Any attempt impartially to analyze the issues involved in the controversy between President Wilson and Senator Chamberlain, which culminated in a victory for the former in the passage of the Overman bill, will meet with serious difficulties. An error, too common to much current journalism, and not entirely absent from the more technical and highly specialized articles when they deal with political subjects, is that of attributing a certain result to one factor when it is brought about by a plexus of causes. Most important political controversies, especially those of national import, involve numerous currents of cause and effect, which, to be understood clearly and appraised impartially, demand of the conscientious publicist careful consideration in their true relationship. Because the fight over coördination involved many prominent men, much diversity of opinion, issues both national and international, and—though indirectly—the question of universal military service, its treatment in an adequate manner is by no means easy.

What is meant by coördination? The noun is defined in the Century dictionary as “the act of arranging in due order or proper relation, or in a system; the state of being so ordered.” The verb “to coördinate” is defined: “to place, arrange, or set in due order or proper relative position; bring into harmony or proper connection and arrangement.”

Returning, in the early days of the war, from a belligerent Germany, through a mobilized Switzerland and a partly mobilized Italy, to an America that was still unperturbed and unprepared, I revisited the famous Museum of Naples. In one of the central corridors, I noticed an ancient mural inscription, which I had doubtless seen before without appreciating its significance—an inscription of the time of Augustus: “To perpetual peace.” Thus even in warlike Rome, and more than nineteen centuries ago, after a series of wars that had shaken the then civilized world from the Alps to the African deserts and from the Pillars of Hercules to the Nile, as after every great war that has since devastated Europe, men's minds were turning with inextinguishable hope to the vision of a warless future.

From tyrannical autocracy to a most radically socialistic régime, from an empire oppressing subjugated peoples to a country proclaiming the principle of “self-determination of nationalities”—such has been the remarkable record of Russia during the past year. These changes, which have come to many as a surprise, were to those acquainted with the ferment permeating Russian life but the logical outcome of Russia's historic development.

In order to be able to interpret the trend of recent events there, events which since the overthrow of Tsarism have been moving with such bewildering rapidity, it is necessary to know what have been the forces that have shaped the life of the country. Russian evolution has come through periods of subjugation, through century long struggles for self-assertion against invaders, through many internal uprisings and through successful wars of expansion. Beginning as a small principality in the interior of a plain, Russia spread to the north and to the south, to the west and to the east until she became a world empire, in area the greatest compact country on the face of the earth, occupying 8,505,000 square miles, or larger in size than all of North America, and having a population of over 175,000,000 people.

To appreciate the political theories and institutions of Asia in the proper historical perspective, it is necessary to remember that, in spite of Switzerland, universal suffrage and the initiative and referendum are essentially young phenomena in Eur-America; and that republicanism cannot be pronounced to be a historic trait of the occidental mind.

On the other hand, it is apparent that the liberal political movements in Young Asia have, if at all, only very remote blood-relationship with the theories and institutions developed in its past history. The Japanese constitutional monarchy, the ideals of the Young Turk, the Chinese republic, as well as the nationalist activities in Egypt, Persia and India, are chiefly based on the modern Eur-American achievements. These sources can be briefly mentioned as: (1) the English parliament, (2) the American federation, (3) the “ideas of 1789,” (4) the idealism of Fichte and Schiller, (5) the socialism of Karl Marx and Louis Blanc, (6) the political mysticism of Joseph Mazzini, and, last but not least, (7) the philosophy and methodology of John Stuart Mill.

Within these limitations it should be possible to define the rightful place of the Asians in a scientific study of comparative politics.

The battle over the Corn Laws was fought out in Great Britain as a domestic issue. But it had nevertheless a great imperial significance. During the mercantilistic régime the colonies had been regarded as a commercial appanage of the mother country. The victory of the free traders opened up a new era in the economic history of the empire. The colonies were released from the irksome restrictions of the Navigation Laws. They acquired the right to frame their own tariffs with a view to their own particular interests. In short, they ceased to be dependent communities and became self-governing states.

