The most telling criticism of political culture theory is that it has coped very inadequately with political change. There is a good reason for this: the assumptions of the political culture approach in fact lead to the expectation of continuity. But continuity can be reconciled with changes, though only changes of particular kinds. The nature of political changes consistent with culturalist assumptions and with the culturalist expectation of continuity are here specified by hypotheses about (1) the effects of changes in social context, whether “normal” or involving abrupt discontinuity, and (2) the effects of attempted revolutionary transformation.

For the last quarter century public-law studies have been dominated by “political jurisprudence,” which tries to understand law as a product of political forces. Critics claim this outlook, as now articulated, has generated fragmented empirical work disconnected from larger normative issues. This essay uses recent “institutionalist” or “structuralist” perspectives, based on critiques of pluralist political science and both Marxist and functionalist sociology, to propose a political approach to public law studies that can avoid such criticisms. If both empirical and normative public-law scholars took as their central concern the “dialectic of meaningful actions and structural determinants” and recast their research in several specified ways, they might be better able to describe the role of normative ideas in law and to achieve a broader empirical agenda that could ground and inform normative debates.

The stability of democracies has been of critical interest to students of comparative politics. One question that has received limited empirical analysis is, How do we integrate class conflict into the broader concept of democratic stability? We extend the work of Przeworski and Wallerstein. Our principal thesis is that as the material bases of class exchange diminish, the state intervenes economically to expand the resources conducive to class consent. A tripartite coalition thus emerges, with the state facilitating class compromise between labor and capital through economic policies. We explore this thesis in a cross-national analysis of data collected from 20 advanced industrial democracies during the time period 1965–83, and explore the essential conclusions and the political-economic implications of our findings.

Political action has affected postwar income distribution in the United States mainly through policy-induced variations in macroeconomic activity and government transfer benefits in proportion to total income. We present a small dynamic model of the connections among the partisan balance of power, macroeconomic fluctuations, transfer spending trends, and income distribution outcomes. The model is based on the premise that the parties have different distributional goals, and it is designed to identify how shifts in party control of the presidency and the strength of the parties in Congress have affected the distribution of after-tax, after-transfer income by influencing cyclical economic performance and the flow of resources to transfer programs. We therefore extend the “partisan theory” of macroeconomic policy to the domain of income distribution outcomes.

Mancur Olson's model of economic growth has attracted great attention as a theoretical account of how interest groups influence the rate of economic growth over time. Moreover, the model appears to have received strong empirical support in Olson's tests employing U.S. state data. However, the specification of the Olson construct in these tests is insufficiently attentive to the complex causal chain implicit in Olson's argument, inadequately accounts for precisely how interest groups matter, and employs a static research design that obfuscates the cause-and-effect relationships posited by the model. We review these issues and develop a more complete specification of the Olson model. The respecified model is then tested using U.S. state data for the period of the late 1970s and early 1980s using new measures of interest-group influence.

The publics of different societies are characterized by durable cultural orientations that have major political and economic consequences. Throughout the period from 1973 to 1987, given nationalities consistently showed relative high or low levels of a “civic culture”—a coherent syndrome of personal life satisfaction, political satisfaction, interpersonal trust and support for the existing social order. Those societies that rank high on this syndrome are much likelier to be stable democracies than those that rank low. Economic development and cultural change are linked in a complex pattern of reciprocal influence. Originally, Protestantism may have facilitated the rise of capitalism, leading to economic development, which in turn favored the emergence of the civic culture. But in those countries that attained high levels of prosperity, there eventually emerged postmaterialist values that tended to neutralize the emphasis on economic accumulation that earlier characterized Protestant societies.

If the realist tradition has underappreciated the formalizable quality of Thucydides' scientific investigations, neorealist teachers and writers have generally failed to see the normative and dramatical features of Thucydides' political science, each an expression of his dialectical epistemology and ontology. Nicholas Rescher's partial formalization of dialectics as a controversy-oriented approach to knowledge cumulation and Kenneth Burkes dramaturgical approach to textual understanding are both shown to fit Thucydides' argumentation in the Melian dialogue. Thus argumentation produces new knowledge about the inner determinants of Athenian imperialism; simultaneously it dramatically reveals the constituting practical rationale of Athenian actions to be unjust. Once Thucydides' determining essences of power politics are properly uncovered, their false “eternal, mathematical necessity” can be appropriately criticized. A case is thus suggested for a “neoclassical polimetrics” more fundamentally grounded in “political argumentation” about practical choices in particular contexts than in ahistorical laws, inductive statistics or deductive mathematics.

