¹ Ronning, C. Neale and Vannucci, Albert P., eds. Ambassadors in Foreign Policy: The Influence of Individuals on U.S. Latin American Policy (New York, 1987).Google Scholar

² Ibid., p. 46.

³ Ibid., p. 111.

⁴ For a succinct explanation of hegemony, see McCormick, Thomas J., “World Systems,” in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, eds. Hogan, Michael J. and Paterson, Thomas G., (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 89–98.Google Scholar

⁵ U.S. Department of State, Biographic Register 1960, p. 134.

⁶ The papers of John Moors Cabot are housed in the Edwin Ginn Library, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts. The collection has been microfilmed by University Publications of America (hereafter cited as Cabot Diary, or Cabot Papers with reel numbers). For Cabot’s public speeches and interviews, see Cabot, John M., Toward Our Common Destiny (Medford, MA, 1955).Google Scholar

⁷ The New York Times, 12 March 1972.

⁸ Schlesinger, Stephen and Kinzer, Stephen, Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala (New York, 1982), pp. 82–83;Google Scholar The New York Times, 25 February 1981.

⁹ For examples of Cabot’s views, see Cabot, John Moors, First Line of Defense: Forty Years’ Experiences of a Career Diplomat (Washington, D.C., 1979), pp. 133–61.Google Scholar On U.S. racism towards Latin America, see Hunt, Michael H., Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, 1987);Google Scholar Krenn, Michael, U.S. Policy Toward Economic Nationalism in Latin America, 1917–1929 (Wilmington, DE, 1990);Google Scholar Black, George, The Good Neighbor: How the United States Wrote the History of Central America and the Caribbean (New York, 1988);Google Scholar Powell, Philip Wayne, Tree of Hate: Propaganda and Prejudices Affecting United States Relations with the Hispanic World (New York, 1971);Google Scholar Johnson, John J., Latin America in Caricature (Austin, 1993);Google Scholar and Pike, Frederick B., The United States and Latin America: Myths and Stereotypes of Civilization and Nature (Austin, 1992).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Cabot Diary, 13 August, 17 November 1959; and 25 August 1960.

¹¹ Cabot, , First Line of Defense, p. 114.Google Scholar

¹² For general studies of the U.S. response to Latin American nationalism, see Rabe, Stephen G., Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism (Chapel Hill, 1988);Google Scholar Krenn, , U.S. Policy Toward Economic Nationalism; Robert H. Swansbrough, The Embattled Colossus: Economic Nationalism and United States Investors in Latin America (Gainesville, 1976);Google Scholar Biaiser, Cole, The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America 1910–1985 rev. ed. (Pittsburgh, 1985);Google Scholar Parkinson, F., Latin America, The Cold War, and the World Powers: A Study in Diplomatic History (Beverly Hills, 1974);Google Scholar and Langley, Lester, America and the Americas: The United States and the Western Hemisphere (Athens, GA, 1989).Google Scholar Some revealing case studies are Immerman, Richard H., CIA in Guatemala (Austin, 1982);Google Scholar and Pérez, Louis, Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy (Athens, GA, 1990).Google Scholar For a recent historiographical essay, see Gilderhus, Mark T., “An Emerging Synthesis? U.S.-Latin American Relations since the Second World War,” Diplomatic History 16 (Summer 1992), 429–52.Google Scholar

¹³ For the rise of Venezuelan nationalism, see Rabe, Stephen G., The Road to OPEC: United States Relations with Venezuela, 1919–1976 (Austin, 1982).Google Scholar On the consequences of Nixon’s reception for U.S. foreign policy, see Zahniser, Marvin R. and Weis, W. Michael, “A Diplomatic Pearl Harbor? Richard Nixon’s Goodwill Mission to Latin America in 1958,” Diplomatic History 13 (Spring 1989), 163–90.Google Scholar On the Panamanian riots, see LaFeber, Walter, The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective (New York, 1989), rev. éd., pp. 98–102.Google Scholar

