1 One receives from many secondary accounts the impression that virtually the only American who did not think the acquisition a complete folly was Mr. Seward. That gentleman by lobbying and legerdemain somehow forced the United States to accept his treaty despite a solid hoot of derision from the American public. See, for example: Bancroft, Hubert Howe, History of Alaska (San Francisco, 1890), vi Google Scholar; Clark, Henry Wadsworth, History of Alaska (New York, 1930), pp. 78–81 Google Scholar; Martin, Asa E., History of the United States (Boston, 1931), II, 334 Google Scholar; Dulles, Foster Rhea, America in the Pacific: A Century of Expansion, 2d ed. (Boston, 1938), pp. 83–88 Google Scholar; Riegel, R. E.; Long, D. F., The American Story (New York, 1955), I, 423 Google Scholar; Handling, Oscar Chance or Destiny (Boston, 1955), p. 119 Google Scholar; Faulkner, H. U., American Political and Social History, 7th ed. (New York, 1957), p. 626 Google Scholar.

The last four works cited testify to the persistence of this view despite the provocative article by Professor Thomas A. Bailey, “Why the United States Purchased Alaska,” in the Pacific Historical Review, III (1934), 39-49. Bailey sampled contemporary editorial opinion in six Pacific Coast newspapers and reached the conclusion that these newspapers were definitely favorable to the Alaskan Treaty. He admits, however, that geographic proximity and special commercial interests could have made press opinion in the Far West a rather special case.

2 The measure to which newspaper opinion reflects public opinion must always be a point of dispute. It is surely a component part of the public opinion of a period, and, to a degree, usually both influences and mirrors general contemporary opinion.

3 See in this connection Farrar's, Victor J. excellent monograph, The Annexation of Russian America (Washington, 1937), pp. 56–57 Google Scholar.

4 House Exec. Doc. #177, 6-109.

5 A group of California fur traders headed by Louis Goldstone had for some years envied the favored position which the Hudson's Bay Company enjoyed under charter in Russian America. Using Senator-elect Cornelius Cole of California as intermediary, they began in 1866 to negotiate with Russian Minister Stoeckl for the expiring rights of the British company. Baron Stoeckl led them on, and, after they had made a formal request, made his refusal the opening wedge in his March, 1867, talks with Seward.

6 New York Herald, April 12, 1867.

7 This is a reference to the old “mass bribery charge” that was well disposed of by Professor William A. Dunning in 1912, but which still crops up on occasion. For the origins of this charge see the New York Sun of November 30, 1868, the Worcester Spy of December 4, 1868 (Worcester, Massachusetts), and Reports of the Committee on Public Expenditures, House Reports (40th Cong., 3d Sess.), #35; #1388.

Professor Dunning's article, “Paying for Alaska” is to be found in the Political Science Quarterly, XXVII (1912), 385-98. See, also, Ellis P. Oberholtzer, A History of the United States Since the Civil War (New York, 1917), I, 556; Reinhard L. Luthin, “The Sale of Alaska,” The Slavonic and East European Review, XVI (1937), 168-182

8 Though the World favored this extension of our boundaries, it was sufficiently anti- Seward to mock the arguments and methods used by the Secretary to help effect the purchase, and to mock the self-conflicting extravagances of the treaty advocates. “Tropical Disadvantages Offset by the Value of the Ice Trade—Secretary Seward's New Ice-othermal Line—A Great Opening for Soda-Water Fountains and Skating Ponds” ran the headline of April 9.

9 Like many Eastern papers, the Times printed large sections from Charles Sumner's famous and scholarly address in the Senate. Sumner's speech, incidentally, was most influential in producing the large pro-ratification majority in the Senate, and had probable influence as well on American press opinion.

10 The Times still strongly favored the purchase fifteen months later, but on abstract constitutional grounds agreed with the pretensions of the “House Constitutionalists.” (July 15). A group of “House Constitutionalists” or “House Rights Men” succeeded initially in attaching to the Alaskan Appropriation Bill the Loughridge Amendment. By this amendment the House of Representatives asserted its right to be “previously consulted” respecting any future purchase of territory. It was but an exhibition of jealousy by the House over senatorial prerogative in treaty-making, similar to that demonstrated in connection with the Jay Treaty. In both cases, the House had finally to give way. For the views of the “House Constitutionalists” see Congressional Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess„ IV, 3621-25; 4052-55; V, 4392-94.

11 The writer has not made a sufficient study of contemporary periodical literature to warrant any over-all conclusions in that area. Of the fifteen “national” periodicals consulted, however, only three expressed an editorial opinion adverse to the Alaskan Purchase: Leslie's Weekly; the New York Nation; and Harper's Weekly.

12 Though there was much initial hesitation on the part of many editors to express a definite opinion, the statement of Theodore Clark Smith that “the bewildered comments of the newspaper press during the week when the treaty was pending indicate clearly the absence of any popular feeling for or against annexation” is a statement of doubtful validity. T. C. Smith, “Expansion After the Civil War, 1865-1871,” Political Science Quarterly, XVI (1901), 415.

13 These arguments were interestingly enough almost identical to those made in Congress during the ratification and appropriation debates. All can be found in Senator Sumner's speech (Home Exec. Doc. # 177, 124-188). In the House of Representatives see the speeches of Representatives Schenck and Banks on “Russian Friendship“; Representatives Orth, Donnelly, Maynard, Myers, Spalding, and Munger on “Expansion and British Columbia“; and Representatives Munger, Higby, Johnson, and Banks on “Economic Value.” Congressional Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., IV, 3625-27; 3659-60; 4054 and V, Appendix, 386-432. These arguments and motives also appear prominently in the private letters received by Senator Sumner in 1867 from such correspondents as Professor Spencer Baird, G. V. Fox, Commander John Rodgers, Major General Meigs, W. Beach Lawrence, John M. Forbes, and Louis Agassiz. Sumner Correspondence for the year 1867 Sumner Papers, Widener Library, Harvard University.

14 It was an argument and “motive,” however. The statement of John G. Latane to the effect that the research of Professor Frank A. Golder in the Moscow archives “leaves one with the impression that Russian friendship can no longer be considered an important factor in the purchase of Alaska” is erroneous. Golder's concern was the motives of Seward and the Johnson Administration, not public opinion and its inspiration. Myths have as much influence on public opinion as facts. Latane, , A History of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1927), pp. 424-25Google Scholar. Golder, , “The Purchase of Alaska,” American Historical Review, XXV (1920), 411 ffGoogle Scholar, “The Russian Fleet and the Civil War,” XX (1915), 801 ff.

15 Bailey, Why the United States Purchased Alaska, loc. cit. See, especially, Sacramento Daily Union, April 1, 1867; Seattle Puget Sound Gazette,: April-May, 1867. See, too, Chicago Evening Journal, April 1, 1867.