But the emancipation of the colonies was by no means complete. The home government still claimed the right to control their tariff policies. The colonies were privileged, indeed, to arrange their tariff schedules according to local needs; but it was expected that their tariff systems would conform to the fiscal policy of the mother land. The free traders, no less than the mercantilists, were determined to maintain the fiscal unity of the empire. There was still an imperial commercial policy; its motif only had been changed from protection to free trade. The colonies were still bound to the fiscal apron strings of the mother country; but the strings were no longer so short, nor the knots so tight as they had formerly been.

Every state legislature in the United States is divided into a considerable number of standing committees. In spite of obvious advantages which seem to render it indispensable, the development of the committee system has been attended by great evils. Indeed, it is perhaps not too much to say that with the committee system the worst evils connected with legislative organization and procedure are intimately associated.

It is the chief purpose of this paper to point out the principal weaknesses or defects of the committee system in connection with state legislatures generally, and particularly the defects which have appeared in the practical operation of the system in the Illinois legislature; and at the same time to discuss certain proposals designed to remedy these defects.

These weaknesses and proposed remedies will be taken up in the following order:
I. Defects in the methods of making committee assignments.
II. Defects due to the number of standing committees.
III. Defects due to the size of committees.
IV. Defects due to the lack of a definite and fixed schedule of committee meetings.
V. Defects due to the lack of publicity and to the irresponsibility surrounding committee proceedings.
VI. Defects due to the insufficient control of each house over its committees.
VII. Defects peculiar to the committee on rules and the conference committee.

In previous issues of this Review Professor Wambaugh and the late Judge McClain have summarized the decisions of the Supreme Court on constitutional questions from 1909 to 1914. It is the purpose of this and a succeeding paper to deal in like manner with the decisions of the last three years. Owing to the number of cases decided during the triennium, the writer must content himself with the rôle of annalist and refrain from assuming that of analyst. For the benefit of those who desire fuller comment or criticism, references are given to articles and notes in various legal periodicals discussing the more important cases.

Since the expiration of the October term of 1913, three changes have occurred in the personnel of the bench. Mr. Justice Lurton died July 12, 1914, and his successor, Mr. Justice McReynolds, took his seat October 12, 1914. Illness prevented Mr. Justice Lamar from participating in any of the decisions of the October term of 1915. He died on January 2, 1916. The commission of Mr. Justice Brandeis, who succeeded him, was not recorded until June 5, 1916, so that during the 1915 term only eight justices participated in the work of the court. Mr. Justice Hughes resigned June 10, 1916, to accept the Republican nomination for the presidency, and his successor, Mr. Justice Clarke, took his seat on October 9, 1916. The bench as at present constituted consists of Chief Justice White, appointed associate justice by President Cleveland and chief justice by President Taft; Mr. Justice McKenna, appointed by President McKinley; Justices Holmes and Day, appointed by President Roosevelt; Justices Van Devanter and Pitney, appointed by President Taft; and the three new justices appointed by President Wilson.

A society of human individuals viewed as a politically organized unit is termed a state. The state, which, in its various activities and forms of organization, furnishes the material for political science, may be regarded from a number of standpoints. It may be studied sociologically as one of the factors as well as one of the results of communal life; it may be examined historically for the purpose of ascertaining the part which it has played in the life of humanity, its varying phases of development being traced and their several causes and results determined; it may be considered as an entity, to the existence and activities of which are to be applied the ethical criteria which the moralist and philosopher establish; it may be psychologically surveyed in order to make plain the manifestations of will, emotion and judgment which support and characterize its life; it may be regarded from the purely practical standpoint to determine how it may be most efficiently organized and operated; and, finally, it may be envisaged and studied simply as an instrumentality for the creation and enforcement of law. It is with the state, as viewed in this last aspect, that analytical political philosophy is concerned.

