1 A detailed nation-by-nation survey of these new social and economic provisions is given in: Academia de Ciencias Económicas, Buenos Aires, Las cláusulas económico-sociales en las constituciones de América (2 vols.; Buenos Aires, 1947-1948)Google Scholar. On the revolutionary character and impact of the Mexican Constitution of 1917, see: Fitzgibbon, Russell H., “Constitutional Developments in Latin America: A Synthesis,” American Political Science Review, XXXIX (June, 1945), 518–520.Google Scholar

George I. Blanksten has defined this expansion of constitutional scope in 20th-century Latin America as a “fourth function” of constitutionalism.” The classic view of written constitutions is that they are designed to perform three functions: to limit the power of government, to set forth the basic outlines of its structure, and to state certain of the broad hopes and aspirations of the constitutions’ framers. Today many of the constitutions of Latin America attempt a fourth function: to render mandatory certain operations of government designed to contribute to the social welfare.” Blanksten, George I., “Constitutions and the Structure of Power,” in Davis, Harold E. (ed.), Government and Politics in Latin America (New York, 1958), p. 237 Google Scholar. This “fourth function” has been called “social constitutionalism “by Latin American legal theorists; see: Oscar Frerking Salas, “Las cláusulas económico-sociales en la constitución política de Bolivia,” in Academia de Ciencias Económicas, Buenos Aires, Las cláusulas, p. 64.Google Scholar

2 For the constitutions of Bolivia see: Ciro Félix Trigo, Las constituciones de Bolivia (Madrid, 1958)Google Scholar. In most of these 19th-century constitutions and especially in the 1880 charter, provisions for a type of parliamentary government were made through congressional right of interpellation and censorship of the cabinet. Stokes, William S., “Parliamentary Government in Latin America,” American Political Science Review, XXXIX (June, 1945), 527–528.Google Scholar

3 Russell H. Fitzgibbon, “Constitutional Development,” pp. 511–518.

4 For the best general political histories of this period see: Arguedas, Alcides, Historia general de Bolivia (el proceso de la nacionalidad), 1809–1921 (La Paz, 1922)Google Scholar, and Finot, Enrique, Nueva historia de Bolivia (ensayo de interpretación sociológica) (2d ed.; La Paz, 1954).Google Scholar

5 Francovich, Guillermo, El pensamiento bolivano en el siglo xx (México, 1956), pp. 83 ff.Google Scholar

6 For a discussion of the ideology and forms of expression of the new Chaco War generation see: Francovich, Pensamiento boliviano, pp. 82–83; Céspedes, Augusto, El dictador suicida, 40 años de historia de Bolivia (Santiago de Chile, 1956), p. 143 Google Scholar; de Medina, Fernando Diez, Literatura boliviana (Madrid, 1954), pp. 342, 358 ff.Google Scholar

7 A host of such groups were formed as early as 1934, the most important ones in La Paz being Beta Gama— whose members included Hernán Siles Zuazo, Victor Andrade, and José Aguirre Gainsborg—(El Diario, August 11, 1935; El Diario, July 25, 1935) and the Célula Socialista Boliviana, under the direction of Enrique Baldivieso and Carlos Montenegro {La Razón, October 2, 1935; El Diario, October 3, 1935). These two groups in turn merged and formed the nationally important Confederación Socialista Boliviana in November, 1935, which by early 1936 was known as the Partido Socialista. For the moderate reform program of these “Baldivieso Socialista,” as they later came to be called to distinguish them from the other various socialist positions, see: Confederación Socialista Boliviana, Programa unificada (La Paz, 7 de diciembre de 1935)Google Scholar; also El Diario, November 23, 1935.

