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Commercial Foot Soldiers of the Empire: Foreign Merchant Politics in Tampico, Mexico, 1861-1866

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 December 2015

John D. French*
Affiliation:
Florida International University, Miami, Florida

Extract

During the period from Mexican independence in 1821 to the end of the French intervention in 1867, Mexico's primary tie to the outside world was based on trade. The foreign merchants, who monopolized this activity, played a crucial role in the economic, diplomatic, and political life of Mexico. The current literature on these nineteenth century merchants includes studies of foreign groups, such as the French, detailed case studies of individual entrepreneurs, firms and merchant families, and one work that provides a unique state-centered perspective on the Mexican/merchant nexus. None, however, have tried to conceptualize the role of foreign merchants as a whole, across national lines and individual rivalries, in the port cities that were the central arena of contact and conflict with the outside world.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Academy of American Franciscan History 1990

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References

1 Enrique Florescano noted in 1977 the need for serious scholarly study of foreign merchants in Mexico in the pre-Porfirian period, especially their “social and economic position in the society of their time.” Florescano, Enrique, “Mexico,” in Latin America: A Guide to Economic History, 1830–1930, ed. Conde, Roberto Cortés and Stein, Stanley (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 450.Google Scholar For the most recent work on merchants in this little understood period, see the works cited later in this essay by Penot, Barker, Tenenbaum, Mayo, Cerutti, and the 1978 collection edited by Ciro Cardoso.

2 Walker, David W., Kinship, Business, and Politics: The Martínez del Rio Family in Mexico, 1824–18 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), pp. 1314.Google Scholar

3 Operating in “anarchic marketplace sometimes without law and often without justice,” foreign merchants were subject, according to Walker, “to illegal confiscations or outright robberies… by powerful local interests or a predatory military” as well as facing unfair “tax assessments… [and] blatant violations of the law” ( Walker, , Kinship, p. 14).Google Scholar Walker was especially critical of a properly influential article by Tenenbaum, Barbara A., “Merchants, Money and Mischief, The British in Mexico, 1821–1862,” The Americas 35, no. 3 (1979).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 Cardoso, Ciro, ed. Formación y Desarollo de la Burguesía en Mexico, Siglo XIX (México: Siglo XXI, 1978), pp. 1920.Google Scholar

5 Bauer, John, “The Evolution of a Mexican Foreign Trade Policy, 1821–28,” The Americas 19, no. 3 (1963), pp. 227, 233Google Scholar; Beltram, J. C., Mexico (Paris: Delaunay Libraire, 1830 Google Scholar; Querétaro: Francos Frías, 1852), p. 30.

6 Velasco, Luis y Mendoza, , Repoblación de Tampico, Documentos Compilados con Disertación y Notas (México: Imprenta Manuel Léon Sánchez, 1942), p. 26 Google Scholar; Genin, Auguste, Les Français au Mexique du XVIe Siécle a Nos Jours (Paris: Nouvelles Editions Argo, 1933), pp. 363–65.Google Scholar

7 Beltram, , Mexico, p. 30 Google Scholar; Bauer, , “Mexican Foreign Trade Policy,” p. 236.Google Scholar

8 Archivo Histórico Municipal de Tampico (hereafter cited as AHMT), 1826 Expediente 51, 1835 Expediente 94, 1859 Expediente 6, 168. For the 1845 figure, see Salas, Carlos González, Tampico: Mi Ciudad (México: Ediciones Contraste, 1981), p. 51.Google Scholar

9 de Tejada, Miguel Lerdo, Comercio Exterior de México desde la Conquista hasta Hoy (México: Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior, 1967), Chart 42.Google Scholar A recent study distinguished Tampico from Veracruz since the former served as a center for both distribution and business transactions by resident merchants. Veracruz, by contrast, served only an intermediary role since business operations were in the hands of large commercial houses located in Mexico City. This may explain, in part, Veracruz’s surprisingly small population of 10,982 in 1860 compared to Tampico with 6,168 in 1859 ( Domínguez, Carmen Blázquez with Concepción Ramírez, Hernández and Durán, Aurelio Sánchez, Veracruz Liberal (1858–1860) [Mexico: El Colegio de México, 1986], pp. 165, 199.)Google Scholar

