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Complaining Like a Liberal: Redefining Law, Justice, and Official Misconduct in Venezuela, 1790-1850*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 December 2015
Extract
One night in April 1822, a slave snuck into Caracas' main plaza, and under cover of darkness, threw the feces of his entire household into the public well. A month later, a local magistrate appeared at the store of José Castellano and Manuel Gonzalez with a contingent of soldiers and arrested them for having ordered their slave to commit this heinous crime. From their jail cell, the two men asserted their innocence and insisted that the magistrate had behaved unacceptably: “Because we have never had any previous warning, because we have not previously been called to appear in court and also because there is no proof … [the magistrate] cannot have been authorised to commit the public insult that he has shamelessly and scandalously put upon our persons.” Their defense relied not only on questions of evidence but also on attacks against the magistrate's civility; they claimed that his actions had transgressed both proper legal and social behavior. This combination of legislative and non-legislative concerns was typical for complaints against officials from the colonial period, and we see it persist directly after independence. In the coming years, however, the formal responsibilities of government employees would change, as would the paradigm for complaints against them.
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- Copyright © Academy of American Franciscan History 2009
Footnotes
*
I would like to offer particular thanks to Linda Arnold and Chris Albi for helping me to refine my ideas, and to Richard Warren, Greg Thomas, and the reviewers from The Americas for reading drafts and offering invaluable suggestions.
References
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35 See, for example: El Constitucional, 25 Oct. 1825, p.4; El Argos, 8 April 1825, pp. 3–4.
36 1821 constitution, Article 167: “Nobody can be judged, much less punished, except in virtue of a law that exists prior to the crime or action, and after having been legally heard and cited. …” The text of the 1830 constitution, Article 196, is virtually identical. The 1830 constitution, Article 190 stated, “Venezuelans have the freedom … to do whatever is not prohibited by the law.”
37 See Chiossone, Tulio, Formación Jurídica de Venezuela en la Colonia y en la República (Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1980), p. 192.Google Scholar For a wider and more theoretical discussion of legislative changes, see Carrillo Batalla, Tomás Enrique, Historia de la Legislación Venezolana (Caracas: Academia de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, 1984).Google Scholar
38 1821 constitution, Article 185.
39 1821 constitution, Article 180; 1830 constitution, Articles 185 and 210.
40 1830 constitution, Article 188. The constitution did establish property requirements to enjoy the franchise, but otherwise a citizen's political power (i.e., the power of his vote) and legal standing should not vary based on economic or social status.
41 The Ministry of Interior held responsibility for such diverse areas as the judicial system, communication between provinces, administrative standards and conduct, police, domestic peace, public education, religion, indigenous peoples, public health, the indigenous population, etc. For more on this lengthy list of responsibilities, see Plaza, “Patriotismo Ilustrado,” p. 75.Google Scholar
42 In the contemporary state of Zulia.
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45 In the contemporary state of Lara.
46 I&J, Tomo 4 (1830), Expediente 8, f54–58.
47 Fermín Toro (1806–65) was a very prominent figure in early republican Venezuela. He was a prolific writer and powerful politician who became one of the leaders of the Liberal Party and served a number of government posts during the 1830s–60s.
48 In the contemporary state of Nueva Esparta.
49 I&J, Tomo 87 (1834), Expediente 28, f29.1–3.
50 In the contemporary state of Zulia.
51 I&J, Tomo 91 (1834), Expediente 15, f108–110 and Expediente 16, f111–14.
52 I&J, Tomo 91 (1834), Expediente 4, f13–18.
53 In the contemporary state of Bolívar.
54 I&J, Tomo 387 (1849), Expediente 55.
55 See for example, I&J, Tomo 3 (1830), Expediente 36, f356; Tomo 4 (1830), Expediente 8, f54–58; Tomo 1 (1830), Expediente 1; Tomo 5 (1830), Expediente 31, f423–27; Tomo 91 (1834), Expediente 1, fl–8.
56 La Plaza Mayor, today called Plaza Bolívar.
57 AGN, CC, 1822, C–19, f1–4.
58 See footnote 36.
59 AGN, CC, 1826, H-10, f2b–3 and f3b–4.
60 In the contemporary state of Miranda.
61 AGN, CC, 1826, 1826, B–02, fl–2b.
62 In the contemporary state of Falcón.
63 Archivo Histórico de Coro (AHC), CC, 1832, #171, fl–lb.
64 AGN, CC, 1844, C–28.
65 AGN, CC, 1850, M–02, f7–8b.
66 In the contemporary state of Miranda.
67 AGN, CC, 1850, C–09, f6.
68 For example: AHC, CC, 1838, #441; 1839, #503. See also AGN, CC, 1835, C–02; 1849, M–01; 1849, P–06; 1850, C–14 #1; 1850, C–15.
69 For a colonial example, see AANH, 1804, 14–5736-1. For republican examples, see AGN, CC, 1822, L–04; 1826, M–05.
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