8 A classic example of this was the pre-war political leader Bautista Saavedra, who renamed his Republican party the Partido Republicano Socialista and announced his adhesion to historic materialism, as opposed to liberalism. Saavedra, Bautista y Vázquez, Edmundo, Manifesto programa, Donde estamos y a donde debemos ir (La Paz, 30 de septiembre de 1935), p. 6. Google Scholar

9 For the ideology of the officer class in reference to fascism and corporatism, see: Arce, Pedro Zilveti, Bajo el signo de la barbarie (Santiago de Chile, 1946), pp. 23 ff.Google Scholar

10 As early as the 1920’s the radical Marof, Tristan [Navarro, Gustavo Adolfo] was expounding his revolutionary thesis, “tierras al indio, minas al estado.”Google Scholar For the fullest development of his ideas on Bolivian society and institutions, see: Marof, Tristan, La tragedia del altiplano (Buenos Aires, [1934])Google Scholar. A typical pre-war radical group was the Grupo Tupac Amaru which advocated violent overthrow of the government, nationalization of the mines, and collectivization of the soil by a revolutionary worker-peasant coalition. Tupac Amaru’s pre-war program is reprinted in López, René Canelas, “El sindicalismo y los sindicatos en Bolivia,” Revista Jurídica (Cochabamba), Año VIII (Junio de 1946), pp. 74–75 Google Scholar; for its anti-war propaganda, see: Grupo Tupac Amaru, Manifesto, La victoria o la muerte (al pueblo boliviano: soldados, estudiantes, obreros) (N. P., [1934]).Google Scholar

11 The best general survey for the governments of “military socialism” is: Machicao, Porfirio Díaz, Historia de Bolivia, Toro, Busch, Quintanilla, 1936–1940 (La Paz, 1957).Google Scholar Also see: Klein, Herbert S., “David Toro and the Establishment of ‘Military Socialism’ in Bolivia,” Hispanic American Historical Review, XLV, 1 (February, 1965), pp. 25–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

12 For a full discussion of all these various reforms, see the ministerial reports collected in: República de Bolivia, Departamento Nacional de Propaganda Socialista, Informe presentado por el señor coronel presidente de la junta militar socialista de gobierno al ejército nacional (La Paz, 1937).Google Scholar

13 Aside from the moderate groupings already noted, there were a host of more radical organizations which promoted far more revolutionary ideologies. Among these organizations the most important were: Grupo de Izquierda of Cochabamba (led by José Antonio Arce and Ricardo Anaya); Bloque Intelectual Obrero Avance of Oruro; Frente Popular of Potosí, the Partido Obrero Revolucionario and much later the Partido Socialista Independiente both of La Paz.

14 The impact of the war on the student movement was clearly seen in the IV Congreso Nacional de Estudiantes held in late 1938. Building on innumerable local university student meetings, it became a platform for the full elaboration of a most revolutionary set of ideological positions, and ended by advocating the overthrow of the existing order by a worker-student alliance. See El Diario, January 4, 1939; and Alberto Cornejo, S., Programas políticos de Bolivia (Cochabamba, 1949), pp. 297–300 Google Scholar.

15 The Bolivian labor movement, which had been smothered by Salamanca at the outbreak of the Chaco War, strongly revived in 1934 and 1935, and by 1936 was able to organize its first national confederation, the Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores de Bolivia. The founding congress of the CSTB also reversed historic labor pplicy in Bolivia and advocated outright affiliation with the small radical grupos such as those in Oruro, Potosí, and Cochabamba into Frentes Populares and direct involvement in elections, etc. El Diario, December 3, 1936. Also two years later the CSTB finally broke Bolivian isolation and became a founding member of Vicente Lombardo Toledano’s inter-American Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina. Augustín Barcelli, S., Medio siglo de luchas sindicales revolucionarias en Bolivia, 1905–1955 (La Paz, 1956), p. 146 Google Scholar.

