1 Pravda, Feb. 15, 1956.

2 Ibid. Said Khrushchev, “It is quite likely that the forms of transition to socialism will become more and more variegated.” The implication for the practice of socialism was more explicitly developed in the “Declaration on Relations between the Yugoslav League of Communists and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, June 20, 1956” in which it was stated that “the path of socialist development differs in various countries, the multiplicity of forms tends to strengthen socialism.” New Times, No. 26, June, 1956, Special Supplement. On the other hand, after the Poznan uprising Pravda attacked “bombastic words about national communism” and insisted that “Communist construction in the Soviet Union and socialist construction in the people's democracies form a unified process of the movement of peoples toward a new life.” Pravda, July 16, 1956, editorial. A definitive pronouncement on whether and how far the practice of socialism as well as its attainment can be variegated in form is obviously still wanting.

3 See Paul Zinner's, E. comments in Zinner, ed., National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe (New York, 1956), p. 3 ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 “Manifest an das deutsche Volk,” Neues Deutschland, April 23, 1946.

5 Ibid.

6 Ackermann, Anton, “Gibt es einen besonderen deutschen Weg zum Sozialismus?” Einheit, Sonderheft, February, 1946.Google Scholar

7 According to Khrushchev, “The political leadership of the working class, headed by its advanced detachment, is the indispensable and decisive factor for all the forms of transition to socialism. Without this the transition to socialism is impossible.” Pravda, Feb. 15, 1956.

8 Ackermann, he. cit. The SED “Manifesto to the German People” contained similar strictures.

9 The relation of the Ackermann thesis to the broader lines of postwar Soviet German policy is important also, but not for the purposes of this paper, which is primarily concerned with its utilization as a weapon of political struggle within the Soviet Zone.

10 Zentralausschuss (ZA): translated here as Central Council to differentiate this SPD executive body from the KPD Central Committee (Zentralkomitee) (ZK).

11 Ulbricht later claimed never to have received the letter. See “Beitrage zur Vorgeschichte der Vereinigung von SPD und KPD,” in PZ-Archiv, 1, Sept. 1, 1950.

12 Leonhard, Wolfgang, Die Revolution entlässt ihre Kinder (Köln, Berlin, 1955), p. 381 Google Scholar. The author was a member of the Ulbricht group. His autobiographical memoirs are a rich and revealing source on the history of the KPD/SED from 1945 to 1948 when the author fled to Yugoslavia.

13 Mahler, Karl, ed., Die Programme der politischen Parteien im neuen Deutschland, (Berlin, 1945), p. 26 Google Scholar.

14 Ibid., pp. 16-20.

15 Ibid., p. 20.

16 Dahrendorf, Gustav, Der Mensch das Mass aller Dinge, Reden und Schriften zur deutschen Politik, 1945-1955 (Hamburg, 1955), p. 92 Google Scholar.

17 The communique issued by the delegates to this joint conference can be found in the Berliner Zeitung, June 22, 1945, reproduced in Richard Lukas, Zehn Jahre Sowjetische Besatzungszone (Mainz, 1955), pp. 57-58. The Lukas book offers the best and fullest chronological coverage of this early period yet available.

18 The official SPD publication, Die ideologische und organisatorische Entwicklung der SED (Bonn, n.d.) is, as its title suggests, more concerned with the subsequent development of the unity party. The stenographic transcript of the 1946 West German SPD Parteitag also contains little on the motivation of party leaders in the Soviet Zone, doubtless in keeping with Dr. Schumacher's refusal to take responsibility for events there.

19 This was, of course, the official raison d'etre of the SED. Cf. “Grundsätze und Ziele der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei,” in Wolfgang Treue, ed., Deutsche Parteiprogramme 1861- 1954 (Gottingen, 1954), pp. 165-70.

20 Cf. Edinger, Lewis J., German Exile Politics (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1956)Google Scholar.

21 Grotewohl, Otto, Im Kampj um Deutsckland, Reden und Aufsatze, (Berlin, 1948), I, 46–47 Google Scholar.

22 Cf. Leonhard, op. cit., pp. 392-401.

23 Leonhard reports, “Doubtless we of the KPD had an advantage. We were able to found our organization in cities and towns earlier than the SPD; our material resources were greater; our papers were more numerous, and we had—and this was especially important in the first period of organizational building—more automobiles at hand and could therefore establish connections with local organs more speedily.” Ibid., p. 423.

