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The Changing Racial and Administrative Structure of the Peruvian Military under the Later Bourbons
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 December 2015
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Despite the fact that the conquest of Spanish America had been primarily a military undertaking, during two centuries of Hapsburg rule the army played a secondary role, with real power and authority being vested in a pervasive civil bureaucracy. The armed groups of adelantados who had initially conquered Peru lacked the objectives and organizational structure of true militaries. Fighters rather than soldiers, their social positions defined more through the possession of encomiendas than by military functions, they cannot be ragarded as constituting a true army. In 1615, Viceroy Montesclaros informed the Crown that in any other area these soldados would be regarded as dangerous vagabonds who posed a threat to public safety.
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References
1 Lockhart, James, Spanish Peru, 1532–1560: A Colonial Society (Madison, Wisconsin, 1968), 138–140, 222 Google Scholar; Konetzke, Richard, Sud- und Mittelamerika I: Die Indianerkulturen Altamerikas und die Portugiesche Kolonialherrschaft (Frankfurt, 1965), 157.Google Scholar
2 Relación of Viceroy Montesclaros, in Memorias de los virreyes que han gobernado el Perú durante el tiempo del coloniaje español. 6 vols. (Lima, 1859). I, 34.
3 The first recorded ordinance on the subject of encomendero military service is located in the Colección de documentos inéditos relativos al conquista y organización de las antiguas posesiones españolas de Ultamar. 2nd series. 25 vols. (Madrid, 1885–1932). X, 357–358. A 1591 Royal Opinion of the Council of the Indies regarding the Lima militia is reproduced in Richard Konetzke, ed. Colección de documentos para la historia de la formación social de hispanoamérica. 3 vols. (Madrid, 1953–1962). I, 612–614. Nancy M. Farriss, Crown and Clergy in Colonial Mexico, 1759–1821: the Crisis of Ecclesiastical Privilege (London, 1968), 3, notes that the clergy’s strong hold over the Indian population allowed the Crown the luxury of a small military.
4 Ugarte, Rubén Vargas, Historia del Perú. 3rd series. 4 vols. (Buenos Aires, 1949).Google Scholar I, 113. In 1536 the viceroy noted that of an estimated 3,000 weapons which had been ordered collected, only 300 had been recovered. Colección de documentos inéditos relativos al descubrimiento, conquista y colonización de las posesiones españolas en América y Oceania. 42 vols. (Madrid, 1864–1884). IV, 90–91.
5 Diego de Encinas, comp. Cedulario indiano. Preliminary study and indices by Alfonso Garcia Gallo. 4 vols. (Madrid, 1945–1946). IV, 218–219.
6 Diario de Lima (1640–1694): Crònica de la época colonial por Josephe de Mugaburu y Francisco de Mugaburu (Hijo). Ed. Horacio H. Urteaga y Carlos A. Romero. 2 vols. (Lima, 1917–1918). I, 94; II, 60, 85, 150–151; Memorias of Viceroy Málaga (1674–1678), Liñán y Cisneros (1678–1681), and Palata (1681–1689), all in Memorias de las virreyes que han gobernado el Perú, I, 234–253; 341; II, 266–278, 347–355 illustrate the variability of this body throughout the century. In 1628, Viceroy Chinchón held that he felt it better not to call out the militia unnecessarily in order to perpetuate the rumor that Lima’s defenses were larger than in actuality. Colección del las memorias o relaciones que escribieron los virreyes del Perú acerca del estado en que dejaban las cosas generales del reino. 2 vols. (Madrid, 1921). II, 115.
7 Relación of Viceroy Esquilache, in Memorias de los virreyes, I, 111; Vargas Ugarte, Historia del Perú. I, 280–281.
8 Relación of Viceroy Guadalcázar, in Colección de las memorias, II, 42; Relación of Viceroy Castellar, in Memorias de los virreyes, I, 252–253; Relación of Palata, in Ibid., II, 348–355. The ramifications of the fuero militar are explained at length in L. N. McAlister, The “Fuero Militar” in New Spain, 1764–1800 (Gainesville, 1957), 6–15.
9 Vargas Ugarte, Historia del Perú, II, 126, 398. The expeditions of both Drake and Anson failed in large part due to ill-health among their crews.
