² Archivos Nacionales de Costa Rica, Relaciones Exteriores Países, Estados Unidos, packet 1549, Alvaro Bonilla to U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica, Nathaniel Davis, March 3, 1948 [hereafter A.N.C.R.]. The opposition’s membership encompassed a wide range of groups from the rich coffee planters to middle-class intellectuals. It was unified by its disdain for Calderón and Picado.

³ The revolution and its origins are described in Aranda, Jesús, Los excombatientes de 1948–55 (San José, 1984)Google Scholar; Rojas, Manuel, Lucha social y guerra civil en Costa Rica, 1940–1948 (San José, 1980)Google Scholar; Baeza, Alberto, La Lucha Sin Fin (Mexico City, 1969)Google Scholar; Cañas, Alberto, Los ocho años (San José, 1955)Google Scholar; Bell, John P., Crisis in Costa Rica: The Costa Rican Revolution of 1948 (Austin, 1971)Google Scholar; Earley, Stephen, Arms and Politics in Costa Rica and Nicaragua, 1948–1981 (Albuquerque, 1982)Google Scholar; Creedman, Theodore, “The Political Development of Costa Rica, 1936–1944: Politics of an Emerging Welfare State in a Partriarchial Society” (Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland, 1971).Google Scholar

⁴ I utilize a broader, more anthropological definition of culture that contains several subfields. A good working definition is: “Culture is the way of life of a people. It consists of conventional patterns of thought and behaviour, including values, beliefs, rules of conduct, political organization, economic activity, and like, which are passed from one generation to the next by learning and not by biological inheritance.” Adam, and Kuper, Jessica, eds., The Social Science Encyclopedia (Boston, 1985), p. 178.Google Scholar Other influential works include: Hammond, Peter, An Introduction to Cultural and Social Anthropology (New York, 1971)Google Scholar; and Harris, Marvin, The Rise of Anthropological Theory: A History of Culture (New York, 1968).Google Scholar Several diplomatic historians, led by Akira Iriye, have increasingly emphasized culture in their works, although their works typically emphasize culture as the exchange of higher forms of culture that influence the elite policymakers. See Iriye, Akira, “Culture,” Journal of American History, 77 (June 1990), 99–107.CrossRefGoogle Scholar I utilize these concepts as well as add to them to incorporate the importance of culture in foreign affairs.

⁵ For more historical information on Costa Rica’s cultural development, see: Stone, Samuel, La dinastía de los conquistadores; la crisis del poder en la Costa Rica contemporánea (San José, 1982)Google Scholar; Fernández, Ricardo, Cartilla histórica de Costa Rica (San José, 1976)Google Scholar; Fonseca, Elizabeth, Costa Rica colonial; la tierra y el hombre (San José, 1984)Google Scholar; Meléndez, Carlos, Conquistadores y Pobladores; origines histórico-sociales de los costarricenses (San José, 1979)Google Scholar; Zamora, Elías, Etnografía histórica de Costa Rica, 1561–1615 (Sevilla, 1980)Google Scholar; Wortman, Miles, Government and Society in Central America, 1680–1840 (New York, 1982)Google Scholar; Gudmundson, Lowell, “Costa Rica Before Coffee: Occupational Distribution, Wealth, Inequality, and Elite Society in Village Economy of the 1840s,” Journal of Latin American Studies (Nov. 1983), 427–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Seligson, Mitchell, Peasants of Costa Rica (Madison, 1980)Google Scholar; Mavis, Karen and Biesanz, Richard, The Costa Ricans (Englewood Cliffs, 1982)Google Scholar; Hall, Carolyn, Costa Rica: A Geographical Interpretation in a Historical Perspective (Boulder, 1985)Google Scholar; Cardoso, Ciro, “The Formation of the Coffee Estate in Nineteenth-Century Costa Rica,” in Duncan, Kenneth and Rutledge, Ian, eds., Land and Labor (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 165–97Google Scholar; Torres, Edelberto, Interpretación del desarrollo social Centroamérica (Central America, 1972)Google Scholar; Ameringer, Charles, Democracy in Costa Rica (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982)Google Scholar; Karnes, Thomas L., The Failure of Union (Tempe, 1976)Google Scholar; Stansifer, Charles L., “Application of the Tobar Doctrine to Central America,” The Americas, 23 (July 1967), 252–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Obregón, Rafael, Hechos militares y políticos de Costa Rica (Alajuela, 1981)Google Scholar; Zelaya, Antonio, Cien años de libertad de prensa en Costa Rica: 1843–1943 (San José, 1943)Google Scholar; Hernández, Edward D., “Modernization and Dependency in Costa Rica During the Decade of the 1880s” (Ph.D. diss., University of California-Los Angeles, 1980)Google Scholar; Sancho, Eugenio, “Merchant-Planters and Modernization: Early Liberal Experiment in Costa Rica, 1849–1870” (Ph.D. diss., University of California-San Diego, 1982)Google Scholar; Cerdas, Rodolfo, Formación del estado en Costa Rica (San José, 1967)Google Scholar; Gudmundson, Lowell, Costa Rica Before Coffee (Norman, 1985)Google Scholar; Fació, Rodrigo, Estudio sobre economía costarricense (San José, 1975)Google Scholar; Seligson, Mitchell, Peasants of Costa Rica and the Development of Agrarian Capitalism (Madison, 1980)Google Scholar; Booth, John A., “Democracy and Citizen Action in Costa Rica: The Modes and Correlates of Popular Participation in Politics” (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas-Austin, 1975)Google Scholar; González, Luis Felipe, Evolución de la instrucción pública en Costa Rica (San José, 1978)Google Scholar; Jinesta, Ricardo, La instrucción pública en Costa Rica (San José, 1921)Google Scholar; Salazar, Orlando, El apogeo de la república liberal en Costa Rica, 1870–1914 (San José, 1990)Google Scholar; Muñoz, Mercedes, El estado y la abolición del ejército, 1914–1949 (San José, 1990), p. 104.Google Scholar