The point of departure of the analytical jurist is that in all communities which have reached any degree of definite political organization, public affairs, whether domestic or international, are not carried on in a haphazard manner, without system or fixed principles, but are governed by bodies of rules logically related to one another and all depending, as deductive conclusions, upon certain assumptions regarding the juristic nature of the state, of its sovereignty, of its law, and of the relations which it bears towards other bodies politic as similarly viewed.

The gerrymander is an American name for a political abuse, which, though by no means exclusively American, has been most widely practiced and generally tolerated in this country. It is a device for the partial suppression of public opinion that simulates agreement with democratic institutions. The subterfuge, therefore, has no place in countries in which oligarchic control is legitimized. Nor is it suited to European conditions, because it is difficult there to shift electoral boundaries. European electoral units in large part have a clearly defined historical basis, which in turn rests upon geographic coherence. This solidarity is commonly so great that it cannot be disregarded. American political divisions on the other hand show in major part very imperfect adjustment to economic and historic conditions, largely, because many of the divisions were created in advance of such conditions. They are, in the main, not gradual growths, but deliberate and arbitrary legislative creations, made without adequate knowledge of the conditions that make for unity or disunity of population within an area. Political divisions tend, therefore, to be less significant than in European countries and to be regarded more lightly. It is in particular the smaller unit, such as the county, that has been manipulated for electoral purposes. In spite of their poorly drawn individual boundaries, groups of counties can be organized into larger electoral units in such a manner as to represent a common body of interests predominating. On the other hand they can be so arranged as to mask these interests. The lack of proper coherence in the individual county may be rectified in large measure in the group, or it may be intensified. Gerrymandering accomplishes the latter result.

In his admirable analysis of the juristic theory of the state, Dr. Willoughby has said that “analytical political philosophy” views the state “simply as an instrumentality for the creation and enforcement of law.” The point of view from which this philosophy proceeds is thus fixed. It is professedly the legal point of view.

It is, however, precisely by peculiar and distinctive points of view from which phenomena are observed, that sciences or philosophies are differentiated one from another. Two philosophies cannot occupy the same standpoint. If there is to be discussion of a philosophy of politics which asserts its viewpoint to be that of a philosophy of law, then it is necessary to define very clearly the relationship between politics and law.

As these concepts have been defined by the analytical school, it is obvious that they are intimately connected. By the opponents of this school it may be objected that, when correctly conceived, politics and law are perfectly distinct. It may perhaps be held that what is known as law in modern society is not essentially political at all; but that it has merely happened as an accident of modern political development that a part of the law has received the additional and nonessential sanction of political authority.

Two instances of race discrimination which came before the court were aimed against aliens. Truax v. Raich annulled an Arizona statute which required every employer of not more than five workers to employ not less than 80 per cent qualified electors or native born citizens of the United States. The decision was based, not only on the equal protection clause, but also on the principle that the states must not interfere with the acknowledged powers of the nation. The power to admit aliens which Congress possesses and has exercised would be nugatory if the states after their admission could deny them the opportunity of a livelihood.

But neither of these principles was held applicable to the exclusion of aliens from employment on public works. The opinions in Heim v. McCall and Crane v. New York went so far as to declare that a state must be as free as an individual to decide for itself what persons shall be employed on work done for it. Yet it must be seriously doubted whether the court by actual decision would go so far as to sanction discriminations against Quakers or Methodists or Republicans or Democrats. The exclusion of aliens may be justified on grounds which would not apply to other whimsicalities.

The Institute for Government Research is an institution incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia and wholly supported by voluntary private donations. It received its charter on March 13, 1916, and began active operations on October 1 of the same year. Its purpose as set forth in its charter is:

“To conduct scientific investigations into the theory and practice of governmental administration, including inquiries into the form of organization and the manner of operation of federal, state and local governmental bodies and offices in the United States of America; the powers, duties, limitations and qualifications of officers; the methods of administration employed; the character and cost of results obtained and the conditions affecting the efficiency and welfare of governmental officers and employees; to carry on such inquiries, directly or with the coöperation of governments, learned societies, institutions of learning or other agencies and individuals and to make public the results of its investigations; to maintain a library for the use of the society or its members and officers and those affiliated with its work; and to prosecute such other inquiries and perform such other services as may tend to the development and application of the principles of efficiency in governmental administration.”