10 Manuel de Amat y Junient, Memoria de Gobierno. Edición y estudio preliminar de Vicente Rodríguez Casado y Florentino Pérez Embid. (Seville, 1949), xlviii. Guillermo Lohmann Villena, Las defensas miliares de Lima y Callao (Seville, 1964), and Vicente Rodríguez Casado and Florentino Pérez Embid, Construcciones militares del Virrey Amat (Seville, 1949) offer a detailed description of Peruvian fortifications during the period.
11 Relación of Viceroy Esquilache, in Memorias de los virreyes, I, 109. This study omits more than passing mention of the Peruvian navy. For a detailed account, see Rosendo Melo, Historia de la marina del Perú (Lima, 1907–1915).
12 Relación of Viceroy Mancera, in Colección de las memorias, II, 180.
13 Relación of Viceroy Málaga, in Memorias de las virreyes, I, 238; II, 272. Portocarrero’s observations are republished as Descripción del virreinato del Perú. Crónica inédita del comienzos del siglo xvii. Edición, prólogo y notas de Boleslao Lewin. (Rosario, 1958), 68–70.
14 Guillermo Lohmann Villena, “Las compañías de gentileshombres, lanzas arcabuces de la guardia del virreinato del Peru,” Anuario de Estudios Americanos, XIII (1956), 141–215, details the early history of the company of nobles which formed the viceregal guard. For a more critical evaluation during the eighteenth century, see Archivo General de Indias: Audiencia de Lima. Legajo 1086 (hereafter AGLAL 1086) no. 331. Visitor General Antonio de Areche to the Crown. Lima, November 14, 1782, ff. 4–6. A spirited defense is found in the relación of Viceroy Palata, in Memorias de los virreyes, II, 128–129, 151–152.
15 Relación of Viceroy Liñán y Cisneros, in Memorias de los virreyes, I, 324–325. An extensive description of the situado as it was disbursed in Chile is in Roberto Oñat and Carlos Roa, Regimen legal del ejército en el reino de Chile (Santiago, 1952), 72–86.
16 War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1713); War of the Austrian Succession (1744–1748); Seven Years’ War (1756–1763); American Revolution (1779–1783); War declared vs. Great Britain (1791–1808); War declared vs. France (1808–1814); Spanish American Independence (1809–1814).
17 The activities of Viceroy Diego Ladrón de Guevara, Bishop of Quito and Viceroy of Peru, 1710–1720, and his successor, Viceroy Diego Morcillo, Archbishop of Lima and Charcas, and Viceroy of Peru 1720–1724, are detailed in Vargas Ugarte, Historia del Perú, III, 69–75; Lohmann Villena, Las defensas militares, 178; and Sebastián Lorente, Historia del Perú bajo los Barbones, 1700–1821 (Lima, 1871), 9–10.
18 Vitorino Montero de Aguila, “Estado político del reyno del Perú,” Revista Peruana, IV (Lima, 1880), 152–154, 172–190, 351–359. Montero, a creole, served as a captain in the viceregal guard, and later was a corregidor of Piura and alcalde of Lima.
19 Relación of Palata, in Memorias de los virreyes, II, 90–92, 266–278, 347–402.
20 Descripción del Perú, 41–43, 64–67.
21 Frezier, Amadée, A Voyage to the South-Sea and along the coasts of Chili and Peru, in the years 1712, 1713, and 1714 (London, 1717), 103.Google Scholar A review held by Viceroy Castellar in December, 1675 produced only 8, 433 men capable of composing a militia. Memorias de los virreyes, I, 246–247.
22 Borah, Woodrow, “Colonial Institutions and Contemporary Latin America: Political and Economic Life,” Hispanic American Historical Review, XLIII (1963), 371–394.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For data on the Peruvian Viceroys of this period, see note 27. The Reglamento para las milicias de infantería y caballería de la isla de Cuba (Havana, 1769), which was later applied to all of Spanish America, states that “no one is exempt from the obligation of defending his country and serving his King.” Persons who were excused, such as bakers, were dismissed in order that “the public might be served”. Capítulo II, no. 25.
23 Excellent descriptions of the Bourbon Reforms are to be found in John Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration, 1782–1810: the Intendant System in the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata (New York, 1958), 1–24, and Magnus Mörner, La reorganización imperial en hispanoamérica, 1760–1810 (Stockholm, 1969).