¹⁴ “OCB Report on NSC 5613/1, CIA Intelligence Annex B, Sino-Soviet Bloc Activities in Latin America,” 15 April 1958, White House Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Records (hereafter OSANSA), NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, box 18, folder “NSC 5613/1 (1),” Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas (hereafter Eisenhower Library). U.S. policy planning documents throughout 1958 give the impression that communist influence was actually growing in Brazil. But the Brazilian Communist Party (Partido Comunista do Brasil, or PCB) had actually lost about two-thirds of its members between 1955 and 1958, mostly because of internal party purges and defections following Nikita Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin in 1956. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957 (Washington, 1987), 7:647 (hereafter FRUS, with year and volume number); FRUS, 1955–1957 6:25; FRUS, 1958–1960 5:6, 13–14, 39, 58; and Chilcote, Ronald H., The Brazilian Communist Party (New York, 1974), pp. 66–73.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Rabe, Stephen G., “Dulles, Latin America, and Cold War Anticommunism,” in John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War, ed. Immerman, Richard H. (Princeton, 1990), p. 181.Google Scholar

¹⁶ OCB Report on Latin America to the NSC, 21 May 1958, FRUS, 1958–1960 5:4–5.

¹⁷ The NSC described the importance of Latin America to the United States in NSC 5902/1, Annex B, 16 February 1959, FRUS 1958–1960 5:104–116. For a list of U.S. interests in Brazil, see FRUS, 1955–1957 6:36–38.

¹⁸ Memorandum of Discussion at the 369th Meeting of the National Security Council, 19 June 1958, FRUS, 1958–1960 5:29–30.

¹⁹ Rabe, , Eisenhower and Latin America, p. 69;Google Scholar Immerman, , CIA in Guatemala, pp. 148–49;Google Scholar Schle-singer, and Kinzer, , Bitter Fruit, p. 145.Google Scholar Cabot contends that he lost his position because Eisenhower's Texas supporters wanted to replace him with Holland, Henry. Cabot, , First Line of Defense, p. 91.Google Scholar

²⁰ The New York Times, 29 April 1959; U.S. Congress, Senate, , Nomination of Clare Booth Luce to be Ambassador to Brazil, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 1959;Google Scholar Briggs, Ellis, Farewell to Foggy Bottom: The Recollections of a Career Diplomat (New York, 1964), 146;Google Scholar Ellis O. Briggs, oral history interview transcript, OH-172, Eisenhower Library (hereafter Briggs oral history interview); 4 May 1959, Cabot Diary.

²¹ The “special relationship” began when Brazilian Foreign Minister Baron of Rio-Branco (1909–1912) shifted Brazil’s “diplomatic axis from London to Washington.” Burns, E. Bradford, The Unwritten Alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations (New York, 1966), 9.Google Scholar For the growing influence of the United States in Brazil following the Second World War, see Haines, Gerald K., The Americanization of Brazil: A Study of U.S. Cold War Diplomacy in the Third World, 1945–1954 (Wilmington, DE, 1989).Google Scholar On the erosion of U.S.-Brazilian relations during the Cold War, see Hilton, Stanley E., “The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War: End of the Special Relationship,” Journal of American History 68 (December 1981), 599–624;Google Scholar Hilton, Stanley E., “Brazil’s International Economic Strategy, 1945–1960: Revival of the German Option,” Hispanic American Historical Review 66 (May 1986), 290–92,Google Scholar 317. The decline in relations is also traced in Weis, W. Michael, “Roots of Estrangement: The United States and Brazil, 1950–1961” (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1987);Google Scholar and Weis, W. Michael, Cold Warriors and Coups D’etat: Brazilian-American Relations, 1945–1965 (Albuquerque, 1993).Google Scholar

²² Loyd A., Free, Some International Implications of the Political Psychology of Brazilians (Princeton, NJ, 1961), pp. 6–9.Google Scholar

²³ Bums, E. Bradford, Nationalism in Brazil (New York, 1968), p. 92.Google Scholar

²⁴ Flynn, Peter, Brazil: A Political Analysis (London, 1978), pp. 195–203,Google Scholar points out that the middle and upper classes prospered more than the working class under developmental nationalism. See also Skidmore, Thomas E., Politics in Brazil, 1930–1964: An Experiment in Democracy (New York, 1967), pp. 89, 164.Google Scholar

²⁵ Skidmore, , Politics in Brazil, p. 174.Google Scholar Falling world coffee prices added to Brazil’s fiscal woes. See Weis, , “Roots,” pp. 280–81.Google Scholar

²⁶ Hilton, , “United States, Brazil; and the Cold War,” p. 623;Google Scholar Weis, , “Roots,” pp. 276–78.Google Scholar

²⁷ Baklanoff, Eric N., ed. New Perspectives of Brazil (Nashville, 1966), p. 109.Google Scholar

²⁸ Memorandum to DDE, 1 May 1959, Whitman File, International Series, box 4, folder “Brazil (5),” Eisenhower Library (hereafter Whitman file with filing information). For examples of prominent U.S. corporations in Brazil, see Ralph Burton to Cabot, “Brazilian Participation in, and Labor Practices of, American Enterprise in São Paulo,” 6 October 1959, reel 4, Cabot Papers.

