1 The reports used in this study, compiled by an area headquarters of the Army Rear Area, are headed as follows:

Feldkommandantur (V) 248, Gruppe V, Verwaltung, “Bericht ueber die im Rayon [name of rajon] vorgefunden Verwaltungsverhaeltnisse,” [date]. No detailed citation of these reports will be made in this study, since (unless otherwise indicated) all information applying specifically to the rajons considered is drawn from them. The writer is grateful to the Department of the Army for permission to use notes on this document series.

2 Article 73 of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR in Konstitucii Sojuza SSR i sojuznykh respublikh s prilozheniem potozhenija o vyborakh v verkhovnyj Sovet SSSR (Moscow, 1937). The following table, based on the German reports, indicates the size and predominantly rural nature of the rajons studied:

3 The legal nature of the “dual subordination” is, however, a complicated matter, with considerable variation from department to department. See especially Karp, A. A., “Pravovoe polozhenie ispolkoma rajonnogo soveta deputatov trudjashchikhsja,” Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 11 (1949), pp. 19–34.Google Scholar

4 Formally entitled “executive committee of the rajon soviet of workers’ deputies.“

5 This commission, though constitutionally a part of the rajon administration, is part “of a single system of the planning organs” subordinated “directly to the Gosplan of the USSR” ( Vlasov, V. A., Sovetskij gosudarstvennyj apparat: osnovnye principy organizacij i dejatel'nosti [Moscow, 1951], p. 163 Google Scholar).

6 Studenikin, S. S., Vlasov, V. A., and Evtikhiev, I. I., Sovetskoe administrativnoe pravo (Moscow, 1950), p. 428.Google Scholar

7 Ibid., p. 429.

8 Ibid., p. 432.

9 The year during which these taxes were collected was not reported, but it was very likely 1940.

10 Karp, op. cit., p. 26. Cf. Volin, Lazar, A Survey of Soxriet Russian Agriculture (Washington, 1951), pp. 26–27.Google Scholar

11 This is about the proportion of cultivable land in household allotments in the Ukraine and the USSR, it the average allotment was 1/2 ha. (cf. figures in Volin, op. cit., pp. 48-49). The statement that household allotments constituted 2.3% of kolkhoz lands in Jasny, Naum, The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR: Plans and Performance (Stanford, California, 1949), p. 340 Google Scholar, refers to the total area of the kolkhozes in the USSR, which included (in contrast to those in the rajons studied) large expanses of unploughed land.

12 The USSR average was .49 ha. in the late thirties (Jasny, op. cit., p. 341).

13 On the relation of the rajon Agriculture Department to the MTS, see Volin, op. cit., p. 59, and Vucinich, Alexander, Soviet Economic Institutions: The Social Structure of Production Units (Stanford, California, 1952), pp. 63, 113, 120.Google Scholar

14 Vucinich, op. cit., p. 118; Volin, op. cit., p. 60; Jasny, op. cit., p. 84.

15 See Burmystenko's speech in Kolhospnyk Ukraïny, July 5, 1939, p. 1.

16 The most important highways (those of “all-Union importance“) were, however, under supervision of the NK.VD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs). The report on Reshetilovka rajon notes that the two strategic roads crossing the rajon, the Kiev- Poltava and the Reshetilovka-Kremenchug highways, were in this category. A road inspector was assigned to each 10-kilometer stretch of these highways, and a highway master to each 30-50 kilometers. Cf. Studenikin, Vlasov, and Evtikhiev, op. cit., p. 377, which notes that highways of “all-Union” significance are under the Administration of Main Highways of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and its local agencies.

17 Studenikin, Vlasov, and Evtikhiev, op. cit., p. 377, states that “kolkhoz members and individual peasants—men from 18 to 45 years of age and women from 18 to 40—are enlisted for work on the roads. Those so enlisted are required to work without pay six days per year and to furnish to the road authority the animal draft power and wagon transport means, and inventory belonging to them. On the recommendation of the administration, the kolkhozes organize permanent road brigades in order to facilitate work. The work of the permanent brigade is credited to the general plan of labor participation of members of the given kolkhozes in road construction.“

18 The three types of Soviet schools do not represent entirely distinct stages of the educational process, as do, for example, the American elementary, junior high, and senior high schools. The “complete secondary” school includes all ten grades of the standard Soviet school system, while the “incomplete secondary” school includes the first seven grades. Thus pupils in the first four grades may be enrolled in any one of the three types. Pupils finishing the first four grades in the elementary school, largely in the rural areas, transfer to one of the secondary types for further schooling.

The total number of schools (not including higher educational institutions but including technical schools not under the Commissariat of Public Education) in the Ukraine in 1941 was 29,999, with 6,543,000 students (Vlasov, op. cit., p. 102). Since the total population was about 40,000,000, there was one school for about 1,300 population, as compared to one to about 900 in the rajons studied. There were about 230 students per school in the Ukraine as against 100 in Kotovka rajon and 50 in Novo Sanzhary rajon. The differences in ratios are probably due to the high proportion of small rural schools in the area studied.

19 See Studenikin, Vlasov and Evtikhiev, op. cit., pp. 410 ft. on the role of the state sanitary inspection in the Health Departments. At the oblast’ level, the state sanitary inspector, in addition to being deputy director of the Health Department, was himself directly responsible to the republic chief sanitary inspector. Probably a parallel arrangement prevails at the rajon level.