24 Humphreys, R. A., Tradition and Revolt in Latin America (London, 1969), 78.Google Scholar
25 L. N. McAlister, The “Fuero Militar” deals primarily with the crisis produced within the ordinary jurisdiction as a result of the proliferation of military privileges in New Spain after 1762. A brief description of the Bourbon military is to be found in Konetzke, Sud-und Mittelamerika, 157–164. Robert Oñat and Carlos Roa, Régimen legal del ejército, deals with the same subject in Chile based on a study of military legislation. Somewhat the same approach is taken by Alfonso García Gallo, “El servicio militar en Indias,” Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español, XXVI (1956), 447–515, and Héctor José Tanzi, “La justicia militar en el derecho indiano,” Anuario de Estudios Americanos, XXVI (1969), 175–277. Two unpublished doctoral dissertations from the University of Florida, Allan J. Kuethe, “The Military Reform in the Viceroyalty of New Granada, 1773–1796,” (Gainesville, 1967) and my own, “The Military Reform in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1762–1800,” (Gainesville, 1970) are efforts to document the racial and administrative changes in those militaries and the effect which they had on civil authority.
26 A majority of the Hapsburg Viceroys, such as Montesclaros, Alba de Liste, Lemos and others were titled nobles. For biographical data on these men see the relaciones and memorias cited above, and Manuel de Mendiburu, Diccionario histórico-biográfico del Parú. 2nd ed. 11 vols. (Lima, 1931–1934).
27 The later Bourbon Viceroys, Armendáriz, Manso de Velasco, Amat, Jáuregui, Croix, Avilés, O’Higgins, and Abascal were all military men, many of whom had served in Chile prior to taking office in Peru. Vargas Ugarte, Historia del Perú, III, 113–114, 295; Lorente, 34.
28 Relación of Armendáriz, in Memorias de los virreyes, III, 203–218. The memoirs of the viceroys indicate these changing defensive preoccupations. The Marqués de Mancera boasted of not spending any money on defense in 1648. Colección de las memorias, II, 180. Montesclaros, writing in 1615, held that geography offered Peru the best permanent defense. Memorias de los virreyes, I, 66. A strong navy was the hope of Carmine Nicolo Caracciolo, the Italian noble who, as the Prince of Santo Buono, ruled in Peru from 1716–1720. Vargas Ugarte, Historia del Perú, IV, 86. During Armendáriz rule, a plan to form a citadel to defend Lima was proposed by Pedro Peralta Barnuevo, the Senior Cosmographer of Peru. Although it was still being discussed at late as 1781, the expense of the project was prohibitive. Lohmann Villena, Las defensas militares, 209–213.
29 Don Dionisio de Alcedo y Herrera, Aviso histórico, político, geográfico … (Madrid, 1883), 260. Alcedo had been aboard the Spanish fleet which had apprehended and cut off the ear of the British sea captain Jenkins which was a direct cause of war in 1739. To defend America militarily, the Viceroyalty of New Granada was created, while Venezuela, Quito and Panama were designated as captaincies-general.
30 Juan, Jorge and de Ulloa, Antonio, Noticias secretas de América sobre el estado naval, militar y político de los reynos del Perú y provincias de Quito, costas de Nueva Granada y Chile … (London, 1826), 23–27, 121, 140–141, 156.Google Scholar
31 Relación of Manso de Velasco, in Memorias de los virreyes, IV, 262–277. AGI:AL 1490 Reglamento para la guarnicion de la plaza del Real Phelipe, Lima, July 1, 1753. This ordinance governed the presidios of Peru and Chile until the passage of the 1768 Reales Ordenanzas para el régimen, subordinación y servicio del ejército, reproduced in Konetzke, Colección, III, 341–344.
32 AGI: Indiferente General (hereafter IG) 844 Nota de los goviernos militares del Peru. Lima, December, 1744; Relación of Manso de Velasco, in Memorias de los virreyes, IV, 333–337. Both Manso and his successor Amat felt that military governors, although more costly than civilians, were valuable for being able to lead troops to aid Lima in the event of an attack. AGI:AL 653 Estado de los corregimientos … del Perú. Lima, February 6,1775.