10 For an overall description of the port of Tampico, consult Camara, Francisco López, La Estructura Económica y Social de México en la Época de la Reforma (México: Siglo XXI Editores, 1967), pp. 123–33.Google Scholar Carmen Domínguez has lamented “the absence of first hand documentation or specialized monographs” on the region of Tampico and Huasteca ( Domínguez, , Veracruz, p. 164).Google Scholar

11 Although this estimate for 1864 provides the most exact figures for the period of this article, we cannot know if the decline in comparison to the 1859 figures reflects an inaccuracy in estimation, an earlier over-estimate, loss of population due to the war, or differing boundaries. ( Díaz, Lilia, ed., Version Francesa de México, Informes Económicos, 1851–1867, [México: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1974], p. 298)Google Scholar Usually fluctuating between 10 to 20% of Tampico’s total population, the foreign community always included transient elements that lacked the long-term residence typical of the foreign merchant community. The French consul’s estimate of 800 foreigners in 1864 included a floating group of some 100 French from New Orleans and an unusually high number of North Americans. His report divided those from the United States into 25 whites and 250 French-speaking “people of color.” Al-though an Afro-American presence in Tampico can be documented since at least the 1820s, the latter group were most likely refugees from a Black colony established in 1857 in the interior of the state by Luis N. Fouche, “a colored native of the state of Florida.”(Franklin Chase, 13 October 1857; Dallas Historical Society [hereafter cited as DHS], Ann Chase papers A50144 MSB -2, pp. 84-85. The author would like to thank Thomas Schoonover for calling the Ann Chase collection to his attention.)

12 On the foreigners’ commercial monopoly in Tampico, see Humphreys, R. A., ed., British Consular Reports on the Trade and Politics of Latin America, 1824–1826 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1940), pp. 302–3Google Scholar; Latrobe, Charles J., The Rambler in Mexico (London: R. B. Seeley, 1836), p. 24 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Norman, Benjamin, Rambles by Land and Water (New York: Pain & Burgess, 1845), p. 100.Google Scholar Foreigner’s control of Mexico’s international commerce placed severe restrictions on participation by Mexican merchants. ( Canales, Inés Herrera, “La Circulación: Transporte y Comercio,” In: Cardoso, Ciro, ed., México en el Siglo XIX (1821–1910) [México: Editorial Nueva Imagen, 1980], 220).Google Scholar

13 Latrobe, , Rambler, p. 24 Google Scholar; de la Barca, Calderón, Life in Mexico (London: Chapman and Hall, 1843), pp. 430–31Google Scholar; Norman, , Rambles, p. 102 Google Scholar; El Restaurador de Tamaulipas, 29 August 1833, 5 December 1833.

14 Nationalist sensitivities among the port’s various non-Mexican groups could, on occasion, reach a flash point. In the second half of 1862, there was a public controversy between the Spanish Vice-Consul Ramón de Obregón and four German merchants who, having gotten drunk while celebrating a friend’s return to Europe, knocked down the Spanish coat of arms. Seeking a public apology for this assault on Spanish dignity, Obregón took court action and the two sides exchanged printed accusations. For details, see the 27 page pamphlet “Manifestación Documentada del Vice Consul Español en Tampico Ramón de Obregón,” (Tampico: n.p., 1862). These problems did not, however, bar simultaneous joint German and Spanish action to defend foreign interests.