²⁹ For a statistical profile of Brazilian nationalists in 1961, see Free, Some International Implications, p. 36. For general works on Brazilian nationalism, see Burns, Nationalism in Brazil and Skidmore, Politics in Brazil.

³⁰ Free, Some International Implications, p. 28.

³¹ The New York Times, 3 May 1959. For the U.S. Embassy’s assessment of the nationalist threat, see Cabot to the department of state, 4 May 1961, reel 5, Cabot Papers.

³² The New York Times, 3 and 21 May, 23 June 1959; Howard Cottam to Cabot, 29 May 1959, reel 3, Cabot Papers; and Congressional Record, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 24 June 1959, 105, pt. 9:11709. On the expropriation of American and Foreign Power, see Briggs memorandum to Rubottom, 14 May 1959, FRUS, 1958–1960 5:723–24.

³³ In early 1959 Kubitschek agreed with the IMF to implement a stabilization program. Named after the finance minister, Lucas Lopes, and the director of the National Bank for Economic Development, Roberto Campos, the Lopes-Campos stabilization program aimed to bring down inflation by curtailing state sponsored investment. Lopes and Campos wanted to take gradual steps to reduce inflation, while the IMF favored the shock treatment. The IMF’s veto power over Brazil’s economy weakened Ku-bitschek’s popularity. Under attack by nationalists, Kubitschek recalled his financial team from Washington in June 1959, and immediately regained lost prestige. See Weis, “Roots,” pp. 285–86, 356–57; memorandum to DDE, 1 May 1959, Whitman File, International Series, box 4, folder “Brazil (5)” and 410th Meeting of NSC, 18 June 1959, Whitman File, NSC Series, both in Eisenhower Library; Cottam to Cabot, 29 May 1959, reel 3, Cabot Papers; FRUS, 1958–1960 5:713–39; Alexander, Robert J., Juscelino Kubitschek and the Development of Brazil (Athens, OH, 1991), pp. 296–99;Google Scholar and Maram, Sheldon, “Juscelino Kubitsheck and the 1960 Presidential Election,” Journal of Latin American Studies 24 (1992), 134–35.Google Scholar

³⁴ 410th Meeting of NSC, 18 June 1959, Whitman File, NSC Series, Eisenhower Library.

³⁵ OCB Report on NSC 5613/1, 21 May 1958, FRUS, 1958–1960 5:8–9; OCB Special Report on NSC 5613/1, 26 November 1958, ibid., 47; Special National Intelligence Estimate 100–37–59, 10 March 1959, ibid., 369–70; Secretary Dulles telegrams to Embassy in Brazil, 18 November 1958 and 2 February 1959, ibid., 707, 710–11; 23 and 24 June 1959, Cabot Diary.

³⁶ 23 July 1959, Cabot Diary.

³⁷ Hispanic American Report 12 (October 1959), 576; 8 August and 9 October 1959, Cabot Diary; The New York Times, 16 October, 1 and 6 November 1959. President Kubitschek canceled the intervention on 9 November 1959. Cabot recounts the frigorifico problem in First Line of Defense, p. 111.

³⁸ Address before the American Chamber of Commerce for Brazil, American Society of Rio de Janeiro, and American Club of Rio de Janeiro, 12 August 1959, reel 3, Cabot Papers.

³⁹ Rio Grande Do Sul telegram to Cabot, 17 August 1959. For other reactions, see American embassy report to the department of state, 25 August 1959. For a comparison of Deputy Coutinho Cavalcanti’s and the American Embassy’s estimates of U.S. corporate profit remittances, see Walker memorandum to Cabot, 14 September 1959, all reel 3, Cabot Papers.

⁴⁰ Cabot to Saltonstall, 17 August 1959, reel 3, Cabot Papers; 15 October 1959, Cabot Diary. For Cabot’s criticisms of U.S. foreign investors in Brazil, see John Moors Cabot, “U.S.-Brazilian Relations: Problems and Prospects.”