33 A discussion of the Committee and its work can be found in McAlister, The “Fuero Militar”, 1–15. Amat’s efforts to raise a militia are described in AGI:AL 1490 Compendio de las prevenciones que el excelentisimo Señor Don Manuel de Amat hizo para la defensa de la guerra contra Portugual, e biglaterra. Lima, November 10, 1763, 1–23. In 1769 the Crown had ordered published the Reglamento para las milicias de infantería y cabellería de la isla de Cuba to cover the recruitment, training, organization, and discipline of these militias. However Amat’s regulation, AGLAL 654 Reglamento para las milicias del Peru, Lima, August 31, 1766, as well as the fijo regulations governed the Peruvian militia until 1779, and the Cuban Regulation was not republished in Peru until 1793. The extent and lack of population in Peru made its application there difficult. For the increased selfimportance assumed by the militias of Peru, see the “Noticía del verdadero ventajoso estado político de el Perú vajo la gobernación de el Excelentísimo Señor Don Manuel de Amat y Junient,” Fénix, V (1947), 289–347. Written by the creole José Morales de Armaburu, whose brother was a captain in the fijo Royal Regiment of Lima, it is a testimonial to Peruvian pride in their new military.
34 Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, 701.
35 AGI:IG 74 Estado que manifiesta el actual destino y fuerza de la tropa que hay en-America. Madrid, January 8, 1771. Of the 31, 405 veteran and fijo troops in America, most were located in the circum-Caribbean region. Cuba had 4, 731, Mexico 6, 196, and Puerto Rico 2, 884. Due to the proximity of Portuguese Brazil, Buenos Aires had 4, 682. When the size of the fijo component in Peru was increased it was due to internal rebellion rather than external threats, with most of the soldiers being located in Chile and Upper Peru. The process of recruitment and militia training is described in L. N. McAlister, “The Reorganization of the Army of New Spain, 1763–1767,” The Hispanic American Historical Review, 33: 1 (February, 1953), 1–32.
As of 1776 the Army of Peru was deployed as follows:
Source: AGI:AL 653 Estado general que manifiesta las tropas … que en este virreynato del Peru se han alistado, Lima, December 31, 1776. The number of militia varied widely throughout the colony and continuing inspections give the impression that the figures, which rose as high as 100,000, were highly inflated. The total number of disciplined, or provincial, militia, enjoying the complete fuero, seem to have remained at around 10,000–19,000 until just prior to independence. Campbell, “The Military Reform,” 238–239. Compare with the Army of New Spain, McAlister, The “Fuero Militar,” 93–99.
36 AGI:AL 655 Libro de Serbicios de los Oficiales, Primeros Sargentos, y Cadetes del Batallon Fixo del Callao, Lima, December 30, 1776. AGLIG 656 R.O. en que se conceden los misinos derechos que a los europeos a los españoles americanos de conocida distinción que entren a servir de cadetes San Lorenzo, November 15, 1776, was passed in response to an impassioned plea by the creoles the previous year. Because of a shortage of officers, these youth were often utilized as training officers for the provincial militias. One creole on the command and staff group of the battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Joaquín Espinosa, was a wealthy limeño who had gone to Spain with his father and there had raised and outfitted at personal expense a company of the Infantry Regiment of Valencia. As a reward, he was later granted the governorship of Tucumán prior to returning to Lima as a training officer. There are numerous examples of wealthy individuals being granted high military rank through beneficios of this sort in the records. See note 37 below.
37 AGI:AL 1491 Lista de los oficiales que se dedicaron al arreglo, egercicio y enseñanza de los soldados de su cargo, Lima, February 23, 1765; AGI:AL 1490 Compendio, 10–20; AGI:AL 1502 Estado … de los Dragones Provinciales de Lima, Lima, December, 1785; Ibid., Estado del Batallon Provincial de Milicias de Infantería Espa de Lima, Lima, December, 1785; Archivo Nacional Lima: Tribunal Militar (hereafter ANL:TM) 1782. Libros de Servicios del Regimiento de Milicias Provinciales de Dragones del Valle de Carabaillo, Lima, December, 1782; AGI:AL 1402 Libros de Serbicios de los Regimientos de Cavalleria y Infanteria de Milicias Disciplinadas del Cuzco, Cuzco, December, 1792; AGI:AL 1499 Libros de Servicios de los Regimentos de Cavalleria y lnfaniteria de Arequipa, Arequipa, December, 1792. In 1768 Charles III ordered that complete service records, containing information on place of birth, social status, racial grouping, military development, and performance, be retained on each soldier. It is important to note that the classification Español was given to poor whites regardless of birthplace. Accordingly, the militia units were probably more “Americanized” than it might seem at first glance. Similar creole involvement in the military has been charted by McAlister, Kuethe, Oñat and Roa, and Santiago Gerhardo Suárez, Las instituciones militares venezolanos del periodo hispánico en los archivos (Caracas, 1969). I am in the process of completely tabulating the Peruvian service records from the Archivo de Simancas in Spain.