15 Unpaid or poorly salaried, consular posts were invariably held by merchants in the nineteenth century. Merchants, for example, composed 78.5% of all U.S. consular appointees in Mexico and Central America prior to 1861 for whom data could be found. ( Burns, Gerald E., “A Collective Biography of Consular Officers, 1828–1861,” [Ph.D. diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1973], pp. 180–81, 207.)Google Scholar On similar conditions in the British consular service, see Platt, D. C. M., The Cinderella Service, British Consuls since 1825 (London: Longman, 1971), p. 42.Google Scholar

16 Building on Tenenbaum’s insight, John Mayo documents the open role played by the British Legation in Mexico City and the Royal Navy in defending and protecting illegal smuggling activity by a powerful British merchant consul. Mayo, John, “Consuls and Silver Contraband on Mexico’s West Coast in the Era of Santa Anna,” Journal of Latin American Studies 19 (1987), pp. 397403.CrossRefGoogle Scholar His essay suggests that Walker is mistaken when he argued that “foreign merchants probably preferred the more secure legal trade to the uncertainties of commerce in contraband,” an activity in which he believes Mexican merchants possessed a “comparative advantage.” ( Walker, , Kinship, p. 14).Google Scholar

17 Like the United States, European powers had long used “unsettled claims, alleged violated rights, and similar complaints to apply diplomatic pressure for imperialistic goals such as territorial cessions or grants of economic or transit privileges.” ( Schoonover, Thomas D., Dollars Over Dominion, The Triumph of Liberalism in Mexican-United States Relations, 1861–67 [Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978], p. 14.)Google Scholar

18 In 1861, the British Minister to Mexico privately acknowledged that many of the claims against Mexico were “trumpted [sic] up and fabricated as good speculations.” ( Bock, Carl H., Prelude to Tragedy: The Negotiation and Breakdown of the Tripartite Convention of London, [Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966], pp. 68, 300, 32–33.)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

19 Bock, , Prelude, pp. 83, 107, 111Google Scholar; Franklin Chase Consular Dispatches, 6 August 1861; Díaz, Lilia, ed., Versión Francesa de Mexico. Informes Diplomáticos (México: El Colegio de México, 1963–1967), Vol. 2, p. 264.Google Scholar

20 DHS, Ann Chase papers, MSB-9, p. 26; Franklin Chase, 27 December 1861; British Consular Dispatches, Tampico, Mexico, 28 December 1861; AHMT, 1861 Expediente 4.

21 DHS, Ann Chase papers, MSB-9, pp. 26–27.

22 Ibid.

23 Grajales, Gloria, ed., México y la Gran Bretaña Durante la Intervención, 1861–1862 (México: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores; 1974), p. 128 Google Scholar; Estrada, Genaro, ed., Don Juan Prim y su Labor Diplomática en México (México: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1928), p. 65.Google Scholar

24 DHS, Ann Chase papers, MSB-9, p. 26; Franklin Chase, 27 December 1861, 27 January 1862.

25 “Foreign life and property,” David Pletcher writes, “were never entirely secure in a country where revolution might break out at a moment’s notice, bringing crowds into the streets with the cry of… Death to the Foreigners! According to the French minister, this meant that people wanted to loot.” ( Pletcher, David M., The Diplomacy of Annexation, Texas, Oregon and the Mexican War [Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1973], pp. 53, 55.)Google Scholar For further examples of the scholarly influence of the xenophobic thesis, see Penot, Jacques, “L’Expansion Comerciale Français au Mexique et les Causes du Conflit Franco-Mexicain de 1838–1839,” Bulletin Hispanique 75 (1973), pp. 191, 193, 200CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Barker, Nancy, The French Experience in Mexico, 1821–1861. A History of Constant Misunderstanding (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979); p. 201 Google Scholar; Bauer, , “Foreign Trade Policy,” pp. 251–52.Google Scholar

26 Mörner, Magnus, “Problemas Que Presenta el Estudio Histórico de la Sociedad Hispano-Ameri-cana del Siglo XIX,” Cahiers dis Amériques Latins, nos. 9–10 (1974), p. 9.Google Scholar