⁶ For more information, reference Froncek, Mary Zygmunta, “Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Costa Rica, 1823–1882” (Ph.D. diss., Fordham University, 1959)Google Scholar; Parker, Franklin D., Travels in Central America, 1821–1840 (Gainseville, 1970)Google Scholar; Curtis, William Elroy, “The Smallest of the American Republics,” Harper’s Magazine, 75 (October 1887), 668–82Google Scholar; Bancroft, Hubert Howe, History of Central America (San Francisco, 1887)Google Scholar; Munro, Dana, The Five Republics of Central America (New York, 1918)Google Scholar; Thompson, Wallace, Rainbow Countries of Central America (New York, 1926)Google Scholar; Jones, Chester Lloyd, “The Costa Rican Attitude Toward the United States,” World Affairs, 96 (March 1933), 41–43 Google Scholar; Gunther, John, “Costa Rica, a True Democracy,” Current History and Forum, 52 (24 December 1940), 11–13 Google Scholar; Herring, Hubert, Good Neighbors: Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Seventeen Other Countries (New Haven, 1941)Google Scholar; Crowther, Samuel, The Romance and Rise of the American Tropics (Garden City, 1929).Google Scholar

⁷ An interesting period that demonstrates the pattern of U.S.-Costa Rican affairs in the 20th century was the 1920s. Costa Rica supported U.S. initiatives in major issues such as the Soviet Union, but clashed with U.S. policymakers on regional issues such as U.S. intervention in Nicaragua. A good overall view is presented by Salisbury, Richard in several articles and his book, Anti-Imperialism and International Competition in Central America, 1920–1929 (Wilmington, 1989)Google Scholar; idem., “Costa Rica and the 1920-1921 Union Movement: A Reassessment,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 19 (August 1977), 393–418; idem., “The Anti-Imperialist Career of Alejandro Alvarado Quirós,” Hispanic American Historical Review, 57 (November 1977), 587–612; idem., “Costa Rica’s Stand on Recognition, 1923–1934,” Hispanic American Historical Review, 54 (August 1974), 453–78.