24 For a suggestion of the alternatives open to the Soviets in postwar Germany, see Borkenau, Franz, European Communism (New York, 1953), pp. 514-15Google Scholar.

25 Walter Ulbricht, “Das Aktionsprogramm der KPD in Durchführung,” Deutsche Volkszeitung, Oct. 14, 1945; Franz Dahlem, “Die Einheit und die Aufgaben der Arbeiterklasse,” ibid, Oct. 26, 1945, cited in Carola Stern, Die SED, (Köln, 1954), p. 165.

26 Cf. Stern, op. cit., p. 166.

27 “Beitrage zur Vorgeschichte,” (II), PZ-Archiv, 2, Sept. 15, 1950.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 See Grotewohl's report on the conference in Das Volk, Dec. 23, 1945, excerpts from which, together with critical comment, appear in Lukas, op. cit” p. 65.

32 Leonhard relates the amusing tale of a Soviet commander who invited the SPD and KPD secretaries of his district to a sumptuous banquet after which he asked that they shake hands. At the sight of the handclasps, he exclaimed exuberantly, “Very good, now I can report that fusion has been achieved in our district.” Leonhard, op. cit., pp. 443- 44. Unfortunately, not all instances of Soviet interference were as amusing.

33 “Beiträge zur Vorgeschichte,” (III), PZ-Archiv, 3, Oct. 1, 1950.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid. Even this marked reversal of the previous party position did not satisfy the advocates of fusion within the SPD. Hoffmann declared to the FDGB Congress that fusion would occur in Thuringia on April 7 and appealed to “party friends in West Germany to follow soon on this way.“

36 Schumacher probably hoped at best to get Grotewohl's agreement to dissolve the SPD in the Soviet Zone rather than accept fusion. Some months earlier in Hannover Grotewohl had promised Schumacher to follow this course if the Soviets pressed fusion. See Schumacher's comments in Protokoll der Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands (Hamburg, 1947), p. 49.

37 Berliner £eitung, March 3, 1946, in Lukas, op. cit., p. 74.

38 The text of this speech is reproduced in Grotewohl, op. cit., p. 109 ff.

39 The results of the Berlin poll were as follows:

Lukas, op. cit., p. 75. Cf. also discussion in Glaser, Kurt, “Governments of Soviet Germany,” in Litchfield and Associates, Governing Postwar Germany (Ithaca, New York, 1953), pp. 154-55Google Scholar.

40 Quoted in Lukas, op. cit., p. 68.

41 Lukas, op. cit., p. 75. This particular designation arises from the fact that at the SPD Congress Grotewohl cautioned party members against the view that the SPD had been crucified on Good Friday (April 20, 1946), promising that “this same Social Democratic Party will have risen again on Easter to a greater and more powerful future.” See Grotewohl's address, “Die Einheit der Arbeiterklasse,” in 40. Parteitag der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands (Berlin, 1946), p. 101.

42 Leonhard, op. cit., p. 425.

43 Das Volk, Dec. 23, 1945, as reproduced in Lukas, op. cit” p. 65.

44 “Beitrage zur Vorgeschichte,” (III), PZ-Archiv, 3, Oct. 1, 1950. Italics supplied.

45 For the text of this speech, see Grotewohl, op. cil” pp. 46-47 ff.

46 The Ackermann thesis did not, of course, directly answer Grotewohl's reservation about party organization. However, fusion itself seemed to promise an open, mass party in which the Social Democrats would have an equal share in positions of leadership.

47 Or, at least, the SMA may have promised individual Socialists that they could expect the SPD to dominate the Unity Party. Cf. J. P. Nettl, The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany (London, New York and Toronto, 1951), p. 89. Wolfgang Leonhard in a letter to the author, Oct. 18, 1957, expresses doubt that the SMA in fact made any promises at all.

48 Cf. Leonhard, op. cit., p. 438.

49 It may of course transpire that doctrine is reintegrated with political power in the interests of defending Communist regimes that are struggling for autonomy from the USSR. This clearly is the case in Yugoslavia and seems currently in process in Poland. For an extensive discussion of the changing relationship between ideology and power, especially in Poland, see Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, “Communist Ideology and Power: From Unity to Diversity,” Journal of Politics, November, 1957.