27 “Against the French and English,” Prim also pointed out, “there is not, in this country, the hatreds and rancors that there are against the Spaniards.” ( Estrada, , Prim, p. 137.)Google Scholar

28 DHS, Ann Chase papers, MSB-9, p. 28.

29 Franklin Chase, 4 March 1862; Martínez, Vidal Covian, “Efemérides de la Intervención Francesa y del Llamado Segundo Imperio en Tampico,” Cuadernos de Historia 1: 8 (1967), 12 Google Scholar; Ann Chase papers. MSB-9, p. 24; de la Garza Treviño, Ciro, História de Tamaulipas (Anales y Efemérides) 2nd ed., (n.c: n.p., 1956), p. 133.Google Scholar

30 Díaz, , Informes Diplomáticos 2, p. 369.Google Scholar

31 Franklin Chase, 24 November 1862; Díaz, , Informes Económicos, p. 262.Google Scholar

32 Magnus Mörner gives another example of such a recourse to arms by the foreign population caught up in disturbances in the Chilean mining district of Copiapó in 1859. Discussing a travelogue by a German participant, he points out that “the solidarity and self defense of the foreigners could… [easily] lead to intervention” in local affairs. Mönter, Magnus, “European Travelogues as Sources for Latin American History from the Late Eighteenth Century Until 1870,” Paper 30 (Stockholm: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1981).Google Scholar

33 Franklin Chase, 24 November 1862, 30 April 1858; Díaz, , Informes Económicos, p. 242.Google Scholar

34 Díaz, , Informes Diplomáticos, p. 227.Google Scholar

35 Franklin Chase, 8 October 1863.

36 Franklin Chase, 2 March 1864, 15 August 1866.

37 de la Peña, Antonio y Reyes, , ed., La Insubsistencia de Una Convención de Reclamaciones (México: 1928), p. xv.Google Scholar Given to lively expressions of fear about the Mexican rabble, U.S. Consul Franklin Chase, nevertheless, failed to report a single incident of anti-foreign violence in Tampico between 1836 and 1866.

38 Mario Cerutti provides a remarkable discussion of the clash between the national government and the northern regional caudillo, Santiago Vidaurri of Nuevo León and Coahuila, who appropriated the customs house revenues destined by law for the national state. (Economía de Guerra y Poder Regional en el Siglo XIX: Gastos Militares, Aduanas y Comerciantes en Años de Vidaurri (1855–1864) [Monterrey: Archivo General del Estado de Nuevo Leõn, 1983]). At the same time, Cerutti does not explain how Vidaurri achieved his remarkable triumph over localistic factions within the region who sought control of customs house revenues for their own purposes.

39 The ultimate sanction in this ongoing conflict is suggested by an apocryphal exchange between a Mexican military man and a Tampico merchant. “When you fail to furnish us with the money for payment of our men, we will give them the privilege of paying themselves.” (Franklin Chase, 22 September 1866.) Yet this negative power was of limited practical utility, since its use would undermine the foreign commerce that financed all the Mexican factions.

40 The municipal archives contain many expedientes dealing with legal merchant resistance to local taxes. AHMT, 1861 Expedientes 25, 113, 127.

41 Franklin Chase, 27 January 1862.

42 Franklin Chase, 27 January 1862, 4 February 1862; Díaz, Informes Económicos, p. 252.

43 Franklin Chase, 27 January 1862, 12 May 1862; Dunn, F. S., The Diplomatic Protection of Americans in Mexico (New York: Columbia University Press, 1933), p. 118.Google Scholar As U.S. Minister to Mexico Thomas Corwin pointed out, the United States was at that very moment taxing its own and foreign residents to finance the Union side of the U.S. Civil War. The logic of the merchants’ position in this case led naturally to a demand for the establishment of full extra-territoriality, a common imperialist demand in Asia at this time.