The decisions of the Supreme Court during the October terms of 1914, 1915, and 1916, indicate on the whole a more tolerant attitude towards the judgment of state legislatures on questions of the police power than one would be apt to infer from the criticisms called forth by the few cases in which laws were declared invalid. The cases on these questions gave rise to more diversity of opinion among the judges than did those arising under the commerce clause. In most of the important cases there was dissent, and several were decided by a vote of five to four. Chief Justice White, and Justices Van Devanter and McReynolds were opposed to the Oregon ten-hour law, the Washington compensation law and the Washington employment agency law; while Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Clarke were in favor of all three. On certain crucial questions these six justices seem quite likely to counteract each other, and leave the balance of power with Justices McKenna, Day and Pitney. Justices Pitney and Day were in favor of the ten-hour law and the compensation law and opposed to the employment agency law. Mr. Justice McKenna was in favor of the ten-hour law and the employment agency law and opposed to the compensation law. In the Oregon Minimum Wage Case, the court was divided four to four, Mr. Justice Brandeis not sitting.

The labor member of the Belgian ministry, M. van der Velde, has drawn a parallel between the Assyrian methods of deportation and those practiced by the Germans. An orientalist has developed this theme with chapter and verse citation. Whatever our sympathies in this present world catastrophe and however close we find the analogy, the episode has undoubtedly excited a certain amount of curiosity as to the methods used by the Assyrians in the government of their dependencies. To the more scientific student there must be great interest in a system which furnished the model to the Persians, to the Hellenistic rulers, to the Romans, and so to the modern systems of provincial government.

As in so many other phases of their civilization, the Assyrians built upon Babylonian foundations, and, as in so many other cases, the Assyrians profoundly modified what they took over. In truth, the Babylonian foundation was comparatively slight. At the beginning of Babylonian history we have the completely independent city state. As one conquered the other, there was no attempt at incorporation, and the patesi, who as vice regent of god on earth ruled the dependent state, was permitted complete autonomy, subject only to the payment of a small tribute and to certain acts which acknowledged foreign suzerainty.

The purpose of this paper is to make plain two facts: first, that the essential qualities of American federal organization were largely the product of the practices of the old British empire as it existed before 1764; second, that the discussions of the generation from the French and Indian war to the adoption of the federal Constitution, and, more particularly, the discussions in the ten or twelve years before independence, were over the problem of imperial organization. The center of this problem was the difficulty of recognizing federalism; and, though there was great difficulty in grasping the principle, the idea of federalism went over from the old empire, through discussion into the Constitution of the United States. By federalism is meant, of course, that system of political order in which powers of government are separated and distinguished and in which these powers are distributed among governments, each government having its quota of authority and each its distinct sphere of activity.

We all remember very well that, until about thirty years ago, it was common to think of the United States Constitution as if it were “stricken off in a given time by the brain and purpose of man.” About that time there began a careful study of the background of constitutional provisions and especially of the specific make-up of the institutions provided for by the instrument.

In addressing the court in due-process cases one should not commence with the usual salutation “May it please the Court.” Instead, one should say “My Lords.” Backed by and charged with the enforcement of the due-process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, the Supreme Court of the United States is the American substitute for the British house of lords. It constitutes the real and only conservative second chamber of the federal government. It is a second conservative chamber for each of the state governments.

The time has come when the political scientists of the country should recognize, in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court under the due-process clause, the functioning of a second chamber, organized to defeat the popular will as expressed in legislation when that will appears to endanger what the court may regard as a fundamental requirement of the social structure itself.

Like all conservative second chambers, the Supreme Court and the due-process clause are in a hopeless dilemma. If the popular will were frustrated as often as the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice McReynolds indicate that it should be, the second chamber function of the court would be assailed by the recall of judicial decisions. If the court bowed to the popular will as often as the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Holmes indicate that it should, the second chamber function of the court would cease to be exercised.