⁸ Trask, Roger, “The Impact of the Cold War on U.S.-Latin American Relations, 1945–1949,” Diplomatic History, 1 (Summer 1977), 271–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹ Booth, John, “Costa Rica,” in Greenfield, Gerald and Maram, Sheldon, eds., Latin American Labor Organizations (New York, 1987), pp. 213–20Google Scholar; Botey, Ana María and Cisneros, Rodolfo, La crisis del 1929 y la fundación del partido communista de Costa Rica (San José, 1984).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Torres, Fernando, Doctor Rafael Calderón-Guardia-esbozo biográfico (San José, 1940)Google Scholar; Calderón, Rafael Angel, El gobernante y el hombre frente al problema social costarricense (San José, 1942).Google Scholar

¹¹ Picado and Calderón did not continue close cooperation. There were some disagreements after Picado assumed the presidency, but the alliance was never destroyed. Furthermore, U.S. officials never truly differentiated between the two, maintaining the concept that both belonged to and owed their loyalty to the National Republican Party. For more information, reference Schifter, Jacobo, “Origins of the Cold War in Central America: A Study of Diplomatic Relations Between Costa Rica and the United States, 1940–1949” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1983).Google Scholar

¹² The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) had started monitoring the Communists in Costa Rica early in World War II. In mid-1941, the FBI reported to the White House that it had established a base of operations in Costa Rica. J. Edgar Hoover to Major General Edwin M. Watson, Secretary to the President, 27 November 1941, Office File 10b, File 998-A, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York [hereafter FDR Library], In September 1943 the FBI issued a report, “Totalitarian Activities in Costa Rica Today.” It emphasized that “there is no doubt but that the Communists of Costa Rica wield considerable power.” The organization contained an executive committtee and local cells composed primarily of workers in the government and banana industries. The FBI expressed “doubt as to the genuiness of the dissolution of the Communist Party,” highlighting that it continued with the same leaders and propaganda. It concluded that “the Communist Party of Costa Rica (PCCR) governs its acts according to the principles of Marxism, Leninism, and Stalinism.” Although the study downplayed the role of the Communists as a threat to U.S. security at that moment, the FBI took a much harder line in the postwar era and the corresponding rise of Communist paranoia. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Totalitarian Activities in Costa Rica Today,” September 1943, Private Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, FBI Reports, file #142, 118, FDR Library.

¹³ As cited in Green, David, The Containment of Latin America: A History of the Myths and Realities of the Good Neighbor Policy (Chicago, 1971), p. 181.Google Scholar

¹⁴ National Archives of the United States, Record Group 59, 818.00/8-145, J. Edgar Hoover to Chief of the Division of Foreign Activity Correlation Frederick Lyon, 1 August 1945 [hereafter N.A.].

¹⁵ N.A. 818.00B/4-1946, Hoover to Lyon, 19 April 1946; N.A. 818.00/6-1046, Hoover to Lyon, 10 June 1946; Alexander, Robert J., Communism in Latin America (New Brunswick, 1957), p. 40.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Groups within the foreign affairs bureaucracy competed to determine U.S. policy toward Costa Rica in the postwar period. This competition fits well into the concept of bureaucratic politics because the high officials were far more concerned with Communism in Europe and Asia rather than Costa Rica. This caused local experts in various departments in the FBI, CIA, and State Department to work to devise a response to the growing unrest in Costa Rica. More information on the concept is outlined in Clifford, J. Garry, “Bureaucratic Politics,” in Hogan, Michael and Paterson, Thomas, eds., Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations (New York, 1991), pp. 141–50.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Political opportunism rather than ideological grounds spurred both Picado and Calderón into working with the Vanguard. Although Calderón tried distancing himself from the Communist question, Picado remained loyal to the Vanguard. Picado’s son emphasized his father’s strong sense of loyalty, a personality trait that both Picado’s political supporters and opponents highlighted. Teodoro Picado-Lara, letter to the author, 13 September 1991.

¹⁸ N.A. 818.00/4-2645, Ambassador Hallet Johnson to the Secretary of State, 26 April 1945. Earlier Johnson highlighted a speech by Mora that called for class collaboration and cooperation with foreign interests. N.A. 818.00/2-2745. Johnson to the Secretary of State, 27 February 1945. Johnson also supplied a quote from a Vanguard publication published during its creation in 1943. “We declare that the Vanguard Popular is a party authentically Costa Rican … that it profoundly respects the religious sentiments of the people; and that its social aim is to prevent misery and ignorance in Costa Rica,” declared the Vanguard. N.A. 818.00/4-2645, Johnson to Secretary of State, 26 April 1945.

¹⁹ N.A. 818.00/10-2946, Johnson to Secretary of State, 29 October 1946.