⁴¹ Address before the American Chamber of Commerce for Brazil in São Paulo, Brazil, 15 October 1959, and Address before the Confederação Nacional do Commercio in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 17 December 1959, reel 3, Cabot Papers.

⁴² The New York Times, 16 October 1959; 18, 21, 23, 28 October, 3 November 1959, Cabot Diary; telegram 637, American Embassy to Department of State, 21 December 1959, reel 4, Cabot Papers.

⁴³ Cabot to Wallner, 14 September 1959; Cabot to Boonstra, 6 October 1959; Cabot to Nelson Rockefeller, 10 September 1959; all reel 3, Cabot Papers. On Cabot’s belief that the Brazilian media was thoroughly infiltrated by communists, see 10 and 19 May 1960, Cabot Diary.

⁴⁴ Cabot to Berent Friele, 17 Novémber 1959, reel 4, Cabot Papers; 20 September 1959, 14 and 16 August 1960, Cabot Diary.

⁴⁵ Cabot to George Phelan (American Consul, Recife, Pemambuco), 2 February 1960, reel 4, Cabot Papers.

⁴⁶ 28 October 1958, Cabot Diary. For other samples of Cabot’s appraisals of his 12 August speech and other speeches, see diary entries for 16, 20, 24, 26, 29 August; 2, 4 September; 21, 23 October; and 30 December 1959.

⁴⁷ U.S. Embassy to Department of State, 25 August 1959, reel 5, Cabot Papers. See public opinion data cited below for evidence that Cabot’s speeches were ineffective.

⁴⁸ For business meetings, see Burton to Cabot, 8 September 1959, 15 October 1959; Fowler to Cabot, 3 August 1960; undated memorandum to Cabot on twelve prominent Brazilian businessmen described as “Pro-American,” “anti-Communist,” or “Nationalist.” For labor meetings, see Cabot’s speech before a Brazilian labor organization, 29 August 1960, all reel 4, Cabot Papers. Cabot won praise in U.S. Congress for conditioning public opinion overseas to accept U.S. policy. See Congressional Record, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 6 April 1961, 107, pt. 4:5475.

⁴⁹ 16 September 1959, Cabot Diary.

⁵⁰ Cabot to Hugh Jencks, Creole Petroleum Corporation, 23 November 1959, reel 3, Cabot Papers. For the composition of UNE, see Therry, Leonard D., “Dominant Power Components in the Brazilian University Student Movement Prior to April, 1964,” Journal of Inter-American Studies 7 (January 1965), 27–48.Google Scholar The role of the JUC in UNE is explained in de Kadt, Emanuel, Catholic Radicals in Brazil (London, 1970), pp. 68–72.Google Scholar For the description of students as abolitionists, republicans, and democrats, see Myhr, Robert O., “The University Student Tradition in Brazil,” Journal of Inter-American Studies 12 (January 1970), 140.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Cabot interpreted the Times story and the editorial the following day as evidence that he was successfully shaping public opinion. The Times story and editorial did report that students found Cabot “charming,” but students also thought that the United States “sincerely tries to follow a policy of non-intervention” but “in practice this is not always the case.” 10 and 11 November 1959, Cabot Diary; The New York Times, 12 and 13 November 1959. Cabot to Friele, 17 November 1959, reel 3, Cabot Papers. For further accounts of Cabot’s meetings with students, including the controversy over the expulsion of a Fulbright professor, see 8, 10, 11, 15 February, 4, 18, April, 10 May, 28 October, 25 March, 3, 9 May, 1961, Cabot Diary.

⁵² Despatch 11, 16 September 1960, reel 3, Cabot Papers; 9 September 1960, Cabot Diary.