The theory of patterned inequality between rulers and ruled provides a valuable analytic approach to the relationship between inequality and political violence. Under conditions of a bifurcated pattern of inequality, the probability of political violence is likely to be greater than under a more generalized inequality typically measured by the Gini index. A strong systematic relationship between patterned inequality in Latin American landholdings and deaths from political violence was discovered using the exponential distribution as a model for the lower portion of the land distribution and the log-exponential for the upper. This degree of association was far stronger than that found between the Gini index of land inequality in Latin America and deaths from political violence. Evidence supporting the theory was also found in an analysis of Middle Eastern landholdings.

I test several hypotheses concerning the origins of political repression in the states of the United States. The hypotheses are drawn from the elitist theory of democracy, which asserts that repression of unpopular political minorities stems from the intolerance of the mass public, the generally more tolerant elites not supporting such repression. Focusing on the repressive legislation adopted by the states during the McCarthy era, I examine the relationships between elite and mass opinion and repressive public policy. Generally it seems that elites, not masses, were responsible for the repression of the era. These findings suggest that the elitist theory of democracy is in need of substantial theoretical reconsideration, as well as further empirical investigation.

Liberalism doubts that a sound theory of politics can be built from a theory of the human good. In pursuit of its authorized ends, the liberal state can establish incentives and disincentives, it can require reparations, and it can restrain dangerous persons. But can liberals punish? By distinguishing punishment from related phenomena and comparing its presuppositions with central tenets of liberalism, I tentatively conclude that they cannot. An analysis of efforts by leading liberal theorists to come to terms with punishment confirms that suspicion: their theories do not authorize punishment or do so at the expense of their more fundamental principles. I conclude that the ability to punish criminal is part of a larger moral experience and capacity that is lost with liberalism's expulsion of the human good from politics, and further, that without reference to the human good, liberalism's central concepts of liberty and equality are left weak and empty.

Condcrcet's criterion states that an alternative that defeats every other by a simple majority is the socially optimal choice. Condorcet argued that if the object of voting is to determine the “best” decision for society but voters sometimes make mistakes in their judgments, then the majority alternative (if it exists) is statistically most likely to be the best choice. Strictly speaking, this claim is not true; in some situations Bordas rule gives a sharper estimate of the best alternative. Nevertheless, Condorcet did propose a novel and statistically correct rule for finding the most likely ranking of the alternatives. This procedure, which is sometimes known as “Kemeny's rule,” is the unique social welfare function that satisfies a variant of independence of irrelevant alternatives together with several other standard properties.

As the U.S. states develop their political institutions and take greater responsibility for their economic well-being, two concerns that have long driven research on national elections—electoral insulation and economic accountability—should become central in research on state elections. I investigate institutionalization's effects on the vulnerability of state elections to major periodic forces—coattails, turnout, and economic conditions—and how political responsibility for economic growth is apportioned between presidents and governors in state elections. The investigation relies upon dynamic models of state legislative and gubernatorial outcomes estimated with a pooled data set comprised of most states and elections in the years 1940–82. The results, which have important implications for state government more broadly, indicate that institutionalization has substantially insulated legislative elections against major threats and that state legislators and governors have less to fear from their state economies than is often thought, but also that state elections are becoming more susceptible to swings in the national economy.

Most studies of contextual influences on political attitudes and behavior have treated geographical areas as the operative social environment. As early research on social influence processes noted, the conditions that promote consensus among inhabitants of a common environment are likely to be present in formal organizations that encourage face-to-face interaction. Churches possess many of the characteristics that should maximize behavioral contagion and are thus fertile ground for the dissemination of common political outlooks. This expectation is tested by assessing the link between theological and political conservatism in 21 Protestant congregations. The theological climate in the churches is found to contribute strongly to the members' political conservatism over and above the personal commitment of respondents to traditional Christian values and a variety of social and attitudinal variables. As churches constitute the single most widespread form of voluntary organizational affiliation in the United States, their potential political impact appears to be considerable.

Once sparce and sporadic, histories of political science have proliferated in recent years. We contend that such histories are a necessary feature of the discourse of political science, because there are essential connections between the history, identity, and actual practices of any rationally progressive discipline. In light of the fact that the objects political scientists study are historically and contextually contingent, there has been—and should be—a plurality of histories to match the diversity of approaches in politicalscience. Unfortunately, most histories of political science prove either “Whiggish” and condescending toward the past, or “skeptical” and negative. The consequence has been an inadequate understanding of the relationship between plurality, rationality, and progress in the discipline. Taking into account both the deficiencies and achievements of Whiggish and skeptical accounts, we argue that context-sensitive histories would better serve the rationality and progress of political science.

