1 Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates, CCCCVI (1945), 943-44.

2 Ibid., CCCCVII (1945), 404-05. The reference to “Trotskyism” obviously was included as a gesture to Britain's war-time ally, the Soviet Union. As Churchill himself explained, “I think ‘Trotskyists’ is a better definition of these people … and it has the advantage of being equally hated in Russia.” Ibid., 405. It should be noted that three years later, when Churchill repeated this charge of an EAM-Communist plot to seize power, he set the date of his intervention order to Scobie as Dec. 6 rather than Dec. 5: “Late one night at this time I drafted a telegram to our General Scobie … that he must no longer consider himself neutral between the Greek parties … and not hesitate to fire upon the communist assailants. This order was sent out about 2 a. m. on the morning of Dec. 6.” Life, XXII (1947), 110.

3 Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates, CCCCVI (1945), 400.

4 Roosevelt, Elliott, As He Saw It (New York, 1946), p. 222 Google Scholar.

5 Text in New York Times, December 6, 1945.

6 Report of the Allied Mission to Observe the Greek Elections…., Department of State Publication 2522 (Washington, 1946), p. 23.

7 This statement was made in an article that Ethridge published in his Louisville Courier-Journal, August 3, 1947. The same theme is elaborated in the book of Ethridge's wife, who accompanied the mission. Ethridge, W. S., It's Greek to Me (New York, 1947), pp. 29, 143-47Google Scholar.

8 McNeill, W. H., The Greek Dilemma; War and Aftermath (New York, 1947), pp. 108, 160, 190 Google Scholar; Hadsel, W. H., “American Policy toward Greece,” Foreign Policy Reports, XXIII (1947), 152-53Google Scholar; Sedgewick, A. C., “The Plot against Greece,” Foreign Affairs, XXVI (1948), 486-96CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9 The most important sources for this complicated and controversial question are Woodhouse, C. M., Apple of Discord: a Survey of Greek Politics in Their International Setting (London, 1948)Google Scholar; Saraphis, S., ELAS (Athens, 1946)Google Scholar; and the series of documented articles by Th.Vokos, “Praktores tou Tsortsil sten Ellada,” Eleuthere Ellada, November 20, 1946 et seqq.

10 Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, 1948), II, 1451-59.

11 The only other significant resistance group was the Greek Democratic National League (EDES), headed by General Napoleon Zervas. For sources concerning these various organizations, see the bibliographical article by Stavrianos, L. S. and Panagopoulos, E. P., “Present-day Greece,” Journal of Modern History, XX (1948), 149-58CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 Full text in Papandreou, G., E apeleutherosis tes Ellados (Athens, 1945), p. 120 Google Scholar. On earlier occasions Papandreou had urged forceful action against EAM-ELAS. According to Colonel Woodhouse, Chief of the British Military Mission in Occupied Greece, “While EAM was being urged to participate in the new-found national unity, the British authorities were considering, under pressure from Papandreou, a plan which amounted to a declaration of war upon ELAS.” Woodhouse, , op. cit., p. 194.Google Scholar Likewise, Papandreou on July 11, 1944 discussed with Komnenos Pyromaglou, the deputy chief of EDES, the feasibility of “dispersing” ELAS, and assured Pyromaglou that “I will dissolve ELAS with [the aid of] the British.” Pyromaglou, K., E ethnike antistasis (Athens, 1947), p .122 Google Scholar.

13 Text of agreement in Papandreou, op. cit., pp. 123-26;Google Scholar National Liberation Front (EAM) White Book May 1944-March 1945 (New York, 1945), No. 6. The latter work, consisting of 121 documents, relating to the origins of the Battle of Athens, was published first in Trikkala on February 1, 1945, and later in Athens. In August 1945 it was translated and published by the Greek American Council, 152 West 42nd Street, New York, N. Y

14 Saraphis also protested to Papandreou that there was no need for British troops to enter Greece as the Germans were already evacuating the country in haste due to the Russian threat to the Salonika-Belgrade railway. Papandreou overruled these protests. See Papandreou, , op. cit., p. 123 Google Scholar; EAM White Book, No. 7. It is apparent that British troops were sent to Greece at this time not for military reasons, but for political reasons related to the British-Russian understanding of October 1944 by which “Russia should , have a largely preponderant voice in Rumania and Bulgaria” while Britain should take : “the lead in Greece.” For analysis of the military situation, see New York Times, October 6, 1944 (Hanson Baldwin), and New York Herald Tribune, October 4, 1944 ; (Major George Fielding Eliot).