⁵³ Bonilla, Frank, “A National Ideology for Development,” in Expectant Peoples: Nationalism and Development, ed. Silvert, K.H., (New York, 1963);Google Scholar Weis, , “Roots,” p. 278;Google Scholar Alexander, , Juscelino Kubitschek, pp. 321–22.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Flynn, , Brazil, p. 206.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Burns, , Nationalism in Brazil, pp. 90–97;Google Scholar Dulles, John F., Unrest in Brazil, Political-Military Crises 1955–1964 (Austin, 1970), pp. 87–89;Google Scholar Black, Jan Knippers, United States Penetration of Brazil (Philadelphia, 1977), p. 38;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Wallis, Victor, “Brazil’s Experiment with an Independent Foreign Policy” in Contemporary Inter-American Relations, ed. Ferguson, Yale H. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1972), pp. 38–43.Google Scholar In his assessment of public opinion polls, Keith Larry Storrs found that the majority of the Brazilian public was apathetic about foreign affairs, but that the more educated sectors favored an independent foreign policy. Storrs, Keith Larry, “Brazil’s Independent Foreign Policy, 1961–1964: Background, Tenets, Linkage to Domestic Politics, and Aftermath” (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1973), p. 250.Google Scholar See also Free, Some international Implications, p. 70. On Brazilian reactions to the Cuban Revolution, see 10 August 1960, White House Office of the Staff Secretary Records (hereafter OSS), Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, box 14, folder “Intelligence Briefing Notes, Vol. II (5) [August-September 1960],” Eisenhower Library; and The New York Times, 26 November 1960.

⁵⁶ Kubitschek to Eisenhower, 22 August 1958, Ann Whitman File, International Series, box 4, folder “Brazil (6),” Eisenhower Library.

⁵⁷ Secretary Dulles to Eisenhower, Telegram 48, 6 August 1958, Ann Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, box 8, folder “Dulles, August 1958,” Eisenhower Library; Secretary Dulles letter to President Kubitschek, 7 August 1958, FRUS, 1958–1960 5:700; Hilton, , “The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War,” pp. 621–22;Google Scholar Alexander, , Juscelino Kubitschek, pp. 286–88;Google Scholar Briggs oral history interview.

⁵⁸ Cabot to William T. Briggs (Deputy Director, Office of South American Affairs, Department of State), 8 February 1960, reel 4, Cabot Papers. For Cabot’s opinion of OPA, see diary entries for 17, 18, 24 November 1959; 3, 28 December 1959; and 8 March 1960. The State Department hoped that President Eisenhower’s visit to would, Brazil “provide a needed psychological impulse to improvement in United States-Brazilian relations.” FRUS, 1958–1960 5:276.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ 24 February 1960, Cabot Diary; Young, Jordan M., ed. Brazil 1954–64: End of a Civilian Cycle (New York, 1971), p. 77;Google Scholar Hispanic American Report 13 (February 1960), 135.

⁶⁰ The New York Times, 26 February 1960.

⁶¹ 28 August 1959, Cabot Diary.

⁶² Hispanic American Report 12 (December 1959), 699.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 13 (February 1960), 135.

⁶⁴ Eisenhower also lectured the Brazilian Congress about permitting free flows of capital, which “knows no nationality, and … will flow where it is best served.” Cabot noted that the Brazilian Congress received the President’s references to private enterprise in “strong silence.” U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, New Directions for the 1970’s: Toward a Strategy of Inter-American Development, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, 556; Department of State Bulletin 42 (28 March 1960), 474–77; 24 and 26 February 1960, Cabot Diary. For the series of meetings between U.S. and Brazilian officials during Eisenhower’s visit, see FRUS, 1958–1960 5:757–68.

⁶⁵ Eisenhower’s visit ended on a somber note after a U.S. Navy plane collided with a Brazilian airliner over Rio de Janeiro, killing 61 passengers. See The New York Times, 27 February 1960; memorandum of conversation (Eisenhower, Walters, Kubitschek), 25 February 1960, FRUS, 1958–1960 5:764–66.

⁶⁶ “Toward Mutual Understanding Among the Americas,” Department of State Bulletin 42 (28 March 1960), 471–86. Some U.S. Congressmen shared the President’s analysis. U.S. Congress, House, Special Study Mission to Latin America: Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Panama, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961. On Eisenhower’s reception in the rest of South America, see Rabe, , Eisenhower and Latin America, pp. 136–37;Google Scholar and Herter memorandum to Eisenhower, 12 March 1960, FRUS, 1958–1960 5:279–80. Cabot thought that Eisenhower’s optimistic assessment of U.S.-Latin American relations was erroneously based on his goodwill tour. The President “certainly isn’t going to fool anyone” he confided to his diary on 9 March 1960. Cabot contributed to Eisenhower’s illusions, however, when he permitted his staff to report to Washington that the president’s visit had made a “favorable impact” that “was real and basic.” U.S. Embassy to Department of State, despatch 1019, 20 April 1960, FRUS, 1958–1960 5:771.