The major Chaco War veterans organization was the Legión de Ex-Comb atientes which was founded in late September, 1935. El Diario, October 3, 1935. Although primarily mutualist in aim and apolitical by original program, the LEC, because of its size and intimate identification with the generación del Chaco, became a major power in the national political scene and had an important control over the direction of government affairs. More frankly committed to direct political action through party politics were the smaller ANDES (Asociación Nacional de Ex-Combatientes Socialista) and the AEP (Asociación de Ex-Prisioneros). For the program of AEP, see El Diario, August 12, 1936; for that of ANDES, see ANDES, Programa politico (La Paz, 1937).Google Scholar

16 For the establishment of the Constitutional Reform Commission, see El Diario, October 1, 1936, and for the electoral promises, see El Diario, November 3, 1936.

17 El Diario, July 14, 1937.

18 El Diario, November 23, 1937.

19 This very unusual composition of the Convention was due to strong government pressure at the polls. In preparation for the convention elections, the scattered moderate and radical leftist political elements had joined forces with the labor and veterans movements—the LEC and CSTB were both permitted to run their own candidates like regular parties (El Diario, August 28, 1937)—to form a temporary electoral coalition known as the Frente Único Socialista in February, 1938. Pledged to present a united list of candidates, it backed the Busch government and had reciprocal support from the latter as representing a government party. El Diario, February 18, 1938. With the government showing strong preference for the new grouping, many of the traditional political parties withdrew from the race (El Diario, February 27, 1938) and the March elections saw a major victory for the Frente slate throughout the nation. El Diario, March 15, 1938. In the actual composition of the convention, of the three great pre-war parties, the Genuine Republicans had no representatives, the Liberals two, and the Republican Socialists a somewhat greater number. Céspedes, El dictador, p. 166.

20 See, e. g., El Diario, May 25, 1938; El Diario, May 26, 1938; Ciro Félix Trigo, Las constituciones, p. 130; Céspedes, El dictador, p. 167. Also see the bitter remarks of Alcides Arguedas, who was defeated for a senate seat for La Paz in the Convention, who labeled the majority of the 1938 Convention deputies as “little men without names, without past, without distinction, almost illiterate and in truth obscure, really insignificant persons, anonimities . . .”, etc. Arguedas, Alcides, Obras completas (2 vols.; México, 1959), I, 1214–1215.Google Scholar

21 El Diario, May 26, 1938.

22 Convención Nacional de 1938, Redactor de la Convención Nacional (5 vols.; La Paz, 1938-1939), I, 31.Google Scholar This work is hereafter cited as Redactor.

23 Ibid., pp. 74, 76.

24 Ibid., p. 3.

25 Ibid., p. 20.

26 Ibid., p. 83.

27 Ibid., p. 59.

28 Ibid., pp. 60–61.

29 Ibid., pp. 63–64.

30 Ibid., pp. 64 ff.

31 This commission’s project, which heavily stressed the corporate state ideology of the Toro period and was strongly influenced by German-Italian ideas in this aspect (El Diario, January 28, 1937, February 2, 1937), was merely presented to the Convention by Busch without formal endorsement, thus giving the Convention full freedom to work up its own charter. El Diario, June 9, 1938, June 10, 1938.

32 Belmonte was one of the founders of the famous secret military lodge known as RADEPA which came to power in the mid-1940’s under Villarroel. Zilveti Arce, Bajo el signo, pp. 23 ff.

33 Redactor, II, 151–152.

34 Ibid., p. 153.

35 El Diario, July 18, 1938, July 16, 1938.

36 Redactor, II, 253–254; Díaz Machicao, Toro, Busch, Quintanilla, p. 83.

37 El Diario, July 15, 1938.

38 El Diario, July 16, 1938.

39 El Diario, July 22, 1938.

40 See, e. g., El Diario, July 27, 1938.

41 Article 17 states: “Private property is inviolable, provided that it fulfills a social function; expropriation can be imposed for reason of public utility, being authorized consistent with the law and previous just indemnification.” (The official text of the constitution is reprinted in Félix Trigo, Las constituciones, pp. 421–455). Other articles of the final constitution, however, considerably deviated from the moderate tone of this particular article, and provided for a far more leftist interpretation of private property and government control; see especially articles 6b, and 106–130.