²⁰ N.A. 818.00/5-446, Johnson to Secretary of State, 4 May 1946.

²¹ N.A. 818.00/4-1447, Johnson to Secretary of State, 14 April 1947.

²² Ibid. Vendors also hawked Mora’s 1940 pamphlet that attacked the imperialism of the State Department.

²³ Johnson to Harry S. Truman, 20 March 1947, Official Files, file 730, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri [hereafter Truman Library]; Several groups in Costa Rica resented Johnson’s open friendship with Picado. In a section, “Jokes and Hoaxes,” La Hora printed news of Johnson’s reassignment immediately beneath a section on the effort to remove Communists from the State Department. La Hora, 25 March 1947.

²⁴ N.A. 818.00/10-947, Ambassador Walter Donnelly to Secretary of State, 9 October 1947. Calderón understood the deteriorating conditions of international affairs in the postwar period and tried distancing himself from the Communist question. In June 1946, as he planned strategies for the 1948 presidential campaign, he met with U.S. officials including Spruille Braden during a visit to the United States. In the encounter, he declared his allegiance to the United States in their struggle against all foreign powers. N.A. 818.00/6-546, Memorandum of Conversation between Calderón, Costa Rican Ambassador to the United States Francisco Gutiérrez, Braden and Murray Wise, 5 June 1946. Later that year, he emphatically declared in La Tribuna, “I am not, nor can I be a communist, but I continue believing that communism is not combatted by showing it the big stick or jail.” La Tribuna, 1 December 1946. Johnson supported Calderón’s denials. “There is no evidence that Calderón Guardia is a member of, or has any sympathy for groups with communist leanings,” the ambassador reported. N.A. 818.00/3-2847, Johnson to Secretary of State, 28 March 1947.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Central Intelligence Agency, “Soviet Objectives in Latin America,” 1 November 1947, Personal Secretary’s Files, Intelligence Files, box 254, Truman Library.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ N.A. 818.00/1-2148, Memorandum from William T. Bennett, Jr., to Robert Newbegin, Robert Woodward, and Paul Daniels, 28 January 1948.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ N.A. 818.00/1-848, Chargé d’Affaires John Carrigan to Secretary of State, 8 January 1948.

³¹ Opposition members and government troops clashed in Cartago following a peaceful demonstration in a confrontation characterized as the “Huegla de los Brazos Caídos” (Strike of the Fallen Arms). Two people died and several were wounded by government soldiers. The opposition responded by calling a nationwide strike that closed most of the country down. After numerous confrontations, the crisis ended when Picado agreed to electoral reforms. Martz, John, Central America: The Crisis and Challenge (Chapel Hill, 1959), pp. 212–14Google Scholar; “Costa Rican Revolt,” Life, 23 (25 August 1947), 36; “Freedom to Campaign,” Newsweek, 30 (4 August 1947), 52.

³² Figueres studied independently in the Boston area for four years during the 1930s and traveled intensively in the United States, twice marrying North Americans. Nuñez attended Niagra University and Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C., in the early 1940s before returning to Costa Rica to found the anti-Communist labor organization, Rerum Novarum. Odio studied in Atlanta and maintained friendships in the United States while Martén attended Pace Institute and Cathedral College in New York City. Fournier received a Master of Laws degree from Harvard in 1942. Most were members of the Center for the Study of National Problems, a student-oriented movement which formed the Partido Social Demócrata (PSD) in 1945. The center dedicated itself to searching for long-term solutions to the ills that plagued Costa Rica. Doggedly anti-Communist, the members called for government activism to monitor the economic and social systems to insure more equitable distribution of wealth and promotion of the general welfare of all Costa Ricans. Strongly influenced by the New Deal, they found Calderón's actions lacking a vision of restructuring the Costa Rican system and despised his alliance with the Communists. They formed the nucleus of the rebel forces and later formed the Partido Liberación Nacional (PLN), the dominant liberal political force in the post-revolution era. For more definitive information on the group, see Ameringer, Charles, Don Pepe (Albuquerque, 1978), pp. 13–16 Google Scholar; Cañas, , Los ocho años, pp. 43–49 Google Scholar; Bell, , Crisis in Costa Rica, pp. 35–36.Google Scholar

³³ Interview by author with Father Benjamín Nuñez, San José, 28 June 1991 [hereafter Nuñez interview]; interview by author with Gonzalo Fació, Washington, D.C., 22 October 1991 [hereafter Facio interview]; interview by author with Bruce Masis, San José, 4 March 1992 [hereafter Masis interview]; interview by author with Alberto Martén, San José, 3 March 1992 [hereafter Martén interview] .