44 Boletín de Noticias, 1 February 1862 in AHMT, 1862 Expediente 126; Franklin Chase, 27 January 1862, 4 February 1862; British Consular Dispatches, 27 January 1862, 23 August 1862. The British consul was trying to curry favor with the Mexicans in an unsuccessful effort to avoid his pending expulsion for his attacks on the Captain of the Port (Franklin Chase, 27 May 1863.)

45 Boletín de Noticias, 26 April 1862 in AHMT, 1862 Expediente 126.

46 See Voss, Stuart, On the Periphery of Nineteenth Century Mexico, Sonora and Sinaloa 1810–1877 (Tucson: Univ. of Arizona Press, 1982), p. 125.Google Scholar Foreign merchant “interference in political questions was notorious.” Carmen Domínguez has noted, since whatever the risks, “political agitation increased the power of the strongest commercial houses.” ( Domínguez, , Veracruz Liberal, p. 201.)Google Scholar

47 La Concordia, 15 June 1839; Franklin Chase, 9 March 1860; On the Federalist revolt in Matamoros, see Potash, Robert, El Banco del Avío de Mexico (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1959), p. 198.Google Scholar

48 Barceló, Javier Malagán, et al.,.eds., Relaciones Diplomáticas Hispano-Mexicanas 1 (México: El Colegio de México, 1966), p. 27.Google Scholar

49 Navarro, Moisés González, Anatomía del Poder en México (1848–1853) (México: El Colegio de México, 1977), pp. 316318.Google Scholar

50 Díaz, , Informes Económicos, pp. 212–13.Google Scholar Tampico’s trade, as foreign visitors often commented, amounted to a “regulated system of smuggling” by which “the purposes of the merchants were fully answered and at least half of the established duties saved to them.” Lyons, G. F., A Journal of a Residence and Tour in the Republic of Mexico in the Year 1826 (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1971), p. 36 Google Scholar; Latrobe, , Rambler, p. 24 Google Scholar; Mason, R. H., Pictures of Life in Mexico (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1852), p. 148.Google Scholar In many ways, the very concept of “smuggling” is problematic for this period in Mexico since it assumes a sovereign national state.

51 Díaz, , Informes Económicos, p. 184 Google Scholar; British Consular Dispatches, 31 March 1861. There is a perverse logic to the dilemma facing Mexican authorities in this situation of incomplete sovereignty. When the need for resources is the greatest, a sovereign state can increase its share of the proceeds of economic activity through taxation and other measures. In the Mexican case, however, it is precisely at the moment of greatest need that authorities have the least leverage over those who control liquid wealth such as merchants. As Cerutti documents, Vidaurri's response to political and military crisis was to decrease rather than increase customs duties. As this and other incidents suggests, even a relatively successful regional caudillo held at best modest power in his relations with local merchants. Later Vidaurri increased tariffs for cotton during the U.S. Civil War but only because the southerners, facing an increasingly successful Union blockade, had no alternative outlet for their cotton. ( Cerutti, , Economía, pp. 96, 76, 80, 160–2, 198, 107.)Google Scholar

52 Such pressures helped force Mexico to make good on the seizures of conductas carrying specie in Tamaulipas in 1861. Díaz, , ed., Informes Económicos, p. 251.Google Scholar

53 Manning, W. R., ed., The Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States: Inter-American Affairs, 1831–1860 9, (Washington D.C., 1932–1939), pp. 859, 904Google Scholar; Thompson, Waddy, Recollections of Mexico (New York: Wiley & Putnam, 1847), p. 227.Google Scholar

54 For a full discussion of the commercial mission of the nineteenth century U.S. Navy, see Karsten, Peter, The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism (New York: The Free Press), pp. 152, 161, 174–75, 201.Google Scholar On Spanish, French, and U.S. naval visits, see Barceló, , Relaciones Diplomáticas 1, pp. 141, 191–92Google Scholar; Díaz, , Informes Diplomáticos 2, p. 143 Google Scholar; U.S. National Archives and Record Service, Record Group 24, “Ship’s Log, USS Fulton, October 6, 1857-August 9, 1858.’ For a U.S. naval officer’s account of conducting negotiations with Mexican authorities, including President Juárez, on behalf of local Tampico merchants, see Dahlgren, Madeline, Memoirs of John A. Dahlgren (Boston: James Osgood & Co., 1882), pp. 213216.Google Scholar Like a disgusted Dahlgren, a British naval officer on the West Coast of Mexico in 1844 spoke openly about his “strong inclination” to teach a lesson to the Mexican official who tried to interfere with his embarcation of illegal silver contraband ( Mayo, , “Consuls,” p. 401).Google Scholar