42 Redactor, II, 529, the Espinoza proyecto.

43 Ibid., p. 530.

44 Ibid., pp. 533–535.

45 See debate, ibid., pp. 615–635.

46 This had been carried out by the Toro government in March, 1937. El Diario, March 16, 1937. For a survey of the whole issue see: Klein, Herbert S., “American Oil Companies in Latin America: The Bolivian Experience,” Inter-American Economic Affairs, XVIII (Autumn, 1964), 47–72.Google Scholar

47 Articles 18 and 110 of the Constitution.

48 Article 19.

49 Article 109.

50 Redactor, IV, 91. The convencionales also attacked the penchant of private road builders, notably Nicholaus Suárez in the Oriente and Simon Patino on the Altiplano, of preventing the public from using their roads and specifically provided that any road in the nation, whether publicly or privately built, was open to the free use of all (Article 26). For this debate see Redactor, II, 600 ff.

51 Ibid., IV, 91–92.

52 Ibid., p. 95.

53 Ibid., pp. 96 ff.

54 Ibid., p. 104.

55 This idea was incorporated into the famous June 7th decree of the Busch government in 1939. See Diaz Machicao, Toro, Busch, Quintanilla, pp. 101–102; Céspedes, El dictador, p. 202.

56 Article 6 on rights of citizens, provided that all persons had the fundamental right “to dedicate themselves to labor, commerce and industry only on condition that they do not prejudice the collective good.”

57 Article 125.

58 Article 126.

59 Redactor, IV, 215 ff.

60 Article 127.

61 Article 122.

62 Articles 131–134.

63 Articles 154–164.

64 Oscar Frerking Salas, “Las cláusulas,” p. 64.

65 At first basing itself on the Liberal beliefs of Simón Bolívar, who sought to create a small propertied peasantry in his famous decrees of Trujillo and Cuzco of 1824 and 1825 respectively ( Bonifaz, Miguel, “El problema agraria indígena en Bolivia durante la época republicana,” Revista de Estudios Jurídicos, Políticos y Sociales [Sucre], VIII, no. 18 [diciembre de 1947], 66-73)Google Scholar, the republican legislation established the non-recognition of the juridical existence of the comunidad, which was charged with being a reactionary institution. This legal attitude permitted the whites and cholos in practice to destroy the property rights of these communities and to dramatically expand the latifundia system with the open aid of the State, which refused to protect in law the property rights of the comunidad. See: Morales, Arturo Urquidi, La comunidad indígena (Cochabamba, 1941), pp. 79 ff.Google Scholar; also Moncayo, José Flores, Legislación boliviana del indio, recopilación 1825–1953 (La Paz, [1953]).Google Scholar

66 See, e.g., Redactor, V, 213–215. Also see: Mariátegui, José Carlos, 7 ensayos de interpretación de la realidad peruana (6th ed.; Lima, 1958), pp. 29 ff.Google Scholar

67 Redactor, V, 270.

68 Ibid., pp. 270–272.

69 Ibid., p. 277. Almost all of the deputies were constantly referring to the Mexican Constitution of 1917 when dealing with the problem of foreign investment and the Indian, and Guevara Arce even went so far as to quote the works of Frank Tannenbaum on the Mexican Revolution, ibid., p. 281.

70 Ibid., p. 282.

71 Article 165.

72 Redactor, V, 283–285.

73 For a description of this harsh system see: Reyeros, Rafael A., El pongueaje, la servidumbre personal de los indios bolivianos (La Paz, 1949)Google Scholar; and Rico, Remberto Capriles and Eguía, Gastón Arduz, El problema social en Bolivia, condiciones de vida y de trabajo (La Paz, 1941), pp. 42–43.Google Scholar

74 Redactor, V, 287–289.

75 Ibid., p. 335.

76 Articles 166 and 167.