Most studies of Japanese elections have seen constituency candidates and their campaigns as the major factor in electoral mobilization. In order to explore the effects of candidate campaigns and voters' images of candidates, as well as party identifications, party images, partisan issue opinions, and past voting, I develop models portraying these effects upon the vote, both separately and together, and test the models using survey data. The results show that partisan attitudes are the dominant force in Japanese parliamentary voting. The most plausible explanation for the importance of partisan factors lies in the electorate's being exposed regularly to information about parties but only intermittently to information about candidates. The plausibility of an information-based explanation of the importance of robust partisan attitudes in Japan suggests in turn that comparative differences in voting may reflect systemic variations in information processes.

Political scientists want to do good. They want to expand knowledge about political life, but also they wish to use knowledge for political reform. Usually this means desiring to promote “democratization.” Historically democracy and political science have tended to develop together. In modest ways political science can contribute to the emergence of democracy. Political reform succeeds best if it occurs incrementally, in the spirit of “one soul at a time.”

We offer a comparative analysis of public and private schools, presenting data from a new national study—the Administrator and Teacher Survey—that expands on the pathbreaking High School and Beyond survey. We find that public and private schools are distinctively different in environment and organization. Most importantly, private schools are more likely to possess the characteristics widely believed to produce effectiveness. We argue throughout that the differences across the sectors are anchored in the logic of politics and markets. This argument derives from our belief that environmental context has pervasive consequences for the organization and operation of all schools and specifically that the key differences between public and private environments—and thus between public and private schools—derive from their characteristic methods of social control: the public schools are subordinates in a hierarchic system of democratic politics, whereas private schools are largely autonomous actors “controlled” by the market.

We address both a puzzle and a theory. The puzzle is posed by the emergence of “Thatcherism,” an un-Conservative ideology that has appeared in an antiideological British Conservative party. We address this puzzle by determining what Thatcherism is and by showing that although it represents a minority viewpoint, it does indeed fit into previous Conservative thinking. The theory in question is the spatial theory of ideological change, which, we argue, is impugned by the circumstances of Thatcherism's construction. We address this theory by investigating potential constituencies at the time of Thatcherism's creation and by examining evidence about the intentions of those who created it. Finally, we seek both to draw out the implications of Mrs. Thatcher's campaign to convert the voters to her views and to explain why the same spatial theory that Thatcherism confounds seem confirmed by equally striking cases in postwar British politics.

We develop and test a market-based model to explain variations in states' welfare medicine policy decisions. The empirical results support the model of state policy outputs, indicating that states' spending efforts for welfare medicine are most sensitive to the supply of services within their borders. We learn in addition that spending effort declines with demand for services, indicating that the states spending the highest proportions of total personal income for the program are those who need it most and can afford it least. Measures of political system development affect spending effort positively and significantly, suggesting that ideology, diversity of interests, and administrative professionalism increase states' welfare efforts.

A central claim of both Marxist and neoclassical political theory is that under capitalism all governments must respect and protect the essential claims of those who own the productive wealth of society. This is the theory of “structural dependence of the state on capital.” Using a formal model, the internal logic and the robustness of the theory is examined. We conclude that in a static sense the theory is false: virtually any distribution of consumption between wage earners and owners of capital is compatible with continual private investment once an appropriate set of taxes and transfers is in place. Yet the state may be structurally dependent in a dynamic sense. Policies that, once in place, redistribute income without reducing investment do reduce investment during the period in which they are anticipated but not yet implemented.

Aggregate-level data are used in this analysis to explain the outcomes of Senate elections between 1974 and 1986. Using the individual Senate contest as the unit of analysis permits estimating the relative influence of a wide variety of factors on Senate election results including political characteristics of states, characteristics of the candidates, and national political conditions. Of these factors candidate characteristics had the strongest impact on the outcomes of Senate elections. The importance of candidate characteristics has had two major consequences for Senate elections. First, two-party competition has spread to every region of the country: in Senate elections, no state can be considered safe for either party. Second, money is probably now more important than ever, especially for challengers and candidates for open seats.