15 Some weeks before the British landings, three Greek government ministers secretly entered Greece to organize some administrative system preparatory to the arrival of their government. All three were impressed by the efficiency of the EAM administration and reported that “exemplary order and peace prevails everywhere” and that they found nothing left for them to do. Details in Morphopoulos, P., “Greece: the Struggle for Power,” New Republic, CXI (1944), 590.Google Scholar

16 On October 8, 1944 an American correspondent reported: “There is a tiny strip thirty-five miles long and twenty-five miles wide in southern Epirus which is under EDES control… The population in this territory amounts to 70,000, and … is something like a Greek San Marino at this moment.” Ibid., p. 589.

17 Ethnikos Keryx, October 20, 1944. This is the New York and not the Athenian National Herald.

18 For a summary of the observations of American and British correspondents in Greece during these months between liberation and the Battle of Athens, see the analysis by Leland Stowe in the New York Post, February 17, 1945.

19 Cited in New York Times, December 7, 1944.

20 Papandreou, , op. cit., pp. 162-63;Google Scholar New York Times, November 6, 1944.

21 George Siantos, secretary of the Communist Party, declared in a public speech on the twenty-sixth anniversary of the Communist Party: “We agree that all volunteer groups, which were formed in the interior and abroad, should be demobilized and be replaced by one National Army: one army which will be formed on the basis of regular military conscription… ” EAM White Book, No.25.

22 The Mountain Brigade, also known as the Third Brigade and Rimini Brigade, was formed in the Near East following the April 1944 mutiny of the exiled government's armed forces. The “politically reliable” soldiers were selected and regrouped into this Mountain Brigade, which was entrusted to the reactionary and violently anti-EAM General Constantine Vendires, and was thoroughly indoctrinated in accordance with his views. For details see Tsouderos, E. I., Ellenikes anomalies ste Mese Amttole (Athens, 1945), Ch. 7–10 Google Scholar.

23 The attempt was made by Lambros Lambrianides, a close friend of Papandreou and a member of his Socialist Democratic Party. He held the position of Under-Secretary of War, while Papandreou was Minister of War as well as Premier and Foreign Minister. As a result of this incident, Lambrianides found it necessary to resign from the cabinet. Details in Saraphis, op. cit., pp. 447, 450.

24 The day after Othonaios found it necessary to resign, Scobie announced that the new Chief of Staff was Vendires. Ibid., pp. 435-39.

25 EAM White Book, No. 28. This plan is not referred to in Papandreou's book mentioned above, nor in he British White Paper issued during the Battle of Athens, Documents Regarding the Situation in Greece, January 1945, Cmd. 6592 (London, 1945).

26 According to Leland Stowe, “ He [Papandreou] gave an EAM minister a letter from Scobie which said Prime Minister Churchill would not permit the royalist Mountain Brigade to be disbanded. This is why the attempt to disarm the political factions in Greece first failed, as confirmed by the American ambassador in Greece.” New York Post, February 15, 1945. Papandreou likewise declared in a proclamation which was distributed on December 7 that, ”… we also were asked to dissolve, together with the demobilization of the volunteer forces, the Mountain Brigade and the Sacred Battalion…. Our answer was that the Mountain Brigade and the Sacred Battalion constitute a regular Army. Also, that the war is still going on and that these two military units of ours are the only ones which we have available, until the organization of our regular army, for participation in the common allied cause; and particularly we notified them that this is the opinion of the British Government and of the Allied High Command.” EAM White Book, No. 30.

27 Saraphis, , op. cit., p. 445 Google Scholar.

28 The fullest account of these negotiations is in ibid., pp. 442-47. For the version of a British officer who participated in the meetings, see Byford-Jones, W., The Greek Trilogy (Resistance-Liberation-Revolution) (London, 1945), pp. 124-28.Google Scholar Byford-Jones gives the date of the first meeting as November 22 rather than November 26. This appears to be inaccurate. In addition, he does not mention the final meeting on November 27.

29 Article Two of this compromise plan reads as follows: “A section of the national army will be organized as a token of continued participation in the common allied struggle and to participate also, if it is required, in the operations in the areas of Crete and the Dodecanese. The existing Mountain Brigade, the Sacred Battalion and a section of EDES as well as an ELAS Brigade, whose strength will equal the aggregate total strength of the aforementioned forces and which will be equally armed, will participate in this section of the National Army, which will also symbolize National Unity… .” EAM White Book, No. 31.

30 Article Two of this Papandreou plan reads as follows: “In order that Greece continue to participate in the Allied cause and until the reorganization of the Regular Army, two Brigades will be formed, one of Elas and one of EDES, besides the existing Mountain Brigade and Sacred Squadron.” Text in Jones, Byford, op. cit., pp. 131-32Google Scholar.