⁶⁷ Translation of Kubitschek’s letter to Eisenhower, 19 July 1960, Whitman File, International Series, box 4, folder “Brazil (2).” For further evidence of Kubitschek’s disappointment at Eisenhower’s failure to respond more positively to OPA, see Alexander, , Juscelino Kubitschek, p. 293.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Calhoun to Goodpaster, 30 July 1960, Whitman File, International Series, box 4, folder “Brazil (2).” The Eisenhower administration did contribute $500 million to the Inter-American Development Bank to help administer the Social Progress Trust Fund, a small-scale development assistance program for improving education, health, housing, and land reform. But Kubitschek wanted billions not millions of dollars for development, and many Latin American leaders believed that the Social Progress Trust Fund did not meet the particular needs of their countries. See Kubitschek letter to Eisenhower, 19 July 1960, FRUS, 1958–1960 5:778–81; and Rabe, , Eisenhower and Latin America, pp. 141–44.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Cabot letter to Rubottom, 4 December 1959 and Rubottom letter to Cabot, 18 January 1960, FRUS, 1958–1960 5:744–56.

⁷⁰ Hilton, , “United States, Brazil, and the Cold War,” p. 623.Google Scholar For an example of Cabot’s early pleas for greater U.S. developmental assistance, see 29 March 1960, Cabot Diary.

⁷¹ On the Alliance for Progress, see Rabe, Stephen G., “Controlling Revolutions: Latin America, the Alliance for Progress, and Cold War Anti-Communism” in Kennedy’s Quest for Victory, ed. Paterson, Thomas G. (New York, 1989), pp. 105–122;Google Scholar Levinson, Jerome and de Onís, Juan. The Alliance that Lost its Way: A Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress, (Chicago, 1970)Google Scholar. For a revealing case study of the Alliance for Progress in Brazil, see Roett, Riordan, The Politics of Foreign Aid in the Brazilian Northeast (Nashville, 1972).Google Scholar

⁷² “Establishing Relations with New Brazilian Administration,” 1 February 1961, National Security Files, folder “Brazil 1/26/61-2/24/61’; Rusk memorandum to JFK, 7 February 1961, National Security Files, folder “Brazil 1/26/61-2/24/61,” John F. Kennedy Library, Columbia Point, Boston, MA (hereafter Kennedy Library).

⁷³ Leacock, Ruth, Requiem for Revolution: The United States and Brazil, 1961–1969 (Kent, 1990), pp. 17–18;Google Scholar Black, , United States Penetration of Brazil, p. 40;Google Scholar Flynn, , Brazil, pp. 207–20;Google Scholar Weis, , “Roots,” p. 383;Google Scholar Roberto de Oliveria Campos oral history interview, Kennedy Library (hereafter Campos oral history interview). Quadros is quoted in Young, Brazil 1954–64, p. 73. On Cabot’s reaction to Quadros’s Cuban visit, see 9, 11, 14 March, 13 April 1960, Cabot Diary. In December 1960 Quadros, who had gone to London for an eye operation, declined an invitation to visit the United States. The State Department believed this evasion meant that Quadros would follow a foreign policy even more independent than Kubitschek’s. Cabot telegram to Department of State, 7 October 1960, FRUS, 1958–1960 5:790; Secretary Herter memorandum to President Eisenhower, 29 October 1960, ibid., pp. 791–92; U.S. Embassy in Brazil to Department of State, despatch 489, 13 December 1960, ibid., pp. 793–96; intelligence report, 6 December 1960, OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, box 14, folder “Intelligence Briefing Notes, Vol. II (7) [December 1960-January 1961],” Eisenhower Library; Cabot to Saltonstall, 17 January 1961, reel 5, Cabot Papers.

⁷⁴ John Moors Cabot, oral history interview, Kennedy Library (hereafter Cabot oral history interview). On the decorations in Quadros's office, see Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston, 1965), p. 179.Google Scholar In his memoirs, asserts, Cabot: “It was clear that Berle’s real mission was to enlist Brazilian support of the forthcoming Bay of Pigs operation. Cabot, First Line of Defense, p. 121.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Both Cabot and Roberto Campos, who was close to Quadros, later claimed that Berle’s offer offender] Quadros because it was such a crude attempt to bribe the Brazilians. See John Moors Cabot and Roberto de Oliveira Campos oral history interviews. Neither Cabot’s nor Berle’s diary entry for 2 March 1961, however, substantiates the contention that Berle had offended Quadros. Berle diary, microfilm, reel 7, Adolph Berle Papers (hereafter Berle diary). Quadros’s foreign minister warned the President beforehand that Berle would attach strings to his aid offer. Leacock, , Requiem, pp. 21–22.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ The New York Times, 3 and 4 March 1961; Leacock, , Requiem, pp. 22–23;Google Scholar Time 17 March 1961; Hickey, John, “The Day Mr. Berle Talked with Mr. Quadros” Inter-American Economic Affairs 15 (Summer 1961), 58–71.Google Scholar Cabot’s diary entry for 3 March 1961 confirms the allegation that no one from Itamarati came to see Berle off.