A brinkmanship crisis with two-sided incomplete information is modeled as a game of sequential bargaining in which each state is uncertain of its adversary's resolve. The sequential crisis equilibria are characterized explicitly and used to analyze the influences of resolve, misperception, and the status quo on escalation and crisis stability. The description of brinkmanship as a contest of resolve is found to be misleading: the state with the greatest resolve may not prevail in the crisis; a state may be less, not more, likely to prevail the greater its resolve; and a states' expected payoff may be less, not more, the greater its resolve. Moreover, reducing misperception may destabilize a crisis. Surprisingly, increasing the stake a potential challenger has in the status quo may not make a challenge less likely. Finally, crises involving severe conflicts of interest are shown to be less likely than crises not entailing a severe conflict of interest.

Despite the explosive increase in the research program on government growth in recent years, little work has been done on government growth disaggregated to the subnational level. I examine the empirical validity of five competing models of government growth for the fifty U.S. states from 1945 to 1984: Wagner's Law, fiscal illusion, party control, bureau voting, and intergovernmental grant. Government size is defined in terms of state government spending as a proportion of total state economic output, with separate implicit price deflators being employed for the public and private sectors. Based on a longitudinal test of these competing models, the analysis uncovers strong empirical support for the bureau voting and intergovernmental grant models, moderately weak support for the Wagner's Law model, and virtually no support for the fiscal illusion and party control explanations. These findings have important implications for the study of government growth in general and, more specifically, in the states.

Liberation theology is not a Marxism in Christian disguise. It is the recovery of a biblical radicalism that has been harbored in the Judeo-Christian tradition virtually from its founding. As such, liberation theology is the revitalization of one of the most profound social, political, economic, and religious challenges to established hierarchies that the West has ever known. Liberation theologians turn to modern Marxism chiefly to gain a comprehensive understanding of contemporary class conflict and poverty. Their primary concerns remain to define themselves as an “emergent church” in the biblical tradition, and to reflect upon the praxis of the “base community” movement they have spawned throughout Latin America. However, the principal liberation theologians of our day exhibit persistent ambiguities about how individuals should relate to their communities. The biblical materials suggest certain solutions to them, but ones so radical that not even the most extreme of the liberation theologians appear ready to embrace them.

Findings from a data-based study of bargaining in recurrent crises between evenly matched states provide the foundation for the construction of four crisis-learning games. Symmetrical and asymmetrical nuclear and nonnuclear sequential three-by-three games assuming complete information and nonmyopic play are presented and analyzed. The empirical study indicated that states that were unsuccessful in one crisis were likely to move to more coercive bargaining strategies in the next crisis. The four sequential games offer insights as to why this is likely to produce unwanted consequences, while demonstrating the importance of the participants' initial strategy choices. With the realpolitik lessons suggested by the earlier study removed, the dynamics of the games present a case for beginning with a cooperative strategy and moving to reciprocating, or tit-for-tat, bargaining.

The modern language of tyranny has distorted the significance of the Greek term tyrannos. In ancient Greek the term was accorded to the new ruler in the city, one whose legitimacy did not reside in his bonds to the ancient rulers and ancient families. Tyranny thus suggested a freedom from the past. Reason, as the Greeks understood it, also entailed a breaking away from the physical world. Reason and tyranny thus work together as expressions of freedom, but it is a freedom that in its transcendence of boundaries leads to tragedy. An examination of Sophocles' Oedipus draws out both the glory and the failure of the individual attempt of the political actor to rise above the historical particular and the mere body to build a world where reason alone is power.

Three important questions are raised by the “return to the state” movement of recent years. First, are the pluralist, structural functionalist, and Marxist literatures of political science societally reductionist, as this movement contends? Second, does the neostatist paradigm remedy these defects and provide a superior analytical model? Third, regardless of the substantive merits of these arguments, are there heuristic benefits flowing from this critique of the literature? Examination of the evidence leads to a rejection of the first two criticisms. The answer to the third question is more complex. There is merit to the argument that administrative and institutional history has been neglected in the political science of the last decades. This is hardly a “paradigmatic shift”; and it has been purchased at the exorbitant price of encouraging a generation of graduate students to reject their professional history and to engage in vague conceptualization.