55 Díaz, , Informes Económicos, p. 240 Google Scholar; Weckmann, Luis, Las Relaciones Franco-Mexicanas 2, p. 32.Google Scholar

56 For a detailed examination of such special deals from the Mexican side, see the discussion of government finance in northeastern Mexico during the Wars of Reform in Mario Cerutti, Economía de Guerra. See also his “Guerras Civiles, Frontera Norte y Formación de Capitales en México en Años de la Reforma,” Boletín Americanista 33 (1983), pp. 235–6; Cerutti, Mario, “El Préstamo Prebancario en el noreste de México: Las Actividades de los Grandes Comerciantes de Monterrey (1855–1890), In: Ludlow, Leonor y Marichal, Carlos, eds. Banca y Poder en México (1800–1925) (México: Grijalbo, 1985), pp. 122–3.Google Scholar

57 Díaz, , ed., Informes Diplomáticos, Vol, 3, pp. 212–3Google Scholar; Díaz, , ed., Informes Económicos, p. 267.Google Scholar

58 Weckmann, , Relaciones Hispano-Mexicanas, Vol. 2, p. 107 Google Scholar; Franklin Chase, 8 May 1856.

59 Díaz, , ed., Informes Económicos, p. 255 Google Scholar; Franklin Chase, 28 June 1862.

60 Díaz, , ed., Informes Económicos, p. 267.Google Scholar

61 Díaz, , ed., Informes Diplomáticos, Vol. 3, p. 212213.Google Scholar

62 Tampico’s foreign merchants envied the success achieved by their Texas trading partners, McKinney and Williams, during the 1830s. By financing and supplying the Texas revolt in 1835, the McKinney and Williams firm had guaranteed themselves a favored status in the Lone Star Republic in the form of customs waivers, repayment of their loans, and the right to form the state’s first and, until 1865, only chartered bank—despite a constitutional ban on corporate banking. Frantz, Joe B., “The Mercantile House of McKinney & Williams, Underwriters of the Texas Revolution,” Bulletin of the Business History Society, Vol. 26 1 (1952).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

63 Franklin Chase, 21 July 1862; 7 August 1862; Díaz, ed., Informes Diplomáticos, Vol, 3, p. 201–206, 212–213, 216.

64 Díaz, , ed., Informes Diplomáticos, Vol. 3, p. 226 Google Scholar; British Consul, 25 January 1864.

65 Díaz, , ed., Informes Diplomáticos, Vol. 3, pp. 250, 234–6.Google Scholar

66 Díaz, , ed., Informes Diplomáticos, Vol. 3, pp. 226–8, 232–3.Google Scholar

67 Voss, , On the Margins, p. 80.Google Scholar It is erroneous to emphasize solely the drawbacks of their involvement in domestic factional politics in Mexico. Discussing the national scene, Ciro Cardoso rightly points out that basically “such dangers were quite relative since the new regime…[being equally needy of their] financial support had in the end to reach an accord even with those capitalists who had been important backers of the government they had replaced: with the result that, after passing problems, in all cases the threatened entrepreneur could recover.”( Cardoso, , Formación y Desarrollo, p. 20.)Google Scholar

68 Díaz, , ed., Informes Diplomáticos, Vol. 3, p. 228.Google Scholar

69 Díaz, , ed., Informes Diplomáticos, Vol. 3, pp. 214 Google Scholar; Niox, , Expedition du Méxique, 1861–1867 (Paris: 1874), pp. 228, 310, 390.Google Scholar

