931), pp. 116–117. The author points out that “… the characteristic of the history of Brazil is the continental tendency of inclining toward the United States; of Argentina, the anti-continental sympathy for Europe; of the remaining South American countries, uncertain grouping and changing affection.” Normano also analyzes the Pan-Latin and Pan-Hispanic movements in Latin America which sought to foster a European orientation on the continent.

⁴ While the creation of the Hispanic confederation was the larger purpose for convening the Panama Congress, there were immediate results which were sought. Professor Whitaker submits five purposes for the conference: (1) a pluralization of the Monroe Doctrine to insure collective action, (2) issuance of a formal manifesto of independence from Spain, (3) a definition of the maritime rights of neutrals, (4) the planning of a combined operation against Cuba and Puerto Rico, and (5) a permanent system of treaties and alliances. Arthur P. Whitaker, The United States and the Independence of Latin America (Baltimore, 1941), p. 573. In the present study these aims are investigated only as they relate to the discussions in the United States Congress.

⁵ Central America was established as the “United Provinces of the Center of America” in June of 1823 after the collapse of Iturbide’s Mexican Empire.

⁶ Lockey, Joseph B., Pan-Americanism, Its Beginnings (New York, 1926), p. 313 Google Scholar.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ In the note of November 2, 1825, José María Salazar, Minister of Colombia, in inviting the United States to participate in the Panama Congress specifically stated that the subject matter of the Congress consisted of two classes: (1) matters peculiarly and exclusively concerning the belligerents, and (2) matters between belligerents and neutrals. He continued that he would confine himself to subjects of only the latter type. Pablo Obregón, Minister from Mexico, in his note of November 3, 1825,. reiterated this sentiment. These notes are found in United States Congress, Message from the President of the United States, in Relation to the Proposed Congress to be Held at Panama, Nineteenth Congress, First Session, March 17, 1826 (Washington, 1826) Doc. No. 129, pp. 38–42. These notes can also be found in United States Congress, American State Papers, Foreign Relations (Washington, 1858), V, 836–837.

⁹ Bemis, Samuel Flagg (ed.), The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy (New York, 1928), IV, 139 Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Richardson, op. cit., II, 302.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 318–321.

¹² Ibid., pp. 329–340.

¹³ United States Congress, Register of Debates in Congress, 1825–1826, Nineteenth Congress, First Session, Vol. II, Part 1, Column 150.

¹⁴ Ibid., 1826, Vol. II, Part 2, Column 2514.

¹⁵ See note from José María Salazar, Colombian Minister to the United States, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States, November 20, 1826. Manning, William R., Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin American Nations (New York, 1925), II, 1303–1304 Google Scholar. The report of the Mexican delegates relevant to the transferal of the conference to Tacubaya is contained in American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. VI, p. 362.

¹⁶ Richardson, op. cit., p. 318.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 319–320.

²⁰ Bemis (ed.), op. cit., p. 142. Among those who opposed the mission were Hayne of South Carolina, Woodbury of New Hampshire, White of Tennessee, Van Buren of Pennsylvania, Holmes of Maine, Dickerson of New Jersey, Benton of Missouri, and Berrien of Georgia. Robbins of Rhode Island, J. S. Johnson of Louisiana, and Daniel Webster favored the mission.

²¹ Richardson, op. cit., I, 213. Freedom of action is clearly implied in this quote from that message. “It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world. …”

²² American State Papers, Foreign Relations, I, 56.

²³ Perkins, Dexter, The Monroe Doctrine, 1823–1826 (Cambridge, 1927), p. 209 Google Scholar, citing American State Papers, Foreign Relations, V, 854.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 210, citing ibid., p. 908.

²⁵ Register of Debates in Congress, Nineteenth Congress, First Session, Vol. II, Part II, Column 154.

²⁶ Ibid., Column 155.

²⁷ United States Congress, Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, 1789–1856, House of Representatives, Nineteenth Congress, First Session, p. 138.

²⁸ Register of Debates in Congress, op. cit., Columns 178–179.

²⁹ Even on a world basis George Washington, in reality, in his message noted that “… we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.” And further he stated that “Harmony, liberal intercourse with all nations are recommended by policy, humanity and interest.” Richardson, op. cit., I, 213.