We contrast the rational theory of choice in the form of expected utility theory with descriptive psychological analysis in the form of prospect theory, using problems involving the choice between political candidates and public referendum issues. The results showed that the assumptions underlying the classical theory of risky choice are systematically violated in the manner predicted by prospect theory. In particular, our respondents exhibited risk aversion in the domain of gains, risk seeking in the domain of losses, and a greater sensitivity to losses than to gains. This is consistent with the advantage of the incumbent under normal conditions and the potential advantage of the challenger in bad times. The results further show how a shift in the reference point could lead to reversals of preferences in the evaluation of political and economic options, contrary to the assumption of invariance. Finally, we contrast the normative and descriptive analyses of uncertainty in choice and address the rationality of voting.

Weber's commentators often accuse him of lacking a coherent political philosophy because his pluralist-elite theory of democracy seems indifferent to liberal-democratic values. I argue, however, that the core of Weber's political philosophy is a politicized neo-Kantian liberalism, one that produces an ethically significant and positive concept of politics. The problem is rather that Weber's pessimism about institutionalizing positive politics in bureaucratized societies left the ethical core of his political philosophy inexplicit. This introduced a conflict into his thought between his ethical commitments and his assessments of political possibilities. The conflict is compelling because it reflects the contemporary gap between the promise and performance of liberal democracies. At the same time, formulating Weber's problems in these terms helps identify democratic solutions that remain obscure in his assessment of conflicts between bureaucratization and democracy.

Predictions of electoral behavior in a multiparty setting should be a function of the voters' beliefs about how parties will perform following an election. Similarly, party behavior in a legislature should be a function of electoral promises and rewards. We develop a multistage game-theoretic model of three-party competition under proportional representation. The final policy outcome of the game is generated by a noncooperative bargaining game between the parties in the elected legislature. This game is essentially defined by the vote shares each party receives in the general election, and the parties' electoral policy positions. At the electoral stage parties and voters are strategic in that they take account of the legislative implications of any electoral outcome. We solve for equilibrium electoral positions by the parties and final policy outcomes.

Participation as amicus curiae has long been an important tactic of organized interests in litigation before the U.S. Supreme Court. We analyze amicus curiae briefs filed before the decision on certiorari and assess their impact on the Court's selection of a plenary docket. We hypothesize that one or more briefs advocating or opposing certiorari increase the likelihood of its being granted. We test this hypothesis using data from the United States Reports and Briefs and Records of the United States Supreme Court for the 1982 term. The statistical analysis demonstrates that the presence of amicus curiae briefs filed prior to the decision on certiorari significantly and positively increases the chances of the justices' binding of a case over for full treatment—even after we take into account the full array of variables other scholars have hypothesized or shown to be substantial influences on the decision to grant or deny.

Over the past two decades psychological models of affect have changed from valence (one-dimensional) models to multiple-dimensional models. The most recent models, circumplex models, are two-dimensional. Feeling thermometer measures, which derive their theoretical logic from earlier (valence) models of emotional appraisal, are shown to be confounded. Underlying the variation obtained using feeling thermometer measures are two dimensions of emotional response, mastery (positive emotionality) and threat (negative emotionality). Analysis of the 1984 NES survey suggests that positive emotional response is twice as influential as negative emotional response in predicting presidential candidate vote disposition to the presidential candidates. Reliance on emotional response is shown to be uniformly influential across various strata of the electorate.

Policy considerations have little direct influence on vote disposition, though policy considerations are indirectly related to vote disposition through the influence of issues on the degree of feelings of threat evoked by the candidates.

Successful deterrence, it is argued, requires a combination of military capabilities and bargaining behavior that enhances a defender's credibility without provoking a potential attacker. Hypotheses on the political and military conditions under which extended-immediate deterrence is likely to succeed or fail are formulated and tested by probit analysis on fifty-eight historical cases. The empirical results indicate that (1) the military capability of the defender to deny the potential attacker a quick and decisive victory on the battlefield enhances deterrence; (2) a policy of reciprocity in diplomacy and military actions by the defender contributes strongly to deterrence success; and (3) a past record of backing down under pressure or intransigence in confrontations with the potential attacker increases the likelihood of deterrence failure.

