1 For bibliography see Stavrianos, L. S. and Panagopoulos, E. P., “Present Day Greece,” Journal of Modern History, XX, No. 2 (June, 1948), 149-58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar I have not been able to consult many of the books listed in this bibliography owing to failure to locate them in libraries in this country.

2 Cf. “Lebanon Agreement,” Article 5, signed in March, 1944, and reproduced in EAM White Book (New York, 1945), Doc. No. 1, p. 3; and General Ronald Scobie's statement made at Corinth on October 25, 1944, reproduced in ibid., Doc. No. 11, p. 12. The F.AM White Book is a translation of Ethniko Apeleutherotiko Metopo, Leuke Bibbs (Trikkala, 1945) issued by the Greek-American Council of New York. It is a collection of documents and excerpts from documents edited for propagandistic purposes; but it constitutes by far the most complete collection of source materials for events in Greece between May, 1944 and March, 1945.

3 The initials of Ethnikon Apeleutherotikon Metopon, i.e., National Liberation Front. It was a coalition of five parties, largely inspired and dominated by the Greek Communist Party. ELAS (Ethnikos Laikos Apeleutherotikos Stratos, National People's Liberation Army) had been created by EAM as the armed wing of the movement. In addition, there were several other organizations affiliated with EAM: a youth group, workmen's association, a relief organization, as well as both open and secret police forces.

4 Woodhouse, C. M., Apple of Discord (London, 1948), pp. 117–213 Google Scholar provides a detailed account of these relations. Col. Woodhouse was the commander of the British Military Mission in Greece from August, 1943 until the time of liberation, and had been among the first British officers dropped into Greece to work with the guerrillas in the fall of 1942. His book provides a very frank account of his own and British official attitudes toward the Greek guerrilla movement

5 Cordell Hull, , Memoirs (New York, 1948), II, 1451-58.Google Scholar

6 In November, 1944, I had occasion to converse with an engineer who was an official of the Bureau of Public Works. He had been dispatched to inspect drainage works in Boeotia some days previously, and had been stopped and turned back by an ELAS road block, despite a sheaf of official papers.

7 Toward the end of November, the Greek government was officially represented in Salonika by two men, the Governor General of Macedonia, George Modis, and General Christo Avramides. Both were accused by local EAM leaders of collaboration, despite the fact that they had been appointed by the “Government of National Unity” in which EAM was represented by five ministers. (Their appointment had, in fact, been agreed upon by the rival factions in the Cabinet largely because both men were near nonentities, former adherents of the Liberal [Republican] Party, who had taken no part in public affairs since 1935.) As “collaborators” EAM refused to coöperate with them, and * when I visted Salonika, both men were helpless, without any administrative machine at their command, and General Avramides was (perhaps unnecessarily) afraid for his life. For accusations of collaboration against these two men, see EAM White BookDocs. No. 16 and 17, p. 15.

8 The British even had under consideration a plan for declaring ELAS hostile to the Allies, a plan which had been suggested in the first place by elements in the exile Greek government. See Woodhouse, op. cit., pp. 194-95.

9 Ibid., pp. 197-201.

10 That the British interpretation of this particular turn of EAM's policy was well founded seems probable. Professor Alexander Svolos, who was for a brief period the president of EAM's provisional government, and who was one of the five ministers who took office under Papandreou, told me in March, 1946 (at a time when he had broken with EAM and was somewhat bitter against the Communists) that when he and the other EAM representatives arrived in Cairo the two Communists among them, John Zevgos and Miltiades Porfyrogennis, called on the Russian Ambassador to Egypt, and were advised to join Papandreou's Government without delay or further bargaining. In giving such advice it seems clear that the Russians were simply fulfilling their part of the bargain concluded in May by which Greece was to be assigned to the British sphere of military operations.

But from the Greek point of view the action was especially remarkable, for only the day before the Liberal Party representatives had withdrawn from the Cabinet, demanding Papandreou's resignation. The Liberals counted on the support of the EAM delegates, for EAM had voiced the identical demand only a few weeks before. Instead, the Liberals found themselves left in the lurch, excluded from the Cabinet entirely.

It may also be noted that subsequent changes in EAM's policy have coincided with shifts in Russian diplomacy. The resumption of guerrilla warfare in the summer of 1946 coincided with the failure of the Western Allies to satisfy the Russians on German reparations and other issues; and the declaration by the guerrilla government of its willingness to engage in peace talks (May 4, 1949) coincided with the agreement to lift the Berlin blockade.