³⁰ Perkins, op. cit., p. 204. Professor Perkins takes care to emphasize the fact that the United States did not hesitate to call on these powers to use their influence to bring about a termination of the war. He also contends that this action showed a basic selfishness in the policy of the United States. These observations are cogent and admirably illustrate the point under consideration. The United States’ action was consistent with freedom of action in that no alliances or commitments were undertaken; at the same time, it certainly did not follow an isolationistic policy by requesting European influence in a matter which vitally affected this hemisphere.

³¹ Formal recognition of Chile, the United Provinces, Peru, Colombia, and Mexico was announced by President Monroe on March 8, 1822. Manning, op. cit., I, 146.

³² Richardson, op. cit., pp. 319–320. This position was reiterated by Senator Robbins of Rhode Island in supporting the Panama Mission of the Administration. See Register of Debates in Congress, op. cit., Columns 178–179.

³³ Abridgement of Debates of Congress, op. cit., p. 168.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 162.

³⁵ In the note of December 30, 1825, José María Salazar, Minister of Colombia, informed Secretary Clay that Colombia and Mexico were being forced to prepare for an expedition to the islands because of the obstinacy of Spain in not terminating the war. He stated that the new Spanish American Republics had given Spain time to reflect on the proposition that peace would mean retention of the islands by her. He further stated that the decision on Cuba and Puerto Rico must be made at Panama. Message of the President of the United States, in Relation to the Proposed Congress to be Held at Panama, op. cit., pp. 47–48.

³⁶ See note of John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State to Hugh Nelson, United States Minister to Spain, April 28, 1823. Moore, John Basset, A Digest of International Law (Washington, 1906), VI, 380ffGoogle Scholar.

³⁷ Professor Bemis submits that the United States since Jefferson had thought Cuba would eventually be included within the American Union. There were also hopes that Spanish misrule would prompt an offer of annexation from Cuba. However, there v/as no urgency and the principal fear was that it would fall into the hands of a major power. Bemis, Samuel Flagg, The Latin American Policy of the United States (New York, 1943), pp. 93fGoogle Scholar.

³⁸ The desire of the United States to insure the status quo of the islands was a major consideration in its efforts to promote a peace settlement between the Latin American States and Spain. The instructions to Mr. Middleton, United States envoy in Russia, were directed toward prompting Russian influence in Spain to settle the war. See communication from Secretary of State Clay to Mr. Middleton. Manning, op. cit., I, 273–274.

³⁹ Abridgement of Debates of Congress, op. cit., pp. 179f.

⁴⁰ President Adams in his message to the House on March 15, 1826, repeated the stand of the Administration with respect to Cuba and Puerto Rico. He stated “… that all our efforts in reference to this interest, the interest of the United States in the islands will be to preserve the existing state of things, the tranquillity of the islands and the security of their inhabitants.” Richardson, op. cit., p. 336.

⁴¹ Note from Secretary Clay to Mr. Middleton. May 10, 1825. Message of the President of the United States, in Relation to the Proposed Congress to be Held at Panama, op. cit., pp. 64–70. It is important to point out that this letter was used to prompt Russian influence in Spain to terminate hostilities.

⁴² Abridgement of Debates of Congress, op. cit., p. 132.

⁴³ American State Papers, Foreign Relations, VI, 361.

⁴⁴ On March 2, 1807, Congress passed an Act to Prohibit the Importation of Slaves. The United States Congress, The Public Statutes at Large (Boston, 1861), II, 246ff. In 1820 it enacted legislation declaring the slave trade to be piracy and the penalty of death was provided as in the case of piracy. Ibid., pp. 600f.

⁴⁵ Register of Debates in Congress, op. cit., Column 165.

⁴⁶ Ibid., Column 290.

⁴⁷ See remarks of Representative Thomas of Pennsylvania. Abridgement of Debates of Congress, op. cit., pp. 187f.

⁴⁸ An excellent analysis of such test cases is contained in Perkins, op. cit., pp. 185–207.

⁴⁹ The principle of consultation was formally enunciated at the Buenos Aires Conference of 1936 while the institution of consultation, the Meeting of Foreign Ministers, was established at the Lima Conference of 1938.

⁵⁰ International American Conference (Washington, 1890), IV, 113 and 143.