31 This version was presented by Anthony Eden in Commons: Great Britain, 5 I arliamentary Debates, CCCCVII (1945), 603-04. See also Papandreou, , op. cit., pp. 167-69;Google Scholar Jones, Byford, op. cit., pp. 130-33.Google Scholar These accounts begin with the Papandreou plan, which is presented as the EAM plan, and ignore altogether the EAM proposals of November 22 ;and November 27, both of which Papandreou first accepted and then rejected.

32 “In the agreement with the Left which Mr. Papandreou initialled on November 22, he himself stipulated categorically that the Mountain Brigade also would be disbanded by granting indefinite leave to the men. Unfortunately Papandreou altered the agreement because, as he explained on many occasions, the British government (particularly Churchill) and the British military leaders in Greece would not permit the dissolution of the Brigade, etc.” Svolos then gives the details of the Lambrianides affair described above, and continues as follows: “Taking into account the desire of the prime minister to satisfy, as he said, the demand of Mr. Scobie for the preservation of the Mountain Brigade, a reply for which we could discover no logical or political basis whatsoever, we devised a solution…. With the approval of Sareyiannis [ELAS general], fellow-fighters Zevgos, Tsirimokos and I submitted to Papandreou a plan for the creation of a mixed army unit which would consist of the existing Mountain Brigade, Sacred Company, an EDES unit, and an ELAS brigade which, it was agreed, would equal in strength and armaments all the other forces which would be retained. This unit, which would be somewhat like a division, would have, as we also agreed, a joint command. There were mentioned also the names of candidates for division commanders.

“The mixture of the men in the units was not accepted by Papandreou, but we agreed on the unification of the units and the united command.

“The reason why the Left asked for unity was to dispel its fear that if an homogeneous ELAS brigade were created, it would have been possible to send it to the frontiers and to keep the other units in Athens and use them at a given moment against the Left. Unfortunately Papandreou, although we agreed on this basis, published on the following day something very different from our plan, thus frustrating its purpose. He abandoned unity and even the idea of a national army, and foresaw only that besides the Mountain Brigade and the Sacred Company, there would be formed from the forces of the national resistance one brigade of ELAS and a corresponding unit of EDES. This formulation was an entirely different matter, as much because the forces retained would have been unconnected, as because a corresponding unit of EDES could mean an EDES brigade, something which we never accepted.

“The renewal of mistrust on the part of the Left was justified and understandable.

“We still insisted on an agreement. We asked Papandreou to return to the original plan which had been agreed upon, but in the meantime the KKE [Communist Party of Greece], seeking more drastic solutions, returned to that which Papandreou regarded as logical but impossible because the English would not permit it, to the idea of disbanding all, Mountain Brigade, Sacred Company and guerrillas.

“When Siantos proposed this plan, Papandreou countered only with the refusal of the English and his inability to change their views.” Cited in Saraphis, , op. cit., pp. 449-51.Google Scholar

33 Article One of this plan provided that: “The national resistance forces of ELAS, ELAN, EDES, the Mountain Brigade, the Sacred Battalion, as well as all military formations stationed in the Middle East, including sections of the gendarmerie in the Middle East, will be demobilized on December 10.” Text in EAM White Book, No. 33.

34 Texts in ibid., Nos. 48, 49.

35 Estimates of the casualties differ. In the EAM White Book, No. 57, they are set at 24; in Jones, By ford, op. cit., p. 140, at 22;Google Scholar and in McNeill, , op. cit., pp. 168-69, at 15Google Scholar.

36 Jones, Byford, op. cit., pp. 152-53Google Scholar.

37 EAM White Book, No. 60.

38 No full account of the battle is available. For a convenient summary with a map, see McNeill, Ch. VII. In view of Churchill's charge concerning “ … a fairly well organized plot or plan to seize Athens…,” it is significant that ELAS was quite unprepared for the battle. By December ELAS had taken the first steps towards demobilization. Orders had been issued to demobilize the reserves, to return the requisitioned horses, mules and vehicles to their owners, and to grant leaves to officers and men wishing to visit relatives. In the capital area there were only ELAS reserves. The nearest ELAS regular units consisted of two regiments at Eleusis and Thebes totaling less than 2,000 men. The bulk of the ELAS veterans were far to the north in Thessaly and were prevented by the Royal Air Force from marching south. Within Athens, six days elapsed before the ELAS commanders were able to communicate with all their units and coordinate their activities. During that period the ELAS reserves lost the battle by attacking prisons, police stations, gendarmerie posts and other such objects of popular antipathy. It is safe to assume that if a plot had existed, they would have seized immediately the utilities, key buildings and airfields instead of frittering away their strength on symbols. Saraphis, , op. cit., pp. 434 Google Scholar ff,; R. Capell, ,Simiomata; a Greek Note Book 1944-1945 (London, 1946), p. 116 Google Scholar.