⁷⁷ Schlesinger to Berle, undated, reel 8, Berle Papers.

⁷⁸ The New York Times, 10 March 1961. There is no agreement on who was responsible for reports of discourtesies between Berle and Quadros. Berle suspected “a low echelon boy in the American Embassy circulating a completely false report.” Itamarati blamed the U.S. embassy. Cabot thought “sources close to Janio” were responsible for leaking the story. The editor of Correio da Manha claimed he had relied on an American source. Tad Szulc cited Berle as a source. 28 March 1961, Berle Diary; 10, 14 March, 10 May 1961, Cabot Diary.

⁷⁹ Untitled report, 6 December 1960, OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, box 14, folder “Intelligence Briefing Notes, Vol. II (7) [December 1960-January 1961]”; Mann to Devine, 17 December 1960, OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, box 12, folder “U.S. Policy Toward Latin America (1) [1954–60],” Eisenhower Library.

⁸⁰ Leacock, , Requiem, pp. 23–25;Google Scholar Storrs, , “Brazil’s Independent Foreign Policy,” pp. 304–85;Google Scholar Jânio Quadros, ”Brazil’s New Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 40 (October 1961), 19–27. For a definition of neutralism, see Brands, H.W., The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947–1960 (New York, 1989), p. 10.Google Scholar

⁸¹ 12 April 1961, Cabot Diary; The New York Times, 13 April 1961. For Dillon’s account of the meeting, see Leacock, , Requiem, pp. 23–24.Google Scholar For Cabot’s recollection of Dillon's visit, see First Line of Defense, p. 121.

⁸² 19 April 1961, Cabot Diary; Storrs, , “Brazil’s Independent Foreign Policy,” pp. 313–314.Google Scholar The Hungarian invasion had in fact split the Brazilian Communist Party. U.S. Congress, House, Special Study Mission to Latin America: Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Panama, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961, 11; Chilcote, , Brazilian Communist Party, p. 67.Google Scholar Cabot opposed the Bay of Pigs on tactical grounds. After the invasion he told U.S. labor leader Serafino Romauldi that further U.S. military intervention was unwise given Fidel’s popularity and the lack of a good excuse. See 26 April 1961, Cabot Diary. For Cabot’s reflections on the Bay of Pigs, see First Line of Defense, pp. 118–19, 121.

⁸³ Leacock, , Requiem, p. 19;Google Scholar Cabot to Waugh, 14 March 1961; Cochran to Cabot, 20 March 1961, reel 5, Cabot Papers; 22 March 1961, reel 8, Berle Diary.

⁸⁴ Leacock, , Requiem, p. 19;Google Scholar Cabot to Waugh, 14 March 1961; Cochran to Cabot, 20 March 1961, reel 5, Cabot Papers; 22 March 1961, reel 8, Berle Diary. Cabot also noted that Quadros had experienced visa difficulties during a former visit to the United States. U.S. immigration authorities had questioned Quadros under the McCarran Act, which prohibits foreigners with suspected communist affiliations from entering the United States. 16 October 1959, Cabot Diary.

⁸⁵ Cabot oral history interview; Bowles memorandum to JFK, 16 May 1961, National Security Files, folder “Brazil 2/25/61-5/31/61,” Kennedy Library; Cabot, , First Line of Defense, pp. 121–22.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ Bowles memorandum to JFK, 16 May 1961, National Security Files, folder “Brazil 2/25/61-5/31/ 61”; Bureau of Inter-American Affairs memorandum to Dungan and memorandum of conversation (Kennedy, Dillon, Leddy, Mariani, W. M. Salles), both 16 May 1961, National Security Files, folder “Brazil 2/25/61-5/31/61”; Bond telegram to Rusk, 31 May 1961, box 11, National Security Files, Kennedy Library. In early May 1961 an aid package was finally worked out. Between the IMF, the U.S. government, European governments, and private banks from both continents, Brazil received $656 million in new financing, and rescheduled $858 million on outstanding loans. Storrs, “Brazil’s Independent Foreign Policy,” p. 253.