³⁴ N.A. 818.00/3-2248, Memorandum of Conversation between Newbegin, Wise, Mario Gutiérrez, and Jorge Hazera, 22 March 1948. Bennett noted that he believed the demonstration outside the Soviet consulate was effective and that officials in Washington were cognizant of its occurrence. William Tapley Bennett, Jr., letter to the author, 14 January 1992.

³⁵ N.A. 818.00/3-1148, Memorandum of Conversation between Gutiérrez, Facio, Norman Armour, and Bennett, 11 March 1948.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Facio interview. Bennett developed a reputation as a virulent anti-Communist throughout his service in the State Department. His worked in the plot to overthrow Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala and his most notable position was as Ambassador to the Dominican Republic during the 1965 intervention.

³⁸ New York Times, 22 March 1948.

³⁹ Ameringer, , Don Pepe, p. 47.Google Scholar Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre was a good friend of the prominent rebel leader, Alberto Monge.

⁴⁰ New York Times, 22 March 1948.

⁴¹ “Neighborhood Squabble,” Newsweek, 31 (5 April 1948), 44. That same day, Time described Picado as dispirited because the revolution forced him “to put so many friends in jail.” “The President Is Sick,” Time, 51 (5 April 1948), 38.

⁴² “Commissar in San Jose,” Time, 51 (19 April 1948), 39–40. The press converage helped insure concern among various American groups. The condemnations of the Picado administration originated from several sources throughout the United States and the Western hemisphere. On March 16 Senator Homer E. Capehart’s (D-IN) office complained that the home newspapers recently reported that the Communists had seized an airport in Costa Rica. The senator’s office expressed concern about the Communists especially in light of recent European events. N.A. 818.00/3-1648, Memorandum of Conversation between Bennett and representatives of Senator Capehart's office, 16 March 1948.

⁴³ Leonard, Thomas, “The United States and Costa Rica, 1944–1949: Perception of Political Dynamics,” SECOLAS Annals, 13 (1982), 17–31 Google Scholar; “Bogotá Berserk,” Newsweek, 31 (April 19, 1948), 48–49; Lleras, Alberto, “The Bogotá Conference,” Bulletin of Pan American Union, 82 (June 1948), 301–11.Google Scholar In early April, the National Security Council staff issued NSC-7 entitled, “The Position of the United States with Respect to Soviet-Directed World Communism.” It stated the ultimate objective of the Soviets was “the domination of the world. To this end, Soviet-directed world communism employs against its victims in opportunistic coordination the complementary instruments of Soviet aggressive pressure from without and militant revolutionary subversion from within.” Trask, , “The Impact of the Cold War on United States-Latin American Relations, 1945–1949,” p. 280.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ N.A. 818.00B/3-2648, Memorandum by Bennett, 26 March 1948. On March 5 Ambassador Gutiérrez met with Newbegin and Daniels to explain the reasons for the annulment of the presidential elections. Daniels changed the subject and queried Gutiérrez about the importance of the Mora and the Communists in the recent elections. The ambassador defended Mora’s position, denying any association between Moscow and the Vanguard chief. The memorandum indicated that “Ambassador Gutierrez gave the impression that he was trying to indicate that Mora and the Vanguard Party were not Communists, while he perhaps in fact questioned Mora's real position himself.” N.A. 818.00/3-548, Memorandum of Conversation between Gutiérrez, Newbegin and Daniels, 5 March 1948.