20 This seems to have been the general pattern. In Kotovka rajon (Dnepropetrovsk oblast’), however, there was a very large mobile unit, including a surgeon, two therapeutic physicians, one physician specializing in venereal diseases, two feldshers, two nurses and a dentist. There was one additional mobile unit in this rajon, but no details are available concerning its staff.

21 According to Studenikin, Vlasov, and Evtikhiev, op. cit,, p. 411, the chief sanitary physician of the rajon is charged with regulation of sanitary conditions throughout the rajon.

22 This situation is in marked contrast to that in the urban centers. Even the small town of Kobeljaki (in Poltava oblast’) with a population of 12,000 had thirteen physicians attached to its 100-bed hospital and to the polyclinic (Feldkommandantur [V] 248, Gruppe VII [Verwaltung], “Bericht ueber die in der Stadt Kobeljaki vorgefundenen Verwaltungsverhaltnisse,” November 15, 1941). A Ukrainian nationalist source (Krakivs'ki visti, February 10, 1942, p. 3) maintains that there were 134 physicians in the city of Poltava even after German conquest. It seems clear that the ratio of physicians to population in the urban centers of the region studied here was far higher, probably in the neighborhood of one to one thousand, than was the ratio in the rural districts. No doubt, of course, the medical services of the urban centers were to some extent available to the inhabitants of the rural areas. Statistics on medical facilities and personnel for the Ukraine as a whole are as follows:

All figures are for 1940, except that for feldshers, which is for 1941. L. Medved’ (Minister of Health, Ukrainian SSR), “Na strazhe zdorov'ja trudjashchikhsja,” Pravda Ukrainy, January 8, 1948, p. 2.

23 Studenikin, Vlasov, and Evtikhiev, op. cit., p. 414.

24 Ibid., p. 416.

25 Ibid., p. 423. 26 For such agencies in agriculture, see the section on the Agriculture Department.

27 See Armstrong, John A., Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939-1945 (New York, 1955), pp. 131 Google Scholar, 139, on the role of the NKVD in anti-German underground and partisan activities in the occupied Ukraine. The Germans also desired information on police staffs because they found it necessary to set up local police authorities to handle routine matters.

28 Cf. Studenikin, Vlasov, and Evtikhiev, op. cit., p. 276.

29 Ibid., p. 281.

30 Ibid., p. 284.

31 That the Soviet authorities were especially concerned with efforts of disaffected elements to burn crops is clear from the Soviet Ukrainian press of this period. See O. D. Balychev, Director of Anti-Incendiary Defense of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, “Doderzhyvatys’ pravyl protypozhezhnoj okhorony,” Kolhospnyk Ukrdiny, June 23, 1939, p. 2. On the work of the incendiary defense section cf. also Studenikin, Vlasov, and Evtikhiev, op. cit., pp. 286 ff.

32 See Vyshinskij, Andrej Ja., The Law of the Soviet State, tr. by Babb, Hugh W., introd. by Hazard, John N. (New York, 1948), pp. 521-22.Google Scholar

33 The ratio of lawyers to rural rajons suggested by these reports corresponds to a report from a Ukrainian nationalist source in Krakivs'ki visti, March 1, 1942, p. 4, which states that there were a total of 250 lawyers in Khar'kov oblast’ under Soviet rule, of whom 200 were in Khar'kov city. Thus, on the average, there would have been about one each in the rural rajons.

34 On the role of the procurator see VyshinsRij, op. cit., pp. 525-37.

35 Inkeles, Alex, Public Opinion in Soviet Russia: A Study in Mass Persuasion (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), pp. 153-54Google Scholar, and Harcave, Sidney, Structure and Functioning of the Lower Party Organizations in the Soviet Union (Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1954), p. 15.Google Scholar

36 Exclusive of the village policemen and, as noted below, laborers and “auxiliary personnel.“

37 The labor force of the average rajon of 45,000 population was probably in the neighborhood of 25,000. Cf. Warren W. Eason, “Population and Labor Force,” pp. 107-8 in Bergson, Abram, ed., Soviet Economic Growth: Conditions and Perspectives (Evanston, Ill., 1953).Google Scholar

38 On the extensive rajon Party apparatus (i.e., permanently employed Party officials), see Harcave, op. cit., p. 15; for a discussion of MTS overhead, see Vucinich, op. cit., pp. 114-16, and Volin, op. cit., pp. 59-60; on sovkhoz overhead, see Vucinich, op. cit., pp. 105-6; on kolkhoz overhead, see Jasny, op. cit., pp. 333-37, Vucinich, op. cit., pp. 81-83, and Volin, op. cit., pp. 30-32. 39 See Armstrong, op. cit., p. 251, for the frequent Ukrainian nationalist criticisms of the lack of initiative of the “half-intelligentsia” in the administrative apparatus of the occupied areas. The following comments by a Soviet critic on agronoms in Makarov rajon (Kiev oblast’) are revealing: “Each of these agronoms rarely appears in the kolkhoz and is only interested in matters ‘concerning his speciality'; he is not interested in the kolkhoz as a whole economy, he does not penetrate deeply into the economics of the artel… . Each agronom frequently gave directions to the kolkhoz without knowing what another agronom had recommended.” (Pravda, December 16, 1940, p. 2).