70 Martin, Charles, Campagne du Méxique (Paris: Tonera, 1863), p. 132 Google Scholar; Díaz, , ed., Informes Diplomáticos, Vol. 3, p. 210.Google Scholar Competition between ports was a recurring problem. For another example, see the defense offered by the Veracruz customs house against charges that it was charging lower duties to the detriment of merchants in Tampico, (Vindicación de la Aduana Maritima de Veracruz con Motivo de las Inculpaciones que le Hacen los Comerciantes de Tampico [Mexico: Imprenta de I. Cumplido, 1869]).Google Scholar

71 Dabbs, Jack A., The French Army in Mexico, 1861–1867 (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1963), p. 62 Google Scholar; Niox, , Expédition, p. 427 Google Scholar; de Kératry, Emile, La Contre-Guérilla Français au Méxique (Paris: Libraire Internationale, 1869), p. 312.Google Scholar For a brief biographical summary of Du Pin’s life, see Dictionnaire de Biographie Française, Vol. 12 (Paris: 1970), p. 362.

72 British Consular Dispatches, 28 August 1863; on French “outrages,” including the arrest and imprisonment of North American citizens, see Franklin Chase, 27 April 1864; 9 June 1864; 16 February 1866.

73 British Consular Dispatches, 28 August 1863; Franklin Chase, 22 April 1864; 27 June 1864; 27 July 1864.

74 Kératry, , Contre-Guérilla, pp. 15960 Google Scholar; Franklin Chase, 27 June 1864.

75 Kératry, , Contre-Guérilla, pp. 151 Google Scholar; British Consular Dispatches, 27 August 1864.

76 Franklin Chase, 27 March 1866; 26 February 1866.

77 British Consular Dispatches, 27 August 1864; Díaz, , ed., Informes Diplomáticos, Vol. 4, pp. 107, 135–36, 302, 271Google Scholar; Franklin Chase, 27 February 1866.

78 Ruiz, Jesús, ed., México en 1863, Testimonios Germanos Sobre la Intervención Francesa (México: Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1974), p. 98.Google Scholar

79 For a detailed analysis of Franklin Chase’s rhetoric in this regard, see French, John D., “A U.S. Merchant Consul and the Foreign Community: Franklin Chase and His Friends and Enemies at Tampico, Mexico 1861–1865” (M.A. thesis, University of Pittsburgh, 1978).Google Scholar See also Barker, Nancy N., “The Factor of ‘Race’ in the French Experience in Mexico, 1821–1861,” Hispanic American Historical Review 59:1 (1979), 6480.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

80 Blumberg, Arnold, The Diplomacy of the Mexican Empire, 1863–1867 (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1971), p. 70.Google Scholar

81 Blumberg, , Diplomacy, pp. 7174 Google Scholar; Díaz, , ed., Informes Diplomáticos, Vol. 4, pp. 272, 294.Google Scholar

82 Recalling the past year, Franklin Chase reported in late 1866 that Tampico’s merchants had grown “fatigued and disgusted by the arbitrary acts of power which the French rulers wielded over the merchants of this place.” Writing after the Mexican reoccupation, he wrote that merchants had “finally smuggled out supplies and money to the liberals” to facilitate their reoccupation of the port. (Franklin Chase, 22 September 1866; 4 & 8 August 1866).

83 DHS, Ann Chase, MSB-9; Voss, , On the Periphery, p. 173 Google Scholar; Cerutti, , “Guerras Civiles,” p. 223.Google Scholar

84 Juárez, Benito, Obras Completas, Vol. 7, p. 263 Google Scholar; Voss, , On the Periphery, p. 80.Google Scholar

85 Franklin Chase, 9 August 1866; Martínez, Covian, Efemérides, p. 26 Google Scholar; Peña, y Reyes, , Insubsistencia, pp. 27, viii.Google Scholar

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