⁴⁵ Acheson, Dean, the Acting Secretary of State, to Johnson, 12 December 1946, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, vol. 11 (Washington, D.C., 1969), pp. 689–90Google Scholar [hereafter FRUS, year and volume number]; FRUS, 1946, vol. XI, Braden to Gutiérrez, 10 December 1946, p. 689; Several examples were that in January 1947 the Costa Rican government wanted to purchase several military airplanes. The State Department rejected the request, citing the country’s complete default on its Lend-Lease account. N.A. 818.248/11-1446, Marshall to Embassy in Costa Rica, 20 January 1947. A month later, Marshall approved an export-license request for ammunition, although several officials opposed the act. N.A. 818.00/2-1347, State Department to Embassy in Costa Rica, 14 February 1947; N.A. 818.00/2-1347, Johnson to State Department, 13 February 1947. Finally, in March, Costa Rica sought fifty submachine guns. Originally the State Department rejected the application, but it relented and allowed the sale of twenty-five guns. N.A. 818.00/3-2147, Memorandum of Conversation between Gutiérrez and Wise, 21 March 1947; N.A. 818.00/1-2048, Memorandum from Bennett to Newbegin and Daniels, 20 January 1948.

⁴⁶ Ameringer, , Don Pepe, pp. 48–54.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ On March 5 an El Salvadoran official approached Davis to report that El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Costa Rica had recently entered into anti-Communist pact. He admitted that the pact was basically anti-Arévalo and designed to maintain the leaders in power against rebel movements. When he reported that he had received instructions to use all his powers to ensure a Calderón victory, Davis cautioned the Salvadoran against intervening in Costa Rica. Private Papers of Nathaniel P. Davis, diary, box 1, 5 March 1948, Truman Library [hereafter Davis Diary]. The State Department issued a warning to all American states that they should avoid intervening in Costa Rica. N.A. 818.00/3-2248, Marshall to Diplomatic Representatives in American Republics, 22 March 1948, p. 499; La Estrella de Panamá, 19 March 1948; N.A. 818.00/3-1848, Chargé d’Affaires in Honduras Harold Montamat to Secretary of State, 18 March 1948.

⁴⁸ U.S. Embassy in San José to War Department, 30 September 1944, Map Room File, box 79, FDR Library.

⁴⁹ Somoza’s problems with the United States are outlined in Krehm, William, Democracies and Tyrannies of the Caribbean (Westport, 1984), pp. 122–25Google Scholar; Schifter, , “Origins of the Cold War in Central America: A Study of Diplomatic Relations Between Costa Rica and the United States, 1940–1949,” pp. 280–90.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ N.A. 818.00/3-1848, Chargé d’Affaires in Nicaragua Maurice Bernbaum to Secretary of State, 18 March 1948.

⁵¹ La Estrella de Panamá, 16 March 1948.

⁵² N.A. 818.00/3-1548, Marshall to Embassy in Managua, 15 March 1948.

⁵³ N.A. 818.00/3-2248, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation by Deputy Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs, Robert Woodward, 22 March 1948.

⁵⁴ N.A. 818.00/3-2248, Bernbaum to Marshall, 22 March 1948; N.A. FW 818.00/3-2248, Memorandum of Conversation between Bernbaum and Chief of the Division of Central America and Panama Affairs, Robert Newbegin, 22 March 1948. Newbegin, knowing that Somoza had tapped the embassy’s phones, stated afterward that “it was probably all to the good that you were taking the conversation down so that there was plenty of time to get the full import.” N.A. 818.00/3-2248, Newbegin to Bernbaum, 23 March 1948.

⁵⁵ N.A. 818.00/3-2348, Marshall to Embassy in Nicaragua, 24 March 1948; N.A. 818.00/3-2448, Embassy in Venezuela to Secretary of State, 24 March 1948; N.A. 818.00/3-2448, Embassy in Buenos Aires to Secretary of State, 26 March 1948; N.A. 818.00/3-2448, N.A. 818.00/3-2448, Embassy in Panama City to Secretary of State, 24 March 1948; N.A. 818.00/3-2348, Embassy in Brazil to Secretary of State, 23 March 1948.

⁵⁶ A.N.C.R., packet 1035, Dr. Rafael Oreamuno to Armour, 17 April 1948. Unfortunately, the information in the Costa Rican National Archives is sparse when compared to other periods. Bell, , Crisis in Costa Rica, p. 149 Google Scholar; Davis Diary, 16 April 1948.

⁵⁷ N.A. 818.00/4-1748, Bernbaum to Secretary of State, 17 April 1948.

⁵⁸ N.A. 818.00/4-1748, Memorandum of Conversation by Newbegin, 19 April 1948.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ N.A. 818.00/4-2048, Bernbaum to Secretary of State, 20 April 1948.