38 Creole domination of the civil bureaucracy is charted by David A. Brading, Miners and Merchants in Bourbon Mexico, 1763–1810 (Cambridge, Eng., 1971) and Jacques Barbier, “Elites and Cadre in Bourbon Chile,” The Hispanic American Historical Review, 52–3, 416–435. Similar phenomena in Peru are outlined in my own “A Colonial Establishment: Creole Domination of the Audiencia of Lima During the Late Eighteenth Century,” Ibid. 52:1, 1–25.
39 The best discussion of this change is to be found in Daniel Valcárcel, Carlos, Tùpac Amaru el revolucionario (Lima, 1970), 216–235.Google Scholar
40 The use of the militia to expel the Jesuits is carefully reconstructed in Martín, Luís, The Intellectual Conquest of Peru: the Jesuit College of San Pablo, 1568–1767 (New York, 1968), 147–153.Google Scholar AGI:AL 644 Relacion que explica los meritos que han adquirido … los Oficiales del Exercito, Caballeros Aventurosos, y oficiales de milicias en esta Ciudad … Cuzco, September 16, 1782, commended 17 regular officers, 33 militiamen, 11 adventurers, and 9 corregidors. Royal skepticism regarding the militia can be seen in AGI:AL 1493 Relacion del Coronel Dn. Demetrio Egan de los alborotos del Peru al Sr. Jose de Galvez, Lima, February 20, 1781, ff. 1–11, and in AGI: AL 640 Informe del Rey a dn. Teodoro de Croix …, El Pardo, March 28, 1783, ff. 1–15. In a report to the Crown, AGI:AL 1100, no. 183, dated Lima, January 16, 1784. Visitor General Escobedo stated that the provincial militia rolls exceeded the total male population of the provinces even where 12-year old boys were included. It was common practice to enroll one’s son in a unit at birth to obtain for him enough time in grade to qualify for promotion.
41 One of the best commentaries on the military situation in Peru is found in Visitor General Antonio de Areche’s Report to the Crown, AGI:AL 1086 no. 331, Lima, November 14, 1782, ff. 1–18. The visitation of Peru is described by Palacio Atard, Vicente, Areche y Guirior: observaciones sobre el fracaso de una visita al Perú (Seville, 1946).Google Scholar For one example of militia disobedience, see my “Black Power in Colonial Peru: the 1779 Tax Rebellion inLambayeque,” Phylon, 33:2 (Summer, 1972), 140–152.
42 The dispatch is described in AGI:AL 640 Informe del Rey, f. 14. Floridablanca’s comments are set out in Gobierno del Señor Rey Don Carlos III, o instrucción reservada para dirección de la junta del estado (Madrid, 1839), 261–262.
43 Report of Visitor General Jorge de Escobedo, who replaced Areche in 1784, in Relaciones de los virreyes, III, 442. The weakened financial condition of Peru, largely occasioned by the creation of Buenos Aires as a viceroyalty in 1776, is detailed by Guillermo Céspedes del Castillo, Lima y Buenos Aires: repercussiones económicas de la creación del Virreinato del Plata (Seville, 1947), 81, 86–87, 145–146.
44 AGI:AL 494 Cotexto del Gasto anual, pie y fuerza del Exercito …, Lima, April 5, 1785; AGI:AL 667 Informe del Inspector General Manuel de Pineda al Rey …, Lima, August 12, 1784, ff. 1–11. Military expenses remained at about two million pesos annually, the largest item in the viceregal budget. Anexo to the Relación of Viceroy Gil, in Memorias de los virreyes, V, 28.