11 Cf. Papandreou's denunciation of Rightists for fomenting civil war, EAM White Book, Doc. No. 23, p. 18.

12 The political complexion of the Greek Mountain Brigade was the result of a mutiny among the Greek forces of the Middle East which broke out in April, 1944. The mutiny came under EAM direction; and the subsequent purgation of the ranks eliminated EAM sympathizers.

13 Cf. EAM White Book, Docs. No. 64, 80, pp. 47, 72.

14 It seems certain that Churchill personally supported King George of Greece, but it would be an oversimplification to say that British policy was ever clear on the question of the King's return to the Greek throne. Various organizations and persons who were concerned with Greek affairs during the war and in the months immediately after liberation argued and sometimes acted at cross purposes; and the general British effort was to keep the whole question in the background. Thus when liberation came, King George was restrained from returning to Greece by British official advice (cf. Hansard, 5th series, CCCCVI (1944), 1906); but he remained the legal head of the Greek government, and the question of his return was left in abeyance. This postponement of decision did not, of course, allay republican and leftist suspicion that the Greek king would be brought back with the support of British bayonets. For an anatomy of British official policy toward the Greek monarchy see Woodhouse, op. cit., pp. 48-55; Hull, op. cit., II, 1240.

15 Membership in all the various organizations of EAM was sympathetically estimated at two million; ELAS numbered about fifty thousand men. See EAM White Book, Doc. No. 34, p. 26. Active adherents of other groups were few indeed; whereas the total population of Greece was a little over seven million.

16 Cf. Professor Svolos’ statement upon his resignation, bid., Doc. No. 51, p. 36.

17 Ibid., Docs. 28-33, PP. 22-26 reproduce sections from some of the relevant documents. They have been edited with a view to showing that the British were responsible for the outbreak of fighting which resulted from the failure of agreement, but the situation was rather more complicated than these documents seem to show. No comparable detailed account of the negotiations has been published by British authorities, but cf. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden's speech in Parliament, Hansard, 5th series, CCCCVII (1945), 603-04.

18 For text of Scobie's proclamation, see ibid., Doc. No. 48, pp. 34-35. In making such a proclamation, General Scobie was unquestionably stretching the powers which had been accorded to him by agreement between-the Greek government, the Allied Force Headquarters and the Greek guerrilla organizations. For text of this agreement, see ibid., Doc. No. 6, pp. 7-9 and Woodhouse, op. cit., pp. 306-07

19 Cf. General Scobie's successive proclamations of December I, 3 and 4, reproduced in EAM White Book, Docs. No. 48, 49, 50, pp. 34-36 and 42-44; and his appeal to General Saraphis, the Commander-in-Chief of ELAS, ibid., Doc. No. 69, pp. 53-54.

20 The conviction that Greeks would never attack British troops was frequently expressed in conversation by British headquarters officers.

21 Cf. EAM appeals to the Allied governments and to General Scobie,ibid, Docs. No. 56, 58, 61, pp. 39-41, 42, 44-45; and from a later date (December 15) the resolution of the Central Committee of ELAS, ibid., Doc. No. 74, pp. 58-60.

22 Ibid., Doc. No. 64, p. 47.

23 Ibid., Doc. No. 60, pp. 43-44.

24 Professor Svolos told me that he withdrew from active participation in the counsels of EAM after December 5 as a protest against the Communist plan to fight against the British. George Siantos, Secretary General of the Greek Communist Party, and one of the three members of the ELAS Central Committee which directed the actual fighting in Athens, confirmed Svolos’ withdrawal when I interviewed him in March, 1946.

25 Cf. the protest from the ELAS Central Committee to General Scobie, dated December 5: “In view of these facts, we believe Your Excellency should not take into consideration the request of such a Government [i.e., Papandreou's Government] and should not issue the order [for withdrawal of ELAS units from Athens]… .” Ibid., Doc. No. 61, p. 44.

26 Ibid., Docs. No. 63, 73, pp. 46, 57-58.

27 The attempt was not altogether foolhardy, and if undertaken earlier might well have been a success. There were only a handful of British combat troops in Greece, before reinforcements began to come in by air; and supply lines were completely insecure. At one stage in the fighting it was rumored that British food and ammunition on hand in central Athens sufficed for only one day's consumption.