⁶¹ The report stated that actions taken by the conference on April 19, “may have been exactly the action required to persuade Somoza to withdraw his troops from Costa Rica.” Foreign Relations of United States: Memorandum of Conversation of Secretary of State, 1947–1952 (Washington, D.C., 1988), Woodward to Brigadier General Marshall S. Carter, special assistant to Marshall, U.S. Delegation, Bogotá, 20 April 1948. La Estrella de Panamá, 22 April 1948; U.S. Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, 18 (30 May 1948), 716.

⁶² N.A. 818.00/9-1946, Wise to Newbegin and Edward Trueblood, 3 October 1946.

⁶³ N.A. 818.00/4-347, Johnson to Secretary of State, 3 April 1947.

⁶⁴ Aguilar, Oscar, Costa Rica y sus hechos políticos de 1948 (San José, 1974), pp. 245–61Google Scholar; Ameringer, Charles, The Democratic Left in Exile: The Antidictatorial Struggle in the Caribbean, 1945–1959 (Coral Gables, 1974), pp. 63–72.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Davis Diary, 18 March 1948.

⁶⁷ Alberto Martén, Figueres’s second-in-command, reported Hughes’s presence, Martén interview. Bruce Masis substantiated Martén's claim. Masis interview.

⁶⁸ N.A. 818.00/3-1948, Memorandum of Conversation by Newbegin, 19 March 1948.

⁶⁹ FRUS, 1948, vol. XI, Kyle to Secretary of State, 24 March 1948, p. 499.

⁷⁰ N.A. 818.00/3-2348, Memorandum of Conversation between González, Daniels, and Newbegin, 23 March 1948.

⁷¹ The Picado administration threatened to take the issue of Guatemalan intervention to the United Nations, but State Department officials dissuaded it from doing so by emphasizing that “the United Nations machinery was cumbersome and that immediate action on the part of the Council could probably not be expected.” N.A. 818.00/4-1348, Memorandum of Conversation between Ambassador Gutiérrez, Robert Lovett, and Newbegin, 13 April 1948.

⁷² N.A. 818.00/4-748, Kyle to Secretary of State, 7 April 1948.

⁷³ Central Intelligence Agency, “The Caribbean Legion,” 17 March 1949, PSF, Intelligence Files, box 256, Truman Library. This concept is also supported by Obregón-Loria, Rafael, Hechos militares y políticos (Alajuela, 1981),Google Scholar and Schifter, “Origins of the Cold War in Central America: A Study of Diplomatic Relations Between Costa Rica and the United States, 1940–1949.”

⁷⁴ Davis and Figueres later became close friends, a relationship that continued for many years.

⁷⁵ Diary, Davis, 1–3 March 1948; La Estrella de Panamá, 3 March 1948:Google Scholar Davis believed that neither Calderón nor Ulate could take the presidency without bloodshed. He promoted selecting a compromise candidate, preferably one without the strong ties to the Vanguard. Davis Diary, 5 March 1948.

⁷⁶ N.A. 818.00/3-1348, Davis to Marshall, 13 March 1948.

⁷⁷ N.A. 818.00/3-2448, Davis to Secretary of State, 24 March 1948.

⁷⁸ N.A. 818.00/4-448, Davis to Secretary of State, 4 April 1948.

⁷⁹ Davis Diary, 17 March 1948. Other actions included government harassment of two American priests in Puerto Cortez and the ransacking of the home of an embassy employee, Virginia Stryker. A.N.C.R., Estados Unidos, packet 1549, Bonilla to Davis, 29 March 1948; A.N.C.R. Estados Unidos, packet 1549, Bonilla to Rene Picado, 1 April 1948; A.N.C.R. Estados Unidos, packet 1549, Davis to Bonilla, 8 April 1948.

⁸⁰ Davis Diary, 14 March 1948.

⁸¹ Ibid., 21 March 1948.

⁸² Ibid., 3 April 1948.

⁸³ Ibid., 11 April 1948.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 12 April 1948.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 19 April 1948.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 13 April 1948. Noticeably absent from the negotiations were Calderón and Mora who unsuccessfully tried on several occasions to influence the outcome. Davis Diary, 18 April 1948.