45 AGI:AL 667 Representacion hecha a nombre de la oficialidad del Regimiento Real de Lima, manifestando los Servicios que han contrayado, y perjuicios que experimentaran sillega a verificarse la supresión de su Segundo Batallon. Lima, August 31, 1784, ff. 1–3. The creole officers argued that the nobility might refuse to answer a call to arms in the future. AGI:AL 681, no. 169, Croix to Antonio Valdés, Ministro de la Marina, Lima, June 16, 1788, ff. 1–4 confided that the anger which the cutbacks had provoked caused him to delay almost a decade in their implementation.
46 AGI:AL 673 Croix to the Marqués de Sonora, Ministro de las Indias, Lima, March 16, 1787, ff. 1–3; Relación of Croix, in Memorias de los virreyes, V, 228.
47 AGI:AL 724 Informe al Rey del Marqués de Avilés No. 136. Lima, February 23, 1804, ff. 1–2; Memoria del Virrey del Perú Marqués de Avilés. Publicada por Carlos Alberto Romero (Lima, 1901), 55–59. By the end of the colony Spain had 29 fijo regiments stationed in America with a total strength of 28,969 soldiers. Of these, only 9, 931 were Spaniards. García Gallo, “El servicio militar,” 500.
48 I have found the pardo, or free Negro militiaman closely circumscribed by Peruvian courts, both civil and military. Leon G. Campbell, “The Military Reform,” 288–299. A broader utilization of pardo military privilege elsewhere is detailed by McAlister, The “Fuero Militar”, 43–62, and by Allan J. Kuethe, “The Status of the Free Pardo in the Disciplined Militia of New Granada,” The Journal of Negro History, LVI:2 (April, 1971), 105–117. An example of the conflicts occurring between the military and the intendants is described in the Relación of Viceroy Croix, in Memorias de los virreyes, V, 178–179, and in Arequipa 1796–1811: La Relacion del Gobierno del Intendente Salamanca. Transcripción y prólogo de J. R. Fisher. (Lima, 1968), 70–71, 91. For their part, veteran officers felt the militia officers were “brilliant in things dedicated to money and business but not in military affairs.” Biblioteca Nacional Lima. No. C4383 Expediente … de varios oficiales del ejercito se la ciudad de Arequipa, sobre a quien corresponde el mando militar en ausencia u otro motivo del Sr. Gobernador Intendente. Arequipa, May 10, 1790, f. 6. The intendancy system was largely a substitute for a large provincial militia, and is reflective of the recommendation of Inspector General Avilés that better administration was the keynote to internal peace rather than increased force. AGI:AL 618 Avilés to Gálvez, Cuzco, January 28,1783.
49 Mark A. Burkholder, “From Creole to Peninsular: The Transformation of the Audiencia of Lima,” The Hispanic American Historical Review 52:3, 395–415 has noticed a pattern of changing appointment policy practiced by the later Bourbons which reduced creole influence on the Audiencia of Lima. My research has turned up no similar policy concerning military appointments. While examples of prejudice against creole officers by Spanish commandants exist (AGI:AL 671 Libro de Servicios del Real Cuerpo de Artilleria, Lima, November 16, 1785), the numerous references to the lack of training and poor discipline among Peruvian troops seem more important in denying creóles the topmost positions. José Fernando de Abascal y Sousa, Memoria de Gobierno. Edición preparada por Vicente Rodríguez Casado y José Antonio Calderon Quijano (Seville, 1944), 361–366, indicates that creoles were utilized as commanders if qualified.
50 L. N. McAlister, The “Fuero Militar” 88–89, locates the roots of praetorianism in Mexico during the later colony, due in large part to the expanded military fueros which accompanied the military reform. My own study, “The Military Reform”, 266–305, indicates the ability of the ordinary, or civil, jurisdiction in Peru to maintain itself against this challenge, and concludes that praetorianism developed during and after independence, rather than before. Christon I. Archer, “The Keys to the Kingdom: The Defense of Veracruz, 1780–1810,” The Americas, 27: 4 (April, 1971), 426–449, indicates that disease, desertion, and pitiful living conditions combined to deter individuals in that region from using the military as a means of advancement, and that strong military traditions developed only much later. The same idea for Peru is set out in Jorge Basadre, “Bosquejo sobre la clase militar en las primeros años de la república,” “Mercurío Peruano, no. 117 (March, 1928), 181–199.
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