The relationship between age and active-passive leadership style is analyzed with direct observational data describing the behavior of a sample of 24 mayors during issue discussion and debate on their councils over a one-year period of meetings. Activity, measured as a time-based rate of verbal participation, was found to increase with the age of leaders to a high in the midfifties, and to decline for older mayors in their sixties and seventies. Political experience interacted with age to affect activity. Inexperienced mayors displayed a less active style, regardless of age; but experienced mayors in their sixties and seventies had the least active style of all. These findings held up under control f or group size, political structure on the councils, and community characteristics.

I provide a narrative of the emergence of an expressly articulated “political science” in the Scottish Enlightenment. Political science was designed by Hume, Smith, and others to advance both a Newtonian method for the study of politics and a politics of moderation whose tasks included a critique of enthusiasm. In this way, political science, moderation, and (anti)enthusiasm were conceptually connected. The emergence of political science, understood in this way, required a number of conceptual changes in a structure of argument shaped largely by Locke. These conceptual changes, in turn, fixed a rhetorical framework for persistent debates over the methodological and political identity of political science, even as ideology literally replaced enthusiasm. These persistent debates reveal the relevance of the history of political science as a forum for remembrance, reflection, and critique.

Understanding why members leave or remain in groups has received little attention despite its fundamental importance for organizational maintenance. In this analysis, a theory of experiential search is proposed and applied to Common Cause. Group participation is conceptualized as a process by which imperfectly informed decision makers learn about the organizations they join. This framework makes quitting understandable and provides a link between the initial membership choice and follow-up decisions.

This analysis investigates the mass dynamics of competitive electoral politics with respect to the presidential vote during the 1928–36 realigning period for the United States. A formal system of three interdependent differential equations is employed to characterize the dynamic processes of the aggregate voter shifts between the Republican, Democratic, and nonvoter populations. The modeling strategy is used to locate substantial variations in the mass dynamics between large subgroups in the electorate as well as to identify both national and socially interactive components to the patterns of voter movements. The results show that the overall realignment period was quite complex. Vote switching from the Republican party to the Democratic party was the dominant characteristic of the 1932 election, whereas additional Democratic gains in 1936 came mostly from new voters.

We develop and explicate a game-theoretic model in which repeated play, incomplete information, and reputation are major elements. A significant advance of this model is the way it represents cooperation under incomplete information among rational actors of different sizes. The model is used to formalize certain aspects of the “theory of hegemonic stability.” It shows that the “dilemma” or “limits” of hegemonic stability look like natural attributes of games where reputation is involved, unifying both “benevolent” and “coercive” strands of hegemony theory. An example, drawn from recent developments in the Organization of Petroleum-exporting Countries, shows how our model of reputation guides the study of hegemonic regime construction. We conclude by comparing the nature of cooperative behavior under conditions of complete and incomplete information.

Researchers ordinarily consider ideological consistency to be a characteristic of individuals; groups are considered to be ideological only if they are composed of ideologically oriented individuals. We show how a group as a whole can be characterized as exhibiting an ideological basis for its preferences even though many, or even most, of its members have preferences that are inconsistent with the supposed unidimensional ideological continuum. As an illustration, we show that the United States electorate of 1980 had collective preferences among the candidates Kennedy, Carter, Ford, and Reagan as if these preferences reflected an underlying left-right dimension among these candidates, despite the fact that a high proportion of individual voters had preferences among these candidates that did not fit the left-right dimension. In general, we show reasons why collectivities are likely to be more ideologically consistent than are the individuals composing them.

The contemporary estrangement of political theory from political science is in large measure the product of a quarrel that originated in the challenge to the values of U.S. political science initiated by émigré scholars during the 1940s. The behavioral revolution was in an important respect a conservative rebellion in defense of the values of liberalism and related notions of science, relativism, and historical progress that had traditionally informed the discipline. This controversy in the context of political science fundamentally structured the discourse of academic political theory and the contemporary constitution of the field both as a division of political science and as a wider interdisciplinary enterprise.