⁸⁷ Both Davis and Figueres emphasized the urgency of negotiations by retelling the story of a former Spanish Republican, Julio López, who reportedly had planted bombs throughout San José and declared that it would not fall like Madrid. He intended to blow up the city rather than allow its capture. The committee tried defusing the crisis by requesting that Picado send for the Spaniard along with Mora and Calderón. After a private meeting with Davis and Picado, López accepted presidential orders to stop his plans. Figueres, José, El espíritu de 48 (San José, 1987), p. 258 Google Scholar; Davis Diary, 15 April 1948.

⁸⁸ Davis Diary, 18 April 1948.

⁸⁹ Ibid. Davis also reported that the Bogotá condemnation of the Nicaraguan intervention “visibly disconcerted” Picado and played an important role in his decision to reverse his request for Nicaraguan aid. N.A. 818.00.4-1748, Davis to Secretary of State, 19 April 1948.

⁹⁰ Aguilar, , Costa Rica y sus hechos políticos de 1948, p. 318.Google Scholar

⁹¹ Ameringer, , Don Pepe, pp. 63–64.Google Scholar

⁹² N.A. 818.00/4-2448, Davis to Secretary of State, 24 April 1948.

⁹³ N.A. 818.00/4-648, Davis to Secretary of State, 6 April 1948; N.A. 818.00/4-1348, Memorandum of Conversation by Gutiérrez, Lovett, and Newbegin, 13 April 1948; N.A. 818.00/4-1348, Newbegin to Lovett, 13 April 1948.

⁹⁴ The revolutionary junta later awarded Hughes a commendation for his activities.

⁹⁵ Bell, , Crisis in Costa Rica, p. 150.Google Scholar Troops in the Canal Zone were placed on alert on 20 April 1948 reportedly in response to the passage of several Soviet ships. New York Times, 21 April 1948.

⁹⁶ Picado, Teodoro, El pacto de la Embajada de Mexico, su incumplimento (Managua, 1950), pp. 5–6.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ Gardner, John W., “The Costa Rican Junta of 1948–49” (Ph.D. diss., St. John’s University, 1971)Google Scholar; Oliver, Judy, “Twelve Who Ruled Costa Rica: The Junta of 1948–1949” (M.A. thesis, Louisiana State University, 1968).Google Scholar

⁹⁸ Bennett, William T. Jr., “The Costa Rican-Nicaraguan Incident: Effective International Action in Keeping Peace,” Department of State Bulletin, 20 (10 April 1949), 460–63Google Scholar; United Nations, “Costa Rican-Nicaraguan Incident,” United Nations Bulletin, 6 (15 April 1949), 384.

⁹⁹ Leonard, Thomas, The United States and Central America, 1944–1949 (Tuscaloosa, 1984)Google Scholar; idem., Central America and the United States: The Search for Stability (Athens, 1991); Marcia Quirós, “The United States and the Costa Rican Civil War of 1948: The Case Against Intervention,” paper presented at the 18th Annual Conference of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, Hyde Park, New York, June 1992. Part of the problem remains the definition of intervention. Some historians believe intervention is direct or covert military activity, but that definition is too narrow. In Latin America, Washington has utilized a variety of diplomatic and military weapons to defeat challenges to its hegemony, such as the use of formal recognition and plotting by its officials with the opposition. The forms can be more subtle than hitting the Latin American over the head with a bat, but they still constitute intervention.

¹⁰⁰ Wood, Bryce, Dismantling the Good Neighbor System (Austin, 1978)Google Scholar; Blasier, Cole, The Hovering Giant (Pittsburgh, 1976).Google Scholar One need only look at the literature on the U.S. role in the revolution and compare it to the large quantity on Guatemala to see that this episode has been downplayed to a rather insignificant role. There is also an absence of specific works in either article or monograph form on the role of the United States in the Costa Rican Revolution of 1948. Although Thomas Leonard, Walter LaFeber, and others have covered the event in their general studies of the Central America, the most comprehensive studies remain unpublished dissertations: Jacobo Schifter, “Origins of the Cold War in Central America”; and Atwood, Paul L., “The United States and Costa Rica, 1945–1960: The Containment of Liberal Nationalism” (Ph.D. diss., Boston University, 1991).Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ Good examples are Green, David, The Containment of Latin America (Chicago, 1971),Google Scholar and Immerman, Richard, The CIA in Guatemala (Austin, 1982).Google Scholar