⁸⁷ Adlai Stevenson’s testimony, 27 June 1961, U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), Vol. 13, pt. 1, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961, 322; Allen W. Dulles”s testimony, 2 May 1961, ibid., 408.

⁸⁸ Cabot developed a negative opinion of Quadros in early 1960. He also speculated that Quadros’s family history was perhaps responsible for his “unbalanced mind.” 9 March, 10 April 1960, Cabot Diary; Cabot, First Line of Defense, p. 122.

⁸⁹ Kennedy offered Gordon the post in April, but Gordon did not want to accept until September. Lincoln Gordon, oral history interview, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas.

⁹⁰ Cabot blamed Gordon and Adlai Stevenson for leaking the news. 13 May and 3 July 1961, Cabot Diary; Cabot oral history interview; Cabot, , First Line of Defense, p. 122.Google Scholar

⁹¹ Translation of portions of Cabot’s Press Conference in Rio de Janeiro, 6 July 1961, reel 5, Cabot Papers.

⁹² Storrs, , “Brazil’s Independent Foreign Policy,” p. 321.Google Scholar

⁹³ 11 July 1961, Cabot Diary.

⁹⁴ 21, 22, 25 July and 12 August 1961, Cabot Diary. A week after Cabot left Brazil, Quadros unexpectedly resigned from office. Quadros blamed his downfall on “terrible forces,” including foreign interests, but most analysts attribute Quadros’s resignation to domestic politics. See Leacock, , Requiem, pp. 33–47;Google Scholar Campos oral history interview; and Schneider, Ronald M., “Order and Progress” : A Political History of Brazil (Boulder, 1991), pp. 203–206.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ 17 August 1961, Cabot Diary.

⁹⁶ Although Brazilian Communists did follow a “national front” strategy by penetrating labor unions, the universities, and the media, they were by no means dominant in these organizations. The PCB, moreover, had been weakened by earlier purges and competition from other political rivals. To impute all Brazilian nationalism to the agitation of the PCB or even to their sympathetic followers, is to exaggerate wildly communist influence in Brazil. See Chilcote, , Brazilian Communist Party, p. 220.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ Conniff, Michael L. and McCann, Frank D., eds. Modern Brazil: Elites and Masses in Historical Perspective (Lincoln, 1989);Google Scholar Burns, E. Bradford, The Poverty of Progress: Latin America in the Nineteenth Century (Berkeley, 1980);Google Scholar Kaplan, Stephen S. and Bonsor, Norman C., “Did United States Aid Really Help Brazilian Development? A Perspective of a Quarter Century,” Inter-American Economic Affairs 14 (1973), 25–46.Google Scholar

⁹⁸ 23 April 1959, Cabot Diary.

⁹⁹ Rabe, , Eisenhower and Latin America, p. 110.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ Cabot oral history interview; 10 April 1961, Cabot Diary; Cabot, , First Line of Defense, p. 122.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ Ellis O. Briggs, Cabot’s predecessor, had also failed to improve the image of U.S. private enterprise in Brazil. See Briggs oral history interview.

¹⁰² During Quadros’s presidential campaign students held a skit in downtown Rio parodying Cabot as a stooge of Wall Street. See Bell, Peter, “Brazilian-American Relations,” in Brazil in the Sixties, ed. Riordan, Roett (Nashville, 1972), p. 81.Google Scholar On the disparity of power between the United States and Brazil, see Smith, Joseph, Unequal Giants: Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Brazil, 1889–1930 (Pittsburgh, 1991), pp. 204–205.Google Scholar For an account of the historic role of U.S. capital in Brazilian development, see Evans, Peter, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton, 1979), ch. 2.Google Scholar

¹⁰³ Paterson, Thomas G., “Defining and Doing the History of American Foreign Relations: A Primer,” in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, 36–54;Google Scholar Chomsky, Noam, Chronicles of Dissent (Monroe, ME, 1992), pp. 342–43;Google Scholar Pelz, Stephen E., “A Taxonomy for American Diplomatic History,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 19 (Autumn 1988), 259–76.Google Scholar